DOI: 10.7213/aurora.28.044.DS04 ISSN 0104-4443 Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons [T] Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant1 Ontologia, metafísica e crítica como Semântica Transcendental a partir de Kant Daniel Omar Perez* Universidade Estadual de campinas (Unicamp), Campinas, SP, Brasil Abstract The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant's critique of traditional metaphy- sics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, 1 Translation to English: Ana Carolina Meinerz. * DOP: e-mail: [email protected] Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 460 PEREZ, D. O. that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those pre- sented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project. Keywords: Kant. Semantics. Ontology. Metaphysics. Criticismo. Transcendental. Resumo O objetivo deste texto é apresentar o núcleo da crítica kantiana à metafísica e à ontologia tradicionais como uma semântica transcendental que permite reformular o problema acer- ca dos objetos e da sua realidade. Para alcançar tal fim propomos uma comunicação em duas partes: 1. Uma breve justificação da interpretação semântica de Kant; 2. Um programa de trabalho a partir de uma semântica entendida como parte fundamental de um modo de resolução de problemas filosóficos. Basicamente, podemos dizer que a posição crítica con- tra a metafísica e a ontologia tradicionais leva à questão acerca de: como são possíveis os juízos sintéticos a priori? Esta pergunta conduz às suas condições de possibilidade, isto é: re- presentações sensíveis; representações intelectuais; regras sintáticas; regras semânticas (ou referenciais, de relação entre as representações intelectuais e algum tipo de sensibilidade ou afetividade); o operador das regras sintáticas e semânticas (sujeito, homem, natureza hu- mana, gênero, povo, etc). Isto constitui o que chamamos o núcleo da crítica em Kant e com o qual podemos começar a resolver os problemas filosóficos inclusive para além dos apresen- tados por nosso filósofo. Nesse sentido, seguiremos sumariamente os seguintes passos: 1. Da metafísica em seus vários sentidos à ontologia dos objetos sensíveis; 2. Uma critica da razão pura contra a metafísica dogmática; 3. Critica como semântica; 4. O projeto semântico e os tipos de juízos; 5. A natureza humana e a teoria do juízo; 6. O programa de trabalho dentro da própria obra de Kant; 7. Os resultados subsequentes do projeto de Kant. Palavras-chave: Kant. Semântica. Ontologia. Metafísica. Crítica. Transcendental. Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant 461 It will be good for metaphysics not to take concepts for things or even their names for concepts therefore reasoning entirely on emptiness. Kant. Introduction From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects Within Kant’s work, we find different ways of defining the con- cepts of metaphysics and ontology. Some of these definitions refer to the work of dogmatic tradition in the history of philosophy, others report to a new meaning given in-relation-to or from-the critical work and transcendental philosophy2. In the specific case of the concept of metaphysics already stated in the pre-critical period, Kant says in Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (Dreams of a vi- sionary) that this subject offers two types of benefits: The first is to carry out tasks which raises the inquiring mind when co- mes to discover through reason hidden properties of things. However, on this matter, the result much disappoints hope and has escaped our eager hands. Ter frustra compressa manus, effugit imago, Par levibus ventis volucrique simílima somno3. The other advantage comes more appropriate to the nature of human understanding and it is to prove whether the task is proportionate to what can be known or not, and the relation between this matter and the concepts of experience upon which all our judgments must always be 2 There are many works consulted during preparation of this research. We mention the most relevant for our reflection. Laywine, A (1993) Kant's early metaphysics and the origins of the critical philosophy. Volume 3 NAKs. California: Ridgeview Publishing Company. Daval, R (1951) La métaphysique de Kant. Perspectives sur la métaphysique de Kant d'après la théorie du schématisme. Paris: Presses Universitaries de France. Freuler, L (1992) Kant et la métaphysique spéculative. Paris: Vrin. 3 Translation: For three times his image moves vainly through his hands as a subtle wind like a fleeting dream. Virgil Aeneid II 793-794 and 701-702 VI. Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 462 PEREZ, D. O. supported. In this sense, metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason ... (A 115)4 Indeed, the "two advantages" Kant mentions in 1766 are nothing but only two perspectives under which we may comprehend metaphy- sics as what has so far resulted and as a task: 1) As an inquiry beyond the experience, Kant’s disappointment relates to the concept of soul proposed by Swedenborg and analyzed in that text; 2) As a science of the boundaries. One concerns the tradition’s frustrating exercise (because it is never decisive) which seeks the hidden, the other indicates a task to be done and it is characterized as having a negative consequence. On the one hand, according to the 1766 text’s results, dogmatic assertions about the concept of soul donnot resist through the analysis of its su- pposed validity in different contexts of use. Kant comes to the conclu- sion that we can not apply this category in any cognitive situation5. On the other hand, the task of knowing how far we can progress with the use of the understanding in the expansion of knowledge would not provide new knowledge, but it would avoid the illusion of seeking or stating what is beyond our limits. The problem of stating this or that positive knowledge about something shifts to an earlier point and leads off to take into account the conditions upon which this or that knowledge may be pronounced. Yet in the full 1790s, once entirelly developed the horizon of criti- cal philosophy, in the beginning of the manuscript on Welche wirklichen Fortschritte sind die, die Metaphysik und seit Leibnizens Wolffs Zeiten in 4 We have used two translations as references for the reading and interpretation of the text in german, one in spanish and the other one in portuguese. However, the translation used in the text was done by us. 5 I held an analysis of the procedure of this text in Perez, D. O. (2008, 92 e ss.) Kant e o problema da significação. Curitiba: Champagnat, (2009) A Loucura como questão Semântica: Uma Interpretação Kantiana. Trans/Form/Ação, São Paulo, v. 32, n. 1, p. 95-117. Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant 463 Deustschland gemacht hat? (Progress of Metaphysics)6, Kant begins by stating that metaphysics is "a sea without shore where progress leaves no marks" (Kant Ak XX, 259). However, he also questions as follows: "What is exactly that reason seeks out of metaphysics? What ultima- te purpose (Endzweck) does it have with its formulation? "(Kant XX Ak, 259). Thus, metaphysics would be "the science that purposes the progress of the sensible knowledge to the supersensible through re- ason "(Kant XX Ak, 260; italics added by us). The sensible knowledge would concern to the objects of the sensibility, which are studied by the sciences of possible experiences; and the supersensible would reach a kind of knowledge that does not concern to those kinds of experiences. Within this framework, Kant operates a reduction or a delimitaton of the meaning of ontology that Christian Wolff (2005) considered to be the prime philosophy. Against it, I quote Kant, namely: Ontology is that science (as part of metaphysics) which constitutes a system of all concepts and principles of understanding, but only to the extent that refers to objects that can be given to the sensibility and be certi- fied by the experience. Ontology does not touch the supersensible, ul- timate purpose, however, of the metaphysics, thus does not belong to this last one but as propaedeutics, as porch or atrium of the mataphy- sics itself and it is called transcendental philosophy for it contains the conditions and first elements of all our a priori knowledge. In it there has not been much progress since Aristotle (Kant XX Ak, 260; italics added by us). Any excess in the attribution of coverage of the presented con- cepts must be avoided while reading this paragraph. First, the phrase "all our a priori knowledge" refers only to all our a priori knowledge re- garding the objects of cognitive experience, as we may specify from what is said at the beginning of the quote. This means that this definition of ontology reaches less the being qua being (either aristotelian or wolffian) 6 For an in-depth study of the concept of metaphysics in the Progress there is a work by Mario Caimi (1989) La metafísica de Kant. Reconstrucción de la argumentation del escrito de Kant. Los progresos de la metafísica desde lá época de Leibniz y de Wolff. Buenos Aires: Eudeba Publisher. There is salso a work by Feliz, Duke (1987) Estudio Preliminar. IN Kant, I. (1987) Los progresos de la metafísicas desde Leibniz y Wolff. Madrid: Tecnos Editorial. Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 464 PEREZ, D. O. that the objects of a possible experience defined and delimited only in the first critique. Thus, Kant states that "ontology is a resolution of know- ledge in a priori concepts of the understanding and has its use in expe- rience" (Kant Ak XX, 260). Therefore, we must warn that, in this case, we are not speaking of the practical philosophy’s objects. Still, a con- troversial point would be whether this definition of ontology includes the objects of mathematics or knowledge by framing of concepts, or not. We understand that although at times the excerptions may be am- biguous, implying that it comes to given objects, it is pertinent to state that it refers to sensible objects both pure and empirical. Therefore, it would effectively include objects like numbers or geometrical figures and also physical objects. In turn, and secondly, a relation of equivalence between ontolo- gy and transcendental philosophy is settled. Hence, we have yet ano- ther issue that is