BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 "Baltic Defence Review" H.E. Lennart Meri President of the Republic of Estonia on the opening of the Baltic Defence College Security is precious and there is never too much of it. And small countries, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are often uncertain in their attitudes towards their own security. Vociferous self- confidence is only too often accompanied by an arrogant shrug. This attitude is based on an illusion that there would be no point for a small country in spending its scanty resources on self-defence. Or on the blind conviction that, if necessary, security will be provided by friendly partner states. Few are aware that Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's attitude towards their security will determine whether our countries are to endure or not, determine the future of our children, our mother tongue, our culture and our home country. These things depend directly on our ability to reckon with the security structures of Europe and the world, and on our ability and will to contribute to these structures. Security is indivisible wealth and must be cultivated in the spirit of close regional concord. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have the task to ensure, to the best of their ability, the security of the Baltic region, which is a necessary precondition to stability in Europe. Such future can be shaped in co- operation with our neighbours, provided that we have the will to do it. Everything begins with will. We are able and willing to choose ourselves, which international security systems to rely on. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have expressly stated their wish to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. We are willing to take on voluntary obligations for achieving this goal. And this is what we are doing. It is true that the task is difficult, even more so because unlike Poland or Hungary, all three Baltic States had to start from below the zero point: the occupation powers had destroyed our defence forces, and for many years, army and military service meant the distorted and ideologised military political machinery serving the purposes of the Soviet empire. Today, our toilsome development has yielded the first results in the international co-operation in peace securing operations. The Baltic Defence College, starting to work before our eyes, and the joint military magazine "Baltic Defence Review", starting publication now, are examples of our will of defence. With these steps, we help to secure our national sovereignty and regional stability, and make our contribution to the strengthening of global security. I wish to underline the help of our Partner States in setting this new school in motion, and to express our sincere gratitude to the first Rector, Danish General Michael Clemmesen. Also, I wish that the whole school, both the students and the professors, would remember that the future students of this school will follow in your footsteps. Be aware of their keen eyes regarding you, of your responsibility to the future! - 1 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 Michael H. Clemmesen Brigadier General Commandant of the Baltic Defence College The Baltic Defence Review will be published bi-annually during its first years. It will be housed in the Baltic Defence College. However, it is not the intent to limit its focus to that of a house journal. The review is created as a forum for debate on Baltic Region security and defence. We hope that the actual and potential participants in that debate will use it as such. This first number will address three questions. The first one is the fundamental one: Can the Baltic States be Defended? The authors behind the three articles in the first section, Robert Dalsjö, Hain Rebas, and Kjeld Hillingsö, approach the issue in very different ways. The second part let representatives of the Baltic States’ defence establishment, Giedre Statkeviciute, Gundars Abols, and Ants Laaneots, describe how far their countries have taken their national defence forces after independence and outline how they have planned to develop their defence structures within the next decade. The final section describes or analyses the steps taken to bring the region closer to NATO by the participation in international co-operation and by increasing the level of interoperability. Linas Linkevicius narrates why and how Lithuania got involved in peace support operations. The articles of Vello Loemaa, Andrius Krivas, and I myself analyse the problems and progress of interoperability. A normal issue of the Baltic Defence Review will besides covering different themes like this first issue, bring book reviews, translations of key articles or documents into English, and, when relevant, articles publishing the results of the work of students and staff at the Baltic Defence College. I thank all the contributors to this number, not least the main illustrator, my old friend, the great Lithuanian photographer and patriot, Tadas Dambrauskas. - 1 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 The Baltic Defence College: Strengthening Baltic Defence Structures through Education Dr Björn von Sydow, Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden It gives me great pleasure to contribute to this first issue of ”the Baltic Defence Review”, produced by the Baltic Defence College. Media and educational systems are both fundamental parts of a democratic and open society and they should therefore be given particular attention. Coming from academia myself, I fully appreciate the fundamental role that education and research play in every society and in every part of society. The city of Tartu, where the College will be located, has historic connotations in this respect. Here, in the year 1632, the second university to be established in the then Swedish Empire was inaugrated. Its first Chancellor was Johan Skytte, in Sweden most remembered for being the tutor of king Gustavus Adolphus and - at the University of Uppsala - our first