YITZCHAK BLAU The Implications of a Jewish Virtue Ethic In 1958, the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe launched a major trend in recent moral philosophy when she argued that the ethical philosophy of the previous few centuries had been mistakenly preoccu- pied with rules and laws.1This law-centered approach, she argued, is an anachronistic remnant of a society that believed in a Divine law-giver. In the contemporary agnostic culture, Anscombe called for a return to the ethics of the Greeks in general and of Aristotle in particular. Aristotle’s classic work on ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, plays down specific rules and obligations. Rather, Aristotle writes of the character traits which belong to the virtuous individual or flourishing person. From this perspective, ethics represents the attempt to become temper- ate, courageous, magnanimous, and so on. The Anscombe/Aristotle approach has becomeknown among philosophers as “virtue ethics.” Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1981 book After Virtuebrought this view into greater prominence and developed it with a higher degree of sophisti- cation.2 MacIntyre claims that it was the loss of a clear notion of a flourishing human being which had led modern philosophers away from Aristotle to their focus on a rule-based ethic. Like Anscombe, MacIntyre advocates a return to the Aristotelian view. However, unlike Anscombe, MacIntyre explicitly endorses the need for some rules within his ethical system. Some writers describe the shift from a rule-based system to a virtue ethic as a movement from “act morality” to “agent morality.” Indeed, YITZCHAKBLAUteaches at Yeshivat Hamivtar in Efrat, Israel. Rabbi Blau has pub- lished articles on Jewish thought and Jewish education. 19 The Torah u-Madda Journal (9/2000) 20 The Torah u-Madda Journal Aristotle makes this difference clear when he distinguishes between the arts and the virtues. “The products of the arts have their goodness in themselves . . . but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. . . . [The agent’s actions must] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”3 Here, Aristotle shifts the focus of ethics from the act to the agent. A Jewish Virtue Ethic This recent trend in modern philosophy has led Jewish thinkers to inquire whether virtue ethics belongs within a Jewish world view. It would, of course, be absurd to claim that Judaism advocates that we do away with rules and laws altogether, as the Halakhah is full of concrete demands in both the personal and interpersonal spheres. However, the Halakhahmay combine a notion of law together with a virtue ethic. In a series of articles and in his book, Ethics of Responsibility,Rabbi Walter Wurzburger forcefully advances just such a thesis.4 Wurzburger argues that Jewish law includes a virtue ethic derived from the miz.vah of ve-halakhta bi-derakhav, imitatio Dei (Deut. 28:9).5 H.azal offer two descriptions of how to perform this miz.vah. Some sources say that just as God clothes the naked, visits the sick and com- forts the bereaved, so must we (Sotah 14a, Tanh.uma Va-Yishlah. 10). Other sources say that just as God is merciful and compassionate, so must we be (Shabbat l33b, Sifrei to Deut. 11:22). While the first set of sources focus on imitating God’s actions, the latter set focus on imitating His attributes.6 Rambam serves as the linchpin of Wurzburger’s thesis. In Sefer ha- Miz.vot, Rambam sees this miz.vah as requiring imitation of both actions and attributes.7 However, in Mishneh Torah, Rambam cites only the source which demands particular character traits.8Indeed, Rambam dis- cusses the acts of kindness in a completely different section of Mishneh Torah.9 Wurzburger suggests that Rambam split the two components of ethical life in order to emphasize that the miz.vah of imitatio Dei refers specifically to emulating attributes.10 Wurzburger offers a number of other supporting texts for his understanding of Rambam. Rambam demands that we repent from bad traits, which seems to point to the traits being a value in themselves.11 Furthermore, Rambam prefers the giving of a thousand individual coins to different paupers to the giving of a thousand coins to one poor per- Yitzchak Blau 21 son, as the repeated acts of charity have a greater impact on the person- ality of the giver than does the single large donation.12 Again, the traits have value independently of the acts. A striking theory in Rambam’s Shemonah Perakim, his introduction to Avot, also coheres with this understanding. Rambam asks who is greater: the h.asid who naturally wants to do the right thing, or the kovesh yez.er who overcomes his inclinations to do evil? Rambam sets up an apparent contradiction between the view of the Greek philosophers together with the simple reading of the biblical verses which both por- tray the h.asid as ideal, and statements in the literature of H.azal which seem to prefer the kovesh yez.er. Rambam resolves the contradiction by distinguishing between conventionally accepted miz.vot