Publishedby StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany ©1985StateUniversityofNewYork Allrightsreserved PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproduced inanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermission exceptinthecaseofbriefquotationsembodiedin criticalarticlesandreviews. Forinformation,addressStateUniversityofNewYork Press,StateUniversityPlaza,Albany,N.Y., 12246 LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Mainentryundertitle: BetweenKantand Hegel. (SUNYseriesinHegelianstudies) Bibliography:p. 1.Philosophy,Modern-18thcentury-Addresses,essays, lectures. 2.Philosophy,Modern-19thcentury- Addresses, essays,lectures. 3.Philosophy,German-18thcentury Addresses,essays,lectures. 4. Philosophy,German-19th century- Addresses,essays,lectures. I. DiGiovanni, George, 1935- II. Harris, H.S.(HenrySilton), 1926- Ill.Series. B2741,B485 1985 142'.3 84-16252 ISBN0-87395-984-1 ISBN0-87395-983-3(pbk.) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 PREFACE This volume was born in what was at first only a strategic decision to combine two mutually compatible (but more limited) projects. On the one hand, there was a desire to fill one of the most important lacunae in the philosophical tradition as it exists for English speaking readers, by providing an anthology from the crucial generation of Germanthinkers betweenKant andHegel; onthe otherhand, adesire to make available the few important essays from the Critical Journal of Schelling and Hegel that were still untranslated. But there was hardly enough material in this second project to make a proper book by itself. The problem with the first project, on the other hand, was to reduce it to the dimensions of a single volume appropriately. Coalescing the two projects resolved both problems at once. The first offered the larger material context required by the second, while the focus provided by the CriticalJournal supplied the first with the limit that it needed. The resulting volume, however, has an organic unity that the original purely strategic decision could not have provided by itself. The remarkable coherence of the philosophical experience documented by the texts in this volume is something which the translators came to appreciate only in the process ofworking on them. It is the lesson that we learned. Kant's critical philosophy was determined by three factors. There was, first, the desire to establish philosophy on a sound scientificbasis; second, the awareness ofthe limitations ofhuman reason; and third, the belief that a science of philosophy could be established all the same, in spite of these limitations, using the 'subject' as principle. Now, in the first period ofthe reception ofcritical philosophy, which is documented in the first part ofthis volume, the tone was setby K. L. Reinhold. Reinhold was a product of the Erllightenment, and his almost instantaneous success in making the Critique popular among his contemporaries was due to a large extent to his ability to re"'state it in term.s drawn from the Enlightenment tradition which they could all understand. The universally accepted assumption was that philosophy mustbe based on the 'factsofconsciousness'. Dissensions arose only in respect to the nature of these supposed facts, or the viii di Giovanni and Harris possibility ofever establishing the truth about them with any degree of certainty. As Reinhold now re...interpreted the Critique, the latter had uncovered a new and infallible source of'original facts' that could resolve all past philosophical dissensions, and finally set philosophy on a scientific, systematic basis. Reinhold's interpretation, in other words, stressed the first and third element of critical philosophy to the prejudice of the second. Of course Reinhold paid abundant lip service to Kant's pronouncements about the limitations of human reason. But in fact there was in him not the least trace of the new 'critical skepticism', or the belief that reason is at odds with itself precisely qua reason, that animated the Critique. In this respect Reinhold's interpretation was a very conservative one. It forced critical philosophybackinto theconceptualstraight...jacketoftheEnlightenment. How much it was still vulnerable, when viewed in this way, to the attacks of the skepticism of the Enlightenment type was amply demonstrated by the Aenesidemus of Schulze. The appearance ofthe Aenesidemus precipitated Fichte's statement of his version of critical philosophy. Fichte, and also Schelling soon after, contributed a new and much more romantic note to the debate surrounding the Critique. They also provided anew definition of'fact of consciousness', and re...stated the problem of the relationship that Kant had assumed between 'appearances' aIld 'thing...in...itself in strictly subjective terms, as a relationship between the 'conscious' and the 'unconscious'. The latter move was one which Reinhold had already anticipated; but it remained for Fichte and Schelling to exploit it in full. Yet, for all their differences from Reinhold, the interpretation of criticalphilosophygivenby Fichte and Schellingwas nolessconservative than his. It was still based on the beliefthat we can escape from the limits of conceptualization, and ground the edifice of philosophical reason on some sort ofimmediate infallible 'fact'. Although they were now parading it in a more dynamicform, dressed up in the execrable language of the Absolute, Fichte and Schelling were still bound to the intuitionism of classical philosophy. The originality of Hegel's interpretation of critical philosophy can only be appreciated when this is recognized. Hegel was the first to take seriously the skeptical aspect ofthe Critique, which was after all its most revolutionary one. He understood that reason is antinomic by nature. It has to enter into conflict with itself, since it is capable of reflecting upon its concepts, and hence is constantly creating adistance between itself and