ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics had a profound influence on generations oflater philosophers, not only in the ancient era but also in the medieval period and beyond. In this book Anthony Celano explores how medieval authors recast Aristotle's Ethics according to their own moral ideals. He argues that the moral standard for the Ethics is a human one, which is based upon the ethical tradition and the best practices of a given society. In the Middle Ages this human standard was replaced by one that is universally applicable since its foundation is eternal immutable divine law. Celano resolves the conflicting accounts of happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, demonstrates the importance of the virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) and shows how the medieval view of moral reasoning alters Aristotle's concept of moral wisdom. ANTHONY CELANO is Professor of Philosophy at Stonehill College, Massachusetts. He is the author of over forty scholarly articles on medieval and ancient philosophy and is a member of the Leonine Commission, which is responsible for critical Latin editions of the works of Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle's Ethics and Medieval Philosophy Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom ANTHONY J. CELANO Stonehill College DCAMBRIDGE ..,, UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE UNIVEllSITY PRESS University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 SBS, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107134850 © Anthony J. Celano 2016 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2016 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Celano, Anthony J. Aristotle's ethics and medieval philosophy: moral goodness and practical wisdom I Anthony J. Celano. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-l-107-13485-0 l. Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics. 2. Ethics. 3. Albertus, Magnus, Saint, ll93?-1280. 4. Philosophy, Medieval. I. Title. B430.C45 2015 l 7l' .3-dc23 2015033489 ISBN 978-l-107-13485-0 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Contents Preface vii Preliminary considerations 2 Practical wisdom in the moral theory of Aristotle 12 3 The moral theories of William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor 52 4 The earliest medieval Latin commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics 75 5 The early moral works of Albert the Great 100 6 Happiness, prudence and moral reasoning in the later works of Albert the Great 131 7 Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure on the understanding of moral goodness 170 8 Two commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics in the late thirteenth century 209 9 Conclusion 233 Bibliography 243 Index 253 v Preface The topic of this study originated from my initial reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (NE) more than thirty years ago. Perplexed by the two accounts of happiness in books I and X of Aristotle's work, I was unable to reconcile the idea that happiness consists in a mixture of intellectual and political activities with the notion that true happiness is constituted by intellectual contemplation alone. The scholarly attempts to explain the discrepancy proved unsatisfactory, since they assumed different dates of composition, interpolations oflater editors or a development of the theory of happiness within the work itself. These explanations posited assump tions that were impossible to demonstrate and were often contradictory. The modern accounts of the two notions of happiness reflect the very same approaches that the medieval commentators used to explain Aristotle's concept of human goodness. Still the reader of Aristotle is left to wonder whether the Philosopher himself did not notice the different accounts of an essential moral idea that appeared in his most important work on moral philosophy. In the course of the study of the text I came to the conclusions that Aristotle's primary moral concept was not that of happiness (eudaimonia) but one of practical wisdom (phronesis). In elevating phronesis to the central theme of the Ethics I was able to construct a way in which the contradictory nature of the text might be explained. I believe that while Aristotle certainly attempted to explain the meaning of human goodness, he had in fact constructed a text concerned primarily with the proper way to attain it, and that practical wisdom governs all activities of the soul that lead to moral and intellectual excellence. Despite Aristotle's clear assertion that the supreme virtue of the human soul is intellectual wisdom (sophia), the primary human, and hence moral, virtue is practical wisdom. In itself the uninterrupted contemplative activity of the intellect elevates human vii viii Preface beings to a divine state in which the object and subject of the process of knowledge are united in the act of the intellect (nous). Human beings, however, are not purely intellectual beings like the gods, and regardless of their participation in the intellectual life they must arrange various pursuits properly in order to achieve the state that Aristotle calls happiness. Wisdom may be the supreme virtue, but practical wisdom regulates all human activity including theoretical pursuits in order that the practically wise person may recognize what is good and how best to attain it. In elevating phronesis to the most important virtue, Aristotle offers a human standard of conduct by which a life is measured against the practices of the best citizens, and rejects any universal moral imperatives that do not arise from human action. In the first chapter of this work I examine various medieval and modern interpretations of some important concepts in Aristotle's moral philoso phy. In Chapter 2 the meaning of happiness in Aristotle's Ethics, especially in light of its relation to the virtues of practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom, is considered. In Chapter 3 the works of William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor reveal a new understanding of moral principles in light of the ideas of natural law and synderesis, which is an innate habit by which universal moral commands are recognized. In Chapter 4 the partial commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics composed before 1248 provide a second stream of interpretation of Aristotle's text, in which the main intention of the authors is to explain carefully the meaning of Aristotle's words. The subsequent two chapters consider the contributions on the topic of Albertus Magnus, whose commentaries on Aristotle were the most influential instrument in directing the medieval understanding of ancient ethics. Albert's work influenced nearly all the later medieval expositors of Aristotle, even when his most famous student, Thomas Aquinas, disagreed with some of his teacher's conclusions on the meaning of happiness. Chapter 7 examines these theories of Thomas and those of Bonaventure, which have significant differences from the doctrines of their predecessors. The discussion on Thomas is relatively short because every aspect of his moral philosophy has provoked a great number of studies in the past century. In the questions considered here Thomas' influence is not quite so great as that of his former teacher. In all these medieval commentaries a constant theme emerges, one that insists upon the idea of the eternal existence of immutable moral laws and the ability of all human beings to recognize them. In the acceptance of natural law and synderesis the medieval authors transform Aristotle's Ethics from one based upon a human standard into one that depends upon a divine foundation. In so doing they change the range of practical