such as murder and theft and miz.votthat come only from God (such as the prohibitions against eating basar ve-h.alavand wearing sha‘atnez). With regard to the former, a h.asid ranks higher; with regard to the latter, the kovesh yez.er reigns supreme.13 While Rambam does not mention imitatio Dei in the above analy- sis, such a notion provides halakhic justification for the distinction he offers. On the one hand, no miz.vah is fulfilled in disliking sha‘atnez clothing and therefore, the kovesh yez.er’s devotion to the Halakhah is superior. On the other hand, becoming the type of person who has no desire to steal fulfills the Divine directive of ve-halakhta bi-derakhavand represents the highest form of service.14 Wurzburger emphasizes that the virtue ethic does not argue for feelings of compassion on the pragmatic grounds that the benevolent person will then most likely fulfill his or her interpersonal obligations.15 Rather, the virtue ethic views the cultivation of such traits as a value in its own right, irrespective of its impact on practice. Our kiyyum ha- miz.vah of ve-halakhta bi-derakhav grants such cultivation intrinsic rather than instrumental value.16 The teachings of the Rav, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, may have stimulated Rabbi Wurzburger’s thinking regarding this issue. The Rav describes ve-halakhta bi-derakhav as not just another miz.vah but as the “foundation of Jewish ethics.”17 Furthermore, the Rav clearly sees the emulation of character traits as intrinsic to the miz.vah:“When a person visits the sick, he must join in with their pain; when he comforts the mourners, he must mourn with them in his heart; and when he gives a person charity, he must bear that person’s burden and empathize with his pain.”18 Wurzburger’s argument represents a shift from the understanding 22 The Torah u-Madda Journal of previously published material on Rambam’s writings. Shalom Rosenberg,19 Leon Roth,20 and Herbert Davidson21 all read Rambam as advocating an imitatio Dei of action and not attributes. They point out that according to Rambam’s doctrine of negative attributes, nothing positive can be said about God’s nature. We can describe only God’s actions but not His attributes.22If so, imitation of God can include only actions and not character traits. This is the notion of imitatio Dei as Rambam expounds it in his Guide of the Perplexed.23 For Wurzburger, however, the above problem precisely explains why Rambam employs the text of the Sifrei on imitatio Dei rather than the more standard text of the Babylonian Talmud. Rambam eschewed the talmudic text (Shabbat 133b) that says “mah Hu rah.um” (“just as He is merciful”) in favor of the Sifreiwhich says “mah Hu nikra rah.um” (“just as He is calledmerciful”) because the doctrine of negative attributes ren- ders it impossible to satisfy the quest to emulate Divine properties. The addition of the word “nikra” allows Rambam to accept imitation of how we perceive the Divine.24 In agreement with Wurzburger, I see no reason to reject the view presented in Mishneh Torahin favor of the view presented in the Guide. Rambam’s Sefer ha-Miz.vot explicitly acknowledges the philosophic problem animating the Guide—that one cannot attribute positive attributes to God—and yet Rambam still demands emulating attributes. Rambam writes that we are commanded “to emulate God’s actions and attributes with regard to which God is depicted by way of analogy.”25 Furthermore, as we have seen, the focus on attributes is a consistent theme of numerous passages in both Mishneh Torah26 and the Com- mentary on the Mishnah.27 Finally, the ensuing years of Jewish scholar- ship have revealed many sources which concur with the view expressed in Mishneh Torah. A perusal of medieval sifrei ha-miz.vot reveals that both positions have their adherents. Some authors of sifrei ha-miz.vot differentiated between miz.vot ha-teluyot ba-guf and miz.vot ha-teluyot ba-lev. R. Isaac of Corbeille’s Sefer Miz.vot Ketannot places ve-halakhta bi-derakhav in the category of physically performed miz.vot,28 while R. Eliezer Azkiri’s Sefer H.aredim locates this miz.vah in the category of the teluyot ba-lev.29 While R. Isaac would say that the miz.vahdemands clothing the sick and burying the dead, R. Eliezer would see it as mandating the cultivation of an ethical personality. Yitzchak Blau 23 Logical Implications of the Virtue Ethic In discussing the implications of a Jewish incorporation of the virtue ethic, Wurzburger focuses on the expanded sphere of ethical activity.30A rule-oriented ethic might limit virtuous behavior to a set of prescribed laws. Conversely, a virtue-based morality demands that the agent con- stantly be animated by ethical character traits. Thus, the virtue ethic prevents a narrow halakhic legalism that views anything not explicitly forbidden by the Halakhah as ethically neutral. As we shall soon see, rabbinic sources do indeed employ imitatio Dei frequently, to expand the parameters of ethical action. However, the sig- nificance of the virtue ethic need not be limited