A NALYSIS PREFACE The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT), signed in Ottawa in 1997, intends to eliminate a whole class of conventional weapons. The fact that over 140 countries have consented to be bound by the Treaty constitutes a remarkable achievement. The progress registered with the putting the Treaty into effect is of great credit to all those involved – governments, civil society and international organizations. Nevertheless, in some of the most seriously mine-affected countries progress has been delayed or even com- promised altogether by the fact that rebel groups that use anti-personnel mines do not consider themselves bound by the commitments of the government in power. Such groups, or non-state actors (NSAs), cannot them- selves become parties to an international Treaty, even if they are willing to agree to its terms. Faced with this potential “show-stopper”, Geneva Call came forward with a revolutionary new approach to engaging NSAs in committing themselves to the substance of the APMBT. Geneva Call designed a Deed of Commitment, to be deposited with the authorities of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, which NSAs can formally adhere to. This Deed of Commitment contains the same obligations as the APMBT. It allows the lead- ers of rebel groups to assume formal obligations and to accept that their performance in implementing those obligations will be monitored by an international body. The success of this approach is illustrated by the case of Sudan. In October 2001, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to give up their AP mines and signed the Deed of Commitment. In Septem- ber 2002, the Government of Sudan, the SPLM/A and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understand- ing to create a single national program of mine action in the country, and in October 2003, the Government of Sudan ratified the APMBT. It is clear from conversations with senior officials of the Government, that they would not have felt able to ratify the Treaty, if the SPLM/A had not already made a formal commitment to observe its provisions in the territory under its control. Not only did the initiative of Geneva Call stimulate the Government and the SPLM/A to work together, and with the United Nations, to deal with the problem of landmines, but the contacts made through this process were a valuable building block for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Nairobi in December 2004, the Review Conference of the APMBT approved a challenging Plan of Action for the period up to 2009 when the first group of countries are due to have completed clearance of all mined areas. A major obstacle to accession to, and successful implementation of, the Treaty in some of the “hardest” coun- tries is the refusal of NSAs to abandon AP mines. The approach pioneered by Geneva Call of engaging these groups in dialogue and persuading them to commit themselves to the provisions of the Treaty offers the best hope of stopping the use of mines in these countries. It is an approach that deserves our full support. In order for this approach to have the best chance of success, Geneva Call needs to understand what motivates each group to continue using mines, how they are using them, and what initiatives stand the best chance of persuading them to stop. The research contained in this volume will help to provide the basic information that Geneva Call and others need to build effective advocacy campaigns, and thereby hasten the day when anti- personnel mines will be weapons of the past. The lessons learned by Geneva Call in this process should also be valuable to other organizations seeking to obtain commitments from NSAs on other issues, such as the need to respect human rights. Martin Barber Director of United Nations Mine Action Service, 2000-2005 October 2005 NSA L 1 SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was made possible by the support of the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN), the Swed- ish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Government of Italy through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as well as the continued support of Switzerland. We gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance provided by these organizations and governments, and wish to express our gratitude for the help received. The report was coordinated by Anki Sjöberg, Research Coordinator and Principal Researcher, under the super- vision of Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey (Project Coordinator), Pascal Bongard and Katherine Kramer. Framework, direction, oversight, quality control and regional expertise for the overall project were provided by Dr. Daniel Warner of the Program for the Study of International Organization(s) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. The principal research team was composed of Cyril Amberg, Matthew Pountney, Anki Sjöberg, Yasmina Sonderegger, and Helena Ziherl. Other research contributors were the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (Colombia), the NGO Horizón Kiné (Democratic Republic of Congo) and the Geneva Call Consultant Major (rtd) Mohamed Noor Ali (Somalia). Ruxandra Stoicescu wrote the section on transfer. Important contributions were made by Mehmet Balci, Veronique Barbelet, Martin Damary, Laurent Perell and Tamara Saphir. Technical sup- port was provided by Stefano Campa, Michelle Hearly and Sylvette Louradour. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining contributed its technical and operational exper- tise and helped solve different queries. UNMAS Geneva Office provided overall advice and expertise. Professor Andrew Clapham of the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Professor Marco Sassoli of the Univer- sity of Geneva contributed legal expertise on specific questions. The report received expert input from many individuals and organizations, including Landmine Monitor re- searchers, national campaigns of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, other locally based organiza- tions and UN Mine Action experts. Particularly warm thanks go to Narine Berikashvili, Hugues Laurenge, Davide Naggi, Hans Risser, Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal and the Small Arms Survey. Special thanks also go to the armed non-state actors who shared valuable information with us. 2 NSA L SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS ABSTRACT Although armed non-state actors (NSAs) have always existed, in the last twenty years the international com- munity has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel (AP) landmines. This report, which builds on an analysis published in 2004, maps the role of NSAs in the landmine problem (2003-2005). The report investigates and analyzes how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines through a presentation of individual group profiles. This report has recorded a global occurrence of AP and anti-vehicle mine planting by NSAs, whether activated by a victim, a vehicle or at a distance by command-detonation. Around 60 NSAs have deployed landmines in 24 countries in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Over 40 groups made use of some type of victim-activated devices. The mines employed were both factory-made and handmade, indicating both involvement in mine transfers and production. One of the main findings of this report is that there is a need to discuss the mine issue not only with states, but also with NSAs. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the long-term perspective of the consequences of mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the international community to find channels of communication with NSAs on the AP mine issue. This report argues that only by understanding NSA and region specific dynamics is it possible to address the - current and future - landmine problem caused by NSAs. NSA L 3 SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS CONTENT ANALYSIS 1 Introduction 8 1.1 Structure of the Report 8 1.2 Background and Rationale of the Report 9 1.3 Definition of Landmine and Use 9 1.4 Definition of NSA 10 1.5 Methodology and Material 11 2 Mine Use by NSAs 14 2.1 Extent of the Problem 14 2.2 How and Why NSAs Use Landmines 15 2.3 Sources of Mines 25 2.4 Stockpiles 28 2.5 Regional Disparities and Preliminary Strategies 29 2.6 NSA Mine Use versus State Mine Use 30 2.7 Impact of NSA Mine Use 31 2.8 The Flip Side of the Coin: The Role of NSAs in Mine Action 34 3 Conclusions 35 4 Sources Analysis 38 Tables Table 1. NSA Use of Mines per Region 2003-2005 14 Table 2. NSA Use of Factory-Made and Handmade Mines (IEDs) per Region 19 Table 3. NSA Use of AP and AV Mines per Region 22 PROFILES Africa 42 Burundi 42 Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL) 42 Democratic Republic of the Congo 44 Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) 46 Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) 47 Eritrea 49 Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement/Islamic Salvation Movement (EIJM) 49 Senegal 51 Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) 51 Somalia 53 Somali National Front (SNF) 54 Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) 55 Somali Patriotic Movement- Faction of General “Morgan” (SPM) 56 Uganda 59 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 59 Landmine Use by Other Non-State Actors: Individuals, Clans, Criminal Groups, Paramilitaries, Self-Defense Groups and Private Companies 48 Stockpiles of Landmines under the Control of NSAs: the Case of Somalia 57 4 NSA L SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS Fact Boxes: • Unconfirmed Allegations against the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy, Burundi, May 2003 44 • Unsubstantiated Allegations of Landmine Use by Various NSAs in the DRC 45 • Unconfirmed Allegations against the Oromo Liberation Front, Ethiopia 50 • Inaccurate Allegations of Mine Use by Somaliland and Puntland 56 • Sudan, Darfur: Non-Attributed Mine Use 58 • Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Sudan 59 Sources Africa 62 Asia 65 Afghanistan 65 The Taliban 65 Burma/Myanmar 68 All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) 68 Chin National Front / Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) 69 Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization/Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBO/DKBA) 70 Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP)/ Monland Restoration Army (MRA) 72 Karen National Union /Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) 73 Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) 75 New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA) 77 Rohingya Solidarity Organization/Rohingya Army (RSO/RA) 78 Shan State Army South (SSA-S) 79 United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) 81 India (Non-Kashmir) 82 Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) 82 All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 84 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 85 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 86 India (Kashmir) 88 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) 88 Indonesia 90 Aceh Sumatara National Liberation Front/Free Aceh Movement (ASNLF/GAM) 90 Nepal 91 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) 91 The Philippines 97 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 97 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 