NEWSLETTER NEWSLETTER NNoo.. 1100--1166 DDEECC 0099 TTaaccttiiccss,, TTeecchhnniiqquueess,, aanndd PPrroocceedduurreess AApppprroovveedd ffoorr PPuubblliicc RReelleeaassee,, DDiissttrriibbuuttiioonn UUnnlliimmiitteedd CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY Foreword Thisinauguraleditionofthe CivilSupportandtheU.S.ArmyNewsletter isintendedtoprovideaforum forongoingdiscussionsandeffortsbalancingtheinvolvementandparticipationoftoday’sfederaland statemilitaryforcesonthe“homelandbattlefield.”The“homelandbattlefield”couldbeacoastalcityhit byacatastrophichurricane,alocationontheU.S.border,acontainerandshipyard,astreetriotinmajor city,achampionship-levelfootballgame,abridgecollapse,orevenapoliticalparty’sconvention. FollowingaMay2009FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)meeting,PresidentObama stated,“Truepreparednessmeanshavingfederalandstateandlocalgovernmentsallcoordinating effectively.”Whatcouldoncebecharacterizedasa“hand-waverelationship”betweenthemilitaryand federal,state,andothercivilianagenciesandfirstrespondersfordisastersorshort-durationeventsnow hasbecomeafullembracetofacilitatevictoryandsurvival.Additionally,since9/11,theDepartmentof Defensewastaskedto“...provideforcesandcapabilitiesinsupportofdomesticchemical,biological, radiological,nuclear,high-yieldexplosiveconsequencemanagement,withanemphasisonpreparingfor multiple,simultaneousmasscasualtyincidents.” Thiscollectionofarticlesisasamplingofcivilsupport,hot-buttontopicsandwillexposesomeofthe differencesamongvariousfederal,state,othercivilianagenciesandfirstresponders,andthediverse challengeseachfaceintheirareasofresponsibility. Theprimaryaudienceforthisnewsletterincludes:Armyleaders,planners,andoperators;the DepartmentofHomelandSecurity;U.S.NorthernCommand;U.S.ArmyNorth;FEMA;theNational GuardBureau;andotherlocal,state,andfederalgovernmentalagenciesexecutingdefensesupportof civilauthoritiesoperations.Formationofnewpartnershipsandrelationshipsmustoccur,alongwiththe creationofnewproficienciesintraining,rehearsals,andcollaborativecommunications.These partnershipsandrelationshipswillpromoteanenhancedunderstandingoforganizationalcapabilities andlimitations. Futurevolumesofthisnewsletterwillcontinuetocaptureandsolicitarticleshighlightinghigh-quality examplesofcivilsupportwithoutinhibitingdiscussiononareasneedingimprovement. Itrustyouwill findthesearticlesinformativeandconsiderusingthemasdeskreferencesonthesecriticalissues. ThankyouforyourinputstodateandIlookforwardtoyourfuturecivilsupportcontributions. i CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY Civil Support and the U.S. Army Newsletter TableofContents Introduction 1 DepartmentofDefenseSupporttoDomesticIncidents 3 ArmyPostureStatement2009Extracts 9 CommandandControl:CommandandControlofMilitaryForcesintheHomeland 13 JeffreyW.Burkett U.S.NorthernCommand&DefenseSupportofCivilAuthorities 25 ColonelR.BarryCronin U.S.ArmyNorth:We’reHereToHelp 33 LTGTomTurner JointTaskForceCivilSupport(JTF-CS):ANationalAsset 35 MSgt(Ret)MichaelEck SupporttoDisasterResponse:TheScienceandArtofDisasterResponsebythe NationalGuard 39 LTGCharlesG.Rodriguez,BerndMcConnellandLTCKristineShelstad “GoldenGuardian2006”U.S.ArmyNorthPreparesforDisasterResponse 45 ScottR.Gourley SupporttoLawEnforcement/ForceProtection:TheNationalGuardTransforming toanOperationalForce 49 LTGH.StevenBlum TheRoleofStateDefenseForcesinHomelandSecurity 57 COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff TheRoleofFederalMilitaryForcesinDomesticLawEnforcementTitle 63 COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff DomesticOperationalLaw:ThePosseComitatusActandHomelandSecurity 73 COL(Ret)JohnR.Brinkerhoff Chemical,Biological,Radiological,andHigh-YieldExplosivePreparationand Chemical,Biological,Radiological,andHigh-YieldExplosiveConsequence 81 ManagementResponseForce:PreparednessforaCBRNEEvent ZygmuntF.Dembek CCMRFandUseofFederalArmedForcesInCivilSupportOperations 