P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 This page intentionally left blank i P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison’s argument inFederalistXof1787,usingideasfromsocialchoicetheoryandfromthe workofDouglassNorth,MancurOlson,andWilliamRiker.Itsfocusisnot on social choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formalmodelofelectionstoconsiderrapidconstitutionalchangeatperiods whensocietiesfacesocialquandaries.Thetopicsexploredinthebookinclude Britain’sreorganizationofitsfiscalsystemintheeighteenthcenturytopros- ecuteitswarswithFrance;theColonies’decisiontodeclareindependencein 1776; Madison’s argument about the “probability of fit choice” during the Ratificationperiodof1787–8;theargumentbetweenHamiltonandJefferson in1798–1800overthelong-runorganizationoftheU.S.economy;theDred Scottdecisionof1857andtheelectionofLincolnin1860;LyndonJohnson andthe“criticalrealignment”of1964;andKeynes’srejectionoftheequilib- riumthesisin1937andthecreationoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsafter 1944. Norman Schofield is the William Taussig Professor of Political Economy at WashingtonUnivesityinSt.Louis.HehasservedasFulbrightDistinguished Professor of American Studies at Humboldt University Berlin in 2003–4, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in 1988–9, and Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the CaliforniaInstituteofTechnologyin1983–4.ProfessorSchofieldistheauthor ofMathematicalMethodsinEconomicsandSocialChoice(2003),Multiparty Government(coauthoredwithMichaelLaver,1990),andSocialChoiceand Democracy(1985).HereceivedtheWilliamRikerPrizein2002forcontribu- tionstopoliticaltheoryandisco-receipientwithGaryMilleroftheJackL. WalkerPrizeforthebestarticleonpoliticalorganizationsandpartiesinthe AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewfor2002–4. i P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 ii P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 political economy of institutions and decisions SeriesEditor StephenAnsolabehere,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology FoundingEditors JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversity,St.Louis Otherbooksintheseries AlbertoAlesinaandHowardRosenthal,PartisanPolitics,DividedGovernment, andtheEconomy LeeJ.Alston,Thra´innEggertsson,andDouglassC.North,eds.,Empirical StudiesinInstitutionalChange LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheRiseofthe AmericanWelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutions,1865–1965 JamesE.AltandKennethShepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositive PoliticalEconomy JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament, 1990–1993 JeffreyS.BanksandEricA.Hanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:Old Topics,NewDirections YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndedition YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andthe ScopeoftheState RobertBates,BeyondtheMiracleoftheMarket:ThePoliticalEconomy ofAgrarianDevelopmentinKenya,2ndedition CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePolitics ofNegativePower KellyH.Chang,AppointingCentralBankers:ThePoliticsofMonetaryPolicy intheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion PeterCowheyandMathewMcCubbins,eds.,StructureandPolicyinJapan andtheUnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopment ofPoliticalPartiesinVictorianEngland ContinuedonpagefollowingIndex iii P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 iv P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory NORMAN SCHOFIELD WashingtonUniversityinSaintLouis v cambridge university press Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo Cambridge University Press TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridgecb22ru,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Informationo nthi stitle :www.cambri dge.org/9780521832021 © Norman Schofield 2006 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionof relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublishedinprintformat 2006 isbn-13 978-0-511-21965-8 eBook(EBL) isbn-10 0-511-21965-2 eBook(EBL) isbn-13 978-0-521-83202-1 hardback isbn-10 0-521-83202-0 hardback isbn-13 978-0-521-53972-2 paperback isbn-10 0-521-53972-2 paperback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyofurls forexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication,anddoesnot guaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate. P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 Contents ListofTablesandFigures pagexi Preface xiii 1 ConstitutionalQuandariesandSocialChoice 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 BalancingRiskandChaos 3 1.3 PreferencesandJudgments 11 1.4 The“InstitutionalNarrative”oftheBook 17 2 PowerandSocialChoice 23 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 TheWorldToday 24 2.3 DemocraticDilemmas 30 2.4 TheLogicofEmpire 34 2.5 SocialChoiceTheory:AutocracyandRisk 44 2.6 SocialChoiceinBritain:1625–1776 49 2.7 TheAgrarianEmpireinNorthAmerica 58 2.8 TheEndofEmpireinBritain 64 2.9 ConcludingRemarks 68 3 FranklinandtheWarofIndependence 71 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 TheQuandaryoftheDeclarationofIndependence 73 3.3 TheDecisiontoDeclareIndependence 80 3.4 Appendixes 85 3.4.1 TheQuebecAct,October7,1774 85 3.4.2 DeclarationandResolvesoftheFirst ContinentalCongress,October14,1774 90 3.4.3 DeclarationofIndependence,July4,1776 94 vii P1:FBQ 0521832020pre.tex CB1037/Schofield 0521832020 March28,2006 1:35 Contents 4 Madison,Jefferson,andCondorcet 98 4.1 TheRatificationoftheConstitution 98 4.2 TheConflictoverUnionandConfederation 100 4.3 SocialChoiceandConstitutionalTheory 113 4.4 LandandCapitalinNorthAmerica,1756–1800 117 4.5 TheInfluenceofCondorcetonMadisonandJefferson 120 4.6 OriginsoftheTwo-PartySysteminthe1790s 125 4.7 ConcludingRemarks 128 4.8 Appendix 132 4.8.1 SpeechbyBenjaminFranklintothe ConstitutionalConventionon September17,1787 132 5 LincolnandtheCivilWar 135 5.1 Introduction 135 5.2 TheIntersectionalPartyBalance 136 5.3 DredScottandtheSupremeCourt,1857 146 5.4 TheIllinoisElectionof1858 149 5.5 LincolninNewYorkandNewHaven 155 5.6 ThePresidentialElectionof1860 158 5.7 ConcludingRemarks 163 6 JohnsonandtheCriticalRealignmentof1964 166 6.1 Introduction 166 6.2 PartisanRealignmentsfrom1896to2000 167 6.3 PartyCompetitioninTwoDimensions 170 6.4 EquilibriuminCandidateCompetition 174 6.5 PartyActivistEquilibrium 176 6.6 AJointModelofActivistsandCandidates 178 6.7 ThirdParties 182 6.8 SummaryoftheModel 183 6.9 PartisanStrategies 185 6.10 Choices,CredibleCommitment,andPathDependence 194 6.11 ConcludingRemarks 195 7 KeynesandtheAtlanticConstitution 200 7.1 Introduction 200 7.2 OrderingthePoliticalEconomy 201 7.3 ProphetsofChaos 207 7.4 PoliticalandEconomicBeliefsintheConstitution 212 7.5 TheCollapseofHegemonyinthe1970s 217 7.6 KeynesandtheQuandaryofthe1930s 223 viii