U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice Seal Office of Legal Counsel Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C 20530 November 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN BELLINGER, III SENIOR ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT AND LEGAL ADVISER TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FROM: John C.Yoo - Signature of John C. Yoo Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert J. Delahunty - Signature of Robert J. Delahunty Special Counsel RE: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty This is to provide you with our views on the question whether the President has the constitutional authority to suspend certain articles of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S. - U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 (the "ABM Treaty") insofar as is necessary to allow the development and testing of missile defenses. You have asked us to consider two cases: first, suspension of the relevant articles by mutual consent of both the United States and the Russian Federation; second, unilateral suspension by the United States. We conclude that the President has the constitutional authority to suspend the articles in either case. We begin by setting out in Part I the relevant features of the ABM Treaty. In Part II, we review the President's constitutional authorities over treaties. In Part III, we address the President's specific powers of treaty termination and treaty suspension. Part TV illustrates these powers by reference to the practice of the United States. Part IV(A) addresses termination, and Part IV(B) suspension. Part V demonstrates that, whereas "amending" an Article II treaty requires Senate advice and consent, the partial suspension of a treaty does not. 1. The ABM Treaty The ABM Treaty, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, originated as a bilateral treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union. In general, the ABM Treaty set limits on the number and location of anti-ballistic missile systems of the former Soviet Union and the United States and prevented the deployment of defenses against long-range strategic ballistic missiles. Each side was originally permitted to have two deployment areas (later, by protocol, reduced to one), so restricted and located that the areas could not provide a nationwide ABM defense, or become the basis for one. Of the two deployment areas originally permitted to each side, one was for a limited ABM system to protect that Nation's capital, and one was to protect an intercontinental ballistic missile system launch area. Quantitative and qualitative limits were set on the ABM systems that could be deployed, and the Parties further agreed to limit qualitative improvements of their ABM technology. In Article V, both Parties agreed to prohibit the development, testing, or deployment of sea- based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. Certain provisions of the ABM Treaty concerned the breach, amendment,or abrogation of the Treaty. Article X provided that "[e]ach Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty." Article XIV(l) authorizes each Party to propose amendments to the Treaty, which if agreed upon "shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty." Article XV(1) provides that the Treaty "shall be of unlimited duration." Article XV(2) grants each Party "the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." The dissolution of the former Soviet Union during the autumn and winter of 1991 required the United States to re-evaluate its bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union, including the ABM Treaty. On the whole, the United States operated on the general principle that the treaty rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union had passed to "successor" States, unless the terms or the object and purpose of a treaty required a different result. See Memorandum for John M. Quinn, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Section 233(a) of S. 1745. at 1-2 (June 26, 1996) ("1996 Dellinger Memo"); see also Edwin D. Williamson and John E. Osborn, A U.S. Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 261, 264-65 (1993). Nevertheless, in the area of arms control treaties it was decided to treat succession issues on a case-by-case basis. On September 26, 1997, the United States entered into a Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, September 26,1997, available at http://www.State.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm mou.html (the "MOU"). Four "successor" States were parties with the United States to the MOU: Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.2 The MOU was intended to reflect the fundamental changes in the political situation caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to preserve the viability of the ABM Treaty. Article I of the MOU provided that, "upon entry into force of this Memorandum," the United States together with the four other signatory States "shall constitute the Parties to the [ABM] Treaty." The four successor States assumed the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union, subject to certain modifications. Only a single ABM 1 See Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of the Ann-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3,1974, Art 1, 27 U.ST. 1645,1646, T.I.A.S. 8276. 2 Each of these four States possessed ABM Treaty-related assets on its territory, and each had demonstrate da desire to become a Party to the ABM Treaty. 