87 MGJeffreyA.Jacobs FirstBrigadeThirdInfantryDivisionastheInauguralTaskForceOperationsfor the2009Chemical,Biological,Radiological,Nuclear,andHigh-YieldExplosives ConsequenceManagementResponseForce 91 COLRogerCloutier,MAJ(P)JasonGarkey,MAJMarcBouth,MAJSteveRanieri, andCPTErikGemza iii CENTERFORARMYLESSONSLEARNED CenterforArmyLessonsLearned Director ColonelRobertW.Forrester DivisionChief LarryHollars CALL Analysts William “Bill” Smith JohnHopson ProductionCoordinator KristineBell Editor MichaelBrooks GraphicArtist EricEck DistributionManager CandiceMiller TheSecretaryoftheArmyhasdeterminedthatthepublicationofthisperiodicalisnecessaryinthe transactionofthepublicbusinessasrequiredbylawoftheDepartment. Unlessotherwisestated,wheneverthemasculineorfemininegenderisused,bothareintended. Note:Anypublications(otherthanCALLpublications)referencedinthisproduct,suchasARs,FMs, andTMs,mustbeobtainedthroughyourpinpointdistributionsystem. iv CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY Introduction Thefollowingcollectionofarticles,reports,andinterviewsfocusesoncivilsupportandtheU.S.Army. Thesearticlesarecategorizedinthefollowingareas:backgroundinformation;commandandcontrol; supporttodisasterresponse;supporttolawenforcement/forceprotection;domesticoperationallaw;and chemical,biological,radiological,nuclear,high-yieldexplosive(CBRNE)preparationandCBRNE consequencemanagementresponseforce.Thesearticlescoverawiderangeofissuesrelatingto supportingcivilauthoritiesandincludesuchtopicsas: possecomitatus;bordersecurity;disaster response;Title10versusTile32statutes;homelanddefenseandsecurity;andjoint,interagency, intergovernmental,andmultinationalpartnerships.Thisnewsletterisnotacomprehensiveor all-inclusivecollectionofcivilsupportarticles.Insomeinstances,theinformationmaybeslightlydated butmanyofthetopicsandlessonslearnedareenduring.Thisnewslettercapturesrelevantarticles publishedinrecentprofessionaljournalsandfromtheCenterforArmyLessonsLearned(CALL) archivestoshowthecomplexityofcivilsupportandprovideahistoricaldocumentforfuturereference. Inmanyinstances,theideaspresentedinthesearticlesarepersonalopinionsandinsomecasesnot approvedArmydoctrine.Additionally,someofthesearticlesmaystiremotionaswellaspoliticalrigor, especiallywhenU.S.armedfederalforcesareusedinsupportoflawenforcementand/orinhomeland securityduties(namelyforborderprotectionandfightingthewarondrugs).Manyofthesetopics continuetoevokehigh-leveldiscussionswithintheDepartmentofDefenseandwithinallbranchesof federalandstategovernment.Therecommendationsinthesearticlesshouldalwaysbevalidatedwith thelatestapprovedArmydoctrineandtactics,techniques,andprocedures. CALLacknowledgesandthankstheprofessionaljournalsandauthorswhopermittedthereproduction ofthesearticlesandinsomeinstanceswerepersonallyinvolvedinassistingCALLintheformatting process. PleasenotethatminormodificationstoformatweremadetosupporttheCALLnewsletterformat. 1 CIVILSUPPORTANDTHEU.S.ARMY Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents From the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, January 2008: <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/DOD_SupportToDomesticIncidents.pdf> TheprimarymissionoftheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)anditscomponentsisnationaldefense.In someinstances,nationaldefenseassetsmaybeavailabletosupportcivilauthoritiesforroutineand catastrophicincidents.DefenseSupportofCivilAuthorities(DSCA)referstosupportprovidedbyU.S. militaryforces(Federalmilitary,Reserve,andNationalGuard),DODcivilians,DODcontract personnel,DODagencyandDODcomponentassets. DODnormallyprovidesDSCAinresponsetorequestsforassistance(RFAs)fromotherFederal departmentsoragencies,orinsomecases,local,tribalorStategovernments.Supportprovidedin responsetosuchRFAsmayhelpcivilauthoritiespreparefor,prevent,protectagainst,respondto,and recoverfromdomesticincidentsincludingterroristattacks,andmajordisasters.Suchassistancemay