eee 7 : ke F 2 sa : Es - ‘ st i , <;m e}a 4 4 ss . : . : © F: : ¥ ) : 5 : See ; : te | ; i Ke : pre o : Ff } 3 —a_ ad Dex pecifically, how important is it after noticed the brake locking up because the deck a six-month cruise? Phrases like “a lot,” was wet and everyone was sliding anyway. “extremely,” or “I can’t begin to tell you” My plan was to take a trap back at the beach, come to mind. But do you want to get home as with no one the wiser. Luckily, the runways much as one H-46 crew a senior officer told were wet (this was luck?), and my entire me about? They left the ship in a helicopter squadron took traps. I didn’t even have to that had an engine problem: one of its two explain why I trapped at the field. I walked engines wasn’t installed. Seems the helo’s inside to maintenance control and downed the engine had broken during deployment, so airplane for brakes. Just wasn’t safe to fly, maintenance removed it while waiting for a you know. replacement. The day before the ship pulled Then there’s the bubblegum-and-bailing- into port, the replacement engine hadn’t wire fix. At least one maintenance department arrived, and the helicopter flew off without it. was brighter than that. They didn’t need the Then there was the H-2 whose rotor blade bailing wire. When they found a fuel leak just began to delaminate in flight. It got the crew’s before the flyoff, they stopped the leak with attention as it deteriorated, so they declared an bubblegum. Whatever works, right? The emergency and landed. The flyoff was the aircrew was ashore, and the squadron didn’t next day, and there was no replacement blade have to crane an airplane onto the pier. on the ship. If the plane didn’t fly off, the Let’s not forget looking good on the fly- aircrew would spend another night on the off. A friend of mine described launching boat. Not only that, the bird would have to be with no fuel in his drop tanks. When I worked on pierside, then craned off after it shrugged, and said “So what,” he then said was repaired. Our ingenious aviators traipsed they stayed in the big “V” formation too long down to admin, borrowed some Superglue, trying to make the squadron look good. They and glued the torn blade together. The H-2 landed with 600 pounds of fuel, shut off the flew off, and everyone was happy. right engiie on touchdown, and taxied in on During one of my flyoffs, the master chief one engine. If you’re not familiar with the in maintenance control briefed me on a brake Tomcat, the low-fuel lights come on at 2,000 problem. He thought the mechs had fixed my pounds, and most SOPs require getting the F-14’s brakes, but if the brakes weren’t fixed airplane on deck by 2,000 pounds during the to let them know and they would try again. I day, 2,500 pounds at night or IFR. remember thinking, “They’ve already re- Flyoffs have to be the ultimate breeding placed everything. What else can they do?” ground for “get-home-itis.”” Nothing anyone My answer: “Not much, and it wouldn’t be says or does will remove the desire to get home. anything they could fix in time for me to make We know that these emotions exist, and when the launch.” we feel like pressing, we have to remind Of course, the brakes weren’t fixed. One ourselves that there’s an alternative much worse side locked up every time I touched them. No than being a day wh problem, I taxied to the cat using one brake. When I forgot and used both brakes, no one Lt. Ken Skaggs, Editor March-April 1995 0 : Number 2 On the Cover: F-14A Tomcat (Photo by Rick Llinares) Articles We'll Have the Chicken-and-Fish Combo to Go! By Lt. Gary Williams and Lt. Paul McSweeney Nugget Inbound By LCar. ScottA . White Disappearing Fuel By Lt. E. Schmitt Windmill Woody By LCdr. John Woods But, the Ship’s Supposed to Know Where We Are! By LCadr. Bud Bishop Hey! The Prop’s Running Backwards! By Lt. Scott Jones The Big Mistake By Lt. Jeff Bohler A Typical Midair By LCadr. Brad Johanson and Lt. Dan Anderson Famous Last Words: “Our Plate’s Too Full” By LCdr. Tom Ganse Help Your Shoe Buddies By Lt. John Harris | Was Very Dis-strut Over the Situation By AWC(AW) Steven B. Connolly The Saboteur By Lt. Donald May Do | Get a Merit Badge for This Maneuver? By Maj. Peyton Dehart, USMCR Let’s Take the Troubleshooter with Us! By Lt. Ted Williams see page 14 PQM + 2 FAC(A)s = UH-1N in H2O By Maj. R.G. Neilson, USMC How to Give Aid and Comfort to the Enemy via Stupidity By Lt. Joey Pollak A New Miserable Experience By Ltjg. Rob Soldon Where'd That Truck Come From? By Lt. Mark D. Laslo Dash 1 Becomes Dash 2. No, Wait! is That Dash 2? Who Was Dash 1...? By Lt. Robert Dennehy Bravo Zulu VQ-4, HC-11 Bravo Zulu see page 24 VFA-37, VP-46, VMFA-451, VFA-203, HS-8 RAdm. Joe Mobley, Commander, Naval Safety Center Save Your Skin with Aircraft-Panel Bags Bill Mooberry, Executive Director Cdr. John G. Mahoney, Head, Media and Education Support By Lt. Bennie L. Wynkoop Derek Nelson, Editor-in-Chief Lt. Ken Skaggs, Editor Blow Your Top, It'll Make You Famous Joe Casto, Assistant Editor By PR3 “Pop Top” Scott Peter Mersky and Bud Baer, Associate Editors Laurinda Minke and Frank Smith, Design and Layout “Up, Down!”