99 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/ National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) 100 The Impact on the Civilian Population of NSA Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines: the Case of Nepal 95 Fact Boxes: • Mine Use by Other Actors in Afghanistan 67 • Unconfirmed Use by Lashkar-e-Toiba 89 • Baluchistan and FATA/Warziristan, Pakistan 103 • Insurgency in Southern Thailand 104 Sources Asia 105 NSA L 5 SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS Europe 112 Georgia 112 Abkhazia 112 South Ossetia 113 Macedonia 115 Albanian National Army (ANA) 115 Russia 118 Chechen Insurgents 118 Turkey 123 Kurdistan People’s Congress / Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kongra-Gel / PKK) 123 Transfer of Landmines 122 Fact Box: New Use of Remote-Controlled Devices in Dagestan 121 Sources Europe 126 Latin America 129 Colombia 129 National Liberation Army (ELN) 129 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 130 Impact of NSA Mine Use in Colombia: Civilians and NSAs 132 Peru 133 Shining Path 133 Sources Latin America 135 Middle East and North Africa 136 Algeria 136 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) 136 Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories 138 Hamas/Islamic Resistance Movement 138 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 140 Lebanon 141 Hezbollah 141 Fact Box: Iraqi Insurgents 143 Sources Middle East and North Africa 144 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 146 6 NSA L SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS ANALYSIS NSA L 7 SAND ANDMINES A NALYSIS 1 Introduction Anti-personnel (AP) landmines1 and similar victim-activated explosive devices are indiscriminate weapons. Their use is considered to be contrary to universally accepted principles of international humanitarian law. They are therefore prohibited by widely accepted treaties. In times of war they blindly strike civilians and sol- diers, friends and enemies alike. Landmines recognize no ceasefire. They remain active and continue to pose a danger to civilians long after the end of hostilities. Beyond the direct threat they pose to the physical safety of those who live near them, landmines prevent communities from having safe access to land, water and infra- structure, and constitute a serious obstacle to the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Landmines also impede the access of humanitarian agencies to vulnerable populations during conflict as well as reconstruction efforts and socio-economic development in post-conflict societies. More concretely, the Landmine Monitor 2004 estimated that landmines cause between 15,000 and 20,000 victims around the world every year, half of which remain unreported.2 Due to the disastrous humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of landmines, three-quarters of the world’s states have acceded to the “1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (hereafter the “Mine Ban Treaty”, also known as the “Ottawa Treaty”). Despite this significant step in the fight against landmines and the considerable efforts of humanitarian mine action agencies, six years after the entry into force of the treaty, landmines continue to constitute an acute problem threatening human security in over 80 countries worldwide.3 One of the important challenges facing a global mine ban is the inclusion of armed non-state actors (NSAs) in the process - whether rebel groups, guerrilla groups or non-internationally recognized governments. This was the rationale behind the launching of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Geneva Call shortly after the coming into force of the Mine Ban Treaty: engaging NSAs in the AP mine ban. Although NSAs have always existed, in the last twenty years the international community has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitar- ian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of AP landmines. This report, which builds on findings published by Geneva Call in 2004,4 is a global analysis of the role of NSAs in the landmine problem. The report maps how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines in different regions of the world and presents some conclusions and recommendations with a view to improving the engagement of these groups in the AP mine ban. 1.1 Structure of the Report This report is organized in two parts; the first part (“Analysis”) maps global trends as well as the regional- specific characteristics of NSAs. It focuses on aspects such as the extent of NSA mine use; the logic behind their mine use; the kinds and types of mines used; the sources of mines (including production and transfer); stockpiling; the relationship between state and NSA mine use; regional disparities, etc. The section concludes with some major findings. The second, main part of the report (“Profiles”) provides group and mine use profiles and short summaries of the around 60 groups that were identified as mine users in the reporting period (2003-2005). The NSAs are organized by region and primary concerned state, in the cases where they are operating in several states. The groups are presented separately. Both general group profiles and mine use profiles are given. The group pro- files are meant to familiarize the reader with the various NSAs and provide background information on the 1 Throughout this report the terms “landmine” and “mine” are used interchangeably. 2 Landmine Monitor Report 2004, (United States of America: Human Rights Watch, 2004) p. 47. 3 Ibid. p. 27. 4 Anki Sjöberg, The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A Call for Action. Executive Summary (Geneva Call, 2004). 8 NSA L SAND ANDMINES