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CONTRACT NUMBER eapon of Denial. Air Power and the Battle for New guinea 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air Force Historical Studies Office,AF/HO,1190 Air Force REPORT NUMBER Pentagon,Washington,DC,20330-1190 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 34 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Weapon of Denial Air Power and the Battle for New Guinea Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of Pacific forces in World War 11, viewed the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as a disaster for the Japanese and a triumph for the Allies. In that great air-sea confrontation, U.S. and Australian air for- ces proved that air power could be decisive in preventing the resupply of ground troops by sea. Months of torturous war- fare in the jungles of New Guinea had left Japanese troops vulnerable to disease and starvation. In the end, Allied air- men were able to break Japan’s grip on New Guinea and end its threat to Australia through the innovative and aggressive use of air power. MacArthur’s strength lay in a dedicated and courageous band of airmen who could attack enemy ships from all directions at any time. The Japanese Onslaught The infamous attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan marked the beginning of a protracted and grueling war in the Pacific. Having dealt a stunning blow to the U.S. Pacific Fleet on De- cember 7, 1941, Japan moved quickly to seize the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and establish a large defensive pe- rimeter of islands between itself and Hawaii. Seemingly un- stoppable at first, it had by late December gained a foothold in the Philippines. During the first three months of 1943, Japanese naval and ground units increased their attacks, consolidated their gains, and moved deeper into the south- west Pacific. New Guinea was their next target. From there, Imperial Forces planned to expand throughout the area, perhaps into Australia itself. By April 1, 1942, they had landed virtually unopposed at various sites from the northwest to Hollandia and down into the southeast. Their arrival spelled the begin- ning of the long and difficult New Guinea campaign, which lasted until July 1944. Eventually, they were repulsed in their advance toward Port Moresby on the southwest coast of the Papuan peninsula by Allied ground forces and pushed back to the island’s east coast. The turning point came in March 1943, when U.S. and Australian airmen won a decisive victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, shattering the enemy’s ability to resupply its beleaguered New Guinea garrisons and setting the stage for the ultimate Allied victory that followed. Girding for Battle By the end of March 1942, Japanese forces had pro- gressed into the Papuan peninsula and as far as the Solomon Islands, moving swiftly from Bougainville southeastward, where on April 30 they began their occupation of Tulagi. Countering this juggernaut, on March 31 U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the Southwest Pacific Area sent the 8th Bombardment Squadron to assist the small Australian garri- son at Port Moresby with some Douglas A-24 dive bombers, the Army’s version of the Navy’s famed SBD Dauntless, which would soon be victorious in the Battle of Midway. A 1 PACIFIC AREA NaWM iles Marshall Is . . I. I * Caroline Is ob a * . New Cale month later, the 8th Fighter Group arrived, equipped with new Bell P-39 and P-400 Airacobra fighters-the latter ex- port models of P-39s intended for use by the Royal Air Force (RAF). The fighters made their first attacks against Japa- nese forces 200 miles north of Port Moresby at two sites 19 miles apart on the western shore of the Huon Gulf-Lae, a major enemy supply base, and Salamaua-on April 30. On May 15 Port Moresby-bound Australian reinforcements were dispatched. Strike and Counter-Strike On May 18 Japanese Imperial Headquarters directed the Combined Fleet to occupy Port Moresby and seize Allied bases throughout the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. Control of the Coral Sea and its shores-the gateway to Australia-would open virtually all of the central and south Pacific to conquest. Elements of the Japanese Fourth Fleet had begun this effort, known as Operation Mo, on May 4 by embarking the Army’s South Seas Detachment from their stronghold at Rabaul on New Britain, the largest island in the Bismarck Archipelago, to Port Moresby. Mean- while, Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher had learned of the Japanese occupation of Tulagi and headed there immedi- ately, taking Task Force 17, built around the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown. On May 4 the force launched fighters, dive- bombers, and torpedo bombers-forty right before dawn, thirty-eight later in the morning, and twenty-one in the af- ternoon-against enemy ships in the area. TF 17 quickly withdrew after sinking a destroyer, a merchant ship, four landing barges, and six seaplanes. Although the nadir of Allied fortunes in the Pacific oc- curred just two days later with the surrender of Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright