wqqq ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu Translated from Turkish to English by: Hacer Şartepe REPORT NO: 33 June 2011 ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu Translated from Turkish to English by: Hacer Şartepe BILGESAM PUBLICATIONS Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Wise Men Center For Strategic Studies Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi (Trump Towers Yanı) No:10 Celil Ağa İş Merkezi Kat:9 Daire:36-38 Mecidiyeköy / İstanbul / Türkiye Tel: +90 212 217 65 91 Faks: +90 212 217 65 93 Atatürk Bulvarı Havuzlu Sok. No:4/6 A.Ayrancı / Çankaya / Ankara / Türkiye Tel : +90 312 425 32 90 Faks: +90 312 425 32 90 www.bilgesam.org [email protected] Copyright © JUNE 2011 All rights reserved. Copying this document (electronically or mechanically) is prohibited without any permission from Wise Man Center for Strategic Studies FOREWORD Making predictions for the future by closely following developments at home and abroad, conducting scientific research on bilateral and multilateral relations and the security strategies of Turkey, as well as on domestic problems in political, economic, technological, environmental and socio-cultural areas, providing also decision-makers with practical recommendations, policy options, and proposals in line with the national interests are all included in the foundation purposes of Wise Man Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM). BILGESAM is preparing reports to fulfill the purposes quoted above. Turkey’s agenda has long been preoccupied by the efforts of placing the civil-military relations on a democratic ground in a contemporary sense. There are certain critical points to be noted concerning civil-military relations. Civil-military relations do not pose a problem only for the countries that try to develop and consolidate their democracies, like Turkey. Contrary to popular belief, civil-military relations constitute a big concern for many parties. It is quite a complicated problem that, at times, also arises in the western countries, which are democratically developed ones. In such countries where democracy has prospered, this problem naturally has manifested itself in different versions and dimensions. Within the scope of social and political sciences, a rather rich literature has been developed concerning civil-military relations. Likewise, scientific researches and publications are being conducted. Turkish scientists, alike, publish their research in prominent journals, thereby highly contributing to international literature. BILGESAM, from its own original point of view, believes it is useful to prepare a report which proposes optimal ideas that could be accepted by anyone. I would like to extend my thanks to Prof. Dr. Ali. L. Karaosmanoğlu who is one of the members of the Wise Men Board and prepared the report under the name of “Armed Forces and Democracy.” I hope that it will contribute to the development of democratic values in Turkey. Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı BILGESAM President Armed Forces and Democracy ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRACY After the Cold-War, there have been radical changes in the international system and the international structure has, to a certain extent, come to be relative. However, division of power in the international community and non-centralized legal order still dominate their roles of being the most characteristic features of international relations. Under such an atmosphere, “security” (however much its content has changed) is still the “value” that should be primarily protected by individuals, societies and states and the lack of which is the source of concern. Therefore, communities of today’s world also accept the critical function of the armed forces. Furthermore, it has been much clearer in the post Cold War era that the security of an individual and the society is as important as that of the state’s security. In this era, it has also come to the fore that this security of the individual and the society could not be protected without the maintenance of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms and democracy. Therefore, the security provided by the armed forces does not suffice. Then security provided by the armed forces should be backed by democratic values, human rights freedoms and the rule of law. However, the history has showed that the armed forces, in performing its mission of protection, has from time to time easily violated democratic values, human rights, freedoms and the principle of rule of law. In this sense, for the protection of the democratic values and thus for the maintenance of individual and social security, it seems compulsory for the military forces to adhere to the civil authority within the democratic regime and to be controlled by the civil authority alike. In other words, civil- military relations should be conducted on a democratic ground. 