professor ever of the independent subject Political Science. In a time long before democracy as we know it was developed, he was a progressive person; in his opening speech at the university, he advocated circulation between the estates, as the social strata were named. He believed that not only noblemen, but also peasants should be welcomed at the university. I expect that the Baltic Defence College will also stand for openness and free meetings of minds in its education, based on the democratic values of our time. In this article, I will focus on two issues; the support to the build up of defence structures in the Baltic states, and the role of our common project, the Baltic Defence College. The strategic environment The security situation of the Baltic Sea region is in historic terms a favourable one. I need not recall all the changes for the better during the last decade, the regained independence of the Baltic states being one of the most important. Some risks and challenges remain, indeed, some new ones have arisen, but the present situation is focused on security-building and institutionalization of the gains we have achieved. In the defence field, one of the most powerful tools in our hands is the Partnership for Peace-process (PfP). The process has two dimensions. It includes most European countries and the United States and Canada in cooperation that is in itself confidence-building. There will be no stable security system if there are new dividing lines. The participation of Russia is needed and, not least in the Baltic Sea region, also the presence and involvement of the United States and other western nations. And, secondly, PfP enhances interoperability so that we are all better prepared for participation in common crisis management operations. When Sweden took the chair of the project creating a common Baltic Defence College, it was without hesitation. A modern defence under civilian democratic control and with popular support contributes to democratic society. In the world in which we live, societies need to feel reasonably safe to be able to develop in a harmonic way. Self-defence is a right and obligation of each independent nation (see, for instance, the UN Charter articles 43 and 51). I believe that the Nordic countries have experience to share with the Baltic states in the defence field. This is based on, among other things, our similar sizes as nations, similar terrain and similar - 1 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 climate. The Nordic countries have over time developed so called ”total defence” systems. They encompass not only military defence units, but all resources our societies can bring together to defend our nations on the whole scale from crisis to full-scale war. Conversely, these resources can be used to counter peace time strains on society, i.e. during severe accidents, fires etc. The concept of total defence Total defence systems along the Nordic model saves money; dual civil-military use should always be considered as it not only reduces expenditures and the need for investments, but contributes to a civilian society more robust and able to withstand strains and crises of different kinds, also in peace time. Rescue services, medical services and telecommunications could be cases in point in this respect. Transportation is another example; why should the military sector procure all transport aircraft and lorries which they may need in a mobilized situation when many of those belonging to civilian society have will not be used during a war? In our experience, smaller countries facing potential existential threats need to pool all kinds of resources to create a credible deterrence. In our view, it would not be wise or economically reasonable - indeed not even possible - to attempt to create separate military structures for deterrence without the full prepardness and support of the civilian resources and society. I therefore find it very encouraging that the Baltic states and the supporting countries have agreed that the Baltic Defence College will be based on Nordic total defence concepts and Nordic military tactics. There are a number of preconditions for the development of total defence structures, for example; elaborated national defence strategies with popular support; Parliamentary endorsement of aims, plans and budgeting; identified roles and missions for all parts of the total defence system (not only the military parts), and the development of openness, transparency and ties between defence structures and the population, for example between military bases and the surrounding local communities. Defence is not a matter only for officers, but a challenge to society as a whole. If popular support is absent, that nation will fail to meet the challenge. National defence - international participation I have mentioned that in our part of the world, this decade is characterized by the building of security structures and common crisis management. It is the historic duty of all of us to participate. What the international community first and foremost requires in the defence field, however, is that we are capable of creating a stable situation for ourselves, i.e. developing a capability for national crisis management and self-defence. Having this, we already contribute positively to the security situation. It is only when, after the Cold War, the security situation became such that we as nations and individuals felt reasonably secure, that we were capable of re-directing our efforts towards common crisis management in a more effective manner. National efforts to build forces for international crisis management and humanitarian operations should, in my opinion, therefore be linked to national objectives identified in the national defence strategy. Different solutions can of course be found. I believe, though, that there should be a national context for the international crisis management capability a nation develops, so that it does not become a foreign object in the national defence system. The international crisis management capability should