ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΟΥΣ ARISTOTLE ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ METAPHYSICS translated by W. D. Ross Α - 1 α - 2 Β - 3 Γ - 4 Δ - 5 Ε - 6 Ζ - 7 Η - 8 Θ - 9 Ι - 10 Κ - 11 Λ - 12 Μ - 13 Ν - 14 Α BOOK 1 1 1 [980α] [21] πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the ὀρέγονται φύσει. σηµεῖον δ᾽ ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their ἀγάπησις: καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others δι᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even ὀµµάτων. οὐ γὰρ µόνον ἵνα πράττωµεν ἀλλὰ when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one καὶ µηθὲν [25] µέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all αἱρούµεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι µάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡµᾶς αὕτη between things. τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and φύσει µὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς µὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and ἐγγίγνεται µνήµη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται. [980β] [21] apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιµώτερα καὶ which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though µαθητικώτερα τῶν µὴ δυναµένων µνηµονεύειν they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of ἐστί, φρόνιµα µὲν ἄνευ τοῦ µανθάνειν ὅσα µὴ animals that may be like it; and those which besides memory δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον µέλιττα κἂν have this sense of hearing can be taught. εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἔστι), µανθάνει The animals other than man live by appearances and [25] δ᾽ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ µνήµῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the αἴσθησιν. τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ human race lives also by art and reasonings. Now from καὶ ταῖς µνήµαις, ἐµπειρίας δὲ µετέχει µικρόν: τὸ memory experience is produced in men; for the several δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a λογισµοῖς. γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς µνήµης ἐµπειρία single experience. And experience seems pretty much like τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ µνῆµαι τοῦ science and art, but really science and art come to men through αὐτοῦ πράγµατος µιᾶς ἐµπειρίας δύναµιν experience; for 'experience made art', as Polus says, 'but ἀποτελοῦσιν. [981α] [1] καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν inexperience luck.' Now art arises when from many notions ἐπιστήµῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅµοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐµπειρία, gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of ἀποβαίνει δ᾽ ἐπιστήµη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς objects is produced. For to have a judgement that when Callias ἐµπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἐµπειρία was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ [5] δ᾽ case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of ἀπειρία τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ experience; but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a πολλῶν τῆς ἐµπειρίας ἐννοηµάτων µία καθόλου certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were ill γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁµοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ µὲν γὰρ of this disease, e.g. to phlegmatic or bilious people when ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλίᾳ κάµνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν burning with fevers � this is a matter of art. νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐµπειρίας ἐστίν: [10] τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ᾽ εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάµνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγµατώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης. πρὸς µὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐµπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ µᾶλλον art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἔµπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience ἐµπειρίας [15] λόγον ἐχόντων (αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ἡ is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and µὲν ἐµπειρία τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ productions are all concerned with the individual; for the τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν: οὐ Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has συµβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal ἄλλων τινὰ [20] τῶν οὕτω λεγοµένων ᾧ but does not know the individual included in this, he will often συµβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι: ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.) But yet ἐµπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου µὲν we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser πολλάκις διαµαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας: than men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον): ἀλλ᾽ ὅµως τό all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ [25] τέχνῃ τῆς know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience ἐµπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόµεθα µᾶλλον, καὶ know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐµπείρων others know the 'why' and the cause. Hence we think also that ὑπολαµβάνοµεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι µᾶλλον the masterworkers in each craft are more honourable and know ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι: τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι οἱ in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers, µὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ᾽ οὔ. οἱ µὲν γὰρ because they know the causes of the things that are done (we ἔµπειροι τὸ ὅτι µὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ᾽ οὐκ ἴσασιν: οἱ think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which δὲ τὸ διότι [30] καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν. διὸ act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον burns, � but while the lifeless things perform each of their τιµιωτέρους καὶ µᾶλλον εἰδέναι νοµίζοµεν τῶν functions by a natural tendency, the labourers perform them χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, [981β] [1] ὅτι τὰς through habit); thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue αἰτίας τῶν ποιουµένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ᾽, ὥσπερ of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ µέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign of the man ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ: τὰ µὲν οὖν who knows and of the man who does not know, that the former ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον τοὺς can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge δὲ χειροτέχνας [5] δι᾽ ἔθος), ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὸ than experience is; for artists can teach, and men of mere πρακτικοὺς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ experience cannot. τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. Again, we do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet ὅλως τε σηµεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ µὴ εἰδότος τὸ surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν particulars. But they do not tell us the 'why' of anything � e.g. τέχνην τῆς ἐµπειρίας ἡγούµεθα µᾶλλον why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot. ἐπιστήµην εἶναι: δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the δύνανται διδάσκειν. [10] ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, οὐδεµίαν ἡγούµεθα εἶναι σοφίαν: καίτοι not only because there was something useful in the inventions, κυριώταταί γ᾽ εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But γνώσεις: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the οἷον διὰ τί θερµὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ µόνον ὅτι necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter θερµόν. τὸ µὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιανοῦν were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at θαυµάζεσθαι [15] ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων µὴ µόνον utility. Hence when all such inventions were already διὰ τὸ χρήσιµον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων ἀλλ᾽ established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων: at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places πλειόνων δ᾽ εὑρισκοµένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν µὲν where men first began to have leisure. This is why the πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων caste was allowed to be at leisure. ὑπολαµβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ µὴ πρὸς [20] χρῆσιν We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήµας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασµένων αἱ µὴ πρὸς present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called ἡδονὴν µηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is οὗ πρῶτον ἐσχόλασαν: διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception µαθηµατικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν [25] τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος. masterworker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of εἴρηται µὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήµης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain ὁµογενῶν: οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούµεθα τὸν λόγον principles and causes. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνοµαζοµένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαµβάνουσι πάντες: ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, [30] ὁ µὲν ἔµπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐµπείρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν µᾶλλον. [982α] [1] ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήµη, δῆλον. 2 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήµην ζητοῦµεν, τοῦτ᾽ Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what ἂν εἴη [5] σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήµη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι is Wisdom. If one were to take the notions we have about the τις τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχοµεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident. τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο µᾶλλον. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as ὑπολαµβάνοµεν δὴ πρῶτον µὲν ἐπίστασθαι far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, µὴ καθ᾽ in detail; secondly, that he who can learn things that are ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήµην [10] αὐτῶν: εἶτα τὸν difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense- τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάµενον καὶ µὴ ῥᾴδια perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of ἀνθρώπῳ γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ Wisdom); again, that he who is more exact and more capable αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥᾴδιον καὶ of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; οὐδὲν σοφόν): ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν and that of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήµην: καὶ τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν δὲ Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, τὴν [15] αὑτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν and the superior science is more of the nature of Wisdom than αἱρετὴν οὖσαν µᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must ὑπηρετούσης µᾶλλον σοφίαν: οὐ γὰρ δεῖν obey him. ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον σοφόν. τὰς µὲν οὖν [20] ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about τοσαύτας ἔχοµεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of σοφῶν: τούτων δὲ τὸ µὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest µάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήµην degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν (οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the τὰ ὑποκείµενα), σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ µάλιστα for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the [25] καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for ἐστιν), ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν αἳ those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those µάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also λεγοµένων, οἷον ἀριθµητικὴ γεωµετρίας): ἀλλὰ instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us µὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding θεωρητικὴ µᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν, οἱ and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in τὰς [30] αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου), τὸ δ᾽ the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν ἕνεκα µάλισθ᾽ chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ µάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήµῃ (ὁ readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the γὰρ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρούµενος τὴν knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first µάλιστα ἐπιστήµην µάλιστα αἱρήσεται, [982β] principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of [1] τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ µάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and µάλιστα δ᾽ ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια (διὰ not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τἆλλα γνωρίζεται science which knows to what end each thing must be done is ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειµένων), the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν, καὶ [5] µᾶλλον than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in τἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ question falls to the same science; this must be a science that φύσει πάσῃ. ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρηµένων ἐπὶ investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήµην πίπτει τὸ ζητούµενον end, is one of the causes. ὄνοµα: δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ That it is not a science of production is clear even from the αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν: [10] καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἓν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ wonder that men both now begin and at first began to ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious φιλοσοφησάντων: διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυµάζειν οἱ difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς µὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the ἀτόπων θαυµάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ µικρὸν οὕτω genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and προϊόντες [15] καὶ περὶ τῶν µειζόνων wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed παθηµάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ᾽ ἀπορῶν from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order καὶ θαυµάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed φιλόµυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ µῦθος by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and σύγκειται ἐκ θαυµασίων): ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ διὰ [20] τὸ the things that make for comfort and recreation had been φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. µαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not συµβεβηκός: σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ alone exists for its own sake. διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as ζητεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι᾽ [25] οὐδεµίαν αὐτὴν beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in ζητοῦµεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, bondage, so that according to Simonides 'God alone can have φαµέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ µὴ ἄλλου this privilege', and it is unfitting that man should not be content ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς µόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν: µόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὑτῆς ἕνεκέν something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, νοµίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις: πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. δούλη τῶν [30] ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the Σιµωνίδην "θεὸς ἂν µόνος τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοι γέρας", proverb, 'bards tell a lie'), nor should any other science be ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἄξιον µὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν thought more honourable than one of this sort. For the most ἐπιστήµην. εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, [983α] [1] ἐπὶ τούτου must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it συµβῆναι µάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς [2] εἶναι would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so πάντας τοὺς περιττούς. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τὸ θεῖον is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be παροιµίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νοµίζειν τιµιωτέραν. [5] ἡ (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιµιωτάτη: τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, ἂν εἴη µόνη: ἥν τε γὰρ µάλιστ᾽ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, but none is better. θεία τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν ἐστί, κἂν εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. µόνη δ᾽ αὕτη τούτων ἀµφοτέρων τετύχηκεν: ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ µόνος ἢ µάλιστ᾽ [10] ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι µὲν οὖν πᾶσαι ταύτης, ἀµείνων δ᾽ οὐδεµία. δεῖ µέντοι πως καταστῆναι τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which τοὐναντίον ἡµῖν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we ἄρχονται µὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴποµεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about θαυµάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ self-moving marionettes, or about the solstices or the <περὶ>τῶν θαυµάτων ταὐτόµατα [τοῖς µήπω incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side; τεθεωρηκόσι [15] τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαµέτρου ἀσυµµετρίαν that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the (θαυµαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι <τοῖς µήπω smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and, according τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν>εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ µὴ to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances µετρεῖται): δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄµεινον too when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν µάθωσιν: οὐθὲν γὰρ [20] ἂν commensurable. We have stated, then, what is the nature of the οὕτως θαυµάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωµετρικὸς ὡς εἰ science we are searching for, and what is the mark which our γένοιτο ἡ διάµετρος µετρητή. τίς µὲν οὖν ἡ search and our whole investigation must reach. φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήµης τῆς ζητουµένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην µέθοδον. 3 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων δεῖ Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes λαβεῖν [25] ἐπιστήµην (τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι φαµὲν (for we say we know each thing only when we think we ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν οἰώµεθα recognize its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four γνωρίζειν), τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὧν senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence µίαν µὲν αἰτίαν φαµὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the definition, and the τί ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle); in another the matter ἔσχατον, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ διὰ τί πρῶτον), or substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in a ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν ὕλην [30] καὶ τὸ ὑποκείµενον, fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the good (for τρίτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, τετάρτην this is the end of all generation and change). We have studied δὲ τὴν ἀντικειµένην αἰτίαν ταύτῃ, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα these causes sufficiently in our work on nature, but yet let us καὶ τἀγαθόν (τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως call to our aid those who have attacked the investigation of πάσης τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν), τεθεώρηται µὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς being and philosophized about reality before us. For obviously περὶ αὐτῶν ἡµῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, [983β] [1] they too speak of certain principles and causes; to go over their ὅµως δὲ παραλάβωµεν καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἡµῶν views, then, will be of profit to the present inquiry, for we shall εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἐλθόντας καὶ either find another kind of cause, or be more convinced of the φιλοσοφήσαντας περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δῆλον γὰρ correctness of those which we now maintain. ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι λέγουσιν ἀρχάς τινας καὶ αἰτίας: ἐπελθοῦσιν οὖν ἔσται τι προὔργου τῇ µεθόδῳ τῇ νῦν: [5] ἢ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι γένος εὑρήσοµεν αἰτίας ἢ ταῖς νῦν λεγοµέναις µᾶλλον πιστεύσοµεν. τῶν δὴ πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει µόνας ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of πάντων: ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξ all things. That of which all things that are consist, the first οὗ γίγνεται πρώτου καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται from which they come to be, the last into which they are τελευταῖον, τῆς µὲν [10] οὐσίας ὑποµενούσης resolved (the substance remaining, but changing in its τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι µεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον modifications), this they say is the element and this the καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, καὶ principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is either διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ conserved, as we say Socrates neither comes to be absolutely σωζοµένης, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν Σωκράτην φαµὲν when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor ceases to be οὔτε γίγνεσθαι ἁπλῶς ὅταν γίγνηται καλὸς ἢ when loses these characteristics, because the substratum, µουσικὸς [15] οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ Socrates himself remains. just so they say nothing else comes to ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑποµένειν τὸ be or ceases to be; for there must be some entity � either one or ὑποκείµενον τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ more than one � from which all other things come to be, it τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί τινα φύσιν ἢ being conserved. µίαν ἢ πλείους µιᾶς ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τἆλλα Yet they do not all agree as to the number and the nature of σωζοµένης ἐκείνης. τὸ µέντοι πλῆθος καὶ τὸ these principles. Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, εἶδος τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ [20] πάντες says the principle is water (for which reason he declared that λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς µὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης the earth rests on water), getting the notion perhaps from ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν from which they come to be is a principle of all things). He got τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερµὸν ἐκ his notion from this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all τούτου γιγνόµενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν [25] ἀρχὴ πάντων)�διά τε nature of moist things. δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ Some think that even the ancients who lived long before the τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρµατα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, present generation, and first framed accounts of the gods, had a τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. similar view of nature; for they made Ocean and Tethys the εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ τοὺς παµπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as being πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους by water, to which they give the name of Styx; for what is θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως oldest is most honourable, and the most honourable thing is [30] ὑπολαβεῖν: Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν that by which one swears. It may perhaps be uncertain whether ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὅρκον this opinion about nature is primitive and ancient, but Thales at τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουµένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν any rate is said to have declared himself thus about the first Στύγα [τῶν ποιητῶν]: τιµιώτατον µὲν γὰρ τὸ cause. Hippo no one would think fit to include among these πρεσβύτατον, ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιµιώτατόν ἐστιν. thinkers, because of the paltriness of his thought. [984α] εἰ µὲν οὖν ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water, and the τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως [1] ἡ δόξα, most primary of the simple bodies, while Hippasus of τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς µέντοι λέγεται Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus say this of fire, and