2 • deployment area was permitted for all of the four successor States combined, and only 15 ABM launchers collectively at ABM test ranges were permitted. Article IX (l) provided that "[t]his Memorandum shall be subject to ratification or approval by the signatory States, in accordance with the constitutional procedures of those States." Id. During the last Administration, our Office took the position that the United States could enter into MOU without Senate advice and consent as a valid exercise of the President's constitutional authorities to recognize States and to implement and interpret treaties. See 1996 Dellinger Memo. While not conceding the constitutional point, President Clinton promised that "[t]he MOU ... will be provided to the Senate for its advice and consent." Letter to Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Comm. on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, from President William Jefferson Clinton (Nov. 21, 1997), reprinted in 144 Cong. Rec. H7276 (1998). The Clinton Administration did not submit the MOU to the Senate, and it remains unsubmitted. We are informed that the United States has not deposited its instrument of ratification of the MOU. We are also informed that all four successor States have ratified the MOU. The Russian Federation's ratification was conditional, however, on the United States' ratification of the START protocols. We understand that this condition has not been met, and that it appears unlikely that it will be met. Consequently, both because the United States has not deposited its instrument of ratification, and because the Russian Federation's ratification was contingent on an as-yet unmet condition, the MOU by its own terms has not yet entered into force.3 II. The President's Constitutional Authority Over Treaties Presidential authority over treaties stems from the President's leading textual and structural position in foreign affairs generally, from the text and structure of Article II's vesting of all of the federal executive power in the President, and from the specific manner in which the Constitution allocates the treaty power. Construing the Constitution in this manner comports with the President's Article II responsibilities to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation, to act as its sole representative in international relations, and to exercise the powers of Chief Executive. Historical practice also plays an important role in resolving separation of powers questions relating to foreign affairs. Judicial decisions in the area are rare, while the need for discretion and speed of action favor deference to the arrangements of the political branches. The historical evidence supports the claim that the President has broad constitutional powers with respect to treaties, including the powers to terminate and suspend them. In light of considerations of all three kinds ~ textual, structural and historical ~ we conclude that the President has the constitutional authority to suspend a provision of the ABM Treaty. 3 Whether the ABM Treaty remains in effect and, if so, who are the Parties to it are questions that continue to be disputed. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, arguably altered the fundamental conditions on which the ABM Treaty was predicated, and it may be argued with considerable force that the treaty did not survive that change. If the ABM Treaty were thought not to have survived, then the MOU would be without effect, because the MOU was designed to extend and multilateralize the treaty. Even on the view that the ABM Treaty did survive, the fact that the MOU has not entered into force appears to indicate that the treaty is at this point a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, rather than a multilateral treaty involving the four successor States and the United States. 3 We begin with constitutional text and structure. Article II, § 1 of the Constitution declares that the "executive Power shall be vested in a President." Article II, § 2 further makes clear that the President "shall be Commander in Chief" that he shall appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and receive ambassadors, and that he "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress possesses its own plenary foreign affairs powers, primarily those of declaring war, raising and funding the military, and regulating international commerce. From the very beginnings of the Republic, this constitutional arrangement has been understood to grant the President plenary control over the conduct of foreign relations. As Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson observed during the first Washington Administration: "[t]he constitution has divided the powers of government into three branches [and] has declared that 'the executive powers shall be vested in the president,' submitting only special articles of it to a negative by the senate." Due to this structure, Jefferson continued, "[t]he transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether; it belongs, then, to the head of that department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly." Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (1790), reprinted in 5 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). In defending President Washington's authority to issue the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, Alexander Hamilton came to the same interpretation of the President's foreign affairs powers. According to Hamilton, Article II "ought... to be considered as intended ... to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the definition of Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power." Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), in 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969). Hamilton further contended that the President was "[t]he constitutional organ of intercourse between the UStates & foreign Nations." Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 7 (1793), id. at 135. As future Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared a few years later, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. . . . The [executive] department... is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation. . . ." 10 Annals of Cong. 613-14 (1800). Given the agreement of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Marshall, it has not been difficult for the executive branch to consistently assert the President's plenary authority in foreign affairs ever since. In the relatively few occasions where it has addressed foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has lent its approval to the executive branch's consistent interpretation of the President's powers. Responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and for protecting the national security are, as the Supreme Court has observed, "'central' Presidential domains." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 n.19 (1982). The President's constitutional primacy flows from both his unique position in the constitutional structure and from the specific grants of authority in Article II that make the President both the Chief Executive of the nation and the Commander in Chief. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982). Due to the President's constitutionally superior position, the Supreme Court has consistently "recognized 'the generally accepted view that foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive."' Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)). This foreign affairs power is exclusive: it is "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a power 4 which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). In light of these basic principles, it should be understood that the treaty power is fundamentally executive in nature. Article II, § 1 of the Constitution provides that *'[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States." By contrast. Article I's Vesting Clause gives Congress only the powers 'herein granted." U.S. Const, art. I, § 1. This difference in language indicates that Congress's legislative powers are limited to the list enumerated in Article I, § 8, while the President's powers include inherent executive powers that are unenumerated in the Constitution. Thus, as we will explain in detail later, any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature - particularly in foreign affairs - must be resolved in favor of the executive branch. While Article II, § 1 vests the President with the general federal executive power. Article II, § 2 specifies other powers, such as the Commander in Chief and treaty powers, that are executive in nature. Some have argued that this either limits the executive power to those explicitly enumerated, or that it recognizes that the treaty power is legislative in nature. The powers specifically enumerated in Article II, however, are not subsumed within the Vesting Clause either because they have been divided between Articles I and II (such as the war power), or because they have been altered by inclusion of the Senate (as with treaties and appointments). The King's traditional powers with respect to war and peace (which, of course, were "executive" in nature) were disaggregated, in that the royal power to declare war was given to Congress under Article I, while the Commander in Chief authority was expressly reserved to the President in Article II.4 Likewise, the Framers altered the plenary powers of the King as to treaties and appointments by including the Senate in the exercise of those powers. 5 Article IIs enumeration of the Treaty and Appointments Clauses thus dilutes the unitary nature of the executive branch only in regard to the exercise of those powers. It does not transform them into quasi-legislative functions. A point of comparison can be drawn with the President's veto over legislation, which is vested in the executive by Article I of the Constitution. Just as the President's veto does not alter the legislative character of the lawmaking process, so too the Senate's advice and consent role cannot change the essential executive nature of the treaty power in Article II. 4 Under the British constitution, as it existed at the time of the Constitution's Framing, the British Crown possessed the unilateral power over both making and terminating treaties. According to Sir William Blackstone, the King's prerogative subsumed the sole power to make treaties and other international agreements with foreign nations, and the sole power to make wax and peace. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 257 (1967 reprint of 1771 ed.). The British constitution recognized that the Crown also enjoyed the power to terminate treaties as well. "It is by the law o fnations essential to the goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power... . [I]n England the sovereign power ... is vested in the person of th eking. Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, o arnnul." Id. at 257. See also James Madison, Helvidius No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of James Madison 72 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) ("The power of making treaties and the power of declaring war, are roya lprerogatives in the British government, and are accordingly treated as Executive prerogatives by British commentators."). See Constitutionality of Proposed Conditions to Senate Consent to the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 10 Op. O.L.C. 12,17(1986) ("Nothing in the text of the Constitution or the deliberations of the Framers suggests that the Senate's advice and consent role in the treaty-making process was intended to alter the fundamental constitutional balance between legislative authority and executive authority."). 5 i Several conclusions flow from this analysis of constitutional text and structure. First, the Treaty Clause's location in Article II makes clear that the treaty power remains an executive one. The Senate's advice and consent role merely acts as a check on the President's otherwise plenary power. It is the President who makes treaties, not the Senate and not the Senate and President. Second, Article II's structure confirms that executive power in this area is broader than the authorities listed in Article II, § 2. Simply because Article II, § 2's Treaty Clause does not specifically detail the location of relevant corollary powers does not mean that such powers lie in the hands of the Senate. Rather, these powers must remain within the President's general executive power. Third, Article II, § l's Vesting Clause requires that we construe any ambiguities in the allocation of executive power in favor of the President. If Article II, § 2 fails to allocate a specific power, then Article II, § l's general grant of the executive power serves as a catch-all provision that reserves to the President any remaining federal foreign affairs powers. This understanding of the constitutional text and structure has led to the recognition that the President enjoys powers, such as the removal of executive branch officials, that may be unenumerated but that are an essential part of the executive power. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). As true as this principle is in domestic affairs, it must especially be the case in regard to foreign affairs, and thus treaties. Treaties represent a central tool for the exercise of the President's plenary control over the conduct of foreign policy: in the course of protecting national security, recognizing foreign governments, or pursuing diplomatic objectives, for example, the President may need to decide whether to perform, withhold, or terminate the United States' treaty obligations. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit has observed, "the determination of the conduct of the United States in regard to treaties is an instance of what has broadly been called 'the foreign affairs power' of the President That status is not confined to the service of the President as a channel of communication . . . but embraces an active policy determination as to the conduct of the United States in regard to a treaty in response to numerous problems and circumstances as they arise." Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706-07 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Construing the Constitution to grant unenumerated treaty authority to another branch could prevent the President from exercising his core constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs. Even in the cases in which the Supreme Court has limited executive authority, it has also emphasized that we should not construe legislative prerogatives to prevent the executive branch "from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).6 Thus, treaty-related powers not specifically detailed in Article II, § 2, such as the powers to terminate or suspend treaties unilaterally, must remain with the President. This has been the general approach in regard to other treaty powers not mentioned in the Constitution. Article II, for example, does not expressly grant the President the power to interpret treaties on behalf of the United States. Yet, when the question arose concerning the proper interpretation of the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France, President Washington issued the 1793 Neutrality Proclamation construing the treaty not to require United States entry into the European wars on France's side. Thus, even though the Court has an independent duty under Article III to determine the meaning of a treaty in a case in which such a question is properly presented, it gives the executive's interpretation of the treaty significant deference. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353,369 (1989); Sumitomo Shop America. Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85(1982). 6 . As noted earlier, Alexander Hamilton defended President Washington's authority to interpret the 1778 Franco-American Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 6, by arguing that this power stemmed from his control over the treaty process and the general vesting of the executive power in Article II, § 2. See Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, supra. Even Hamilton's great opponent, James Madison, did not challenge the view that the Article II, § 2 gave the President unenumerated treaty powers, although he argued they could not be read to frustrate Congress's power to declare war. Madison, Helvidius No. 2, supra, at 80. Today, it is generally recognized that the President is the primary interpreter of international law and of treaties on behalf of the United States. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 112 cmt. c(1987). Other treaty powers similarly have been understood to rest within plenary presidential authority. Thus, it is the President alone who decides whether to negotiate an international agreement, and it is the President alone who controls the subject, course, and scope of negotiations. "In the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments, it is imperative that the United States speak with one voice. The Constitution provides that that one voice is the President's." Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 40 (1990) (quoting 2 Pub. Papers of George Bush 1042, 1043 (1989) (President's veto message of July 31,1989)); see also United States Military and Naval Bases in the Philippines, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 143, 163 (1953) ("the President is authorized by the Constitution to negotiate on any appropriate subject for negotiation with a foreign government"). The President has the sole discretion whether to sign a treaty and whether to choose even to submit it for Senate consideration. The President may even choose not to ratify a treaty even after the Senate has considered and approved it. "[E]ven after [the President] has obtained the consent of the Senate it is for him to decide whether to ratify a treaty and put it into effect. Senatorial confirmation of a treaty concededly does not obligate the President to go forward with a treaty if he concludes that it is not in the public interest to do so." Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705; see also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United Slates Constitution 184 (2d ed. 1996). HI. The Presidential Powers to Terminate and Suspend Treaties We turn now to two other unenumerated powers of the President with respect to treaties - the power to terminate and the power to suspend.7 The President's power to terminate treaties must reside in the President as a necessary corollary to the exercise of the President's other plenary foreign affairs powers. As noted before, the President is the sole organ of the nation in regard to foreign nations.8 A President, therefore, ' In saying that the President has the power to terminate treaties, we do not of course deny that Congres shas the power to enact legislation tha tabrogates a treaty as a matter of domestic law, or that effectively puts the United States in breach of its treat)' obligations by making performance impossible. See, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United Slates, 175 U.S. 423,460 (1899). But other than by declaring war, Congress has no power to extinguish the international obligations of the United States, and in that sense lacks the competence to terminate treaties. Moreover, Congress may not direct the President to terminate a treaty without impermissibly invading his authority to conduct foreign affairs. 