Canadian  Journal  of  Disability  Studies       Published  by  the  Canadian  Disability  Studies  Association   Association  Canadienne  des  Études  sur  l'Incapacité       Hosted  by  The  University  of  Waterloo       www.cjds.uwaterloo.ca     [email protected] Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       Being-towards-death and Taxes: Heidegger, Disability and the Ontological Difference Thomas Abrams, M.A., Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University [email protected] Abstract Phenomenological disability studies seek to bridge the gap between the personal experience and cultural production of disability. This paper illustrates the manner in which the everyday experience of disability is shaped into a coherent object within the Canadian federal income tax regime. The Canada Revenue Agency's T2201 Disability Tax Credit Certificate is an essential component in this regard, allowing successful applicants access to tax credits and other programs aimed at offsetting the costs of impairment faced by disabled Canadians. This paper employs Martin Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference—the distinction between beings as merely present objects and Being as human experience—to highlight some of the difficulties faced translating human experience into bureaucratic categories. The argument proceeds as follows. First, the paper reviews the existing phenomenological disability studies literature and reviews the relevant work of Martin Heidegger. Next, the T2201 form is introduced and discussed in light of the ontological difference. By viewing disability as a merely present being, and not a way of Being, a great deal of experience is left out—especially that of exclusion. The paper concludes by highlighting the dividends of the second section, both in terms of future tax forms, and the future of disability studies. Keywords phenomenology, tax forms, Martin Heidegger, ontology, ontological difference   28 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       Being-towards-death and Taxes: Heidegger, Disability and the Ontological Difference William James (1996) stated that "the problem of being is the darkest in all philosophy" (p.46).1 This problem is the starting point for phenomenology. Phenomenological approaches to disability have tried to shed light on the following question: what is the relationship between the cultural production of disability and the experience of the disabled? In this paper, I seek to apply the phenomenological method to the bureaucratic administration of disability through Canadian Federal income tax forms. A key and potentially problematic component of these forms, I argue, lies in the manner in which the experience of disability is made accountable and objectively presentable through administrative categories. This is an instance of what philosopher Martin Heidegger (1996) calls the 'ontological difference': the distinction between beings as objects and Being as human experience. Below, I first provide a brief review of phenomenological disability studies. Next, I demonstrate what the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger offers us, and use the Canadian T2201 Disability Tax Credit Certificate as an example. I conclude with some implications for disability studies and provide suggestions for future research. Phenomenological approaches to disability vary quite widely in their subject matter. Here, I seek to review some of their key similarities. First and foremost is the notion of 'embodiment'. Some background is required. Beginning with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1962), phenomenologists have argued that the lived experience of the body has been generally ignored in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an examination of early twentieth century psychological work on perception, particularly that of Koffka (1935), Merleau-Ponty sought to reconcile the lived body (German: lieb) with the body-                                                                                                                 1 I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Award number 737-2010-1495) for generously providing financial support for this project.   29 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       as-object (körper), to highlight the role of the body as the basis of human experience. For Merleau-Ponty, to be human is to be embodied. This position is a critique of the Cartesian cogito, the argument that the human mind is made of thinking substance (res cogitans), and the world is made of physical substance (res extensia), our bodies included. In contrast, phenomenologists have argued that the rigid distinctions between mind and world, body and mind are unable to accurately represent what it means to be a human being in the everyday 'life- world' (German: lebenswelt). Simply: human being is embodied and cannot be reduced to dualistic categories without great loss. With this philosophical background in place, we turn to phenomenological disability studies. Applying Merleau-Ponty's work, Kevin Paterson and Bill Hughes (1999) seek to bridge the theoretical underpinning of corporeal sociology with the critical aims of disability studies. They seek: Firstly, to bring to disability studies a sense of embodiment in the lebenswelt, and, secondly, to counter, simultaneously, phenomenology's 'undersocialized' approach to disability and disability studies' 'oversocialized' approach to the experience of disability. (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 604) Here Paterson and Hughes encounter a theme common within phenomenological approaches: employing the notion of embodiment to counter dualistic thinking about disability (for a detailed discussion of the two arguments, see Aho & Aho, 2008). Their primary target is the so-called 'social model of disability', originating in the work of Michael Oliver (Oliver, Oliver, 1986; 1990). Dominant within early UK disability studies, the social model of disability seeks a radical distinction between impairment, as biological malfunction, and disability, as social oppression (this distinction borrowed from the Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation, 1975) The social model approach is barrier-focused, and highlights the exclusion of impaired subjects from material life. Paterson and Hughes, however, see the social model as an   30 