be developed as part of, and in harmony with, the defence system as a whole. - 2 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 In Sweden, every six months the responsibility for setting up our ”standing” UN battalion - based on conscripts - rotates between different Swedish units so that the task constitutes an integral part of our national defence. The experience from participation in international service is thus fed back and integrated into the whole of the defence system. The Baltic Defence College is a joint Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian school. This is a worthwhile end in itself. Despite many differences, there is much commonality in the respective situations and resources are scarce both on the Baltic side and on the side of the supporting nations. Attending educational institutions in other countries is an important additional experience, that is why most nations exchange students, but there exists a definitive need for a school that is based on the specific preconditions of this region. Sending students to other countries´ schools is also a quite expensive undertaking, especially over the longer term. Much can thus be saved and gained by a common project, as in other areas of defence cooperation, such as the Baltic Peace-keeping Battalion, the Baltic Naval Squadron and the Baltic Air Surveillance Network. Direction of defence cooperation In the context of the BALTSEA (Baltic Security Assistance) group of countries a common view has been developed on the direction of defence related support, based on the plans and priorities of the Baltic states themselves. We fully support the continuing work of this group to refine the coordination of defence support so that it is as efficient and effective as possible. In the long term, however, coordination of support can only be done in the ministries of the Baltic states themselves. To assist the development of the Baltic states´ own planning capabilities is therefore a strategic and central area in our support. The direction of defence-related support has also been discussed and confirmed at the Baltic- Nordic-American Defence Ministerial meeting in June 1998. From the Swedish point of view, we intend to pursue the direction we have understood to be the intention of the Baltic states. The direction of support from our part - as regards the military sector - is therefore: • capability for ”the Nordic conduct of warfare”, • priority to the quality of personnel and training (”quality of life”), • emphasis on mobilized, reserve based defence, • priority to land forces with anti-air and anti-armour capabilities, C4-enhancement and air defence (that is, land based surveillance systems and anti-air-systems), • integrated logistics considerations. Our common effort Crisis management and defence capabilites along these lines, chosen by the Baltic states themselves, will contribute to the enhancement of security in our region. It will be the task of the Baltic Defence College to build the basis for those defence structures under democratic, civilian control through well educated, open-minded students who will be the future leaders of the Baltic defence forces. Leadership will be a key subject. It will be a common effort by the Baltic states and the supporting countries; the College will have a truly multinational staff, the students will come not only from the Baltic states but also from supporting nations. Over time, the gradual take over of responsibilites by the Baltic states is the aim of the project and this will be a measure of its success. It will not be an easy task, but, I believe, a most inspiring one and together we will make it a success! - 3 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 Baltic Self-Defence Capabilities - Achievable and Necessary, or Futile Symbolism? Robert Dalsjö* When the status and security of the Baltic states is discussed, ”hard” security issues, including capabilities for self-defence, are often considered as sensitive or problematic. Nonetheless, these issues remain fundamental in the lives of nations, and they are pertinent regardless of whether the aim of NATO-membership is attainable in the longer term, or some other arrangement is found — short of re-inclusion into an exclusive Russian sphere of influence. A failure to address these issues properly, by the Baltics and by the West, could derail the entire process of Baltic integration into Western structures, with repercussions for the Euro-Atlantic security system as a whole.1 The political and military utility of Baltic self-defences It is often claimed that the geopolitical and military situation of the three Baltic States is such that military means cannot play any important role in their security policy — resistance would be futile should a Russian attack occur. A common corollary is that the purported indefensibility of the Baltics makes it useless and dangerous for the West to issue security guarantees in any form, “as nothing could be done except by nuclear means“.2 It is also often — wrongly — assumed that these nations lack a military heritage and a proven record of soldiering.3 The charge of indefensibility is of course true, if we refer to repelling a major attack of a reconstituted Russian military machine, using all possible resources, bearing down on just the Baltics, or on a single one of them. But it is equally true that this is a fairly trivial observation. The fact is that no country in the world can be successfully defended against all threats (especially in the nuclear age), and that few, if any, countries are defenceless against each and every threat.4 Furthermore, simple one-on-one military force balances or comparisons of geographic size do not provide the final word. One must also take into account such things as determination, terrain, an aggressor’s time-constraints, and the wider military and political situation. There are plenty of examples of how will, skill and the logic of deterrence — if applied correctly and in the right circumstances — can defy the logic of numbers and geography. Moreover, it