— Crunch Approach is a bimonthly publication published by the Commander, Naval Safety Center. By AE2(AW) J.A. Turner Address comments, contributions and questions about distribution and reprints to: Commander, Naval Safety Center, Grapes Make It Clean, Clear and Bright 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399, By JO2 Lance Lindley TeleApthtoenneti:o n:C omAmpeprrcoiaaclh —( 80C4)o de4 44-771 416 TelephAotntee:n tioCno:m mMeercciha l— (C8o0d4)e 474141- 7689 The Voice eD-SmaNi l:5 64e-d7a4p1p6r;ch F@AtXe cn(e8t0t4 ) jc4t4e4.-jc6s7.9m1i l FAXD S(N8 045)6 44-4746-8697 91 By Lt. Mark A. Parcell Approach contents should not be considered directive and may not be construed as Who Cares? It’s Broken Anyway incriminating under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Views expressed in guest-written articles are not necessarily those of the Naval Safety Cenie:. The Secretary By AOCS(AW) Ken Randolph of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business Self-Service, Full Service or Disservice required by law. it is funded and printed in accordance with all Navy publishing and printing regulations and approval of the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee. Approach By AEC(AW) Edward S. Thompson is available for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Approach (ISSN 0570-4979) is published monthly by the Naval Safety Center, Crossfeed 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399. Second-class postage paid at Norfolk, VA and AKCS Dan Steber, Editorial Coordinator additional mailing offices. * POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Approach, Naval Safety Center, 375 A Letters Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399. While in a 20-degree left-wing-down attitude at about 200 feet and 500 knots, we heard an extremely loud pop as something struck the pilot’s right shoulder and helmet, and the right side of my helmet. My first thought was a catastrophic engine failure, but it only took about another second to figure out that we had hit a bird. The inside of the cockpit—including us!—was covered with feathers and bird entrails. As I looked up toward the pilot, I saw that there was a 12-inch hole in the right quarter windscreen panel. The center bullet- proof windscreen, while still intact, had completely shattered. I immediately tried to talk to the pilot to determine whether he could maintain control of the aircraft. I hoped that I would not have We'll Have the Chichen- to choose my other option. At 200 feet and 500 knots, I did not expect to survive an ejection. and-Gish Comba te Go! My first attempt to call the pilot was unsuccessful because of the deafening noise in the cockpit. I screamed to him over the ICS to pull up while looking for any kind of response. My pilot later said that at first, he By Lt. Gary Williams and Lt. Paul McSweeney could not hear any calls over the ICS or radio because of the wind noise. 6: squadron was preparing for a two- My scan immediately became altitude, week air-to-ground det to El Centro, and attitude, and airspeed. Fortunately, the pilot all aircrew would get a refresher brief on had come to the same conclusion and started LAT. This flight was a LAT instructor climbing and decelerating. I told lead about check flight for my pilot and for the RIO in our problem, and we immediately turned for the lead aircraft. The flight leader gave the home base. brief. He was a LAT instructor pilot, and he As we decelerated to 200 knots, we were covered the specifics of the flight in detail, able to communicate with each other again. as well as emergency procedures, including We climbed to approximately 8,500 feet, bird strikes. Minimum altitude for the hop and our lead joined on us and checked our was 200 feet AGL. F-14 for damage. There didn’t seem to be We flew the LAT portion of the flight at anything more. Navy Dare target range. Everything went as The pilot couldn’t see out the front or briefed until approximately 40 minutes into right side of the aircraft, so we decided that the hop. While completing a TAC turn, my our lead would take us back for a section pilot was looking out the left side for our lead PAR and drop us off on the ball of the long while I was looking out the same side to runway. On the way back, we checked check lead’s six o’clock. controllability in the landing configuration, approach March-April 1995 