itself. On the other hand, by the very fact that reason recognized its inner discord, it has already overcome it. It knows how to contain it. This, ifany, is the fundamental 'fact' ofconsciousness on which philosophy has to capitalize in order to establish itself as genuine science. To take this as the starting point of philosophy, ----------------------- Preface ix however, as Hegel eventually did, was to reverse the whole thrust of the previous interpretations of critical philosophy. It was to commit philosophy to the circle of conceptualization, whereas all previous philosophy had tried to transcend it. The task ofphilosophywas now to abide by the conflictsofreasoninorderto deepen their significance, and ultimately turn them into constructive means ofthe life ofspirit. Kanthadofcourse implicidy defined aprogramme ofthis sort. Criticism was for him a way ofliving at the very limitofthought, by recognizing that limit and ensuring that it is never transcended. But Kant still hankered after a supposed intellectual intuition that would have removed the limit-as if the labour of the concept could yield only the second best truth, or the only truthfor us. The difference in Hegel is th.at for him that labour is all that there is, and to try to escape it through some mystical intuition only leads to nihilism. This position of Hegel is only to be found fully elaborated in the Phenomenology and in the Logic. It is not to be found in the essays from the CriticalJournal translated in the second part ofthis volume. Yet these essays are significant, because they show Hegel precisely as he is reflecting on the nature of skepticism, both new and old. The break from Schelling's intuitionism was still to come, but the reconstruction of the history of skepticism that Hegel was now attempting provided the falling stone that eventually precipitated the latter developments, as the actual facts show. For even now Hegel perceived that the truth of skepticism (of ancient skepticism at least, for Hegel put no more store by the skepticism of the Enlightenment type than he did by Reinhold) is that there is no criterionby which to distinguish between true appearance and false. At this time Hegel could just as well use his insight to justify the kind of negative logic with which he routinely prefaced his lectures on metaphysics. The function of this logic was to unmask the contradiction inherent in any conceptual construct, and thereby clear the way for the intuition on which the metaphysics supposedly depended. ButHegel only had torealize thatthe soughtfor criterionlies preciselyinthe debatebetween one philosophical position and another, between skepticism and dogmatism, and ultimately between philosophy and unphilosophy, in order to make that supposed intuition superfluous. The texts in the second part of this volume document some of Hegel's earliest public reflections on critical philosophy, and on the debate surrounding it. They herald his eventual shift ofconcern away from the 'content' ofphilosophicaldebate to the 'debate' itself. Together with the texts in the first part they represent one aspect of the story of the events that run from Kant to Hegel. The whole story, as we see it, consistsinHegel'sreturn to aKantfreed from hisEnlightenment encumbrances, after Hegel's break from Schelling's intuitionism has x di Giovanni and Harris allowed him to shake off those encumbrances himself. Neither the texts, nor the two introductory essays (either singly or together) give the full story, of course. They only hint at it; we only hope that the hint is more than just a vague gesture. In another respect too the present volume is limited. The focus provided for itby the CriticalJournal has resulted in abias that should not be overlooked or minimized. What happened in Germany in the twenty,five years following the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) is far more complex than this selection of texts can reveal; there are importantfigures and groups who are here omitted, and in some instances what is included can hardly provide an adequate sample of the author's range and significance. There is scope left for at least another volume of texts that would reflect the moral side of the debate represented here. At any rate, the present volume ought to be read in conjunction with the translations by Cerf and Harris, PeterHeath, and FritzMarti, ofotherearly textsfrom Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The complete absence in thisvolume ofF.H.Jacobi is to be regretted. But the reader will soon realize that repetitive long,windedness is a common fault in this generation of writers; andJacobi suffered from it more than most of them (as Hegel's summaries and citations in Faith and Knowledge rather cruelly underline). Jacobi was an influential thinker-not least upon Coleridge. But his first appearance in English dress must wait upon another occasion. Exceptin the case ofone previously published essay, we have each gone over the other's work carefully; but only the Schelling essay is a collaborative effort in the full sense. There the first draft and the final revision of the text is by di Giovanni; but a second draft was made, and finally the footnotes were added by Harris. Elsewhere we have operated more independently, and each of us bears the final responsibility for his own decisions. Because of this independence some variations in terminology will be observed; but we hardly feel that this calls for apology, since even one translator working alone could not maintain terminological uniformity in rendering such.a varied group ofwriters (atleastnotwithout awkward artificialities, and perhaps not without serious distortions). We should mention, on the other hand, three instances in which we deliberately chose to be consistent. The distinction between wissen and erkennen (and their derivatives) is in German to a large extent idiomatic. Butin Hegel it assumes philosophical significance, and for this reason