93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 35 AUGUSTINE, THOMAS AQUINAS, HENRY OF GHENT, AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS: ON THE THEOLOGY OF THE FATHER’S INTELLECTUAL GENERATION OF THE WORD Scott M. WILLIAMS Abstract There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psychological account of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, in their own ways, follow the first route; John Duns Scotus follows the second. Aquinas, Henry, and Scotus’s psy- chological accounts entail different theological opinions. For example, Aquinas (but neither Henry nor Scotus) thinks that the Father needs the Word to know the divine essence. If we compare the theological views entailed by their psy- chologies we find a trajectory from Aquinas, through Henry, and ending with Scotus. This theological trajectory falsifies a judgment that every Augustinian psychology of the divine persons amounts to a pre-Nicene functional Trinitari- anism. This study makes clear how one’s awareness of the theological views entailed by these psychologies enables one to assess more thoroughly psycholog- ical accounts of the identity and distinction of the divine persons. 1. Introduction In much of the contemporary anglophoneTrinitarian theology asso- ciatedwith‘analyticphilosophy’,tremendousattentionhasbeenpaid totheissueoftheidentityanddistinctionofthetrinityofdivineper- sons1. These philosophical theologians have responded to the ques- tion«Howcantherebethreepersonsandyetonedivinesubstance?» 1. See M. REA, «The Trinity», in: T. FLINT– M. REA(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, Oxford, 2009, pp. 403-429, and references there. Also, see D.TUGGY, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/> accessed August 2009, and refer- ences there. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales77(1), 35-81. doi: 10.2143/RTPM.77.1.2050372 © 2010 by Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. All rights reserved. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 36 36 S.M. WILLIAMS However, what has been missing in such discussions is the issue of the two ad intra divine productions. For example, what account might we give of the (eternal) generation of the Son, whom is called the«Word»intheprologueofJohn’sgospel?Likewise,whataccount might we give of the (eternal) procession of the Holy Spirit? By pay- ing more attention to the issue of the ad intra divine productions, theologians might have more resources for assessing theories that attempt to explain the identity and distinction of divine persons.To thisend,inwhatfollowsIsurveyThomasAquinas,HenryofGhent, and Duns Scotus’s accounts of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. I trace what I take to be a significant trajectory in their philosophicalpsychologiesthataccountfortheFather’s(eternal)gen- erationoftheWordandthetheologicalviewsthattheyentail.Icon- clude by saying how we might accept or reject a psychological account of divine persons on the basis of a theological position that it entails. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus all consider a proposedrequirementfortheFather’sgenerationoftheSon,whoisthe Word.Putintheformofaquestiontheproposedrequirementisthis: «IstheFather’sactofunderstandingthedivineessencenecessaryforthe FathertogeneratetheWord2?»Atfirstglancethisquestionmayseem relatively insignificant, but I aim to show that it manifests philosoph- icalandtheologicaldifferencesbetweenthesetheologians.Tobringinto focustheirtheologicaldistinctivesIwillconsideracloselyrelatedques- tion:«DoestheFatherhaveanactofunderstandingthedivineessence, which is an immanent perfection, intrinsically or by dependence on thegeneratedWord?»Thislatterquestionhelpsustoseewhetherathe- ologianthinkstheFatherinsehastheresourcestohaveanactofunder- standingthedivineessence,oriftheFatherrequiresthegeneratedWord inorderthattheFatherhasanactofunderstandingthedivineessence. HavingshownhoweachtheologiananswersthefirstquestionIwillbe able to elicit from them an answer to this second question. All of these scholastic theologians respected and appealed to Augus- tine’s authority when (in effect) giving their answers to the two ques- tions above. What motivate their use of philosophical psychology to 2. I use the locution ‘act of understanding’ throughout to stand for any occurrent intellectual cognition. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 37 AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, HENRY, AND SCOTUS ON THE WORD 37 answer these questions are Augustine’s reflections on the Father’s gen- eration of the Son/Word in De Trinitate. And, what motivated Augus- tine was the prologue of John’s Gospel (John 1: 1-3) where we learn that «in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God». With John’s prologue to hand Augustine wonders how to understand what a ‘word’ might be, and how the Father (eternally) generates his Word. It is Augustine’s use of philo- sophical psychology to attempt to understand these things that pro- vokes Aquinas, Henry, and Duns Scotus (among other things) to use their philosophical psychologies to answer these two questions. There are many key passages from Augustine’s De Trinitatethat can be used to support these scholastics’ responses to the first question. Asit turns out they use various passages to support contrary opinions. For example, in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, Augustine considers two ways to understand the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. First, Augustine supposes that (1) the Father’s act of under- standing the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word; second, Augustine supposes that (2) the Father’s act of under- standing the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word. As it happens, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent side with (1), and Duns Scotus sides with (2). In §2 below I explain what Augustine says in some relevant pas- sages from De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, and elsewhere, that function as important background to understanding these scholas- tics’ own philosophical and theological positions with regard to our two questions. In §3 I survey Aquinas’s philosophical psychology that promotes the view that the Father’s act of understanding with regard to the divine essence is necessary for, and productive of, the Word. In §4 I show that Henry also thinks the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the generation of the Word, but that it is necessary for a different reason than Aquinas offers. Moreover, Henry denies that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is productive of the Word. Given that Henry’s philosophical psychology within the Trinitarian con- text is less well known3, I go into some detail about it since it is in 3. For discussion of Henry’s philosophical psychology outside the confines of his Trini- tarian theology, see S. MARRONE, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 38 38 S.M. WILLIAMS stark contrast to Aquinas and Scotus’s better-known philosophical psychologies. I argue that Henry’s philosophical psychology, when used to explain the Father’s generation of the Word, improves on Aquinas’s in one respect but nevertheless has a certain problem of its own. In §5 I show that, for Duns Scotus, the Father’s act of under- standing the divine essence is neither necessary for, nor productive of, the Word. Moreover, I say how Duns Scotus critically develops the gains Henry made over Aquinas’s view, and how Duns Scotus avoids a problem that arises from Henry’s philosophical psychology. Having seen how these three scholastics answer the first question, in §6 I say how each answers the second question. I show that Aquinas’s psychology entails a theologically weak view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection and may suggest a theologically illicit view of the Son and Holy Spirit’s intellectual perfection. However, Isay how Henry and Duns Scotus’s views entail a theologically strong view of the Father’s immanent intellectual perfection. Furthermore, I explain how Henry’s philosophical psychology entails a theological position intermediate between the theological opinions entailed by Aquinas and Duns Scotus’s philosophical psychologies. In §7 I con- clude with an assessment of how the views of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus each follows one of two routes that Augus- tine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, that is, whether the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is causally necessary for the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Having made clear the connection between a given philosophical psychology and a the- ological opinion that it entails, I say how this puts one in a better position not only to judge the charge that all Augustinian divine psy- chologies amount to a Trintiarian functionalism, but also to assess a given psychological account of the identity and distinction of the divine persons. of Ghent, Cambridge, Mass. 1985; B. GOEHRING, Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Men- tal Representation, Unpub. PhD. Diss., Cornell University 2006; M. ROMBEIRO, Intelligi- ble Species in Some Late Thirteenth-Century Theories of Cognition, Unpub. PhD. Diss., Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America 2005, pp.126 -177 [henceforth: Intel- ligible Species]; R. PASNAU, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, New York 1996, pp.306-310; J. PAULUS, Henri de Gand, Paris 1938, pp.3-13; also, see T. NYS, De wer- king van het menselijk verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent, Leuven 1949. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 39 AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, HENRY, AND SCOTUS ON THE WORD 39 2. Receptions of Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25 In DeTrinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, Augustine reflects on the Father’s generation of the Word. In these remarks Augustine discusses human cognition to attempt to understand how from eternity the Father intellectually generates his Word. I want to focus on these remarks because in them we can see the seeds of our scholastic the- ologians’ divergent answers to the proposed requirement (in the first question) for the generation of theWord4. But before I discuss what in effect are Augustine’s different responses to this question, it is helpful to take a step back to see what Augustine believes a ‘men- tal word’ is. In his survey of diverse creaturely analogies that might help us to understand better the trinity of divine persons Augustine considers a psychological analogy in which the Father has the divine memory, the Son has the divine intelligence, and the Holy Spirit has the divine love5. On this view there is one substance with three distinct aspects or parts that is supposed to be analogous to the one divine substance and three distinct persons. However, Augustine declares thatthispsychologicalmodelfailsiftakeninacertainway.Consider the following. But now I have already argued earlier on in this book that the trinity which is God cannot just be read off from those three things which we have pointed out in the trinity of our minds, in such a way that the Father is taken as the memory of all three, and the Son as the understanding of all three, and the Holy Spirit as the charity of all three; as though the Father did not do his 4. For Aquinas’s reference to Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 16, 25, cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, 34, 1, ad 2, ed. Leon., IV, Roma 1888, p.366 [hence- forth: ST] in note 16 below. For Henry’s reference to Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 14, 24, and XV, 15, 25, cf.HENRYOFGHENT, Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum,40, 7, ed. G.A. WILSON, Leuven 1994, pp.289, 92 – 292, 63 [henceforth: SQO]. For Henry’s reference to Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 16, 25, cf. HENRY OF GHENT, SQO, 54, 9, ed. I. BADIUS, Paris 1520 [Reprint: Saint Bonaventure 1953, 2 volumes], fol. 104vC. For Scotus’s reference to Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 14, 23, cf.DUNSSCOTUS, Ordi- natio, II, 1, 1, 11, ed. C. BALICet al., Opera Omnia, VII, Vatican 1973, pp.6, 9 – 7, 2; for Scotus’s reference to Augustine’s De Trinitate, XV, 14, 24, cf.DUNSSCOTUS, Ordi- natio,I, 2, 2, 1-4, 291, ed. C. BALICet al., Opera Omnia, II, Vatican 1950, pp.299, 13 – 300, 9. 5. Cf.AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 7, 12, ed. W.J. MOUNTAIN– F.GLORIE, Turn- holti 1968, pp. 475, 23 – 477, 80. Also, see L. GIOIA, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate, Oxford 2008, pp.279-282. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 40 40 S.M. WILLIAMS own understanding or loving, but the Son did his understanding for him and the Holy Spirit his loving6…. According to this theologically undesirable view, which Augustine rejects,eachdivinepersoninselackswhatweoughttosupposetobe attributes(e.g.,theactofunderstanding,theactloving)equallyshared byeverydivineperson.Onthistheologicallyillicitview,forexample, the Son has intelligence as an immanent perfection but no other divine person has intelligence as an immanent perfection; hence, the Father has intelligence only insofar as he is related to the Son. Like- wise, if the Holy Spirit has divine love as an immanent perfection but no other divine person has divine love as an immanent perfec- tion, then e.g., the Father has divine love only insofar as the Father is related to the Holy Spirit. But Augustine believes that this view is theologically undesirable because every divine person should be thought to have divine attributes like intelligence and love imma- nently. Memory, intelligence, and love are essential (shared) attrib- utesofthedivinepersonsandnotunsharedpersonalproperties.Nev- ertheless, Augustine suggests that we can