and the pilot reported no problems. The passenger—or at least part of one. Its white aircraft and both engines were operating feathers combined with the smell of fish led normally. us to believe we had hit a seagull on his way We called base, and they told us to make home from lunch. sure we had safed our upper ejection handles, As we checked each other over, I saw that something we had not thought of. Although the pilot’s helmet and visor were covered the right quarter-panel had a large hole in it with bird guts and feathers. Our squadron and the wind noise was tremendous at high SOP and briefing guide both contain a LAT speed, there was little wind blast coming in checklist. The first two items on this checklist the cockpit. are visor down and mask on. If the pilot had Our approach and landing at NAS not had his visor down, I am convinced the Oceana were uneventful, and we decided to outcome would have been different. < shut down in the throat after turning off the Lt. Williams (pilot) and Lt. McSweeney (RIO) fly with runway so we would not FOD an engine with VF-14. the loose plexiglass, which was hanging from the right quarter-windscreen panel. As we took off our masks to exit the aircraft, we were hit with the smell of rotten fish. It wasn’t until I looked into the canopy turtleback that I realized we had a third March-April 1995 approach = arrived in the Philippines for my H2P on detachment. Besides, the flight was deployment, wearing my service dress thrilling, and I certainly didn’t want to make blues and full of anticipation, apprehension, waves my second day of deployment. and perspiration. The ship had a permanently My second flight was the det fly-on to the assigned det at Cubi, and our people rotated AFS as the ship pulled out of Subic Bay. We every six months. The detachment welcomed launched with a full bag of fuel, a ton of me, promptly took me on an Olongapo fam, IMRL-gear, and several bags of golf clubs. and had me flying the following day. My first We were hot and heavy, but we still had flight was a day familiarization flight around single-engine capability at 70 KIAS. The Cubi Point, at that time a license to steal. We OINC gave me several simulated emergen- started with some touch-and-goes, quickly cies as we flew up and down the coast became bored, and decided to go for a sight- waiting for a green deck. seeing tour around Luzon. During a single-engine procedure, he told Some of you old salts may remember me he wanted to show me how to “milk” “prehistoric valley.” We flew up the valley at single engine in ground effect. about five feet. I voiced my concern to the “Ground effect! That’s less than 50 feet!” HAC about our flathatting, and he responded, I said. “You’re on det now, son. Just relax and enjoy Apparently, he had learned this tech- the ride.” I looked back at the crew and they nique in the past, and he was determined to were laughing at me. Being a naive nugget, I show it to me. I objected as much as any assumed these guys knew what they were nugget can object to his lieutenant- doing and that this type of flying was normal commander OINC. 4 approach March-April 1995 I said something like, “Sir, are you sure aircraft. How many of us still train in unsuit- you know what you’re doing? I don’t think able conditions because we don’t want to be a we’re supposed to do single-engine work “wimp”? The prevailing wisdom is we “train below 200 feet over water.” like we fight,” but certainly there are times Of course, he responded, “No sweat, I’ve when the risks of training in uncooperative done this a million times.” Again, the crew conditions are not worth the increased smiled cynically at the nugget. As we likelihood of a mishap. descended through 50 feet, the OINC pulled The Naval Aviation Safety School in aft stick and reduced collective, followed by Monterey uses a film called “The Road to forward stick and up collective. The next Abilene” to illustrate how a group may do thing I knew, rotor rpm was about 80 percent, something that no one actually wants to and we were falling like a piano. simply because no one questions the original The OINC yelled, “We’re going in!” idea. The lesson is that if an idea is not in As we splashed, we grabbed the engine- the group’s best interest, individuals must condition lever, threw it back into “fly,” and have the courage to speak up. Otherwise, rocketed out of the water up to 1,000 feet. the idea gathers momentum, and the flawed Fortunately, no harm was done to the aircraft, plan goes ahead. although our maintenance officer was furious I am often amazed that entire crews will because of the man-hours needed to de-salt go along with me simply because of my the aircraft. authority as the HAC. Moreover, it is appall- My third flight was a shipboard