Atlas of Southeast Europe Handbook of Oriental Studies Handbuch der Orientalistik section one The Near and Middle East Edited by Maribel Fierro (Madrid) M. Şükrü Hanioğlu (Princeton) Renata Holod (University of Pennsylvania) Kees Versteegh (Nijmegen) VOLUME 108/1 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ho1 Atlas of Southeast Europe Geopolitics and History Volume One: 1521–1699 By H.H.A. Hötte Edited by Colin Heywood LEIDEN | BOSTON Library of Congress Control Number: 2014954459 This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0169-9423 isbn 978-90-04-21467-5 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-28888-1 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. 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Table of Contents Editor’s Preface 3 The Author & the Atlas 5 General Historical Survey 7 General Legend 1521-1699 18 Legend of the Habsburg Dominions 20 Maps 1. 1520–1526 23 2. 1526–1530 37 3. 1530–1540 45 4. 1540–1550 55 5. 1550 - 1566 61 6. 1566 - 1593 69 7. 1593-1606 77 8. 1606–1649 87 9. 1649–1673 95 10. 1672-1683 103 11. 1683 – 1699 107 Karlóca 1699 130 Survey 1: Transylvania from 1521 to 1699 135 Survey 2: Slavonia and Croatia from 1521 to 1699 138 Survey 3: The Habsburg Empire from 1521 to 1699 141 Survey 4: Greece and the islands from 1521 to 1699 144 Index 151 Editor’s Preface This atlas offers a survey of the history of Southeast Europe from 1521 mobile forces built around the levies of the warrior nobility, plus in- until 1699. That it ends with the well-known Treaty of Karlóca of 1699 creasing numbers of mercenaries drawn from diverse parts of Europe will be easy for most readers to understand, but the starting date directly financed by royal revenues derived from taxation. In addition, might be less obvious. Why begin in 1521? as part of the gunpowder revolution which transformed warfare from The fateful year 1521 is marked by the first major land campaign un- the mid-fifteenth century onwards, the Hungarians became increas- dertaken by Süleyman I, the new Ottoman sultan, in the third, and ingly skilled in the use of firearms, both in the field and for defence, finally successful, Ottoman attempt to capture Belgrade, which and in utilising the tábor (T. tábur), the Wagenburg or mobile fortified brought to an end almost sixty years of relative stability, at least in ter- camp formed from carts chained together, which had been adopted ritorial terms, on the Danube frontier of the Ottoman Empire. In the from the Hussite rebels in Bohemia. decades which had followed Süleyman’s great-grandfather Mehmed A further aspect of this apparently stable but potentially highly II’s unsuccessful siege of Belgrade (1456), his final extinction of the unstable frontier situation was a duality in terms of the actual war- Serbian state by the capture of the fortress of Smederevo (Semendire) fare carried on along its length. For the entire period from 1396 to in 1459, and the annexation of most of the lands of medieval Bosnia 1521 all the major field encounters between Ottoman and Hungarian (1462-3), the frontier between the lands of the Ottoman sultanate and forces – not that there were many: Nicopolis itself (1396); the “winter those wide tracts of central and eastern Europe owing allegiance to or campaign” of 1443-4; the crusade of Varna (1444) – and all the major claimed by the Hungarian-Polish crown, had followed the line of the Ottoman sieges – Belgrade (1440; 1456; 1521); Jajca (1462) – took place river Danube from its mouth to Belgrade; and from thence westwards, on the Ottoman side of the frontier. Ottoman offensive activity north the line of its main tributary, the river Sava; and ultimately to the lim- of the river, across an arc stretching from the south-eastern provinc- its of Venetian territory on the borders of Croatia. es of Austria to Transylvania, was carried out almost entirely by the The “long” fifteenth century on the middle Danube frontier, Rumelian uj-begis and their followers. Where regular Ottoman forces which extends from the defeat and destruction in 1396, in the battle did penetrate north of the Danube, as in the ill-fated campaign into of Nicopolis, at the hands of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I, of a cru- Transylvania led by Şihabeddin Pasha in 1442, who was defeated on sading army drawn mainly from western Europe, comes to an abrupt the Ialomitsa River by János Hunyadi, the Ottomans were unable to end in the Ottoman capture of Belgrade in 1521, and the destruction penetrate the Hungarian Wagenburg / tábor system of field