is misleading to assess military security mainly in terms of the possibility and outcome of a major deliberate invasion. In most cases it is much more relevant to focus on the political consequences of perceived or real military imbalances — on domination and accommodation rather than on outright invasion. A situation where one part is perceived as superior and the other as vulnerable can affect patterns of influence and political freedom of action; it can facilitate coercion in a crisis or when a major decision is to be made, and it can open up for the use of force for intervention or for action by proxies. Given the history and geographic position of the Baltic three it is understandable that the possibility of a major and deliberate Russian attack on them cannot be discounted. But the Russian army of today and the foreseeable future is only a shadow of the once mighty Soviet Army, in quality as well as in quantity, and would be hard-pressed to launch a traditional invasion. Actual conditions in Russia as well as in the Baltic States warrant focusing on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, or at least on contingencies involving limited forces: Intervention during a crisis, attacks by local forces or irresponsible actors, armed destabilisation, or the use of military threats for black-mail. These are types of conflicts and threats where even rather limited defence capabilities can be very effective. They can make clear that an act of aggression is taking place, by denying an aggressor the chance of a quick fait accompli, and raising the ante, and by putting down unrest which could give a predatory power a pretext for intervention.5 - 1 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 The Baltic defence forces, which have been created so far, may appear insignificant in international comparison. Nonetheless, they already provide the states with the basic capability of asserting sovereignty and putting up more than just symbolic resistance. Furthermore, a capability to seriously impede an attack by such Russian forces that could be rapidly made available (a high-end estimate might yield about three brigades worth of ground troops, plus some helicopter and air assets) should be within reach, provided that current shortcomings in arms, communications and training are rectified.6 Deterrence at this level — regionally available forces — has a stabilising effect by restraining a possible Russian inclination to use military instruments rashly in case of a crisis, and by limiting the options for a Russian commander considering to take action on his own. An attack using only regionally available forces could turn into a rather messy affair, while sending reinforcements to the area prior to an attack would require decisions, time and actions which would be noted abroad. This could help responsible decision-takers in Moscow to withstand pressure for military action, as well as allow for other states to intervene politically. The prospect of destruction of infrastructure of vital importance to Russian exports, such as pipelines and terminals for oil, could also make politically influential Russian business conglomerates weigh in against a resort to force. In a slightly longer perspective, say a decade, it should be possible for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to acquire forces which would give a potential aggressor cause to think twice before planning even a more deliberate operation. While the comparison of military forces is hardly an exact science it still seems possible to make rough estimates, indicating possibilities and problems. Current force development plans for the Baltic countries generally aim at setting up about five mobilizable brigades per country. Provided that the quality of these units is sufficient to make quantitative comparisons meaningful, the combined Baltic defensive strength of 15 brigades would not be negligible when set against a Russian army which may consist of no more than 6-8 fully manned and equipped divisions. This is especially so if the Baltics can make proper use of the defensive qualities of the terrain, which are better than commonly appreciated in the West.7 These numbers indicate that if the Baltic three can stick together in a crisis or in the face of a military threat, their chances of attaining a force-ratio amenable to asymmetric deterrence increases considerably. An attack on such a grouping, if united, would seem risky unless forces normally deployed at the borders against China, Central Asia and the unruly Caucasus are transferred in advance. Granted, extensive application of airpower, helicopters and high-technology gear could reduce an attacker’s need for ground troops and time considerably, but hardly to the point of obviating the need for a build-up of forces before an attack. The fact that such a build-up would be time-consuming and hard-to-conceal gives other powers the opportunity to assist the Baltics in ways that might avert a conflict or change its course. A key prerequisite for outside, primarily US/NATO, military assistance to the Baltics in case of crisis would, however, seem to be that the Baltic armed forces have the competence, quality and structure necessary to appear “helpable“ and the capability to put such help to good use. All in all, potential Baltic capabilities for self-defence may be greater than commonly thought. A combination of small rapid-reaction units and mobilizable battalions or brigades, supplemented by territorial units, could make a considerable contribution to the stability of Europe and the region, as well as to the direct security of the Baltic states themselves. The contribution would not primarily lie in averting intervention or invasion, but in the political ramifications of the existence of a defence capability: Ensuring that the eastern shore of the Baltic is not seen as a tempting military vacuum; reducing the room for bullying and recourse to military threats as a political instrument; increasing confidence in the Baltics and elsewhere about the permanence of