night- ing when a mishap board discovers a trend of training flight. The OINC had been repri- “cowboy” antics by a pilot involved in a manded in a P-4 from the squadron CO “human factors” mishap. because the det had not been logging enough The collective reaction is, “Oh yeah, that nighttime. We were going to log some night- guy flew like a wild man! Everyone knew time, come hell or high water. Well, the high that.” Questioning a misguided scheme may water came. In fact, we were sailing right into often be difficult for a military member the middle of a typhoon. Losing sight of the trained not to question authority, but we are ship in the landing pattern was routine, the certainly not talking about questioning orders winds were atrocious, the deck was pitching in the heat of battle. As vigilant crew mem- and rolling more than I have ever seen since, bers, we must not let anyone in the aircraft and the rain was coming down in sheets. pursue a course that will place anyone in Being an ignorant nugget, I did not even unnecessary jeopardy, intentional or not. < know enough to be scared. LCdr. White is the OINC for HC-11’s Det 11. I just kept asking, “Is it this bad out here This article represents the “way things often? Doesn’t our SOP require us to have a were.” Today’s way of doing business does visible horizon for single-ship ops?” not tolerate rogue-warrior behavior by a The HAC handed me a grease pencil and naval aviator. Human Factors Boards and said, “Here, just draw a horizon on the Aircrew Coordination Training were devel- windscreen and you'll be fine.” oped to detect this behavior and eliminate “Ha, ha. That’s a good one,” I said. their types of mishaps. However, these It did not take long for the HAC to programs are only as good as the attention decide it was time to end this folly, since I that commands and aircrews give them. — was all over the sky trying to control the Cdr. Charlie Hilton, Head, Rotary Wing Branch, Naval Safety Center. March-April 1995 approach ;| h e complexities and quirks of the F-14’s required 3,750 pounds of fuel. No problem, fuel system mystify most of us. On a we thought. night cross-country 380 miles from NAF The situation started compounding. We Atsugi, my pilot noticed a left fuel- pressure began the usual comm battle with the Japa- light. We immediately started the PCL proce- nese controllers who wanted to vector us 100 dures. Step No. 4 said to monitor the fuel miles out of our way. Once they realized we distribution. The final step indicated that this were going to fly a bingo profile regardless of was a land-as-soon-as-practical emergency. what was said, they cooperated. We decided to press to Atsugi where the Next, our transponder failed. I couldn’t weather was excellent and we knew the field. fix the problem. Because we were out of Knowing MCAS Iwakuni was about 160 radar contact, a position report was required miles to the southwest was a comforting every two minutes. To divide the workload thought, except the weather there was just between us, and to circumvent the communi- above mins and showing no sign of improve- cation barrier that arises when talking to the ment. The other options were JSDF (Japa- Japanese controllers, I gave my pilot the nese Self Defense Force) fields that were just frequencies to Iwakuni’s tower and ground as close as Iwakuni, but were also under the for the front radio. On the other end of these same blanket of rain and fog that frequently frequencies were American controllers. covers Japan. Eighty miles out, we got the gear rigged at After we had completed the initial PCL Iwakuni and had ground crews waiting for us. drill, |w orked on bingo profiles for Atsugi Most importantly, we received current and Iwakuni. I also familiarized myself with weather updates. The field was approaching approach and field diagrams for Iwakuni. mins, and it was raining hard with fog. Then the pilot noticed we had a growing fuel Looking at our charts, Iwakuni was the only imbalance, which was not unusual for this suitable place for us to land. We were com- type of emergency. mitted. Following normal procedures, we se- Since our course to Iwakuni had to be the lected the high side. The PCL says to monitor most expeditious, and we were unable to get a fuel distribution. If there was migration from TACAN lock, we used our hand-held GPS the right side (which was working) to the left and INS to navigate and update our position. side (which wasn’t) we were to return the As we started our idle descent, it occurred switch to norm. The migration of fuel from to us that something was amiss with our fuel. the good to bad side indicated a sump-tank We had burned more than expected, and our interconnect failure. fuel was down to 3,300 pounds on the Soon fuel began