and his forces in the Philippines, the war for both sides was about to change. The Japanese inva- sion fleet, spearheaded by the light carrier Shoho and two Pearl Harbor veterans, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, continued to sail south into the Coral Sea, intent on capturing Port Moresby. On the morning of May 6, B-17 Flying Fortresses from the 19th Bombardment Group discovered the Shoho 3 sixty miles south of Bougainville and the rest of the invasion force later that day. Pursuing the enemy fleet, Admiral Fletcher’s Task Force 17 joined Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch’s Task Force 11, built around the carrier USS Lexington, and British Rear Adm. J. G. Crace’s support group of cruisers and destroyers. TF 11 was absorbed into TF 17 to form TF 17.5, while the support group was redesignated TF 17.3. The entire force immedi- ately steamed northwest toward New Guinea and the Japa- nese Fourth Fleet. Coral Sea through Milne Bay That night, the two opponents prepared for combat, which erupted on May 7, 1942, in the first naval battle ever fought strictly by carrier-based aircraft. When the Battle of the Coral Sea was over, the Allies had turned back the sea- borne invasion of Port Moresby, sunk the Shoho, and seri- ously damaged the Shokaku and the Zuikaku. Of critical importance to the Allies, neither of the two surviving Japa- nese carriers would be available in time for the coming Battle of Midway, the turning point of the Pacific War less than a month later, and although the Lexington was lost, the heav- ily damaged Yorktown was repaired in time to participate. The Battle of the Coral Sea saved the vital Allied stronghold of Australia and also ended the enemy’s attempt to conquer Port Moresby by strictly amphibious operations. In mid-May, Imperial Japanese Headquarters estab- lished the Seventeenth Army under the command of Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake. Operating with the Imperial Navy’s Second Fleet and First Air Fleet, the Seventeenth Army’s mission was the same as the original South Seas Detach- ment’s-to capture Port Moresby, New Caledonia, Samoa, and Fiji. This time the Japanese ground force was signifi- cantly larger, comprising nine infantry battalions including the South Seas Detachment. Maj. Gen. Tomitoro Horii would lead his troops overland along the Kokoda Trail to Port Moresby, a difficult route which required their traversal of the towering Owen Stanley Mountains. General Horii and his force moved out of Gona, a Papuan peninsular coastal settlement on Holnicote Bay, on July 21. By August 12 they 4 had pushed into the mountains and taken a key pass, behav- ing as brutally along the way as their comrades in China. In a particularly ghastly incident on August 13, the Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force rounded up and beheaded every man, woman, and child in the village of Buna, just south southeast of Gona. When they reached their last victim, a sixteen-year-old girl, they bungled horribly, inflicting griev- ous wounds instead of immediate death, and had to finish their crime by holding her down as she struggled and screamed to the end. To support their drive against Port Moresby, the Japa- nese set out to seize Milne Bay, at the southeast tip of the Papuan peninsula in late August, planning to land troops at Rabi on its north shore and then capture a new Allied airfield being constructed nearby. General Horii and 11,000 rein- forcements had set out along the Kokoda Trail on August 22. Five days later Japanese amphibious forces from New Ire- land, in the Bismarck Archipelago, and Buna headed for Milne Bay. At the same time, the Australians had assembled six battalions of infantry along with the 46th U.S. Engineers, the 709th U.S. Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battery, two squad- rons of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Curtiss P-40 Kit- tyhawks, and a detachment of RAAF Lockheed Hudson twin-engine reconnaissance aircraft. The Allies at Milne Bay numbered 9,500 men in all. Perhaps because the bay was often shrouded by rain and mist, they were hidden from the enemy. Worse for the Japanese, RAAF forces were com- manded by a remarkably creative and tenacious officer, Group Capt. William H. “Bull” Garing, and would, under his leadership, be victorious in the coming battle there. The Japanese were shocked by their eventual discovery of this mighty Allied assemblage and driven to precipitous and intemperate action. Rather than wait for the Aoba De- tachment, still in the Philippines, they proceeded with troops immediately at hand. The Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force (612 men), a portion of the murderous Sasebo 5th Spe- cial Naval Landing Force (197 men), and the 16th Naval Pio- neer Unit (362 men) totaled 1,171 troops. This force sailed for Rabi on August 24 aboard two transports. In addition, 353 men of the Sasebo force, fresh from their atrocities at Buna, followed on board seven large motorized barges. 5 CORAL SEA EASTERN NEW GUINEA AND BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 0 20 40 60 80 100 # # # # I Nautical Miles Guadalcanal