say the Father generates the Son/Word from memory if we bracket out this theologically illicit position7. In his analysis of human memory, intelligence, and love, Augustine takes memory as dispositional belief or knowledge, intelligence as hav- ing acts of thinking, and love as having an act of will8. Since mem- ory is like a storehouse of thoughts, we can say that it might be the storehouse of e.g., knowledge, and when we episodically think of what 6. Cf.AUGUSTINE,De Trinitate, XV, 17, 28, pp.502, 28 – 34: «Sed iam in hoc libro superius disputavi non sic accipiendam esse trinitatem quae deus est ex illis tribus quae in trinitate nostrae mentis ostendimus ut tamquam memoria sit omnium trium Pater et intel- ligentia omnium trium Filius et caritas omnium trium Spiritus Sanctus, quasi Pater non intellegat sibi nec diligat, sed ei Filius intellegat et Spiritus Sanctus ei diligat …»; E. Hill (trans.), St. Augustine, The Trinity, New York 2002, p.419. Also, see AUGUSTINE, De Trini- tate, VII, 1, 2, pp.245, 56 – 246, 111; and De Trinitate, XV, 7, 12, p.476, 45-48. One might take such qualifications to rebut the charge that Augustine has a trinitiarian ‘func- tionalism’; cf.A. FOKIN, «St. Augustine’s Doctrine of the Trinity in the Light of Ortho- dox Triadology of the Fourth Century», in: M.Y.STEWART(ed.), The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, Dordrecht / Boston / London 2003, p.148. Also, cf.note 89. 7. See AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 21, 40, pp.517, 1 – 518, 21. 8. See AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XII, 14, 23, pp.376, 44 – 377, 80; also see note 7; also, see De Trinitate, IX, 12, 18, pp.309, 26 – 310, 80; and De Trinitate, XV, 20-1, 38, 41, pp.516, 25 – 39; 518, 22 – 24. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 41 AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, HENRY, AND SCOTUS ON THE WORD 41 we dispositionally know, then the stored knowledge brings about occurrently cognized knowledge. In short, Augustine says that occur- rently cognized knowledge is «knowledge [generated] from knowl- edge» (scientia de scientia)9. Augustine says that what gets produced from memory is a «mental word». Mental words are not features of a spoken or written natural language (e.g., French, Latin), but are a purely mental language10. What is important for my purposes here is Augustine’s claim that memory brings about cognized knowledge called a mental word. Memory is a productive power (analogous to a parent), and a mental word is its product (analogous to a child). Inthe case of God, Augustine wonders whether the Father brings about an act of understanding and the divine mental Word from memory. By surveying Aquinas, Henry, and Duns Scotus we find two gen- eral interpretations of what a generated mental word is supposed to be. When a person thinks of something, she has the act of under- standing, on the one hand, and the object or cognitive content that fixes the act of understanding, on the other hand. Consequently, there is an act-theory and an object-theory of what a mental word is; and as I say below, Henry of Ghent proposes a composite view of these. To his scholastic descendents Augustine suggests two kinds of responses to the question: «Is the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence necessary for the generation of the Word?» In his ini- tial response (in De Trinitate, XV, 25, 24) Augustine focuses on the claim that in the normal course of human understanding the act of understanding entails a generated mental word such that the act of understanding is a necessary condition for a generated mental word11. 9. Cf.AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 15, 24, p.498, 24-28: «Quid cum verum est ver- bum nostrum et ideo recte verbum vocatur, numquid sicut dici potest vel visio de visione vel scientia de scientia, ita dici potest essentia de essentia sicut illud dei verbum maxime dicitur maximeque dicendum est?». 10. See AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 15, 24, p. 497, 32-39. On Aquinas’s and Ockham’s elaborations on Augustine’s proposed ‘mental language’, see C. PANACCIO, «From Mental Word to Mental Language», in: Philosophical Topics20 (1992), pp.125-147. 