defences. of medieval Hungary in 1526 at the battle of Mohács. It was a period It was this system, and the allied reforms, that brought the Hungari- in which the middle Danube frontier, and the lands which bordered ans close to victory in the “winter war” of 1443, only to be defeated by the Danube-Sava line on both sides, possessed their own special char- the bitter weather in the Balkan Mountains and the resolute Ottoman acter, a character which would be largely lost once the Ottoman con- defence at the Zlatitsa Pass. quest of Hungary became a reality. After the Ottoman victory over a crusading army at Varna in 1444 The Danube-Sava frontier was a border or zone of transition in – an event more momentous for crusading history as it was the last more than one way: ecological, from the Balkan uplands to the marsh- western army to penetrate the Balkans for almost two and a half cen- es and swamps of the Hungarian plain; ethnic and religious, from a turies, than it was for this history of the Danube frontier – and after Slav and Orthodox world to a Magyar and Latin Catholic one; and po- Mehmed II’s failure to take Belgrade (1456) and Jajca (1462), an uneasy litically, from the social structures of the Ottoman sultanate to the very peace, punctuated by episodes of furious raiding warfare from both different ones of the Hungarian kingdom. In the “long” fifteenth cen- sides, settled on the frontier. The battle of Kenyérmező (Brotfeld; Şi- tury it may have been a frontier which was territorially stable, but it bot), in Transylvania in 1479, late in the reign of Mehmed II, when a was by no means quiet or even quiescent. On the Ottoman side of the traditional army collected together by the Hungarian nobility annihi- frontier this was the golden age of the Rumelian uj-begis, the ‘frontier lated an invading Ottoman force commanded by nearly all the begs of lords” and their followers, the Malkoç-oğulları, the Mihail-oğulları, and the Rumelian frontier in what has been termed “the greatest battle of the Evrenos-oğulları, the descendants of the original uj-begis who had the age”, was followed by further violent incursions in the years after played a major role in the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. Under the death of the sultan. Indeed, it has been suggested that the fron- their command were the subordinate commanders (tövija) and the tier begs of Bosnia and Semendire must have regarded the succession mass of the Rumelian akincilar, or raiders and freebooters, possibly struggle which followed on death of Mehmed II, and the consequent 20,000 strong, animated perhaps more by the joy of looting, raiding temporary weakening of the central state authority under Bayezid II, and enslavement, and the profits of plunder, than by zeal as ghazis for as an especially favourable opportunity. In 1481, the year in which Me- the “holy war”, but in any case a potent destructive and destabilizing hmed II died (on May 3), devastating raids were launched into Hun- element along the whole length of the frontier throughout this period. gary; in reprisal Pál Kinizsi, the Hungarian governor of Temesvár (and On the Hungarian side, the growth in royal power as a response to the redoubtable victor at Kenyérmező four years earlier) laid waste the Turkish threat perceived more clearly in the aftermath of Nicopo- with fire and sword to the province of Semendire. Thereafter, with lis, and evident in the military reforms undertaken by the Hungarian neither Bayezid II nor the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus (1458- ruler Zsigmond (1387-1437) and his successors, effected a transforma- 90) eager for a serious conflict, a truce for five years, later extended to tion of the mobilisation and border defence systems of the kingdom, 1491, was signed in 1483. establishing a system of a double line of heavily fortified and strong- The death of Matthias in 1490 destabilised the Hungarian king- ly manned borders fortresses, with Belgrade, “the key to Hungary”, at dom, which now fell on evil days. A revolt, spearheaded by the great- its centre, at intervals on the Danube-Sava line, together with more er nobility, against royal taxation designed to support the late king’s 3 “Black Army” of mercenaries, and the election of Vladislav (Wladis- During the six decades which lie between the Ottoman conquest law) II, a weak and amiable but clearly incompetent king, rapidly un- of Semendire and that of Belgrade little appeared to have changed did the military structures which underpinned the defence and secu- on the Danube – Sava