to expanding the realm of ethical activity. The virtue ethic also impacts on the very actions man- dated by the Halakhah in terms of the motivation for their performance. In order to understand this point, we must survey some of the philo- sophical discussion regarding the proper motive for ethical behavior. Discussions of the optimum motivation for ethical acts often begin with the striking position of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, one must act ethically not in order to produce a particular result, and not out of feelings of compassion, but rather as a fulfillment of duty. Kant denies moral worth to the individual who is motivated to act ethically either out of self-interest or out of feelings of sympathy.31 Scholars debate what the Kantian position says about cases of mul- tiple motives, where a person acts ethically both because of adherence to duty and due to feelings of sympathy. Friedrich Schiller, the German poet, understands Kant to mean that the sympathetic feelings detract from the performance of duty and points out the resulting absurdity that such a view ascribes greater moral virtue to a person who despises his or her friends than a person who likes those friends.32Recently, sev- eral philosophers have argued that Kant would have had no problem with a secondary motive as long as the will to fulfill one’s duty could have sufficed as an independent motive. However, even the latter group concedes that sympathy plays a minor role in the Kantian scheme.33 Conversely, according to Aristotle, the virtuous man acts ethically because such is his nature. Contrary to Kant, Aristotle viewed pleasure in doing the right thing as a positive and even necessary component of the moral personality.34 If we view virtue as a state of character, then pleasure in acting virtuously reveals a correct character. The charitable individual delights in assisting the destitute and requires no compulsion in order to do so. 24 The Torah u-Madda Journal Yeshayahu Leibowitz argues that the proper motivation for conduct according to Jewish law most closely resembles the Kantian ethic. Of course, Kant saw autonomous human reason as the source for deter- mining our duty, while a Jewish Kantian sees the Divine command as the source. Nevertheless, the common denominator is that both value a particular motivation for behaving morally, namely the performance of one’s duty.35 However, according to a Jewish virtue ethic, the cultivation of a benevolent personality reflects the fulfillment of a Divine directive. If so, one who successfully develops the trait of benevolence will want to give charity or comfort a mourner irrespective of the specific miz.vah to do so. A person’s need to consistently struggle against inclination in order to adhere to these miz.votwould indicate that such a person has not ade- quately fulfilled imitatio Dei.36 Two examples may help illustrate the point. Imagine a father asking an older brother to take care of his younger sibling out of love for a fam- ily member. If the older brother thinks that he must look out for the younger brother solely because his father said so, he fails to fulfill the parental directive. His father requested that the elder son feel loving familial ties with the younger brother, and not merely that the elder per- form the actions of consideration toward the younger. Friendship provides another analogy. Smith and Jones, two old friends, separate for a brief period. During that time, Jones becomes friendly with Lewis. Jones introduces Smith to Lewis in the hope that they will feel a similar bond. Unfortunately, Smith does not like Lewis, and he shows friendship to Lewis only to make Jones happy. When Jones finds out, he expresses his disappointment, as he had wanted his two friends to truly feel friendship for each other. Jones may even ask Smith to cultivate feelings of friendship toward Lewis. In both of the above examples, the instructor, the father or Jones, wanted the listener to feel the same feelings toward a third party as he did. In an analogous fashion, God desires that we care for the rest of humanity as He does: not out of compulsion to comply with a com- mandment, but out of an independent will to achieve this result. However, the older brother need not forget the father’s role in com- manding him to cultivate feelings of brotherhood. Thus, the virtue ethic does not obliterate the sense of duty. The Rav utilizes the notion of imitatio Dei as the bridge between two conflicting impulses of the religious personality. On the one hand, a religious person desires the ethical freedom to create his own norms. Yitzchak Blau 25 On the other hand, he or she yearns for complete subjugation to the Divine Will. Cultivation of the ethical personality in imitation of God allows for maintaining both sides of the dialectic. As Wurzburger explains the Rav’s position, “once commandments are internalized, they are no longer experienced as heteronomously imposed imperatives. Instead, at this level human beings become partners with God in the creation of the