independence; and facilitating further Baltic integration in Western structures, including NATO. It would, of course, not be prudent to assume that Russia’s current weakness will last forever. However, it now seems unlikely that Russia could bounce back as a great power in less than 15-20 - 2 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 years, and every year that passes without basic reforms increases the time for revival even more. These are objective conditions that could not be changed by the exertions of old-style communists or nationalists, should they come to power. The Baltics and their friends in the West can use the time available to establish a pattern where real Baltic independence, and military deterrence at the regional level, is part of normalcy and where any change for the worse would be seen as a threatening aberration. When Russia finally emerges revived, chances are that its political elite may have reconciled itself to the new pattern, or at least that it considers the cost of changing it as too high. Two problems - domestic funding and foreign arms The special historical circumstances of Estonia’s, Latvia and Lithuania’s rebirth as sovereign states meant that national defences had to be organised from scratch. This difficult task was compounded by the after-effects of the traumas which have befallen the Baltic nations this century, including a wide-spread feeling that defence efforts are futile, and an attitude to things military shaped by fifty years of occupation. Given this, and the more general burden of clearing up the detritus of Soviet rule, it is not surprising that it has proved hard to get political attention for defence issues, to assign priority to military spending, and to convince the populace to accept conscription. However, the process of seeking membership in NATO has increased the political salience of the defence issue and highlighted the need for credible and visible efforts in order to qualify as candidates. Estonia and Lithuania reacted first, raising defence spending to about 1,2% and 1.5% of GNP respectively (1998 figures), and making political commitments to raise the level to 2%, as well as working to ensure a greater intake of conscripts. Latvia was slower in realising the importance of defence issues. The defence budget long languished at a level, less than 0.7% of GNP, which barely covered the salaries of present staff, leaving morale suffering and little or no room for improvement in capabilities. Much needed reforms of the regular (conscript) army and its associated structures have been held up and parliament has been reluctant to tighten lax conscription laws.8 However, the fact that a lack of effort could jeopardise prospects as a candidate for NATO finally registered in 1998, leading to a decision to increase spending to 1% of GNP 1999 and to set a target of 2%. This decision has, albeit with some deferments, survived through an election, a change of government and a scandal involving use of defence funds, and might thus stick. However, just increasing the amount of Baltic attention and treasure devoted to defence will not suffice. Despite healthy economic growth, the Baltic three are still poor and it will be a long time before they can afford to buy — on commercial terms — the equipment they need, especially as a substantial part of the defence budget needs to be spent on attracting and retaining talented young people. So for the coming decade, the Baltic three will need outside assistance — training, arms, other equipment — supplied on favourable terms. There are good reasons for concerned states in the West to provide such assistance, the potential pay-off is considerable and the cost is almost negligible. So far, substantial aid has been forthcoming from some 8-10 Western countries, including the Nordics. But most of the assistance has until recently either been focused on the tri-national Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), or been limited to light infantry arms, to training and planning, and to non-lethal equipment. Most potential donors have hesitated to give what is most needed: anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons; night-vision devices and modern communications; and general military equipment in such quantities that entire units can be outfitted in a uniform manner. Such hesitancy is not without cost. Refusal to supply arms may be seen as a signal that the Baltics are still on the eastern side of some geo-strategic line. Furthermore, officers and men who perceive that they are given the opportunity to die for their country, but not the equipment necessary to present a danger to an aggressor can hardly be blamed if they lose heart. Likewise, political and - 3 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 popular support for a national defence effort are likely to suffer if the armed forces fail to impress and cannot show examples of progress. With this in mind, potential donors need to overcome their inhibitions and supply equipment to sustain and encourage national efforts. This now seems to be happening, as Finland has provided howitzers and ammunition, America has supplied large quantities of M-14 and some M-16 rifles, Norway has donated anti-aircraft guns, and Germany has re-militarised some of the equipment it donated earlier. Even Sweden, after lengthy fence sitting, has offered sales of used anti-armour and anti-aircraft weapons at reduced prices. Looking forward Opinions are divided as to whether the Baltic three will truly break away from the shadow of Russia, in their own as well as in Russian eyes. The sceptics are numerous and weighty, but the last ten years have shown that conventional wisdom often underestimates the power and the magnitude of the changes underway since the fall of the Berlin wall. The re-unification of Germany, the liberation of the Baltic states, the break-up of the USSR, robust action in Bosnia, the enlargement of NATO — all were things considered impossible or unnecessary until shortly before they happened. What was labelled as ”prudent realism” has