Arcana Imperii: Roman Political Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action in the Mid-Republic A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University Sara Perley 24th November 2016 © Copyright by Sara Perley 2016 All Rights Reserved Cover Image: Gaius Fabricius Luscinus and Pyrrhus. Ferdinand Bol, 1656. © Stichting Koninklijk Paleis Amsterdam This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously been submitted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any other degree. To the best of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis and all sources used have been duly acknowledged. SARA PERLEY 24th November 2016 Acknowledgements It is a pleasure to acknowledge and thank the many people who made this dissertation possible. I would like to thank the chair of my supervisory panel, Paul Burton, first and foremost for supplying me with coffee, but also for his expertise, understanding, and endless patience. I appreciate his vast knowledge and skill, and his assistance in transforming a somewhat bloated manuscript into a readable form. His efforts and aid have been invaluable. I must also acknowledge the support and encouragement from various members and students of the Centre for Classical Studies and the School of Literature, Languages, and Linguistics for engaging discussions and debates over the last three years. I recognise that this research would not have been possible without the financial support of an Australian Postgraduate Award and I am grateful that the Australian National University, and specifically the College of Arts and Social Sciences, recognised my potential in awarding me this scholarship. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, without whose generous encouragement and support throughout my life and this project in particular, I would never have completed this dissertation. This is especially true for Laura, without whom I would never have achieved so much. i Abstract The general scholarly conception of Roman military and political intelligence is that it was so poor as to be virtually non-existent, that Roman armies and officials blundered through their affairs and their world with little understanding or appreciation of the utility and importance of intelligence about their friends, foes, and neighbours. Some scholars who address the growth of the Roman empire make assumptions about intelligence usage; those who investigate intelligence practices more closely tend to focus on military intelligence or intelligence over long periods of Roman history. The conclusion usually reached is that the Roman state valued and practiced intelligence very poorly. There are no studies that focus specifically on political intelligence, and none that focuses on a specific period of Roman history. This study aims to illuminate the realities of Roman political intelligence for the period of the mid-republic, and attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of Rome’s appreciation for and use of intelligence techniques in their international relations. Analysis of ancient sources reveals that the Roman understanding of the intelligence was neither as dire nor unsophisticated as current scholarly consensus would have us believe. While political intelligence endeavours often failed or from hindsight might appear inadequate, when examined in their historical context intelligence efforts were in fact suitable for Roman needs. Roman officials protected their state through counterintelligence, developed preliminary cultural dossiers through foreknowledge, undertook concerted efforts to gain more specific intelligence prior to major international interactions, and on occasion engaged in covert activities to improve their position and ensure their national security. This is indicative of an attitude toward the broader Mediterranean world they inhabited, and their place in that world which was neither blindly aggressive nor defensive, that was neither passive nor opportunistic, but that was considered, sophisticated, and appreciative of the complexities of the Mediterranean international system. ii Table of Contents i Acknowledgements i Abstract ii Abbreviations iv I – Introduction 1 The Literature 2 Approach 24 Chapter Outline 36 II - Contextualising Roman Intelligence 39 Logistical Problems 42 Socio-Cultural Constraints 57 Conclusion 76 III -Political Counterintelligence 80 The Control of Information 83 The Control of People 99 Political Deception 111 Conclusion 115 IV - Foreknowledge 119 Sources of Foreknowledge 122 Accessibility and Employment of Foreknowledge 141 Conclusion 165 V - Trust but Verify: The Roman Intelligence Cycle 168 5.1 - Collection 176 5.2 - We’ll look into it: Negligence or Verification? 206 5.3 - Intelligence and the Build up to the Third Macedonian War 241 VI - Intelligence and International Interference 263 6.1 Political Interference 268 6.2 Covert Diplomacy, Espionage, and Assassination 296 6.3 Concluding Observations 322 VII - Conclusion 328 VIII - Bibliography 341 iii Abbreviations Abbreviated references generally follow the conventions of The Oxford Classical Dictionary, eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, rev. 4th edn., Oxford 2012. iv I – Introduction Intelligence is the neglected child of international politics.1 If this is so, then Roman intelligence is the downtrodden stepchild of Roman studies, overawed by various (ugly) stepsiblings. There is little discussion about how and what Roman officials, whether senators or military commanders, knew about their friends and foes. But in the words of Robert Jervis, ‘even the most close- minded decision-maker eventually needs to understand the world in which he or she is operating’.2 Powers in the modern world have spent enormous amounts of time and money developing organisations to discover information about others to better understand them and make informed foreign policy decisions. As states do not exist in a vacuum, to undertake decisive action in relation to other powers, the leaders of one state need an understanding of the resources, abilities, intents, and beliefs of neighbouring states. Unless we are to believe that Roman officials simply blundered along, with no knowledge of anybody except themselves, then intelligence must have played a role in their success. In the period between the First Punic War in 264 and the final conquest of Numantia in 133 Rome went from being a relatively small city-state to the dominant power in the Mediterranean world.3 The causes behind this have long been the subject of intense academic inquiry. Much ink has been spilled on debates about the nature of Rome’s expansion. Arguments centre on whether Roman ‘imperialism’ was essentially offensive or defensive, and most adopt a purely metrocentric viewpoint.4 It is only in recent years that ancient historians have begun to interpret the rise of the Roman Empire through modern International Relations theory.5 How, if, and to what extent Roman officials 1 Sir Alexander Cadogan refered to intelligence as the 'missing dimension of most diplomatic history'. Cadogan and Dilks 1971: 21. The idea was popularised by Andrew and Dilks in 1984 and has since become something of a guiding assumption for intelligence theorists; Andrew and Dilks 1984. 2 Jervis 2009: 71. 3 All dates are B.C. unless otherwise indicated. 4 On which, see below. 5 Henceforth IR indicates the discipline of International Relations, whereas the lower case ‘international relations’ refers to the activities of states. 1 knew about their neighbours has never been linked to the growth of their empire, their foreign policy, or their international affairs. While some scholars have argued that Rome sought control of material resources and profit, there has been no discussion about how they knew a specific conquest promised enough booty to outweigh the costs of war. Scholars who advocate defensive imperialism provide no discussion as to how the Romans knew or perceived that other states were threats to themselves or their allies. Mid-republican Romans did not indiscriminately destroy everybody they came across. They conquered, annihilated, and enslaved; they also traded, made alliances and treaties, and mediated foreign struggles. They did not do this blindly with no knowledge as to the resources, abilities, intentions, and beliefs of those with whom they interacted. This thesis seeks to investigate the understandings, modes, and methods of intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert actions employed by the Romans in the mid-republic as an aspect of their pursuit of foreign policy. It will consider the relationship between international relations, intelligence studies, and Rome’s rise to dominance in the Mediterranean. The Literature Roman Intelligence Specific studies of intelligence in the ancient world are rare; studies focusing explicitly on mid-republican intelligence more so.6 Certain aspects of intelligence activity, primarily with a military focus, have been touched upon in studies of ancient warfare. These studies mention activities that are classified as intelligence.7 But they rarely include discussion of how intelligence was gathered and analysed, or attempts at counterintelligence or covert action, let alone political intelligence. The earliest works that deal with aspects of intelligence with any degree of specificity discuss the transport and communication of information in the 6 For intelligence in ancient Greece see for example Starr 1974; Gerolymatos 1986; Richmond 1998; Russell 1999. 7 The ways in which the term ‘intelligence’ will be used in this study will be discussed in the next section. 2