norm.”37 Until now, we have mentioned cases in which both the ethic of duty and the ethic of virtue lead to the same result: helping others. Now we shall turn to the more controversial case of a clash between the ethic of duty and the ethic of virtue. The Halakhah at times demands actions that conflict with our feelings of compassion. David Shatz analyzes situations in which a person does the morally wrong thing as an expression of virtuous character traits.38For example, four people risk their lives in a foolhardy attempt to save the life of someone with little chance of survival. According to Shatz, most non- Jewish ethical theories praise such people because the expression of virtue creates a “halo effect” which clouds over the moral wrongdoing. Judaism, with its heavily legalistic stress, rejects such a “halo effect.” Even if Judaism does not allow the ethic of virtue to override halakhic principles, it may allow for a different interaction between legal duty and the virtue ethic. Whenever a clash exists, Judaism demands that duty, in the form of adherence to the governing halakhah, take precedence. However, the ethic of virtue will still find expression as it will determine the feelings of the person as he or she performs that duty. If we adopt a virtue ethic, a feeling of compassion must pervade all aspects of a person’s life, as that feeling reflects his or her essence. Unlike an ethic of duty which can be limited by the parameters of that duty, an ethic of virtue must always express itself. The virtue ethic relates to the core of a person’s personality and that core does not change from act to act. As MacIntyre writes, “although the virtues are just those qualities which tend to lead to the achievement of a certain class of goods, nonetheless unless we practice them irrespective of whether in any set of contingent circumstances they will produce those goods or not, we can- not possess them at all. We cannot be genuinely courageous or truthful and be so only on occasion.”39 Therefore, the virtuous (and compassion- ate) personality should experience a difference between his or her feelings toward constructive and destructive miz.vot. He or she performs the for- mer willingly and the latter reluctantly. Thus, the miz.vot of destroying 26 The Torah u-Madda Journal Amalek and the seven nations would require a fight against our natural inclinations, and we would have to marshal our sense of duty as the sole motivation. We have now argued on logical grounds for three implications of the virtue ethic. First, such an ethic will expand the parameters of halakhic ethical behavior. Second, such an ethic will encourage a desire to perform interpersonal miz.votfor reasons other than their being com- manded. Third, the performance of destructive miz.votwill be motivated solely by the Divine command. We will now discuss the accuracy of these three claims in classic rabbinic sources. One caveat deserves mention prior to analyzing sources supporting the first claim. While ve-halakhta bi-derakhav could serve as the source for a virtue ethic and thereby expand the realm of halakhic ethical behavior, it could just as easily create a similar expansion by demanding an imitation of benevolent actions (the view of the gemarain Sotah and R. Isaac of Corbeille). In other words, we must help others in situations not explicitly mandated either because Halakhah demands that we be compassionate in nature or because we emulate God, whose actions are always compassionate. If so, rabbinic utilization of imitatio Dei to gen- erate new obligations illustrates the significance of imitatio Dei, but does not prove the virtue ethic. Nevertheless, such source material may reflect a halakhic virtue ethic. Expanding the Parameters of Ethics The notion of imitatio Dei as an expanding force may help solve the perennial problem of the seeming inadequacy of elements of the Jewish ethic. For example, the halakhah that lost objects of gentiles need not be returned (Bava Kamma 113b) appears to be beneath the Torah’s high standards. However, if imitatio Dei demands that people behave ethically beyond the explicit halakhic commands, then the Torah does mandate much more than it initially appears to. A large number of sources testify to the fact that halakhists through- out Jewish history employ a general command to be ethical as a creator of new obligations. Their usage of the phrases “mah Hu af attah” and “God’s mercies are on all His works” (Psalms 145:9) clearly reveals imi- tatio Deias the source of these obligations. If God’s mercy extends to all, then in our imitation, our mercy must likewise extend even to the wicked, the undeserving, gentiles, slaves, and animals.40 Let us focus on these briefly, in turn. Yitzchak Blau 27 The Wicked: According to the “Alter of Slabodka,” R. Natan Z.evi Finkel, Abraham’s praying for Sodom was an expression of “mah Hu af attah.” Just as God cares for the wicked, so must man. In a strikingly powerful formulation, the Alter claims that not stepping forward on behalf of the Sodomites would have represented a lacuna in Abraham’s middat ha-h.esed—for which he would have been punished. Other twen- tieth-century ba‘alei musar, such as R. Avraham Grodzinski42 and R. H.azkel Levenstein,43also saw ve-halakhta bi-derakhav as creating a man- date for mercy toward the wicked. The Undeserving: R. Aharon Lichtenstein deals with the question of whether to give charity to poor people who make no effort of their own to obtain a livelihood. R. Lichtenstein distinguishes between two sources of gemilut h.asadim: ve-ahavta le-re‘akha kamokha and ve-halakhta bi- derakhav. While the former would not mandate charity to those who do not help themselves, the latter would. Man must emulate God’s care for the non-deserving (Berakhot7a). 