alsobeusedtosupportdomesticspecialeventsofnationalimportance,suchasthenationalpolitical conventions.DODassetsareusuallyrequestediflocal,tribal,State,andotherFederalassetsarenot available.However,DODresourcesarenottypicallyrequiredtomitigateeverydomesticincident.For example,ofthe65disastersPresidentiallydeclaredasmajordisastersoremergenciesin2005,DOD respondedtoonlythree. DefenseresourcesarecommittedafterapprovalbytheSecretaryofDefenseoratthedirectionofthe President.ManytypesofDODsupportcanbeprovidedbyindividualDODComponentsunderseparate establishedauthorities.WhendecidingtocommitDODresources,considerationisgiventomilitary readiness,cost,lethality,risk,appropriateness,andwhethertheresponseisinaccordancewith applicablelawsandregulations.ContinuouscoordinationwithFederal,State,tribal,andlocal authoritiesbefore,during,andafteraneventisessentialforefficientandeffectiveDSCA. Withtheexceptionofimmediateresponseauthoritiesandsupportprovidedundermutualaid agreements,whicharedescribedbelow,DODdoesnotprovidefirstrespondersupporttocivil authorities.Whenplanningorconductingexercises,civilianrespondersmustunderstandthatDOD resourcesmaynotbeimmediatelyavailableduetotheDepartment’sprimarymissionandshouldbe preparedtoconducttheinitialresponsewithlimitedDODassistance.DODassetsmayrequiresome timetomobilize,train,anddeploytorespondtoaRFA. DODisafullpartnerintheFederalresponsetodomesticincidentsandtheDODresponseisfully coordinatedthroughthemechanismsoutlinedintheNationalResponseFramework(NRF).Inproviding DSCA,theSecretaryofDefensewillalwaysretaincommandofDODpersonnel,withtheexceptionof NationalGuardforcesunderthecommandandcontroloftheGovernors.NothingintheNRFimpedes theSecretaryofDefense’sstatutoryauthoritypertainingtoDODpersonnelandresources. Conceptsof“command”and“unityofcommand”havedistinctlegalandculturalmeaningsformilitary forcesandmilitaryoperations.FordeployedFederalmilitaryforces,commandrunsfromthePresident throughtheSecretaryofDefensetothecombatantcommandertotheDODon-scenecommander.The civiliancommunity’sIncidentCommandSystem(ICS)definitionof“unifiedcommand”isdistinctly differentfromthemilitarydefinitionofthisterm.DODresourceswillsupporttheIncidentActionPlan. 3 CENTERFORARMYLESSONSLEARNED CATEGORIESOFCAPABILITIES:Ifrequested,DODcouldprovidethefollowingcategoriesof capabilities: a)Transportation–air,ground,andmaritime b)Damageassessment–Rotaryandfixedwingaircraftequippedwithimageryandfull motion videocapabilities c)Evacuationplanningandsupport,includingtransportationassetsforpatientmovement d)Communications e)Debrisremovalalongemergencyevacuationroutes f)LiaisonandCoordination(DefenseCoordinatingOfficer/DefenseCoordinatingElementand EmergencyPreparednessLiaisonOfficers) g)Supporttotemporaryshelters h)MilitaryinstallationsforMobilizationCentersandOperationalStagingAreas i)Fueldistributionpoints j)Temporarymedicaltreatmentfacilities REQUESTFORASSISTANCE:Inmostinstances,DODprovidesDSCAinresponsetoRFAsfrom anotherFederalagency.DSCAnormallyisprovidedwhenlocal,tribal,State,andFederalresourcesare fullycommittedorwhenacapabilityuniquetoDODisrequired.DODtypicallyprovidesDSCAona reimbursablebasis,asrequiredbytheappropriatestatutoryauthorities. CRITERIA:UponreceiptofanRFA,DODusesthefollowingcriteriatoevaluatetheRFAfor supportability: (cid:129) Legality(compliancewithlaws) (cid:129) Lethality(potentialuseoflethalforcebyoragainstDODforces) (cid:129) Risk(safetyofDODforces) (cid:129) Cost(whoisfundingtherequest;impactonDODbudget) (cid:129) Appropriateness(whethertherequestedmissionisintheinterestofDODtoconduct) (cid:129) Readiness(effectontheDOD’sabilitytoperformitsprimarynationaldefensemission) Onceapproved,DODwillprovidetheassetstofulfilltherequest.HowquicklyDODsupportcanbe applieddependsonseveralfactors: (1)assessmentoftherequirementandtheappropriatemilitaryassettomeettherequirement (2)identification,availability,andmobilizationofassets (3)training 4