PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Anxious Uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) Ian McGregor, Kyle Nash, Nikki Mann, and Curtis E. Phills YorkUniversity In4experimentsanxiousuncertaintythreatscausedreactiveapproachmotivation(RAM).InStudies1 and2,academicanxiousuncertaintythreatscausedRAMasassessedbybehavioralneuroscienceand implicitmeasuresofapproachmotivation.InStudy3theeffectofarelationalanxiousuncertaintythreat onapproach-motivatedpersonalprojectsinparticipants’everydayliveswasmediatedbytheidealismof those projects. In Study 4 the effect of a different relational anxious uncertainty threat on implicit approachmotivationwasheightenedbymanipulatedsalienceofpersonalideals.ResultssuggestaRAM accountforidealisticandideologicalreactionsinthethreatanddefenseliterature.Speculativeimplica- tions are suggested for understanding diverse social and clinical phenomena ranging from worldview defense,prejudice,andmeaningmakingtonarcissism,hypomania,andaggression. Keywords:threat,anxiety,uncertainty,ideals,approachmotivation To relieve anxiety some animals tenaciously run, lick, and bite. reactionsinhumans(andinotheranimalsthatshareouruncertainty- Indeed,someratsreacttoanxietybyrunningsoeagerlyonawheel linkedneuropsychologyofanxiety;Gray&McNaughton,2000).Our thattheystarvetodeath,andsomedogslickthemselvestothepoint starting premise is that RAM effectively provides insulation from ofskinlesions.Suchcompulsive“displacementbehaviors”canseem anxious uncertainty through a kind of motivated tunnel vision that bizarrebecausetheyhavenoobviousinstrumentallinktotheeliciting shieldstheimpactofgoal-irrelevantanddissonantinformation(Gable anxiety(Antelman,Szechtman,Chin,&Fisher,1975;Berridge,Mit- & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009; Harmon- ton,Clark,&Roth,1999;Rappaport,Ryland,&Kriete,1992;Rout- Jones&Harmon-Jones,2002;Harmon-Jones,Harmon-Jones,Fearn, tenberg & Kuznesof, 1967; Uchiumi, Aoki, Kikusui, Takeuchi, & Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Klinger, 1975; Shah, Friedman, & Mori,2008).Hereweproposeareactiveapproachmotivation(RAM) Kruglanski,2002).Accordingtoourpalliativeaccount,thedomainof accountofrelatedreactionsinhumans. RAM may thus be wholly unrelated to the eliciting threat because Hypomania, smoking, and aggression have been viewed by psy- RAMmerelyneedstoprovideanalternativefocusforeagerabsorp- choanalytictheoristsascompulsivedisplacementstorelieveanxiety tion.Theelicitinganxietieswillfeellessbothersomebecausetheyare (Dollard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Fenichel, 1945). mutedbythenewgoalfocus. Janis(1958,pp.140–141),forexample,noticedthatintheanxious For humans, thinking about cherished ideals may serve as an weeksleadinguptotheirsurgeries,patientsseemedtoshowakindof efficient and reliable focus for RAM. Ideals are self-defining, “surface euphoria”—a “forced hyperactivity” or “pseudo elation” abstract goals that guide more concrete goals (Carver & Scheier, beliedbyagitation—ofteninvolvingfantasiesofunlimitedpersonal powerandpotential(seealsoFenichel,1945,pp.407–411).Theidea 1998; Higgins, 1996, 1997; Powers, 1973). Ideals can therefore thatpeoplemaskanxiousuncertaintyandmotivationalconflictwith serveasaccessiblealternativegoalstoapproachwhenfocalgoals idealizedextremesofconfidenceintheselforasocialidentityisa arecompromised(Rogers,Kuiper,&Kirker,1977).Humanscan cornerstoneofneoanalytictheoriesofdefensivepride(Horney,1950), eagerly approach meaningful ideals, at least in part, by simply self-superiority (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956), and authoritarian heightening imagined commitment to them (McGregor & Little, hostility (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; 1998).Privateconvictionforidealsisalsorelativelyfreefromthe Fromm,1941). risks of failure or critique that can hamper more temporal goals. Inthepresentlaboratoryresearch,weinvestigateabasicmotiva- Beyondtheirefficiencyandreliability,idealsarealsoresistantto tional mechanism that might account for such eager displacement disillusionment and habituation because they can never be fully attained (Klinger, 1977). Promoting ideals as a means for RAM maythereforebeanappealinghumanresponsetoanxiousuncer- IanMcGregor,KyleNash,NikkiMann,andCurtisE.Phills,Depart- tainty.1 mentofPsychology,YorkUniversity,Toronto,Ontario,Canada. This research was supported by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Thanks to Denise Marigold, JordanPeterson,andMikePrenticeforhelpfulcomments. 1Hypomanic episodes arising from anxious uncertainty and conflict Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ian havebeendescribedinpsychoanalytictermsasbeingcharacterizedbya McGregor, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele self-perceivedunificationoftheegowithsuperegoideals(Fenichel,1945; Street,Toronto,OntarioM3J1P3,Canada.E-mail:[email protected] seealsoHorney,1950). JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2010,Vol.99,No.1,133–147 ©2010AmericanPsychologicalAssociation0022-3514/10/$12.00 DOI:10.1037/a0019701 133 134 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS Anxious Uncertainty Brower, 1987). In doing so, we target anxious uncertainty in contrasttobenignuncertaintyorotherunpleasantbutunconflicted Pharmacological,behavioral,andlesionstudiesonhumansand negative arousal states (e.g., mere informational uncertainty with other animals reveal a basic goal-regulation process that begins less bearing on personal goals in Studies 3 and 4 or aversion to withtheexperienceofanxiousuncertainty(Gray&McNaughton, dentalpaininStudy1). 