neither trivial nor unproblematic: the writing of the 1790s reduces "transcendental philosophy" to an "ontology" and this one to the "science of the concepts and principles that refers to objects that can be given to the sensibility". We believe that along the develo- pment of GMS (Grounds) and KPV (The Critique of Practical Reason) there is another meaning of the wording "transcendental philosophy" that includes not only "the science of the concepts and principles that refers to objects that can be given to the sensibility" but also "the inves- tigation about the supreme principle of morality", whereas a special kind of knowledge extends only to the principles of pure reason, with nothing empirical. But Kant, controversially, did not include this point in the text of Fortschritte (Progress). In order to make our position explicit we can say that we per- ceive that Kant begins with a restricted notion of transcendental phi- losophy in the first critique connected to ontology explicated in the theoretical reason, and later he develops the concept of extended trans- cendental philosophy including the supreme principle of morality ex- plicated in the practical reason. This movement will be comprehended in Fortschritte (Progress) by Kant as the transition from ontology to metaphysics, as reframed concepts and, wherefore, differed from the Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant 465 meaning of the those ones used in the tradition characterized by Kant as dogmatic. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics According to Kant in Fortschritte (Progress), metaphysics "in its scholastic concept is the system of all the principles of pure theoretical rational knowledge through concepts, in short: it is the system of pure theoretical philosophy" (Kant XX Ak, 261). Thus, the dogmatic meta- physical thinkers went forward with ontological principles beyond the objects of experience where nothing can be confirmed or refuted, that is, said as valid, precisely because it's no longer about the sensible, but the supersensible. "This is the way of the dogmatics, previous to Plato and Aristotle, but extendable to Leibniz and Wolff ..." (Kant Ak XX, 262). This natural and illusory way of the operation of reason itself fin- ds, in contrast, the skeptics’way with its doctrine of doubt about the dogmatic assertions. The third step taken by metaphysics is held in the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the capacity (Vermögen) of a priori expansion of human knowledge in general. According to Kant, the three times (dogmatism, skepticism and criticism) are based on the very nature of the human capacity of knowledge in its operation. This means that it is not a continuous line of absolute overcome, but three times that can always restart according to the way reason operates. In order to move forward on a comment of the "progress of me- taphysics" and understand the nature of a critique of pure reason, we shall divide the question into a formal section and a material section. The formal part that concerns us for the purpose of observing the pro- gress of reason in trying to solve its necessary problems is divided by Kant into three steps: 1) To make the distinction between analytic judgments and synthe- tic one; 2) To formulate the question: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?; Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 466 PEREZ, D. O. 3) To establish the problem of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments: this is, to discuss its possibility and to prove its ob- jective reality. In this third point, about the possibility (validity) and evidence, we find the indispensable syntactic and semantic elements we shall hi- ghlight. Only with the deployment of that route, which is concluded by the presentation of the elements for an evidence, within a critique of pure reason, we will be able to retake the problem of the possibility of a metaphysics along Kant: The transcendental philosophy, that is, the doctrine upon the possibi- lity of all a priori knowledge in general, which is the critique of pure reason and whose elements have been now fully presented, has as its aim the establishment of a metaphysics, whose purpose, for its turn, while purpose of pure reason, propones itself to extend the bound of the sensible to the supersensible; and this is an over step (Überschritt), which in order not to be a dangerous shift, once it is not a continuous process within the same order of principles, an extreme concern is re- quired related to the boundaries of both territories (Kant, AK XX, 272). At the same time, it is deterrent to move forward on the theore- tical knowledge beyond the objects of experience, as it is defined in its concepts and principles under the notion of ontology, the critique of pure reason sets the stage to advance the possibility of a knowledge with the mere principles of pure reason, which is being called here as metaphysics. In this sense, Kant is conclusive: the results of a critique of pure reason would allow us to state that the "amplitude of theore- tical knowledge of pure reason does not extend beyond the objects