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       example of Cartesian dualism par excellence, arguing that the impairment/disability dichotomy is a barrier to the accurate portrayal of what it means to be a disabled body. Simply, Paterson and Hughes maintain that the rigid divide between medical pathology and oppression cannot account for the experience of embodiment. Hughes (1999; 2000) argues that the dualistic ontology underpinning social model thinking is unable to account for the modern 'aesthetic of oppression', in which abject, disabled bodies have been located throughout that period of Western History. This aesthetic is more than a gaze; it informs practice as well as sensuous apprehension. "Bodies are not simply seen, they are also read, and through categories which place them in a hierarchy of bodies." (Hughes, 1999, p. 163) Hughes argues that disability is anathema to the modern 'will to order', a messy problem to be managed by the institutions of modernity. Many of these institutions find their raison d'être in the creation and management of strangers; the discipline of sociology is a notable institution in this regard. Following the philosophy of Georges Canguilhem (1989) and Michel Foucault (2006), Hughes seeks to problematize the 'the natural' and 'the essential' aspects of disability and emphasize its historical nature as a social problem. Similar to Hughes above, Turner (Turner, 2001) seeks to augment the phenomenological concept of embodiment with Foucault's notion of 'governmentality' (Foucault, 2003). That is, he is interested with the 'conduct of conduct', the manner in which disabled bodies have been governed over time. Used in this sense, 'government' refers to any practice that shapes disabled subjectivities, be it enacted within medicine, social work or psychiatry. Each of these institutions participates in defining disability as an explicit object and a problem to be managed. Turner's project seeks to isolate the regimes of truth in which disabled bodies have been located and to provide an account of what it means to be a disabled person so subjected (for a similar   31 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       project outline, see Hacking, 2004). Though Hughes criticizes Turner's politics, each of the two authors seeks to describe the manner in which disabled bodies are culturally shaped, and circumscribes the manner in which they have been governed historically, both within biomedicine and without. Similar to the work of Turner, Hughes and Paterson, Tanya Titchkosky (Titchkosky, 2006; 2007) employs Merleau-Ponty's somatic phenomenology in her discussion of the enactment of disability within the "everyday life of print". (Titchkosky, 2007, p. 11) For Titchkosky, text is not an apolitical mediator through which meaning is benignly transferred from an author to a receiving public. Texts are produced through oriented social action, and emerge from a particular sociomaterial location, the products of which deeply impact the manner in which embodied selves encounter disability, either directly or through regimes of governance. Thus, for Titchkosky: "[what] is written on and read about disability acts to gesture the type of world that grounds the possibility of disability having the meaning that it does." (Titchkosky, 2007, p. 20) The fact that texts shape the cultural meaning attached to disability, and that these meanings seeps into the everyday experience of and with disability, makes her work phenomenological. Hence her 2007 subtitle: "The Textured Life of Embodiment". It is not only phenomenological, however. Titchkosky enlists a vast army of thinkers in the social sciences and humanities in her exegesis of disability-in-text. Next I single out but one member of this cohort. A key concept employed throughout Titchkosky's hermeneutics is that of the "god trick", borrowed from Donna Haraway's (1988) feminist social theory. The "god trick" represents the process through which textual production, which is always produced in a culturally-entrenched commonplace or topos, has its situated heritage erased, so as to produce the illusion that the   32 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       perspective it presents is a "view from nowhere"—an objective, unbiased and de-situated location (Haraway, 1994, p. 58). For Haraway, and thus for Titchkosky, this is impossible. All texts are socially-situated doings. They represent the partial perspectives of their authors, and rely on other adjacent texts, similarly influenced, for support. In terms of disability: the objective, context-free facts presented "about" disability perform this "god trick". I use "about" since for Titchkosky disability is only made a socially relevant entity through intertextual production. Not only this: facts purportedly "about" disability are not only alienated from the authors who produce these textual accounts, but disability-as-fact is also alienated from the embodied social contexts in which it is experienced and produced, as well. Titchkosky cites the "god trick" in her analysis of Canadian federal policy documents "about" disability: [Here to] think about disability is to think of some individuals with some functional problem; it is not to think about how the notion 'functional' is a socially organized term with a highly contingent usage that presupposes a rather mechanical version of the body and is sometimes even used to imagine embodiment as somehow separate from the socio-politico milieu within which bodies always appear. (Titchkosky, 2007, pp. 55-56) For Titchkosky, these texts perform two sorts of erasure: the cloaking of the social relations in which the documents are produced, and the elimination (or, stated more charitably, 'bracketing') of the social conditions in which disability is experienced by those so characterized. Below, I will argue that a crucial component of the T2201 tax form lies in this second form of erasure (undoubtedly, the first form of erasure is present as well). Before we move on, a caveat: I do not mean to suggest that this brief summary reflects the entirety of Titchkosky's phenomenological contributions (an example: for a critical account of disability's place in the phenomenological lebenswelt, see Titchkosky & Michalko, 2012). It does, however, situate her work suitably in respect to my main goal, a phenomenological exegesis of the T2201 form. We will encounter her work again below.   