2000). Anxiety arises when an animal is approach-oriented but simultaneouslyexperiencespunishmentcues,evidenceoffrustra- tivenonreward,uncertainty,orthreateningnovelty.Theessential From Anxious Uncertainty to RAM anxiogenic predicament thus arises from the uncertainty of an Acardinalfeatureofanxietyisheightenedvigilancearoundthe approach–avoidance conflict. Even approach–approach conflicts domainofthethreat,whichpreparestheanimalforthepossibility among equally compelling alternatives, or novel circumstances, of a transition to fight or flight, should it become necessary. can become approach–avoidance conflicts to the extent that ap- Vigilancealsohelpstheanimalnoticealternativeroutesformore proaching one alternative implies frustration of others (Lewin, viable goal pursuits. Once a viable alternative is identified, the 1935). According to Gray and McNaughton (2000), the brain’s anxious animal can surge toward it, restore clear approach moti- septo-hippocampalsystemrespondstosuchmotivationallyuncer- vation, and thereby relieve the uncomfortable symptoms of anx- tainpredicamentswithanxiety;directbehavioralinhibitionofthe iousuncertainty.Withanxiousuncertaintyandvigilancerelieved, focal goal; and iterative, negative biasing of all goals. These uninhibitedapproachofafocalgoalpromotesthereturntoakind responses are adaptive when they facilitate disengagement from of single-mindedness characteristic of committed approach- predicamentsthatrendergoalsuncertainandengagementinmore viable alternative goals. When the septo-hippocampal system is motivation whereby goal-irrelevant stimuli become less motiva- lesioned, animals lose the capacity to extricate themselves from tionally salient (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & goalconflicts(Gray&McNaughton,2000). Gable, 2009; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon- Intheircomprehensivereviewofanimalandhumanresearchon Jonesetal.,2008;Klinger,1975;Shahetal.,2002).Suchsingle- the neuropsychology of anxiety, Gray and McNaughton (2000) minded states allow goals to be powerfully approached without were clear in emphasizing that anxiety essentially arises from distraction—obstacles to action and alternative perspectives be- uncertainpredicaments(seealsoPeterson,1999)—fromcuessig- comelesssalientasone’sownimpulsesandperspectivespredom- nalingpossible(butnotcertain)impedanceofanactive,approach- inate(cf.Cs´ıkszentmiha´lyi,1990;Galinsky,Magee,Inesi,&Gru- motivatedgoal.Thiscoretenetoftheneuropsychologyofanxiety enfeld, 2006; Guinote, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, highlightsapivotaldistinctionbetweenanxietyandothernegative 2003). butnonconflictedstates,suchaspanic.Incontrasttouncertainty- Thecapacitytotenaciouslylockandloadonanalternativegoal rootedanxiety,whicharisesfromsimultaneouslyactiveapproach canbeadaptivewhenitfacilitatesappropriategoalswitchingand andavoidanceimpulses,panicarisesfromclearandunambivalent maintainsviablegoalpursuit.Thepremiseofthecurrentresearch, avoidancemotivation. however, is that tenacious absorption in an alternative goal can Gray and McNaughton (2000) illustrated this distinction with also be engaged for merely palliative purposes. In the face of findingsfromresearchonhungrymiceapproachingfoodincages anxious uncertainty, RAM focused on any compelling goal (or smearedwiththescentofacat.Themicewillcontinuetohaltingly ideal) may be immediately rewarding insofar as it insulates the approach—butwithanxiousuncertaintyandperiodicrearingupto individualfromtheelicitinganxieties.RAMmaythusbeengaged scan for a possible cat to avoid. In contrast, if a cat actually simplyforreliefofdistresswithoutregardforlongertermconse- appears, the mice react with distinct and purely avoidant (panic- quences. related)fight-or-flightreactions.Lesionandpharmacologicalstud- Themotivationaltunnelvisionassociatedwithactiveapproach ies show that different brain regions uniquely mediate anxiety motivation may partially account for why neural markers of ap- versus fight-or-flight reactions (i.e., septo-hippocampal vs. peri- proachmotivationaresorobustlyassociatedwithwell-beingand aqueductalgray,respectively;Gray&McNaughton,2000). decreased reactivity to threatening or risky stimuli (Elliot, 2008). In the present research, we focus exclusively on experimental Relative left frontal brain activity is a robust indicator of both threats designed to elicit anxious uncertainty. We use the term dispositional and situational approach-motivation tendencies anxious uncertainty to distinguish it from merely informational (Elliot, 2008), and approach-related brain activity induced by uncertaintythatdoesnotthreatenpersonalgoalsorcauseanxious biofeedback has been found to inhibit goal conflicts (Harmon- or ideological reactions in the threat and defense literature Jones et al., 2008). Approach-related brain activity also predicts (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009; Van den Bos, 2009; cf. happiness and meaning in life (Urry et al., 2004) and lower Sorrentino&Roney,2000;Wilson,Centerbar,Kermer,&Gilbert, reactivity to risky and noxious stimuli (Gianotti et al., 2009; 2005). To do so we use face-valid manipulations of anxious Jackson et al., 2003). Moreover, two recent studies demonstrate uncertaintyinthecontextofnormativelyimportantpersonalgoals. that approach-motivated patterns of electroencephalographic Importantgoalsaremorepronetoanxietythanaretrivialones (EEG) activation are significantly correlated with less anxious becausereluctancetosimplydisengagefromthemwhentheyare reactivityintheanteriorcingulatecortex(whichregistersconflict impeded maintains the uncertainty of approaching the goal and and uncertainty) after Stroop-task errors (Nash, McGregor, & avoiding the impedance. In the present research, therefore, we Inzlicht, 2010). Behavioral neuroscience markers of relative left operationalizeanxiousuncertaintyindomainsofourundergradu- cerebral hemisphericity similarly predict vigorous, powerful, and ate participants’ most important normative life tasks (relational robustapproach-motivation-relatedmoodstates(Drake&Myers, and academic/career; Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & 2006).Thereisthusconvergingtheoretical,experimental,neural, REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 135 and behavioral neuroscience precedent for the expectation that Such idealistic reactions to anxious uncertainty do not result RAMshouldbearewardingresponsetoanxiousuncertainty. after other kinds of negative arousal states or after reminders of merely informational kinds of uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009). Dozens of studies, for example, have shown that being reminded Ideal Approach of the experience of dental pain causes as much generalized From the RAM perspective, when faced with anxious uncer- negative affect as does being reminded of mortality salience. tainties people would be expected to turn to their ideals, ideolo- Dental pain reminders do not, however, cause the ideological gies, meanings, and worldviews with heightened tenacity and reactionsthatexperientialmortalityoruncertaintyreminderscause vigor (cf. Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Hogg, 2007; McGregor, (McGregor&Jordan,2007;Solomonetal.,2004). Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Peterson, 1999; Van den Bos, Recently researchers further compared the effects of conflict- Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). Doing so related aversive experiences with serious but non-conflict-related couldservethesamedisplacementfunctionasotheranimals’more aversive experience (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009). Partic- concrete reactive compulsions, but with little expenditure of re- ipantswererandomlyassignedtodescribehowtheyfeltabout(a) sources. Ideals are abstract goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Hig- “animportantgoalyouarepursuingthatisnotgoingverywelland gins, 1996), and merely thinking about them can activate the is impeded by a frustrating obstacle or obstacles,” (b) “a current pattern of left-frontal cerebral hemisphericity that characterizes situation in which you feel torn in deciding between similarly approach motivation (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & promisinggoals,butreallyyoucanonlyaffordtopursueone,”or Harmon-Jones,2004).Idealsmaythusprovideaparticularlyeffi- (c)“abigproblemthatiscurrentlymakingyouseriouslyreassess cient and reliable focus for RAM because ideals are relatively whoyouareasaperson,yourvalues,and/orhowtheworldworks impervioustotemporalfrustrationsandcanbereadilypromotedin around you” (a topic at least as aversive as the others but less theprivacyofone’sownimagination,freefromfailureorcritique. conflictedbecausetheindividualhasdisengaged).Thedependent As Lewin (1935, pp. 56, 103, 145, 178–179) observed, conflicts variable was a five-item scale that assesses the extent to which among “simultaneously present psychical tensions” can cause participants were “looking,” “searching,” and “seeking” “mean- “flightintounreality”or“fantasy,”to“unrealplanesofhopesand ing,” “purpose,” and “mission” in life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & dreams” where there are no reality checks on the goals one Kaler,2006,p.93). constructs.Becomingidealisticmaythereforebeanattractiveway Results showed that the goal-conflict conditions ([a] and [b]) forhumanstoactivateRAMandgainreliefinthefaceofconflicts each caused significantly more meaning seeking than did the anduncertainties.2 nonconflicted serious problem condition (for similar reactive Past research has shown that anxious uncertainties do indeed meaning-seeking findings see McGregor et al., 2001, Study 4). causepeopletopromotetheiridealsandmeanings.Forexample, Goal conflict is one of the predicaments that can reliably put in a study by McGregor et al. (2001), participants reacted to people in a motivationally uncertain and therefore anxious state personaldilemmasorexistentialuncertaintiesbycleavingtomore (Gray&McNaughton,2000).Thus,previousresearchspecifically idealistic and meaningful values, identities, and personal projects links predicaments related to anxious uncertainty with idealistic intheirlives(Studies2and4);theyalsoreportedastrongerdesire and meaning-seeking reactions. The main novel purpose of the to find meaning in life (Study 4) and to eagerly defend their presentresearchistoprovideanintegrativeframeworkforunder- consensual worldviews (Studies 1 and 3; see also, e.g., Hogg, standing such idealistic reactions—from meaning seeking and 2007;Landau,Greenberg,&Sullivan,2009;Landau,Greenberg, value conviction to ideological extremism and worldview de- Sullivan, Routledge, & Arndt, 2009; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Van fense—that are currently explained by competing theories in the den Bos et al., 2005). Past work has also shown that salient literature. uncertainties lose their sting if participants are given a chance to expresstheirideals,values,convictions,identifications,andmean- Overview ings(McGregor,2006b;McGregor,Haji,&Kang,2008;McGre- InfourexperimentswetesttheRAMhypothesiswithface-valid gor & Marigold, 2003, Study 4; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & manipulations of anxious uncertainty that have caused anxious Kang,2005,Study4;McGregoretal.,2001,Study1). Dozensofstudiesinspiredbyterrormanagementtheory(TMT) havesimilarlyfoundmortalitysaliencetoheightenconvictionfor 2Theprivacyofidealsandmeaningsmayalsoprotectthemfromreality cultural, worldview, and positive-self ideals (reviewed in constraintsandallowthemtogravitatetowardunrealisticconvictionand Solomon,Greenberg,&Pyszczynski,2004;seealsoGreenberget utopianextremes.Extremesmayprovideparticularlyreliablesolaceinthe al.,2003,andVandenBosetal.,2005,forevidencethatitisthe faceofanxiousuncertaintybecauseconflict-relateddistressisexperienced anxiety and uncertainty associated with mortality salience that to the extent that the conflicting elements have equally strong valences. causestheworldviewdefense).Evensubtleanxiety-inducingnov- Themathematicalformulathatbestpredictstheamountoffeltdiscomfort eltycuesintheenvironmentcancausesimilarworldviewdefense arisingfromcognitiveconflictisthesquareofthevalenceoftheweakerof theconflictingelementsdividedbythestrongeroftheconflictingelements reactions,whichdisappearifanxietycanbequelledinsomeother (Newby-Clark,McGregor,&Zanna,2002).Amplifyinganextremeposi- way (Proulx & Heine, 2008). Other research has linked anxious tion in either direction exponentially increases the denominator of the uncertaintytotheneedforarigidideology(Jost,Glaser,Kruglan- ambivalence formula and accordingly decreases distress. Approach of ski,&Sulloway,2003)andtoheightenedconvictionforpersonal ideological extremes, then, might be a particularly reliable avenue for values, ideals, and religious orientations (McGregor & Marigold, RAM.Notonlyareidealsreadilyavailableandefficient,butideological 2003; McGregor et al., 2005; McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, in extremesarealsoreliablefocithatarethemselvesstructurallyimmuneto press;McGregoretal.,2001). anxiousuncertainty. 136 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS experience,ideologicalextremes,andworldviewdefensesinpast tically controlled. In addition to being a poignant anxious uncer- research. Studies 1 and 2 assess whether anxious uncertainty- taintythreat,thismanipulationalsoreliablycausesparticipantsto threatswillcausebehavioralneuroscienceandimplicitevidenceof become more ideologically extreme. It has caused more extreme RAM. Study 3 tests whether the effect of anxious uncertainty on and fervent conviction for personal and political values, more personal project approach motivation is mediated by idealism. zealous religious commitment, and even willingness to support Study4assesseswhetheranexperimentallymanipulatedfocuson religiouswarfare(McGregor,Haji,Nash,&Teper,2008;McGre- ideals will augment the effect of anxious uncertainty on the im- gor & Jordan, 2007; McGregor et al., 2005; McGregor et al., in plicitmeasureofapproachmotivationusedinStudy2.TheRAM press). accountwouldbesupportedifthreatsthathavecausedideological Themodal3-minwaittimeaftertheanxiousuncertaintymate- extremesinpastresearchalsoheightenapproachmotivation,me- rialsservedastheshortdelaythathasbeenfoundnecessaryinpast diatedandmoderatedbysalienceofideals. research to allow time for uncertainty-related threats to reemerge afteraperiodofproximalthreatsuppression(seeWichman,Brun- ner, & Weary, 2008; cf. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, Study 1 1999). At the end of the study, participants were fully debriefed We manipulated anxious uncertainty about academic aptitude andassuredthatthethreatmaterialshadnoactualbearingontheir andthenassessedabehavioralneurosciencemeasureofapproach ownabilities.Thetrackrecordofthisanxiousuncertaintymanip- motivation. This measure has correlated significantly in past re- ulationincausinganxiousuncertainty,andalsoincausingreactive search with approach-motivation-related affect (Drake & Myers, idealism, makes it a good initial candidate for testing our novel 2006) and with the precise pattern of EEG activity in the dorso- hypothesisthatthesamethreatsthatcausedefensiveideologywill lateralprefrontalcortexthatischaracteristicofapproachmotiva- alsocauseRAM. tion(Nash,McGregor,&Inzlicht,inpress). Relative left cerebral hemisphericity. Links between left- frontal asymmetry and approach motivation were first noticed in patientswithfocallesionstotheleftorrightcerebralhemisphere, Method which tended to result in depressive or manic symptoms, respec- Thirty-sixsecond-yearpsychologystudents(sevenmale;mean tively (Elliot, 2008). More recently, in dozens of studies relative age(cid:1)21years)completedallmaterialsduringthehalf-timebreak left-frontal EEG activity has consistently been associated with in a 3-hr personality psychology lecture. Participants first com- approach motivation and related constructs—such as behavioral pletedtheexperimentallymanipulatedanxiousuncertaintyorden- activation, risk taking, positive mood, and anger (Elliot, 2008)— talpaincontrolconditionmaterials.Afterwaitinguntiltheslowest and with a tenacious focus on goal-related phenomena and inhi- participant was finished (modal wait time of 3 min), all were bition of conflicting cognitions (Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009; instructedtoturntheexperimentalmanipulationmaterialsupside- Harmon-Jonesetal.,2008). downontheirdesk,andthebehavioralneurosciencemeasurewas In the present study we used the line bisection task to assess distributedandcompleted. relativeleftcerebralhemisphericity.Participantsmadetickmarks Anxiousuncertaintymanipulation(academic). Theanxious at what they perceived to be the center point on each of 14 uncertaintymanipulationwasdesignedtoinduceuncertaintyinthe staggeredlinespresentedonahorizon-viewsheetofpaper.Each domain of participants’ important academic goals. Participants linewasapproximately24cmlong.Estimationerrorstotheright randomly assigned to the anxious uncertainty condition were re- reflect an overnoticing of the right visual field characteristic of quired to summarize an extremely difficult, one-page statistics relative left cerebral hemisphericity (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). passage on LISREL, structural equation modeling. It was pre- Thus, we computed the index of relative left cerebral hemisphe- sentedasapopulartoolforanalyzingdatainpsychology,andwe ricity by subtracting each participant’s number of left-of-center claimed to be interested in assessing how well they could under- ticks from right-of-center ticks. Experimentally elicited active stand and summarize it in 5 min. The passage was taken out of approach motivation has been associated with relative left hemi- context and included complicated formulae, statistical terms, and sphericity on a similar measure in past research (Friedman & mathematicalsymbols(fromPedhazur,1982,pp.639–640).Key Forster,2005,Study3).Rightwarderrorsonthelinebisectiontask sentences were also deleted to make it even more confusing. arealsosignificantlyandspecificallycorrelatedwiththepatternof Participants in the dental pain control condition were instead relativeleft-frontalEEGactivationcharacteristicofapproachmo- randomlyassignedtowriteabouttheexperienceofdentalpainat tivation(i.e.,atfrontalF7vs.F8sites;Nashetal.,inpress. the dentist. Although highly aversive, thoughts about dental pain Variousfactorssuchasthetendencyofpeopletoreadfromleft donotarouseuncertaintyaboutgoalpursuit. to right and to write with their right hands make it difficult to Previousresearchhasshownthattheprimaryaffectivereaction interpretlinebisectiontaskresultsasanindexofabsolutediffer- totheLISRELmanipulationofanxiousuncertaintyisspecifically ences in hemispheric activation (e.g., McCourt, Freeman, uncertainty-related (McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008). For Tahmahkera-Stevens, & Chausee, 2001). For our purposes, how- example, this same anxious uncertainty manipulation caused sig- ever, the line bisection task serves adequately for measuring nificantlymoreuncertain,frustrated,andconfusedfeelings(inthat changes in relative left cerebral hemisphericity caused by the orderofeffectmagnitude;ps(cid:2).001)thaninacontrolcondition. randomly assigned anxious uncertainty threat (we accordingly It also caused threatened participants to feel less good and suc- report standardized results). To reduce error variance we con- cessful(ps(cid:2).005)thanparticipantsinthecontrolcondition,but trolled for dispositional differences in participants’ line bisection thespecificeffectonfeelingsofuncertaintyremainedsignificant tendencies by including as a covariate in our main analysis the even when the other negative and positive adjectives were statis- same measure of relative left cerebral hemisphericity assessed REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 137 under neutral conditions 1 week later. Six participants did not approachIATdependentvariable.Thisdelayalsoallowedtimefor returnfortheTime2linebisectiontaskreassessment,whichleft defensestoemerge(Wichmanetal.,2008). 