all to often proven to be conservatism and a lack of feel for political dynamics.9 Whether this applies also to the case of NATO and the Baltic States is open to debate. It is quite possible that developments will take a direction which makes enlargement less charged, where the process rather than the result is paramount, and where de facto integration becomes more important than de jury membership. But as long as the process of enlargement goes on and aims at enhancing the security of all European states, it seems immensely important that the Baltic three are neither excluded from the process on geopolitical grounds, nor fall out of the race because of lack of support or lack of own effort. Given the uncertainty of what and where NATO will be in ten years time, and the possibility of temporary upsets in the process, it also seems wise to ensure that NATO is not the only pillar on which these small nations base their security, even when security is defined in a traditional way. All in all, there is little ground for letting considerations of hard security and military defence eternally banish Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the European margin or to some type of grey zone. Geography is not likely to change, and the past cannot be undone. But the political implications of a certain geographic location can very well change over time, and the past can lose its hold on the future. Time can work in favour of the Balts’ desire to truly close the door on Molotov-Ribbentrop and to re-join the European mainstream, as well as in favour of Western desires for a Baltic Sea region and a Europe which is ”whole and free”. But time will only work in favour of these aims if it put to good use and a steady progress can be seen. This presupposes action on defence issues from both the Baltics themselves and their western sponsors. Provided action is taken and fears of imperialism and domination can be laid at rest, the position of the Baltics on the doorstep to Russia can turn from a liability into an asset. * The author is a Senior Analyst with the European Security Studies Group (Tesla) of the Defence Research Establishment (FOA) in Stockholm. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the FOA or of the Swedish government. Earlier versions of this text has been published by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LAI), and in the August issue of RUSI Journal (Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London). 1 For a highlighting of the linkages between the Baltic states and overall European security, see Carl Bildt, ‘The Baltic Litmus Test’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994, and Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurrick, ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States’, Survival, Summer 1996. 2 These arguments often surface both in internal Baltic discourses and in international circles. Cf. Douglas Hurd’s Alastair Buchan memorial lecture at the IISS 1996. - 4 - BBBBaaaallllttttiiiicccc DDDDeeeeffffeeeennnncccceeee RRRReeeevvvviiiieeeewwww 1111////1111999999999999 3 Baltic resistance against German and Danish expansionism was fierce in the late Middle Ages, and the victory in 1410 at Tannenberg is famous. The 20th century-record of the Baltic peoples is less well known, but worth looking at. During the First World War, battalions of Latvian riflemen served with distinction in the Czar’s army, later forming the core of the early Red Army and supplying its first commander, Jokums Vacietis. All three states, though initially lacking military assets, fought successful wars of independence in 1918-20, defeating German and Russian enemies in major engagements. Notably, mutual Baltic assistance and limited foreign help (including Finnish and British) played key roles in securing victory. During the inter-war years the Baltic armed forces were each able to field three to four divisions after mobilisation, plus air and naval units. The decision not to resist in 1939/1940 was by no means pre-ordained and was, in retrospect, tragic. (Finland’s situation was in many ways similar, but Helsinki, after deliberation, made the opposite choice.) During the Second World War, the occupying Germans and Soviets raised several divisions of Baltic volunteers or draftees, which fought in the battles of 1944/45. Following Soviet re-occupation in 1944, tens of thousands of partisans kept up resistance to the early 1950’s. 4 Colonel (retired) Bo Hugemark, a noted Swedish writer on strategic affairs, often makes this point. 5 It is worth keeping in mind that one of Moscow’s prime tools for “re-integration“ of recalcitrant former soviet republics has been the strategic equivalent of a protection racket: covertly fomenting and supporting armed rebellions, e.g. in Abkhazia and Transdniestria, until the legal government submits to a Russian military presence. 6 The first weeks of the Chechnyan war clearly demonstrated that even small defence forces could seriously impede an attack, derail the initial thrust and bog the aggressor down in slow and costly combat. A common estimate of the strength of the defending Chechen forces is 2000-3000 ”regulars” with about 100 pieces of major land equipment, supported by some 30000 irregulars. Mark Galeotti, ‘Decline and Fall - What went Wrong in Chechnya?’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1995. 7 Though lacking in mountains, the Baltics are in no way a western extension of the steppe. Much of the land along the eastern borders is marshy and wooded; the bulk of the area between the borders and the capitals is largely forested and criss-crossed by streams, and many of the main roads pass through built-up areas. 88 ‘A frank overview of Latvia’s defence problems in found in Henning Frantzen, ‘The Baltic response to NATO’s enlargement’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 1997. 9 Cf. Robert Dalsjö, ”Ryssland och NATOutvidgningen, En kritisk granskning i ljuset av svenska intressen” Strategiskt Forum för säkerhetspolitik och omvärldsanalys 1997:2. (FOA, Stockholm), - 5 -