11. Cf.AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 15, 25, pp.498, 34 – 499, 11: «Illa etiam quae ita sciuntur ut numquam excidere possint quoniam praesentia sunt et ad ipsius animi na- turam pertinent ut est illud quod nos uiuere scimus; manet enim hoc quamdiu animus manet, et quia semper manet animus et hoc semper manet; id ergo et si qua reperiuntur similia in quibus imago dei potius intuenda est, etiamsi semper sciuntur, tamen quia non semper etiam cogitantur, quomodo de his dicatur uerbum sempiternum, cum uerbum nostrum nostra cogitatione dicatur, inuenire difficile est. Sempiternum est enim animo 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 42 42 S.M. WILLIAMS Once the act of understanding ceases to exist, so too does the mental word. But suppose that the Father’s act of understanding eternally exists. If this were so, then the generated divine Word would also eter- nally exist. Therefore, on this initial consideration the Father’s eternal act of understanding the divine essence is necessary for the eternal generation of the Word. However, on Augustine’s second view, he worries that if we say an act of understanding is necessary for the generation of a mental word, then we might be tempted to suppose that the generated mental word can come and go since human acts of understanding are typically episodic. Augustine worries that if the divine Word «can be formed» (formabile), then it might not have been formed12. To avoid the infer- ence that the divine Word might not have been even if it is eternally generated, Augustine denies that the divine Word «can be formed». Instead, the generated divine Word is the same simple form (that is, the divine essence) as the Father, and the Father’s act of understand- ing (cogitatio) the divine essence is not in any way necessary for the generation of the Word. Since acts of understanding are typically uiuere, sempiternum est scire quod uiuit, nec tamen sempiternum est cogitare uitam suam vel cogitare scientiam uitae suae quoniam cum aliud atque aliud coeperit, hoc desinet co- gitare quamuis non desinat scire. Ex quo fit ut si potest esse in animo aliqua scientia sem- piterna, et sempiterna esse non potest eiusdem scientiae cogitatio, et uerbum uerum nos- trum intimum nisi nostra cogitatione non dicitur, solus deus intellegatur habere uerbum sempiternum sibique coaeternum». 12. Cf.AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XV, 15, 25, pp.499, 51 – 500, 14 (emphasis mine): «Nisi forte dicendum est ipsam possibilitatem cogitationis quoniam id quod scitur etiam quando non cogitatur potest tamen ueraciter cogitari, uerbum esse tam perpetuum quam scientia ipsa perpetua est. Sed quomodo est uerbum quod nondum in cogitationis uisione formatum est? Quomodo erit simile scientiae de qua nascitur si eius non habet formam et ideo iam uocatur uerbum quia potest habere? Tale est enim ac si dicatur ideo iam uocan- dum esse uerbum quia potest esse uerbum. […] Ac per hoc etiam si concedamus, ne de controversia uocabuli laborare uideamur, iam uocandum esse uerbum quiddam illud men- tis nostrae quod de nostra scientia formari potest etiam priusquam formatum sit quia iam ut ita dicam formabile est, quis non uideat quanta hic sit dissimilitudo ab illo dei uerbo quod in forma dei sic est ut non ante fuerit formabile postque formatum, nec aliquando esse possit informe, sed sit forma simplex et simpliciter aequalis ei de quo est et cui mirabiliter coaeterna est? Quapropter ita dicitur illud dei uerbum ut dei cogitatio non dicatur ne ali- quid esse quasi uolubile credatur in deo, quod nunc accipiat, nunc recipiat formam ut uer- bum sit eamque possit amittere atque informiter quodam modo uolutari. […] Non ergo ille dei filius cogitatio dei sed uerbum dei dicitur. Cogitatio quippe nostra perveniens ad id quod scimus atque inde formata uerbum nostrum uerum est. Et ideo uerbum dei sine cogitatione dei debet intellegiut forma ipsa simplex intellegatur, non aliquid habens forma- bile quod esse etiam possit informe». 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 43 AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, HENRY, AND SCOTUS ON THE WORD 43 episodic, and he denies that the Word depends on an act of under- standing, Augustine supposes that he avoids suggesting that the Word might not have been generated. On this second consideration Augus- tine takes up his claim that the divine Word is «knowledge [generated] from knowledge» and suggests that the Father generates the Word directly from memory, as though divine memory were the productive power by which the Father eternally generates his Word13. Conse- quently this second view proposes that the Father’s act of under- standing the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word. As we will see below, both Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent affirm the first view that the Father’s act of understanding the divine essence is somehow necessary for generating the Word; but Duns Scotus affirms the second view that the Father’s act of under- standing the divine essence is not necessary for the generation of the Word. 3. Thomas Aquinas: The Father’s Act of Understanding the Divine Essence is Necessary for, and Productive of, the Word In what follows I focus on Aquinas’s mature account of human cog- nition and not on how he developed his own philosophical psychol- ogy14. Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian teaching that what we nor- mally intellectually cognize derives from the external world. As it were, information starts from an external object and ultimately arrives in the human intellect by a series of mediations. External objects send infor- mation to a person’s sense organs and powers, and then the informa- tion passes through the common sense to the imagination and ulti- mately stops in the intellect. Aquinas teaches that the information received in the imagination naturally stops there but can be trans- ferred (abstracted) into the possible intellect (a power of the soul) by 13. On memory as a productive power, see AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, XI, 7, 11, pp.347, 1 – 348, 24; also, see note 7. 14. On Aquinas’s earlier and latter accounts of the divine Word, see V. BOLAND, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Leiden / New York / Koln 1996, pp.235-248, esp. 245-246; also, see G. PINI, «Henry of Ghent’s Doctrine of Verbum in Its Theologi- cal Context», in: G. GULDENTOPS– C. STEEL(eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transforma- tion of Scholastic Thought, Leuven 2003, pp.308-316; G. EMERY, The Trinitarian Theol- ogy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Oxford 2007, pp.180-5. 93225_RTPM_10-1_02_Williams_AP 17-06-2010 20:43 Pagina 44 44 S.M. WILLIAMS certain causal interactions between a person’s agent intellect (another power of the soul), and a phantasm (what is imagined). What is important here is the product from such causal interaction between the agent intellect and a phantasm, that is, what Aquinas calls an «intelligible species». An intelligible species is a disposition that is a likeness of its external object, and this likeness inheres in the possible intellect. An intelligible species must inhere in a person’s possible intel- lect before a person can will to generate an act of understanding what- ever the intelligible species is a likeness of. An intelligible species is that through which (id quo est) a person understands something. How- ever, a mental word, which Aquinas describes as an «understood inten- tion» (intentio intellecta), is that in which (in quo) something is under- stood15. A mental word is a likeness of the intelligible species on which it (formal) causally depends; consequently the intelligible species and the mental word are likenesses of the same (external) object. The issue that I will pursue here is how an act of understanding is causally con- nected to the generation of a mental word. In the case of humans, Aquinas believes that the possible intellect, informed with an intelligible species, produces an act of understand- ing, and this act of understanding, which is an operation, is somehow productive of a mental word («intellectus in concipiendo format; inquantum scilicet intuitu cogitationis divinae concipitur verbum Dei»)16.Now, this is peculiar, since it means that, on Aquinas’s view, 15. See G. EMERY, The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, p.184, and refer- ences there. Also, see M. ROMBEIRO, Intelligible Species, pp.37-60. Also, see V. BOLAND, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, pp. 235-237. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra Gentiles,I, 53, ed. Leon., XIII, Rome 1918, pp.150-151 [hereafter: ScG]: «Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelli- gendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae… Haec autem intentio intel- lecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium; licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo». Also, cf. THOMASAQUINAS, ScG, IV, 11, ed. Leon., XV, Rome 1930, p. 34: «Est autem de ratione interioris verbi, quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi termi- nus intellectualis operationis …». Also, cf. THOMASAQUINAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, ed. R. BUSA, VI, Stuttgart 1980, p. 229: «istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum, non sicut quo intel- lectus intelligit, sed in quo intelligit …». 16. Cf.THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, Ia, 34, 1, ad 2, ed. Leonina, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Opera Omnia IV, Rome 1888, p.366 (emphasis mine): «Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad intellectum pertinent, personaliter dicitur in divinis,