33 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       So far, this review of phenomenological disability studies has been restricted to work applying Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodiment. Next, I would like to move to the work of Michael Schillmeier. His work is important for two reasons. First, he takes an empirical approach to lived experience, the experience of blindness in particular, absent in the literature discussed to this point. This is in contrast to the abstract theoretical formulations we have seen up to this point. Secondly, Schillmeier's work is an excellent application of the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Before attending to that application, I would like to make a few remarks about the relationship between the Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontyian approaches. What is particularly useful in the transition to the Heideggerian phenomenological approach is the movement from embodiment to Being. As both Aho (2005) and Askay (1999) indicate, while there are a great many similarities between the Heideggerian and Merleau- Pontyian approaches—as there should be, considering the former's considerable influence on the latter—there are some notable differences as well. For my present purposes, the most important of these relates what I will call the problem of subjectivity.2 For Merleau-Ponty, it is through an analysis of perception that we find that the human body fundamentally grounds our entry into the world. From the Phenomenology of Perception: We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective and detached knowledge which we have of it in virtue of its always being with us and the fact that we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self, and, as it were, the subject of perception. (Emphasis mine. Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 206)                                                                                                                 2 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.   34 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       Here we see that for Merleau-Ponty, while the lived body cannot be divided from the body-as- object, the analysis of perception yields an account of embodied subjectivity. Here we find a fundamental divergence from Heidegger's analysis of Being. In his Letter on Humanism (1993), Heidegger addresses the work of his French contemporaries3. There, he situates the existentialism of the French phenomenologists within the humanistic tradition, and that tradition within the history of metaphysics. Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough. Of course, the essential worth of man does not consist in his being the substance of beings, as the "Subject" among them, so that as the tyrant of Being he may deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly bruited "objectivity." (Heidegger, 1993, p. 210) For Heidegger, while Merleau-Ponty's analysis of somatic being may indeed be correct, his conclusions about the ontological primacy of the embodied human subject are not (see above). Where Merleau-Ponty attempts to overcome Cartesian dualism through his notion of embodiment and body schema, Heidegger suggests that Being is ontologically more primary: it must exist first and before embodied being, or any other sort of being for that matter, can emerge. Man is never first and foremost a man on the hither side of the world, as a "subject", whether this is taken as "I" or "We". Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which is always simultaneously related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that lights the "between" within which a "relation" of subject to object can "be." (Heidegger, 1993, p. 229) For Heidegger, any attempt to encapsulate the experience of human being within the framework of 'subjectivity' will inevitably fall victim to the metaphysical nature of that framework: one that posits a pre-existing objective world and an autonomous subject that engages its contents. Thus,                                                                                                                 3 Regrettably, Heidegger employs androcentric terminology throughout the essay. I place one warning here at the outset of my analysis, to avoid unnecessary confusion by amending the cited text too frequently.   35 Abrams, "Being-towards-death and Taxes" CJDS 2.1 (January 2013)       Heidegger's problem is not with 'Cartesian dualism' per se, but rather Cartesianism, a set of philosophical claims about the contents and structure of the world, defined singly in terms of res extensia (this is dealt with extensively in Being and Time. See Heidegger, 1996, 18-21). For this reason he eschews the term 'subjectivity' (for a political, rather than philosophical, objection to 'humanism' and 'subjectivity' as founding concepts for disability studies, see Overboe, 2012). Even Merleau-Ponty would later accept this, stating: "the problems posed in the Phenomenology of Perception are insoluble because I start there from the "consciousness"-"object" distinction." (Merleau-Ponty in Aho, 2005, p. 19) In the Letter on Humanism Heidegger traces the emergence of 'the subject' within the history of Western metaphysics. Similarly, my goal here is to map the manner in which disabled subjects are (in-part) produced in and through bureaucratic categories, similar to the work of Titchkosky above. My preference for the work of Martin Heidegger stems from his fundamental concern with Being, and its (reductive) interpretation in terms of mere beings, as seen in the example of Descartes. This is not to discount the work of Merleau-Ponty. The T2201 story certainly has to do with bodies, but, more fundamentally, it has to do with the translation of experience into objective categories. It is for this reason that I apply the work of Heidegger. To this end we turn to Michael Schillmeier, whose work will serve as an excellent introduction to Heidegger's philosophy. Here I take two pieces by Michael Schillmeier as representative of his corpus, "Dis/Abling Practices: Rethinking Disability" (2007) and "Time-Spaces of In/dependence and Dis/ability" (2008). In both papers, Schillmeier provides an impressive synthesis of actor- network theory and Heideggerian phenomenology (for introductions to both traditions, respectively, see Heidegger, 1992; Latour, 2004). In short, Schillmeier seeks to identify the   36