1 Armed Forces and Democracy The problem in civil-military relations is not particular to Turkey or to the countries whose democracy has not yet developed. It is a general problem that manifests itself in different versions in the liberal democracies of the West. The problem in civil-military relations has been much more apparent, especially in America and England with regards to the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions. It would be of use to mention how the theory of political science refers to the importance and the complexity of this problem. According to Peter D. Feaver,1 one of the pioneering names in this scope, the armed forces totally differs from the other state institutions, highlighting where the problem starts. The armed forces is different, as it can be understood from its name of being “armed.” Its big potential of power cannot be compared to any other institution or even to the civil democratic government. Hence, the civil government’s relations with the armed forces cannot be similar to its relations with any other public institutions, such as its relations with any directorate general. The final word in democratic regimes always belongs to the one who comes to power through elections. However, the armed forces has its own hierarchy, disciplinary rules, rules of promotion and assignment and the discretionary power in this scope. The problem is related to the boundaries of this autonomous field. As mentioned above, both a society and a political regime need protection from threats. The armed forces has been established by society and the state with this purpose of protection and practice has maintained itself up until now. For the same end, armed forces should be powerful so that they can effectively maintain their role of protection. Nevertheless, such powerful armed forces may sometimes pose a threat for the society and the politics. Soldiers should be powerful, however, they should not exercise power over the society and the politics and even make its existence so explicit. Feaver calls this dilemma “the civil-military problematique.” Then, how can the civil ruling party and the soldier cope with this dilemma, which manifests itself almost in any society in various versions and dimensions? Turkey’s democracy has not been consolidated since the second half of the 1940s, when Turkey adopted the multiple-party system. One of the most important reasons of this lies under the fact that the civil-military relations have not been able to be established on a democratic ground. Even though the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has never categorically objected to democracy, it has been one of the important players of the Turkish political life. The Turkish Armed Forces has always been the item of the ‘political’ agenda and exerted its authority over Turkey’s politics either through the coup d’états, juntas within itself, interventions in the politics by some reasons or through its wide-ranging autonomous sphere of influence –which cannot be seen in any other democracy. 1 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4-7. 2 Armed Forces and Democracy The political role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the modernization history of Turkey could be traced back to the mid- 19th century. The modernization movement gaining momentum in the 19th century has placed the armed forces at the center of this movementand given birth to the domination of a political-military culture. The Republic of Turkey has inherited this interventionist culture and especially after the acceptance of the multiple-party system , the military interventionism has still maintained its role of being part of the political life. Therefore, transition into democracy has not been able to come into being in Turkey’s civil- military relations. After the Second World War, democracy has come to be the sine qua non of the modernization (in Atatürk’s terms with the main goal being “the contemporary civilization”). This, in turn, has brought the Turkish Armed Forces into a deadlock. How could the armed forces (which regarded itself as the protector of the modernization) have protected the products of the Republic (mainly being nation-state and secularism) within the multiple- party democratic regime? How could it be able to harmonize this mission of protection with democracy, the new element of the modernization? TAF has been striving for the solution of this dilemma since 1945. Its failure in overcoming this dilemma has both inhibited the consolidation of the multiple-party regime and led to failures within the TAF, thereby impairing the professionalism of the institution. In Turkey, civilians have also played a big role in slowing the democratization process. At times, politicians and their political parties have displayed anti-democratic attitudes. Evading responsibility, they assigned their responsibility to the soldier. They did not pay much attention to the fields related to the soldier and did not need to improve themselves in this sense. More important is the fact that there have always been civilians who tried to influence the soldier “subjectively” in Turkey. Some political parties, ideological groups, media groups, university members and non-governmental organizations have always tended to influence and use the TAF in accordance with their own political views and ideologies. They have even encouraged the TAF to be included in the politics. In Huntington’s terms, civilian efforts which aspire to attain the “subjective control” of the soldier have always appeared. Parallel to this however, “objective control” of the soldier has never been settled.2 The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), institutionally and principle-wise, has never objected to the democratic regime. It could even be said that the Turkish Armed Forces has regarded itself as the protector of both the Turkish version of secularism and the multiple-party regime. After seizing the control of the administrations, it immediately assigned the power to the civil governments and passed into the multiple-party regime. This is one of the important 2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-85. 