of the sensibility" (Kant, Ak XX, 273) "no knowledge of the supersensible is possible with regard to the speculative capacity of reason" (Kant, Ak XX, 277). "For the ultimate purpose of metaphysics, as it is an attempt to transcend the sensible and move on to the supersensible, this know- ledge is, therefore, inappropriate" (Kant, Ak XX, 286). The restriction in the advance of knowledge by reason is given by the way Kant grants Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant 467 objective reality to the categories. Kant mentions two procedures with respect to the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason: the scheme and the symbol (Kant, Ak XX, 279-280). These two pro- cedures provide referential rules (semantic ones) to the objectification of the categories used in the formulation of the knowledge stated in judgments. If the referential rules are restrictive as for the use of the categories and limit what can be considered a valid theoretical know- ledge, then we shall ask along with Kant: "What kind of progress can metaphysics make on the supersensible?" (Kant, Ak XX, 296). Kant will reserve the term “supersensible” to refer to the territory of freedom. It would go from philosophy as speculative science to philosophy as doctrine of wisdom (Kant, Ak XX, 301). The performed transition is from the theoretical reason, which tries to report on the cognitive ex- perience and its limits, to the practical reason, which tries to report on the practical experience (or moral experience in a broad sense) which is already pure, that is, only on principles of reason. Therefore we do not go from a physical knowledge of objects to a metaphysical knowledge of transcendent entities but from a domain of objects given to the sen- sibility to another domain, that of freedom. As such, Kant explains in the Introduction to the third critique the location of the concepts used in one domain and in the other one. I quote Kant: The concepts, to the extent that they can be related to its objects and regardless of whether it is possible or not to have knowledge of them, have their field (Feld), which is determined simply according to the rela- tion its object has with our capacity of knowledge. The part of this field, wherein knowledge is possible for us, is a territory (Boden) for these concepts and for the capacity of corresponding knowledge. The part of this field to which they dictate its laws is the domain (Gebiet) (dithio) of these concepts and the capacities of knowledge that fit them (Kant, KU XVII). So then we have the scope of the objects given through the sen- sibility (and here we find the ontology) and the scope of freedom and its respective concepts (what Kant is pointing out in the text Fortschritte [Progress] as metaphysics). Regarding the part concerned Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016 468 PEREZ, D. O. to a transcendent theology, Kant makes his position very clear with regard to a speculative on the Ens Originarium, metaphysics and the limits of ontology. I quote Kant (Ak XX, 301-304): With metaphysics reason wants to make itself a concept of the origin of all things, of the original being (ens originarium) and of its intrinsic na- ture; it subjectively begins by the original concept (conceptus originarius) of thingness in general (realitas), that is, of that whose concept repre- sents in itself a being the difference of that whose concept represents a non-being, however, in order to objectively think the unconditional of the original being, it represents this original being as if it contained the whole (omnitudo) of reality (ens realissimum), thereby determining com- pletely its concept of supreme being, which no other concept draws, and with regard to the possibility of such being, as Leibniz adds, there is no difficulty in proving, because the realities as mere statements can not contradict themselves, and what is thinkable because of its concept does not contradict itself, that is, everything of which a concept is possi- ble is also a possible thing, this is, none the less, something before which reason guided by the critique may well enough shake its head. It will be good for metaphysics not to take concepts for things or even their names for concepts therefore reasoning entirely on emptiness. According to Kant, in the dogmatic metaphysics we make a sub- jective condition of thought the objective condition of possibility of things themselves. Thus, we mistake concepts that may have a logical meaning with things that must be given in sensibility. Freud names this phenomenon schizophrenia. However, Kant shows that it is the procedure of a dogmatic metaphysics which has not made that funda- mental distinction and tries to prove any of these two statements: 1) A perfect metaphysical being must necessarily exist, for if it did not exist it would miss perfection. 2) A being that exists as a necessary being must have got supre- me perfection, for if it hadn´t, it would not be a priori fully de- termined by its concept, therefore, it could not be conceived as necessary. Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 28, n. 44, p. 459-488, maio/ago. 2016