frontier between the Ottoman and Hungarian rity of the kingdom. Crown revenues were plundered by magnates, lands. The province of Semendire, in 1520, the year in which Süley- ecclesiastical and lay; royal power was further curtailed, and the reve- man I ascended the throne, was still the frontier province it had be- nues of the state were farmed out to speculators and foreigners, while come when formed in 1459. But the Ottoman state, in these years, had a bitter struggle for power developed between the magnates and the become changed out of all recognition. In 1459 (and for most of the lesser nobility. succeeding period) it had been a powerful but still (despite Mehmed All these developments opened up for the Ottomans, even II’s pretensions to universal sovereignty as the conqueror of Constan- though they were themselves constrained by the ongoing crisis cen- tinople and the self-proclaimed heir to the Caesars) an essentially lo- tred on the person of Bayezid II’s brother Jem Sultan, a hostage of the cal Balkan and west- and central-Anatolian polity. Now, in 1520, and Knights of St John and the king of France, the possibility of once again thanks largely to the work of Selim I, it had become a true imperium, intervening profitably in the affairs of Hungary once the truce of 1483 controlling a vast arc of territory from the borders of Hungary to the finally expired. In 1492 the Ottoman frontier raiders swept deep into Crimea, the fringes of the Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean lands, Hungary, Croatia, and the Austrian provinces of Styria, Carniola and Egypt, the Red Sea littoral, and the Arabian Holy Places. Carinthia: in a desperate battle near Villach, deep within Austrian In 1521, therefore, when Süleyman I appeared with his army be- territory, 10,000 raiders and 7,000 Christian troops were slain; further fore the walls of Belgrade, the kingdom of Hungary, weakened, riven devastating raids were launched in the following years against Croa- by social dissent in the aftermath of the brutally suppressed Dózsa tia, Styria and Temesvár, while the Hungarians were also still powerful peasant rising of 1514, and with a weak, fifteen-year old king in the enough to carry out retaliatory devastations in the region of Semen- person of Lajos II, found itself facing unprepared the military might dire. Thereafter, in 1495 both sides concluded a three-year truce, re- of a new imperial and world power. newed on occasion (e.g., in 1503), and for the last time in 1519, despite How had this situation of impending catastrophe come about? continuing local unrest along the frontier. In the first place, the kingdom of Hungary, despite what is generally It was, however, not so much the continuing strength of the accepted as its immense territory, stretching from Bohemia to Poland, Hungarian defences, or their ongoing military capability, but devel- and its relative prosperity, was now unable to finance an effective mil- opments elsewhere which largely led to the apparent stability of the itary defence against the Ottomans. Complacency had played its part. Danube frontier in the late fifteenth and the first two decades of the It has indeed been argued that the sixty years of relative peace had sixteenth century. Ever since the last decade of the reign of Mehmed helped to precipitate the Hungarian defeats both in siege warfare at II, the focus of Ottoman policy and statecraft had shifted steadily to Belgrade and on the battlefield at Mohács. It was not the Hungari- the east. Mehmed II himself had absorbed the once-powerful Anato- an forces, but the institutions of the state and its military leadership lian emirate of Karaman; this had led him into hostilities with the east which were militarily totally inadequate to the task. By the early six- Anatolian/west-Iranian Turkoman dynasty of the Ak-Koyunlu, the de- teenth century there were few amongst the Hungarian leadership who feat of whose ruler Uzun Hasan by Mehmed II led to conflict with the had experience of either siege defence or battlefield tactics against Mamluk sultanate of Egypt and Syria. It also opened up in Bayezid’s the central military forces of the sultan. Furthermore, there had been reign what became an ideological challenge to the Ottomans through a too easy acceptance of Selim’s I’s renewal of the truce in 1519, only a the coming to political power in eastern Anatolia and Iran of the year before his death, an event which did not mean that Selim or, for strongly Shiʿi religious movement of the Safaviyya (1501). The policies that matter, any