Believing by faith This page intentionally left blank Believing by faith An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief John Bishop CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD 1 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxfordox26dp OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwidein Oxford NewYork Auckland CapeTown DaresSalaam HongKong Karachi KualaLumpur Madrid Melbourne MexicoCity Nairobi NewDelhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto Withofficesin Argentina Austria Brazil Chile CzechRepublic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore SouthKorea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPress intheUKandincertainothercountries PublishedintheUnitedStates byOxfordUniversityPressInc.,NewYork JohnBishop2007 Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted DatabaserightOxfordUniversityPress(maker) Firstpublished2007 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced, storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans, withoutthepriorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress, orasexpresslypermittedbylaw,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriate reprographicsrightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproduction outsidethescopeoftheaboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment, OxfordUniversityPress,attheaddressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisbookinanyotherbindingorcover andyoumustimposethesameconditiononanyacquirer BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Dataavailable TypesetbyLaserwordsPrivateLimited,Chennai,India PrintedinGreatBritain onacid-freepaperby BiddlesLtd.,King’sLynn,Norfolk ISBN978–0–19–920554–7 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Preface ix Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1 Themetaquestion:whatistheissueaboutthe‘justifiability’of religiousbelief? 4 Faith-beliefs 6 Overviewoftheargument 8 Glossaryofspecialterms 18 2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26 Astandardview:theconcernisforepistemicjustifiability 26 Theproblemofdoxasticcontrol 28 Theimpossibilityofbelievingatwill 29 Indirectcontroloverbeliefs 30 ‘Holdingtrue’and‘takingtobetrue’ 33 Asecond—direct—locusofdoxasticcontrol 35 Moraldoxasticresponsibilities 41 Themoralsignificanceoffaith-beliefs 47 Linkingmoraltoepistemicjustifiability:reinstatingthestandard view? 48 3 The epistemic justifiability of faith-beliefs: an ambiguity thesis 53 Plausibilityofrequiringepistemicformoraljustifiabilityundera realistinterpretationoffaith-beliefs 53 Interpretingthelinkprinciple:epistemicentitlementasrequiring evidentialjustification 55 Evidentialistrequirementsspecifiedbyanimplicitevidentialpractice 65 Rationalempiricistevidentialpractice 66 Applyingrationalempiricistevidentialpracticetotheistic faith-beliefs:anambiguitythesis 68 vi contents 4 Responses to evidential ambiguity: isolationist and Reformed epistemologies 77 Twostrategiesfordefendingthemoralprobityoftheisticfaith-belief inthefaceofevidentialambiguity 78 Appealingtoaspecialtheisticevidentialpractice/improved epistemologies 79 Anisolationistepistemology 79 Reformedepistemology 86 Conclusion:theneedforafideistresponsetoambiguity 99 5 Faith as doxastic venture 101 Agendaforadefenceofdoxasticventure 102 Thenatureoftheisticfaith 103 Thedoxasticventuremodel 106 Thepsychologicalpossibilityofdoxasticventure 111 AJamesianaccount 112 ‘Passionally’causedbeliefs 113 6 Believing by faith: a Jamesian position 122 AninitialhypothesisforaJamesianthesisonpermissibledoxastic venture 123 Thenotionofa‘genuineoption’ 125 A‘degreesofbelief’challenge 128 Evidentiallyundecidableforcedoptions 129 Permissibledoxasticventure:supra-notcounter-evidential 135 Howtheisticreligioncouldpresentessentiallyevidentially undecidablegenuineoptions:thenotionofahighest-orderframing principle 137 Restrictingthesis(J)tofaith-propositions:thesis(J) 145 i 7 Integrationist values: limiting permissible doxastic venture 151 Cancounter-evidentialfideismbenon-arbitrarilyexcluded? 151 Acoherencerequirementandintegrationistvalues 155 Moralintegrationoffaith-commitments 163 Implicationsforreflectivefaith-believers 167 Coda:AreflectiononAbrahamasforebearinfaith 170 contents vii 8 Argumentsfor supra-evidential fideism 174 Theimportanceofdefendingtheepistemicpermissibilityof faith-ventures 176 Strategiesforsupportingfideism 178 An‘assimilationtopersonalrelationscases’strategy:experimental venturesininterpersonaltrust 180 The‘assimilationtopersonalrelationscases’strategy:caseswhere ‘faithinafactcanhelpcreateafact’ 182 Aconsequentialiststrategy 185 AnoteonPascal’sWager 187 Thetuquoquestrategy 189 Ishard-lineevidentialismself-undermining? 190 Attitudestopassionaldoxasticinclinations 194 Epistemologicalexternalismagain:apresumptioninfavourof fideism? 196 Scepticismaboutpassionaldoxasticinclinationsasguidestotruth: howpassionsmaybeschooled 197 Thesignificanceofscientifictheoriesofpassionalmotivationsfor faith-commitment 204 Animpasse? 206 9 A moral preference for modest fideism? 208 Implicationsofaccepting(J+)fororthodoxandrevisionarytheistic faith-ventures 209 Theapparentfideist/evidentialistimpasseanditsimplications 211 Beyondimpasse?Directmoralevaluationofthefideist/evidentialist debate 215 Self-acceptanceandauthenticity 216 Hard-lineevidentialismasgroundedindoctrinairenaturalism 220 Coherenceamongstmoralandreligiouspassionalcommitments 225 Conclusion 227 Bibliography 230 Index 237 This page intentionally left blank Preface This is not the book I originally intended to write. My initial motive was to write on alternative concepts of God—alternative, that is, to the prevailingclassicaltheisticconceptofGodasthesupernatural,omnipotent, omniscient,omnibenevolentCreatorexnihilo(whomIhavethesomewhat irreverent habit of referring to as the ‘omniGod’). People have too readily assumed that rejecting belief in omniGod excludes any kind of continuing theistic commitment. Yet believers could reject classical theism as an inadequate theory of the nature of God as revealed in the theistic religious traditions while still maintaining their faith: one should not, after all, confuse God’s reality ‘in itself’ with a theory of the nature of God’s reality. To continue to believe in God while an ‘omniGod atheist’ will, however, be an intellectually respectable position only if one has some idea of a viable alternative theory of God’s nature. And it was my intention to explore further the possibility of concepts of God that were both clearly distinct from the classical theistic conception and religiously adequate for (at least some form of) theistic religious tradition. I thus set out to write a book inquiring into the question whether it could be justifiable to believe in God according to some alternative concept, expanding on a discussion already published (‘Can There Be Alternative Concepts of God?’ Nouˆs, 32 (1998): 174–88). I found, however, that I lacked a clear enough understanding of what it would be for any theistic commitment—revisionary or classical—to be ‘justifiable’. My attempts to getthis question out of the way in ashort preliminary chapter increasingly became both long-winded and unsatisfying. The present book is the result of my desire to do the best I can to deal with this dissatisfaction. Not, of course, that I am now fully satisfied! I have, however, come to a settled view on the following key points. First, philosophers of religion have not fully appreciated a significant distinction betweenthebelief-state ofholding aproposition tobetrueand the action of taking it to be true in (practical) reasoning. The evaluation of the justifiability of religious beliefs should not therefore be confined to