8 Indeed, because the President alone is able to communicate with foreign nations on behalf of the United States, it is the President who actually decides whether to terminate a treat)'. Even if Congress or the Senate were to take action that had the effect of abrogating a treaty as a matter of domestic law, only the President can decide whether to 7 may need to terminate a treaty in order to implement his decision to recognize a foreign government. Or, for example, the President may wish to terminate a treaty in order to reflect the fact that the treaty has become obsolete, to sanction a treaty partner for violations, to protect the United States from commitments that would threaten its national security, to condemn human rights violations, or to negotiate a better agreement. Authorities such as the Framers, judges, legal scholars, and government officials, have agreed upon the President's power to terminate treaties unilaterally. Alexander Hamilton, in his Pacificus No. 1, stated that although "treaties can only be made by the President and Senate [jointly], [but] their activity may be continued or suspended by the President alone." Pacificus No. 1, supra, at 42. Professor Louis Henkin, in his leading treatise on foreign affairs law, states that "it is apparently accepted that the President has authority under the Constitution to denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty, whether such action on behalf of the United States is permissible under international law or would put the United States in violation." Henkin, supra, at 214. Similarly, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) have acknowledged that the President has the power either "to suspend or terminate an [international] agreement in accordance with its terms," or "to make the determination that would justify the United States in terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by another party or because of supervening events, and to notify a foreign nation of a decision to abrogate the agreement. Thus, federal courts will treat the executive's declaration as to whether a treaty remains in effect as dispositive in litigation .See, e.g., TWA. Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984). 9 Other scholars have taken this view. Professor Westel Willoughby, author of the most prominent constitutional law treatise of the first half of the twentieth century, observed that "it seems almost too clear for argument that Congress, not having been made by the Constitution a participant in the treaty-making power, has no constitutional authority to exercise that power either affirmatively or negatively, tha tis, by creating or destroying agreements. It would seem, indeed, that there is no constitutional obligation upo nthe part of the Executive to submit his treaty' denunciations to the Congress for its approval and ratification. "1 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States 585 (2d ed. 1929) (footnote omitted). See also Edwin S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957, at 196 (1957) ("as a matter of fact... treaties have been terminated on several occasions by the President, now on his own authority, now in accordance with a resolution of Congress, at other times with the sanction simply of the Senate") (emphasis added) ;id. at 435-36; Randall H. Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 878, 887-88, 906 (1958); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 164-165 (1st ed. 1978) ("[T]he President ... has exclusive responsibility for... terminating treaties or executive agreements ...."). Other scholars and government officials who have supported the President's unilateral power to terminate treaties are cited in the Brief for the Respondents (President James Earl Carter and Secretary of Stat eCyrus Vance) in Opposition at 19-20, n.7, Coldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979),No. 79-856 (the "Executive's Goldwater Brief"). Further, as Professor Tribe has noted, the President "may, of course, terminate a treaty in accord with its terms." 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 643-44 n. 1 (3d ed. 2000). Those who believe that the Senate can properly play a role in treaty termination must agree that when a treaty expressly authorizes termination, e.g., after notice, and the President does terminate it in the prescribed manner, the President is acting at the apex of his constitutional authority. To be sure, there is no scholarly consensus on the issue of treaty termination, and some have argued that congressional (or Senate) authorization is (at least usually) required. See .e.g.. Motion of Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 6, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), No. 79-856 ("In our opinion, the better constitutional view, confirmed by a careful examination of past instances of termination, is that in the absence of material breach or rebus sic stantibus and, arguably, in the absence of an overwhelming external crisis to the body politic, the presumption must be that the President requires congressional authorization to terminate any agreement other than a presidential agreement."); J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. Legis. 46 (1978); Edwin S. Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Relations 115 (1917). 8 proceed to terminate or suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States." Restatement (Third), supra, at § 339. The executive branch has long held the view that the President has the constitutional authority to terminate treaties unilaterally, and the legislative branch seems for the most part to have acquiesced in it. The Justice Department has consistently maintained that the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs provides him with the power to unilaterally terminate treaties. "In particular, the President's plenary authority in the field of foreign relations includes his power to terminate treaties." Memorandum for Judith H. Bello, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The President's Authority to Terminate the International Express Mail Agreement with Argentina Without the Consent of the Postal Service at 5 (June 2, 1988). While some Members of Congress have questioned unilateral presidential termination of treaties," and several Members in the past brought suit against the President to stop a termination (which will be discussed below), other congressional authorities have accepted the President's functional power over treaty termination. While claiming that "[w]hether the President alone can terminate a treaty's domestic effect remains an open question," a recent study by the Congressional Research Service concludes that "[a]s a practical matter, however, the President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect." Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate 201 (Comm. Print 2001) (prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) (footnotes omitted). 10 See also the Executive's Goldwater Brief at 20 ("The logic of the constitutional arrangement is compelling. Just as the Senate or Congress cannot bind the United States to a treaty without the President's active participation and approval, they cannot continue a treaty commitment that the Presiden thas determined is contrary to the security or diplomatic interests of the United States and is terminable under international law. The Senate or Congress cannot undertake, or revive or continue, a treaty obligation o fthe United States over the President's objection. That is the constitutional scheme."); Memorandum for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, from Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements That Substantially Modify the United States' Obligations Under an Existing Treaty at 8 n.14 (Nov. 25, 1996) (reviewing Office precedents) (the "1996 Schroeder Memo"); Memorandum for the Attorney General from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Presidential Authority to Modify the Conditions under which the United States Will Recognize the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Without Prior Congressional Approval at 11-15 (Apr. 9,1984) (reviewing judicial and other support for view that President may unilaterally terminate treaties); Memorandum for the Honorable Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State f,rom John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Proposed Reservation to Salt II Conditioning Termination on Senate Approval (Nov. 13, 1979); International Load line Convention. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 119, 123 (1941) ("it is proper that the President, as 'the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,' should speak fo trhe nation" in declaring treaty inoperative) 1 The Senate engaged in a lengthy debate over the President's prerogatives at the time of President Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Originally, a proposed Senate Resolution disapproved of unilateral presidential action, but mat Resolution was amended and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to recognize at least fourteen bases of presidential termination. The amended Resolution wa sin turn amended to state the "sense of the Senate" claiming a consenting role for the Senate in the termination of treaties, but no final vote was ever taken on the Resolution and the Senate did not in the end place itself in conflict with the President See Goldwater. AAA U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, 517 & n.18 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 1982 ed.). 9 The events surrounding President Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1979 support this understanding of the President's powers. In that case, President Carter announced, without seeking or obtaining the consent of either the Senate or of Congress as a whole, that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and abrogate the treaty with Taiwan. The Senate adopted a "sense of the Senate" resolution that the President could not terminate any mutual defense treaty without the advice and consent of two-thirds of its Members. Senator Goldwater and other individual Senators filed suit to block President Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. The District Court agreed that the Constitution required both the President and Congress to take formal action before a treaty could be terminated. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. . 949,954(D.D.C. 1979). Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and upheld the President's unilateral power to terminate treaties. Goldwater v. Carter. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The per curiam Court offered eight general reasons why the President enjoyed this authority: 1) the President had a unilateral power over removal of federal officials; 2) the constitutional text is silent as to treaty termination; 3) the Senate's advice and consent role is extraordinary and should not lightly be extended; 4) the President is the constitutional representative of the United States in its foreign relations; 5) Congress's power over domestic implementation of a treaty is irrelevant to the question of termination; 6) requiring Senate consent for the termination of treaties "would be locking the United States into all of its international obligations, even if the President and two-thirds of the Senate minus one firmly believed that the proper course for the United States was to terminate a treaty," 617 F.2d at 705; 7) even though historical evidence has provided many different examples of treaty termination, "in no situation has a treaty been continued in force over the opposition of the President." Id. at 706. Meanwhile, the conduct of the United States in regard to treaties is part of the executive's plenary power over the conduct of foreign affairs. 8) No judicially manageable standards exist for drawing distinctions among treaties based on their substance, in order to determine any implied role for the Senate in treaty termination in regard to particular treaties. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit opinion and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the question raised was nonjusticiable. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Justice Brennan, the only Justice who reached the merits, would have affirmed the D.C. Circuit. While the D.C. Circuit opinion has no precedential value, we believe its analysis is persuasive and provides the correct answer on the merits. The Supreme Court's vacatur of the lower court opinion, moreover, indicates that any presidential termination of a treaty would be unreviewable in the courts. Congressional opponents of a President's decision to withdraw from a treaty would have no cognizable injury with which to demonstrate standing, and, even if they did, most likely the courts would find the controversy to be nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. This has the practical 10