44 Gentiles: We support the gentile poor and visit their sick because of “darkei shalom” (Gittin 61b). Some interpret darkei shalom to reflect a pragmatic consideration, similar to “mi-shum eivah.”45 Rambam, how- ever, explicates darkei shalom using the verse “God’s mercies are on all His works.”46 This prooftext clearly implies that, according to Rambam, darkei shalomis derived from the ethical mandate of imitatio Dei. Many authorities argue further that Jews are in fact commanded to love gentiles. This list includes people as diverse as R. H.ayyim Vital,47 R. Pinh.as Horowitz (author of Sefer ha-Berit),48R. Simh.a Zissel Ziv,49R. Yaakov Emden,50 R. Z.vi Yaakov Mecklenberg51 and R. Avraham Yiz.h.ak Kook.52 R. Kook emphasizes this love for all beings as a fundamental component of the religious personality. The above authorities do not all explicitly link loving gentiles with imitatio Dei,but such a linkage would provide halakhic ground for the bold step they take.53 Furthermore, if the love demanded relates to an emotional state and not just behavior, then only the imitation of character traits could provide halakhic justifi- cation for such a demand. Slaves: While there exist many halakhotwhich protect the Jewish slave, the eved kena‘anireceives less care in explicit halakhic sources. Rambam’s closing halakhahin Hilkhot Avadimaddresses this issue powerfully: It is permitted to work a heathen slave with rigor. Though such is the rule, it is the quality of superlegal piety and the way of wisdom that a man be merciful and pursue justice and not make his yoke heavy on the slave or distress him, but give him to eat and drink of all foods and 28 The Torah u-Madda Journal drinks. . . . Cruelty and effrontery are not frequent except with the hea- then who worship idols. The children of our father Abraham, however— i.e., the Israelites—upon whom the Holy One, Blessed Be He, bestowed the favor of the law and laid upon them statutes and judgments, are mer- ciful people who have mercy upon all. Thus also it is declared by the attributes of the Holy One, Blessed Be He, which we are enjoined to imi- tate: And His tender mercies are over all His works.54 As R. Yosef Karo already notes in his Kesef Mishneh, Rambam did not base this statement on a clear talmudic source. R. Karo writes, “These are the words of the master and they are appropriate for him.”55 In fact, as the final sentence of the text makes clear, Rambam does have a more general talmudic basis: he simply applies the miz.vah of ve- halakhtabi-derakhav. Animals: The Talmud (Bava Mez.i‘a 32b) suggests that the prohibi- tion against z.a‘ar ba‘aleih.ayyim, causing pain to animals, is biblical, but does not reveal its biblical source. R. Menah.em ha-Meiri traces the source back to the prohibition against muzzling an animal working the field.56 Both R. Elazar Azkiri57 and R. Mosheh Sofer58 employ “God’s mercy is on all His works” as the source. This echoes a talmudic story about R. Yehudah ha-Nasi in which kindness to animals emerges from that same verse (Bava Mez.i‘a 85a). A similar spirit may have animated R. Yeh.ezkel Landau’s declaration that hunting for sport, though not necessarily technically forbidden, is “not the way of the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”59 As mentioned above, the expansion of obligations created by imita- tio Dei can help deal with some of the apparent moral lacunae of the Halakhah. However, a critic may still ask why the Torah did not demand ethical behavior more directly, without need of this general miz.vah. R. Avraham Yiz.h.ak ha-Kohen Kook offers a startling explanation in a letter to R. Mosheh Zeidel. R. Kook argues that making an explicit miz.vahfor every ethical requirement would actually destroy ethics because it would cut off the possibility of voluntary ethical choices. He writes, “That which is added by good intention and the spirit of giving must be [counted as] middat h.asidut, and if these exalted virtues were set as fixed obligations, the harm suffered by humanity would be immeasur- able.”60R. Kook adds a powerful statement on the need for autonomous moral sentiments. Admittedly, R. Kook’s idea fails to address the problem fully, since a critic may still ask why particular items were left open for voluntary realization while others were explicitly mandated. God could have