eventual successor, might have no aggressive inten- of Bayezid II in his last years, and those of his son and successor Selim tions towards Hungary for the future. As it turned out, within a few I (1512-20) were determined largely by the social and religious situa- months of the accession of Süleyman I events were rapidly to demon- tion in Ottoman Anatolia, where a large-scale, Safavid-inspired revolt strate not only that the dominant Hungarian nobility were wrong amongst the strongly pro-Shiʿi Turkoman tribes of the region (1511) to believe that it was possible to come to a lasting agreement with led, following on Selim I’s seizure of power (1512), to a massive Otto- an aggressive great power, but that their reliance on their – by now man Drang nach Osten: the defeat of the armies of the Safavid Shah outdated and antiquated – personal levies would be sufficient to save Ismaʿil I at Chaldiran (1514) and a major campaign against the Mam- the country’s independence. In 1521, and again in 1526, events were to luks (1516-17) which led rapidly to the Ottoman conquest of Syria and prove otherwise. Egypt, and to the Ottoman assumption of suzerainty over the Muslim Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. Colin Heywood 4 The Author & the Atlas This atlas was conceived and produced by Hans H.A. Hötte, who died in 2007. Hötte was born in 1922 in Semarang, the Netherlands Indies, and was educated in the Netherlands. His interests in the rich and complex history of Middle and Southeast Europe already dated back to his years in high school, but it was not until the Second World War that he turned his full attention to the subject. In 1943, Dutch students were forced to pledge their loyalty to the Nazi authorities who had occupied the Netherlands in 1940. Hötte’s refusal to make the pledge made it impossible for him to continue his medical studies and his first attempts at map-making date from this period. After the war, Hötte recommenced his medical studies, becoming a full-time ophthalmologist in the 1950s. His medical career proved impossible to combine with his passion for the history and geopolitics of South- east Europe, but he made annual trips to the area to gather further information. In 1970, he obtained his PhD from the University of Am- sterdam with a study called Orbital Fractures (published in London by William Heinemann Medical Books Ltd. in the same year). After Hötte’s retirement, he took up map-making again and be- gan working on what he came to regard as his most important life’s work, an electronic historical atlas of Southeast Europe. Using spe- cialised software and engaging a professional typesetter to help build the files, he compiled a digital atlas layer by layer. His expertise as an ophthalmologist was relevant to the project, because he used only those colours and patterns of demarcation which create contrasts that are optimal for the human eye; this also explains why the back- ground to all maps is grey instead of white. During the final years of the author’s life discussions with IDC Publishers (which was later taken over by Brill) about an online publi- cation stranded because the technical hurdles were insurmountable. Despite technological advances, these challenges are still difficult to overcome, so it was decided to publish the atlas in print first. The Atlas of Southeast Europe is published several years after the au- thor’s death. Colin Heywood edited the author’s General Historical Survey, while the original typesetter Hötte had worked with, Huibert Stolker, extracted the maps included in this volume from the complex files in the author’s estate. Three external peer reviewers provided invaluable suggestions for improvements, after which Dr. Moniká F. Molnár copy edited both the texts and the maps. The atlas contains two types of maps: survey maps, which rep- resent a static situation at the beginning of a (CE) calendar year, and detailed maps which zoom in on particular events. Each new section begins with a survey map, which shows the situation immediately af- ter the events of the previous section. Volume One of the atlas ends in the year 1699, when the Treaty of Carlowitz heralded a new phase in the region’s history. That new phase will be covered in Volume Two. The publisher gratefully acknowledges the support and patience of Hans Hötte’s widow, Doris Hötte-Wintgens. The conscientiousness of Huibert Stolker and his team at Stip Grafisch Ontwerp (Marjolein, Joris and Valentine) has significantly contributed to the quality of the atlas. Maurits van den Boogert BRILL 5