30 participants for the main analysis (five male; mean age (cid:1) 21 Approach IAT. We presented participants with a version of years). theIATthatmeasuredtherelativestrengthsofassociationbetween the self and approach-related words versus avoidance-related words.Participantswererequiredtocategorizestimuluswordsthat Results appearedinthecenterofthescreenaccordingtothecategoriesof The line bisection task measure of relative cerebral hemisphe- approach versus avoidance or self versus other. In the critical ricity was reliable, with a test–retest correlation of r(30) (cid:1) .71, self–approachblockoftrials,thecategorywordsselfandapproach p (cid:2) .001. An analysis of covariance controlling for Time 2 line appeared together in one upper corner, and the category words bisection scores revealed significantly more relative left cerebral otherandavoidanceappearedtogetherintheotheruppercornerof hemisphericity(i.e.,morerightwarderrors)intheanxiousuncer- the computer screen. Participants were required to use the same taintycondition(Z(cid:1).27)thaninthecontrolcondition(Z(cid:1)–.30), key to categorize words related to the self (I, me, mine, self) and F(1, 27) (cid:1) 5.45, p (cid:2) .05. This encouraging behavioral neuro- approach (advance, pursue, forward, reach) and another key to science evidence is necessary but not sufficient support for the categorize words related to other (them, they, their, other) and RAM hypothesis. Studies 2–4 were conducted for multimethod avoidance (retreat, withdraw, flee, reverse). In contrast, in the convergence. othercriticalblockofself–avoidancetrials,thecategorypairings werereversed,andthecategorywordsselfandavoidanceappeared together in one upper corner, and the category words other and Study 2 approachappearedtogetherintheotheruppercorner.Eachcritical Study2wasdesignedtoprovideimplicitsupportforthebehav- block consisted of 60 trials. The order of the critical blocks was ioral neuroscience evidence of RAM found in Study 1. For the counterbalancedbetweenparticipants. implicitmeasureofRAMweassessedthestrengthofassociation Participants were told to respond to stimuli as quickly as pos- between the self and the concepts of approach versus avoidance siblewhileremainingasaccurateaspossible.Aftermakingcorrect followingthesameacademicanxiousuncertaintymanipulationas responses on a trial, participants were presented with a blank in Study 1. To do so we created a self-approach version of the screen for 1,000 ms before the next trial. After making incorrect implicitassociationtest(IAT).TheIAThasbeenadaptedinpast responses on a trial, participants were presented with a blank research to measure the strength of association between the self screenfor100msfollowedbyaredXinthemiddleofthescreen and various concepts including social categories (e.g., Devos & for 800 ms and then another blank screen for 100 ms before the Banaji, 2005; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002; Pinter & nexttrial.Foreachcriticalblockoftrialsweaveragedthelatency Greenwald, 2004), stereotypes (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, of participants’ correct responses. We computed approach IAT 2001), academic constructs (e.g., Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, Phills, scoresbysubtractingthemeanlatencyofcorrectresponsesinthe & Dovidio, 2008; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), and self- self–approach block of trials from the mean latency in the self– esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). We predicted that the avoidance block. Higher scores, in ms, thus represent higher im- uncertainty threat manipulation would cause participants to more plicit approach, that is, participants’ relative facility with self– readilyassociatetheselfwithapproachrelativetoavoidance. approachversusself–avoidancejointcategories. Manipulation check. During the manipulation check at the end of the study, participants were asked to recall the anxious Method uncertaintymanipulationmaterialstheyhadcompletedandtorate Seventy-five undergraduates (gender undisclosed; mean age (cid:1) howtheyhadmadethemfeelonascalerangingfrom1(notatall 20years)completedanonlinestudyinexchangeforcoursecredit. ...) to 5 (extremely ...) concerning the following adjectives: Uponloggingintothestudywebsite,participantsreadthatthefirst Good, Happy, Smart, Successful, Likeable, Meaningful, Frus- studywouldassesstheirabilitytounderstandstatistics.Afterthey trated, Confused, Uncertain, Empty, Anxious, Insecure, Lonely, wererandomlyassignedtheanxiousuncertaintyorcontrolcondi- Ashamed,andStupid. tionmaterials,adaptedfortheInternetfromStudy1,participants readthatthesecondstudywouldassesscognitiveprocesses.They Results then completed the dependent variable that assessed implicit as- sociationsbetweentheselfandapproachversusavoidance—what Manipulation check results revealed that participants in the wewillrefertoasanapproachIAT. anxious uncertainty condition felt significantly worse than did Anxiousuncertaintymanipulation(academic). Participants those in the control condition on the following adjectives: Con- randomlyassignedtotheanxiousuncertaintyconditionweregiven fused(M(cid:1)3.65vs.M(cid:1)2.76,respectively,p(cid:1).002),Uncertain 2 min to process the confusing one-page passage about statistics (M(cid:1)3.43vs.M(cid:1)2.73,p(cid:1).02),Ashamed(M(cid:1)2.37vs.M(cid:1) from Study 1. After 2 min, the screen advanced and they were 1.79, p (cid:1) .03), and Stupid (M (cid:1) 2.29 vs. M (cid:1) 1.76, p (cid:1) .04). given 2 more min to summarize what they had read. Participants Differences between conditions on all other adjectives were non- randomly assigned to the control condition completed similar significant. materials but with reference to a simple paragraph about why TheabsenceofsignificancefortheAnxiousitemmayreflectthe statistics are useful in science. After this manipulation of the notoriouslypoorreliabilityofself-reportedanxietyafterthreaten- independentvariable,forapproximately3minallparticipantsread ing experiences that has inspired research relying on indirect instruction screens to set up the second study assessment of the methodstodemonstratethatanxietydrivesdefensivereactionsto 138 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS anxiety-related predicaments (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003; Kay, the extent to which participants’ personal goals were approach- Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Zanna & motivated. Cooper,1974).Giventheclosetheoreticallinksbetweenaversive, Anxious uncertainty manipulation (relationship dilemma). experientialuncertaintyandanxiety(Gray&McNaughton,2000; Participants randomly assigned to the anxious uncertainty condi- VandenBos,2009),however,itseemswarrantedtoconcludethat tionweregiventhefollowinginstructions,whichrequiredimmer- in the present study, anxious uncertainty was likely aroused and sionincurrentconflictsanduncertaintiesabouttheirinterpersonal not just a pleasant