migrating to the inopera- operative side. About 10 minutes later and 20 tive side, and we turned toward Iwakuni, as miles from Iwakuni, we had only 2,000 we would be unable to bingo to Atsugi on pounds of usable fuel, about 1,800 pounds 5,500 pounds of unusable fuel. The 9,000 less than expected. pounds of fuel on the left side was trapped We knew we were in trouble and reevalu- and inaccessible. The bingo to Iwakuni ated our options. It was nighttime, rapidly approach March-April 1995 By Lt. E. Schmitt becoming IMC, and the field was at mins. If missed the gear. When we finally grabbed a we missed the approach, we might have to wire, the crash crew gave us the signal for eject. If the approach was successful, we were emergency shutdown. Fuel was streaming out going to do everything possible to keep the of our vent mast like a fire hose. We had only plane on deck. It helped to know the field had 600 pounds of usable fuel left. three sets of arresting gear. Always know your diverts and fuel It was becoming apparent that we had not needed to get to them. If we had delayed our just a sump-tank interconnect failure, but decision to go to Iwakuni, we would have possibly a fuel leak. We followed the PCL probably flamed out. Secondly, divide up the procedures for a fuel leak, except for shutting work. By having my pilot talk to Iwakuni down the affected engine. We didn’t secure while I continued to speak to the Japanese the engine because we felt it would have been controller, we avoided delays in the last phase impossible to control the plane with a dead of the flight. engine on the side with 9,000 pounds of fuel. Thirdly, consider the emergency before At the present rate of fuel consumption, we securing a good engine. The PCL said to were barely going to make the field. secure the engine. However, compounded At 10 miles, in the goo, my pilot lost his with the other problems in our situation, it primary attitude reference. We had 1,200 would have been a wrong thing to do, which pounds of usable fuel as we continued the reinforces the point that NATOPS does not approach. Finally, we broke out at 1/2 mile and have all the answers.< < 300 feet. The pilot did an excellent job keeping Lt. Schmitt is a first-tour RIO with VF-154. us on glideslope and centerline considering the 9,000-pound weight difference between the left and right sides. He had to trim the stick full right and use full right rudder. We touched down on a wet runway. At first, we were afraid that we had ONO den By LCdr. John Woods ou do some things in life that come Somewhere over the Plains it became back to haunt you. This one always obvious, even to me, that we were taking an seems to come back to me during my morn- unnecessary risk. In what would become my ing shower. All I can do is grimace, shake my only example of sound judgment, I diverted head, and try to forget it. to get some gas. If only that was the end of I was an “experienced” P-3 pilot, a newly the story! frocked lieutenant commander. Since I was We had a nice lunch, and the admiral flying every day in an exciting operational chit-chatted with the base’s commanding environment, my confidence was growing. In officer. Then we all manned up to continue fact, I was so confident that when offered an on our way to Andrews but soon discovered opportunity to fly one of our flag officers that our No. | engine had sheared a starter from Hawaii to NAF Washington at Andrews shaft. AFB, I took it. This was one opportunity to These were my options in order of most screw up badly that I couldn’t refuse. prudence: I did what I thought was a complete job 1. Tell the admiral I was sorry, wish him of preflight planning. Weather was forecast good luck getting to Andrews, order a starter, to be CAVU throughout the trip, and the only and get a BOQ room. Delay: two days. disappointing aspect was a forecast headwind. Sure enough, when I ran an OPARS fuel plan, it indicated that I would be about 2,000 pounds short of required reserves if I departed at my maximum weight and tried to stretch it in one leg. I threw caution to the wind (pardon the pun) and took off with all the fuel I could load. I figured there were lots of gas stops between the West and East Coasts, and the odds were in my favor that the wind would come around. We made landfall over NAS Moffett Field at about 0600 local where my copilots woke me up (as I said, I was very confident) to give me the bad news. At current consump- tion, we’d be 1,000 pounds below our re- quired minimum fuel at Andrews if we didn’t refuel now. I didn’t want to wake up the admiral, or for that matter, surprise all the Moffett brass before their first cup of coffee with a VIP visit, so I talked my flight crew out of stopping and pressed on. 8 approach March-April 1995