we decided to retain it in English as far as possible by translating the two terms with 'knowledge' and 'cognition' (and their derivatives) respectively. But 'cognition' and 'cognizing' can be terribly artificial in English; so, in the other (non...Hegelian) texts we have Preface xi been prepared to shift back to 'knowledge' and 'knowing' whenever the awkwardness became unbearable, provided that there was no obvious advantage in abiding by the convention. (This happened especially in the excerpts from Aenesidemus and from Beck). The same applies to Verhaltnis and Beziehung. In this case too the distinction acquires a technical meaning in Hegel, and we have tried to preserve itby translating Verhaltnis as 'relation' and Beziehung(apartfrom rare and unimportant exceptions) as 'connection' or 'reference'. In any event, 'relation' as itis being used in English nowadays is too broad a term for Beziehung; the epistemological bias of our texts requires a narrower concept such as 'connection' or 'reference'. The translation of ich also presented a problem. '1' can be awkward. 'Self, which is the translation adopted by Heath and Lachs, does notreally translate ich. Moreover, it carries psychological connotations that are completely outofplace incertaincontexts (notablyin Fichte). The term isobviously a technical one which our authors use with meanings that vary considerably and since in English the natural way of rendering philosophical technical terms is Latin, we finally opted for ego. This translation also has the advantage of reminding the reader of the Cartesian background of the German philosophical ich. All the internalreferences to the texts translated in thisvolume are by the pagination of the original text (which is printed in the margin of our text). It remains for us to make due acknowledgements. We shall do this under separate initials below. To all those mentioned, and to the others, some ofwhom we may notremember, we wish to express our heartfelt thanks. George di Giovanni H.S. Harris McGill University YorkUniversity Montreal Toronto I wish to thank McGill University for a research grant that helped defray some of the expenses incurred in the work of translation and in the preparation ofthe final manuscript; my colleagues in the German J. Department, Profs. H. Richter and Schmidt, who answered innumerable questions about German usage; Dr. Manfred Kuehn, who helped track down some very obscure references; Mrs. Laurie McRobert, who read and commented on an early draft of the Beck Itext; and Dr. Laura Zagolin, who did the same for the other texts for IwhichI amresponsible. MostofallI wishto thankmy collaboratorin this project, H.S. Harris, who went over all my texts with a fine xii di Giovanni and Harris toothcomb, detected many inaccuracies and made innumerable stylistic suggestions. If Reinhold, Schulze, Fichte, Maimon and Beck have as good acommand ofcolloquialEnglish as they show in this volume, it is due to a large extent to him. I am responsible of course for any mistake. G. di G. The editing and preparation of the final manuscript of the Critical Journal essays was supported by two research grants from Glendon College (York University) for which I am very grateful. Most of this final editorial work was done by Anne Harris (who also helped in lots of other ways). The «Introduction for the Critical Journal» and the «Scepticism» essay were typed by Ruth Koski Harris; «Scepticism, Dogmatism and Speculation» and the «Krug» essay were typed first by Ida Sabag and again by Anne Harris. Stephen Boos helped with the Bibliography. To all of them, my thanks. For the text of the essays from the Critical Journal I have used the reprint published in 1957 (Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, Hildesheim). But Ihave also consulted both the critical edition, edited by H. Buchner and O. Poggeler (Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV, Hamburg: Meiner, 1968) and the French translation of the «Intro.. duction» and the «Skepticism» essay by B. Fauquet (Paris: Vrin, 1972). From these two sources I derived much of the information in the footnotes; and the pioneer work ofFauquet was an immense help in the making of the English version. (I wish that I had discovered N. Merker's Italian translation .. Bari, Laterza, 1970-sooner. He was the real pioneer, but I did not know it). The translation of the «Introduction» for the Critical Journal was first published in the Independent Journal of Philosophy, III (1979). It appears here bykind permissionofthe editor, Dr. George ElliotTucker. Dr. Tucker deserves my thanks also for his careful examination of the translation at the time ofitsfirst appearance. Many ofhis helpful suggestions were adopted then and are preserved now. To George di Giovanni lowe a debt of a different kind. It is true that he went over my other contributions in the way that Dr. Tucker wentover the "Essence ofPhilosophical Criticism"; and Iam grateful for that. But the insights Ihave gained from his own contributions to this volume (and from our discussions about it) into whatHegel called the "revolution" to be expected from the perfecting of the Kantian system are much more important. Ihave written about that"revolution" for years without any proper grasp of its context. I trust that I am only the first ofmany readers to owe this debt to George; and Iwould Preface xiii wish their gratitude to be directed to the right address-as mine is. George being on sabbatical leave in Belgium at the time, the task ofcorrecting proofs and preparing the indexfell to my lot(whichwas only fair since he did most of the work in the earlier preparation of the manuscript). I have received valuable assistance in both tasks from Carol and Anne Harris and from Pierre Bruneau and James Devin. The index was typed by Ruth Koski Harris. I am very grateful to all of them. H. S. H. PART I The Critical Philosophy and its First Reception The Facts of Consciousness George di Giovanni