or benign uncertainty that would not be ex- goals in life (adapted from McGregor et al., 2001, and Taylor & pectedtocauseRAM(McGregor,Prentice,&Nash,2009;Wilson Gollwitzer,1995): etal.,2005). Pleasetakeaminutetothinkofanunresolveddilemmainyourlife For the main analysis, outlier latencies less than 300 ms and thathassomethingtodowithyourinterpersonalrelationships.You greaterthan2,000ms(3.01%)wererecodedto300msand2,000 arenotyetsurewhethertoleavethingsastheyareormakeachange. ms, respectively, and all incorrect answer trials (6.4%) were ex- You feel very uncertain, but haven’t yet decided what to do. The cludedfromanalysis.Resultsrevealedhigherimplicitapproachin dilemmashouldbecomplexandshouldtaketheformof“ShouldI theanxiousuncertaintycondition(M(cid:1)174.19)thaninthecontrol make a change ... or not?” Please briefly name your interpersonal condition (M (cid:1) 60.56), t(71) (cid:1) 3.80, p (cid:2) .01. This finding dilemma. What personal value makes you want to make a change fromthewaythingsarerightnow?Whatpersonalvaluemakesyou conceptually replicates the behavioral neuroscience results from wanttonotchangeanything,andleavethingsastheyarerightnow? Study 1 with a radically different, implicit measure of approach How does this dilemma make you feel? List any possible future motivation. Studies 3 and 4 were conducted to provide further consequencesthatcouldresultifyouoptedforchangingthings.List convergentevidenceforRAMafteranxiousuncertaintythreatsin possible future consequences that could result if you left things the relationalratherthanacademicdomains. waytheyareanddidnotmakeachange. Participantswhowererandomlyassignedtothecontrolcondi- Study 3 tionansweredthesamequestionsbutaboutadilemmathatafriend was facing. In past research this uncertainty threat specifically We designed Study 3 to conceptually replicate the results of causedfeelingsofanxiousuncertainty(e.g.,“bothered,”“uneasy,” Studies 1 and 2 and to directly investigate the proposed link “uncomfortable,” “torn,” and “of two minds”) but not general between reactive idealism and RAM. For further multimethod negative or positive affect (McGregor et al., 2001, Studies 1 and convergence, we manipulated anxious uncertainty about personal 2). It also caused participants to react with idealistic conviction relationships (instead of academics as in Studies 1 and 2) and about value-laden opinions and intergroup attitudes (McGregor, measured RAM in the context of participants’ most self- Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008, Study 2; McGregor et al., 2001, characteristic personal projects. We focused on personal project Studies1and2). dimensions related to eagerness and tenacity, which are central Personalprojectapproach. Forthepersonalprojectsanaly- qualitiesofapproachmotivation(Carver&Scheier,1998;Drake sis materials, participants were given 2 min to list all the current &Myers,2006;Elliot,2008;Keltneretal.,2003). personalprojectsintheirlivesthattheycouldthinkof.Theythen In addition, we also measured personal project dimensions re- selected the four projects that were most representative of them- lated to participants’ guiding ideals, values, and meanings selves and rated each using a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (McGregor & Little, 1998; McGregor et al., 2001). Doing so (extremely) on five dimensions theoretically linked to approach allowed us to probe our hypothesis that for humans, reactive motivation (Drake & Myers, 2006; Elliot, 2008; Higgins, 1997; idealism is a normative mechanism that mediates engagement in Keltneretal.,2003):Approach(“Towhatextentdoesitfocuson RAM.Wefurthermeasureddimensionsrelatedtoavoidancemo- approaching something positive?”), Promotion (“To what extent tivation to determine the extent to which anxious uncertainty doesitfocusonpromotionofgoodthingsthatyouhavehighhopes specifically arouses RAM and not just reactive motivation more for?”), Determination (“How firmly determined are you to com- generally. Finally, we measured the agentic and communal do- pleteit,evenifitrequiressacrifices?”),Outcome(“Howlikelyare mains of participants’ personal projects to assess the extent to you to ultimately succeed at it?”), and Competence (“To what which RAM is a basic, domain-general response to anxious un- extentdoyoufeelcompetentandabletopursueit?”).Asinpast personalprojectsresearch(McGregor&Little,1998;McGregoret certainty.WedidnotexpectRAMtobedomain-specific,because al., 2001; Palys & Little, 1983), we relied on participants’ self- inouraccountRAMismerelypalliative. ratingsbecauseweassumedthattheywerethemostdiscriminating judgesofthepersonalmeaningandfunctionoftheirownprojects Method (Little,1983,1993;Littleetal.,2007). Inapilotstudywith109participants,thisfive-dimensionmea- A total of 158 undergraduates (24 male, 34 undisclosed; mean sure of personal project approach was unifactorial and internally age(cid:1)22years)completedallmaterialsduringthehalf-timebreak consistent (Cronbach’s (cid:3) (cid:1) .79). Its validity as a measure of in a 3-hr personality psychology lecture. The uncertainty threat approachmotivationwassupportedbyitssignificantcorrelations materials were followed by the same delay as in Study 1, with a (ps(cid:2).01),withpersonalitytraitstheoreticallyrelatedtoapproach modal wait time of 3 min while participants waited for the last motivation: behavioral activation (Carver & White, 1994), participant to complete the experimental materials. Next, for the r(109)(cid:1).28;actioncontrol(Kuhl,1994),r(109)(cid:1).25;promotion dependentvariableweadaptedpersonalprojectsanalysismaterials focus(Lockwood,Jordan,&Kunda,2002),r(109)(cid:1).36;purpose (Little,1983,1993;Little,Salmela-Aro,&Phillips,2007)toassess inlife(Crumbaugh&Maholick,1964),r(109)(cid:1).44;purposeand REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 139 personalgrowth(Ryff,1989),rs(109)(cid:1).37and.40,respectively; approachmotivationonthreatcompletelyeliminatedthesignificant self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), r(109) (cid:1) .34; and narcissism personalprojectapproachbeta,reducingitfrom.20to0. (Raskin&Hall,1979),r(109)(cid:1).27.Consistentwithourpalliative There was less support for the reverse mediational possibility. view of RAM, this measure of personal project approach was Includingpersonalprojectapproachasacovariateinaregression negativelycorrelatedwithself-reportedlifestressonthePerceived of personal project idealism on threat only partially reduced the Stress Scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), r(109) (cid:1) idealismbeta,from.25to.09,whichapproachedsignificance(p(cid:2) –.29. Finally, personal