3 Armed Forces and Democracy aspects that make the situation in Turkey different from the military dictatorships of Southern America and the Middle East. However, the Turkish Armed Forces, after each coup d’état, has expanded its autonomous sphere of influence by making changes in the constitution and legislation as of 1960, thereby contracting that of the civilian authority. Thus, except for the Turgut Özal period, the military control over the civil life has increasingly grown and survived up until 2000s. Civil-military relations have developed in tandem with the democratic multiple-party regimes both in Portugal, Spain, in the dictatorships of South America and later in the totalitarian regimes of the countries within the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe. In such countries, democratization has pursued a linear process. Narcis Serra, who was the Spanish Minister of Defense during Spain’s transition into democracy from Franco regime, touches on this linear process when he talks about his Spain experiences.3 On the contrary, democratization of the civil-military relations in Turkey has not been parallel to the democratic multiple-party regime. But instead, democratization has undergone a non-linear process rife with various dilemmas, and other ups and downs, continuing to develop in this manner. This study does not aim at analyzing Turkey from the perspective of the periods that have clear-cut differences from each other. Nevertheless, this study may sometimes give some room to two different stages which may from time to time overlap or to reforms of two different generations.4 The first generation reforms relate to the change of the existing institutions and rules (legislation) and to the preparation of a normative ground that fits in with the democratic values. This normative ground proposes the superiority of the civil authority that has come to power through elections and the monitoring of the military organization by this civil authority. As for the second generation reforms, they represent a broader and deeper approach. They relate to the effective implementation of the first generation reforms and to the realization of their purposes. To actualize this, the political staff’s knowledge concerning the military should be increased, civil bureaucrats should be trained, the required transparency should be ensured within this scope and the media, think-tanks, and public opinion should be able to contribute to the effective and informative debates related to the military. Within this framework, along with the emphasis on the principles of democracy, a special emphasis should be attached to the principles of “effectiveness” and “efficiency”5 for the military activities. In this second stage, along with 3 Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 4 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethining Democracy and Civil-Military Relations”, Armed Forces and Society, vol.29, no.1 (Fall 2002), 31-56. 5 “Effectiveness” refers to the armed forces’ being active and ready for service and for the realization of the expected result from a certain operation. “Efficiency” refers to the efficiency ratio in parallel with the work 4 Armed Forces and Democracy the civil-military relations, restructuring of the whole security sector should be suggested. Since the restructuring of the whole security sector requires a more comprehensive study, this subject is not included in this report. First generation reforms are necessary for the civil-military relations to evolve from authoritarian and “custodian” grounds into a democratic one. Yet, they are not adequate for the establishment of a fully functional democratic order. For a real democratic civil-military regime, realization of the second generation reforms should also be ensured. The first generation could be defined as “transition into democracy” while the second generation could be described as the “consolidation of democracy.” It has been sixty years since Turkey adopted the multiple-party regime and political parties started to be designated through elections. However, Turkey has not yet been able to actualize even the transition into democracy in civil-military relations (in other words, the first generation reforms). Especially as of 2002, many reforms have been performed in this field in Turkey. Within this scope, in order to restrict the autonomous sphere of the soldier and ensure the civil authority’s control over the soldier, in addition to reducing the influence of the soldier on politics and the society, remarkable changes have been executed in the constitution and the legislation. Despite the reforms performed, there is still a need for many changes so that the civil-military relations could be based on a more democratic ground in the country. The steps that should be taken for the constitution and the other legislation could fall into four groups. First comes the clarification of the clauses in the constitution and in other legislation. For instance, there should be a clause indicating the superiority of the civil authority for both internal and external security, be it in time of war or peace, and without any uncertainty showing that the civil authority has the authority and the responsibility for administration and control. Secondly, the control of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the acts and defense budget of the armed forces should be ensured. Thirdly, the Turkish General Staff and the Service Commands should be unified with the executive. Fourthly, it is utmost importance to constrain the military jurisdiction and remove the janus-headed judiciary. The Basic Principles of Democratic Civil-Military Relations Since the start of the Cold War, Turkey has been the member of the international organizations which were founded by democratic countries of the Western world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Council are among the most important ones in this sense. Besides, Turkey has initiated membership talks with the EU and is a candidate member. During the Cold War Era, civil democratic control on the military was not among the conducted or the energy exerted; in other words, refers to the achievement of the expected result with the use of minimum sources. 5