project approach was not correlated with .06). These mediational analyses provide some statistical support socialdesirability(Crowne&Marlowe,1960),r(109)(cid:1).02,ns. fortheprimacyofreactiveidealismasaleverforRAM.Study4 Personal project idealism. Participants also rated their per- returns to this question with an experimental design to more sonalprojectsonfivedimensionsrelatedtotheextenttowhichthe adequatelytestthecausalassumptionsuggestedbythemediational goals reflected the most meaningful ideals or values that guided analysesinStudy3. theirlives:ValueCongruence(“Towhatextentdoesitreflectthe Finally,additionalanalysesrevealedthatthesignificantsurgein most important values that guide your life?”); Conviction (“How idealistic RAM was specific to approach but not avoidance. The certain do you feel that this is a project that you want to devote effectofanxiousuncertaintyonpersonalprojectavoidancemoti- yourself to?”); Self-Identity (“To what extent does it reflect the vation was nonsignificant (|t| (cid:2) 1). Moreover, RAM was not kind of person you really are, at your core?”); Ideals (“To what constrained to either communal or agentic pursuits. There were extentdoesitfeellikesomethingyoutrulyandideallywanttobe null effects of the anxious uncertainty manipulation on the per- doing, regardless of what you feel you should be doing?”); and sonalprojectdimensionsofTogethernessandWork(both|ts|(cid:2)1), Personal Choice (“To what extent did you choose it, i.e., not consistentwithourassumptionthatRAMcanbemerelypalliative dictated to you by other people or circumstances?”). In the same and not necessarily aimed at restoring any particular threatened pilot study as mentioned in the previous section, an index of goal. personalprojectidealismfromthemeanoftheseratingswasalso In sum, Study 3 demonstrates that the RAM effects found in unifactorialandreliable(Cronbach’s(cid:3)(cid:1).79). Studies 1 and 2 are domain-general. They can result from either Personalprojectavoidance. Threedimensionsassessingper- academic or relational anxious uncertainty, and they are relieved sonal project characteristics related to avoidance motivation byasurgeingeneralidealismthatdoesnotappeartobedomain- gauged the extent to which the anxious uncertainty manipulation specific. The involvement of ideals in RAM processes is poten- specifically stimulated RAM and not just reactive motivation in tiallyimportant,becauseitcouldprovidethebasisforunderstand- general:Avoid(“Towhatextentdoesitfocusonavoidingsome- ing a wide range of enigmatic idealistic and ideological thing negative?”); Prevention (“To what extent does it focus on phenomena (to be discussed in the General Discussion section). preventing bad things from happening?”); and Should (“To what Study4accordinglyprobestheroleofidealswithanexperimental extent does it feel like something that you SHOULD be doing, methodtoallowmoreconfidentconclusionsaboutthecausalrole regardlessofwhatyouwouldideallyliketobedoing?”). ofidealsasaleverforRAM. Personal project agency and communion. Finally, two di- mensionsmeasuredtheagenticandcommunaldomainsofpartic- Study 4 ipants’ personal projects to assess the extent to which RAM is domain-generalratherthan-specific.GivenourviewofRAMas TheresultsofStudy3revealedacloseempiricallinkbetween averybasic,domain-generalprocess,weexpectedageneralized, idealsandRAM.Study4wasdesignedtoreplicatethatassociation nonspecific response, with null effects on the following domain- with the implicit measure of RAM used in Study 2 and with an specificdimensions:Togetherness(“Towhatextentareyoudoing experimental manipulation of ideals. If focus on ideals mediates ittofeelclosetootherpeople?”)andWork(“Towhatextentisit the effect of anxious uncertainty on RAM, then priming partici- focusedonaccomplishinggoalsatschoolorwork?”). pantswithafocusonactiveidealsshouldfacilitateRAM(seethe Spencer,Zanna,&Fong,2005,recommendationforusingexper- imentalmoderationtoestablishmediation). Results Asinthepilotstudy,thepersonalprojectapproachandidealism Method measures were again unifactorial and reliable, and each had a Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .83. As predicted, participants in Sixty-fourundergraduates(genderundisclosed;meanage(cid:1)20 the anxious uncertainty condition reported significantly higher years) in an introductory psychology course completed an online personalprojectapproach(M(cid:1)8.38)thandidparticipantsinthe study for course credit. The experimental manipulation of ideal control condition (M (cid:1) 7.95), (cid:4) (cid:1) .20, t(157) (cid:1) 2.51, p (cid:1) .01. salience preceded the anxious uncertainty manipulation, which Theyalsoreportedsignificantlyhigherpersonalprojectidealismin was followed by the implicit approach dependent variable, as- the anxious uncertainty condition (M (cid:1) 8.30) than in the control sessed as in Study 2. Upon logging in to the study website, condition(M(cid:1)7.74),(cid:4)(cid:1).25,t(157)(cid:1)3.18,p(cid:2).005.Consis- participants read that the first study would involve recalling as- tent with the hypothesis that people turn to idealistic goals as a pects about themselves from the past and that the second study reliableandeconomicalwaytoactivateapproachmotivation,the wouldinvolverecallinginstancesofrelationships. effect of the anxious uncertainty manipulation on personal project Idealsaliencemanipulation. Intheidealsaliencecondition, approachwasentirelymediatedbypersonalprojectidealism.Personal participants were randomly assigned to complete a promotion projectapproachandidealismwerehighlycorrelated,r(158)(cid:1).80, focus exercise. It required them to write about current hopes and p (cid:2) .001, and inclusion of the idealism term in the regression of aspirations they would ideally like to accomplish and how these 140 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS differedfromtheidealsthatguidedthemwhentheywerechildren. lience control condition, manipulated anxious uncertainty had no Intheidealnonsaliencecondition,participantsinsteadcompleted effect (|t| (cid:2) 1). The other simple effects revealed that, in the apreventionfocusexercisethatrequiredthemtowriteabouttheir anxiousuncertaintycondition,approachIATscoreswerehigherin currentdutiesandresponsibilitiesthattheyoughttoattendtoand the ideal salience condition (M (cid:1) 155.38) than in the ideal non- how these differed from those they had as young children (Hig- saliencecondition(M(cid:1)34.59),t(33)(cid:1)2.32,p(cid:1).03.Intheno gins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Participants were given 4 anxiousuncertaintycondition,however,therewasnoeffectofthe minforthistask,afterwhichthescreenautomaticallyadvanced. idealsaliencemanipulation(|t|(cid:2)1). Anxiousuncertainty(troubledrelationship). Intheanxious uncertainty condition, participants identified a troubled relation- General Discussion ship in their lives that had an uncertain prognosis and were then askedto(a)“Describethekindsofproblemsanddifficultiesyou Four anxious uncertainty threats caused evidence of RAM. In arehavingwiththisperson”and(b)“Describeyourthoughtsand Study 1, academic anxious uncertainty caused behavioral neuro- feelingsregardingthepossibilityofthisrelationshipcontinuingto scienceevidenceofRAM;inStudy2,thesamethreat(butwitha go poorly or perhaps even getting worse.” Each question was different control condition) caused implicit RAM; in Study 3, an presentedseparatelyonthecomputerscreen,andparticipantswere anxiousuncertaintythreatinthecontextofarelationshipdilemma given 2 min for each question. Participants in the no anxious causedpersonalprojectRAM;inStudy4,anotheranxiousuncer- uncertainty condition identified a friend’s relationship and re- tainty threat in the context of close relationships caused implicit spondedtotwosimilarquestionsabouttheirfriend. RAM as assessed in Study 2. The convergent evidence across Identical and similar anxious uncertainty manipulations in the diverseanxiousuncertaintythreatsandwithimplicit,explicit,and context of close relationships have specifically heightened self- behavioral neuroscience measures of approach motivation pro- reportedanxiousuncertainty(andnotgeneralnegativeaffect)and videsthefirstcomprehensiveevidenceforRAM. ideological conviction (McGregor & Marigold, 2003, Study 3; ThehypothesisthatidealsmediateRAMwasalsosupported.In Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2010, Study 1; McGregor et al., in Study 3, RAM in participants’ personal projects was entirely press).Forexample,inonestudyparticipantscompletedthisexact mediated by personal project idealism. In Study 4, manipulated anxious uncertainty manipulation (after having first completed a salienceofidealsenhancedtheeffectoftheanxiousuncertaintyon relationshipgoalprime)andthenratedtheextenttowhichitmade implicitapproachmotivation.Together,thesemediationandmod- them feel “good,” “happy,” “smart,” “successful,” “likeable,” erationfindingswithrespecttotheroleofidealsprovidepromis- “meaningful,” “frustrated,” “confused,” “uncertain,” “empty,” ingsupportforaparsimoniousandintegrativeaccountofdiverse “anxious,”“ashamed,”“insecure,”“lonely,”“stupid,”and“outof idealistic and ideological phenomena in the social psychological control.” The anxious uncertainty manipulation significantly literature.Theysuggestthatreactiveidealismandideologyinthe heightened anxiety and uncertainty but had no significant effects faceofthreatmayservetoactivateRAM. onanyoftheotheritems(Nash,McGregor,&Prentice,2010). ApproachIAT. Theimplicitmeasureofapproachwasthesame Toward an Understanding of Idealistic and Ideological as in Study 2. Again, IAT scores were calculated such that higher Defenses as RAM scoresrepresentedgreaterstrengthofself-approachassociations. Gordon Allport (1943) coined the term fluid compensation to Results refer to the curious tendency of humans to cope with thwarted drivesbybaskinginanysuccess,evenwithnoclearrelationtothe As predicted and shown in Figure 1, there was a significant threat.“Happiness,itseems,doesnotdependuponthesatisfaction interactioneffect,F(1,62)(cid:1)3.98,p(cid:1).05.Amongparticipantsin ofthisdriveorthatdrive,itdependsratheruponthepersonfinding theidealsaliencecondition,thoseintheanxiousuncertaintycon- someareaofsuccesssomewhere”(Allport,1943,p.466).Avast dition had higher approach IAT scores (M (cid:1) 155.38) than did amountofempiricalsocialpsychologicalevidencefromdifferent thoseinthenoanxiousuncertaintycondition(M(cid:1)62.56),t(34)(cid:1) research paradigms supports Allport’s claim. Indeed, fluid com- 2.29,p(cid:1).03.Incontrast,amongparticipantsintheidealnonsa- pensation effects appear even more fluid than Allport imagined. Variouspsychologicalthreatsnotonlymotivatestrivingsforcom- pensatory success toward self-worth ideals (e.g., Baumeister & 160 Jones, 1978; Dunning & Beauregard, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Col- No Anxious Uncertainty lins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000), but they also motivate compensa- h oac 120 Anxious Uncertainty tory conviction, idealism, ideology, worldview defense, group pr identification,andthesearchformeaning. p plicit A 80 sucThhedrieveisrsleivfelluyiddecboamtepienntshaetilointereaftfuercetsc.oSnocmereninthgehooriwststoheaxvpelainin- m I 40 vokedbroad,superordinatemotivessuchasself-integrity(Steele, 1988),meaning(Heine,Proulx,&Vohs,2006),symbolicimmor- 0 tality (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), or security Ideals Not Salient Ideals Salient (Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005), which varied threats under- mine and diverse fluid compensation reactions are thought to Figure 1. Effect of manipulated anxious uncertainty and ideals on im- bolster. Other theorists have argued for restoration of other psy- plicitapproach. chological currencies, such as self-esteem (Aronson, Cohen, & REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 141 Nail, 1999), certainty (Van den Bos et al., 2005), or identity orthogonaldispositionalinclinationstowardvulnerabilityandap- (Hogg,2007)asthemotivationforthedefensivereactions.These proach motivation combine to catalyze RAM. In three experi- theories are generative insofar as each continues to produce new ments,lowimplicitself-esteem(adispositionrelatedtoexperien- evidenceforfluidcompensationeffectsafterdiversethreats.The tial vulnerability; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & RAM account may hold promise, however, for illuminating an Correll, 2003; McGregor & Jordan, 2007) and high explicit self- integrativerootprocessrelatedtothebasicgoalregulationmech- esteem (disposition related to approach motivation; McGregor, anismsdescribedbyGrayandMcNaughton(2000). 2006a; McGregor et al., 2007) interacted to predict ideologically Indeed,sixrecentgoal-primingstudiessupportthepremisethat defensive reactions to uncertainty-related threats (McGregor & RAM reactions to the anxious uncertainty manipulations in the Marigold, 2003, Study 3; McGregor et al., 2005, Study 1; present research are essentially reactions to goal conflict. Nash, Schmeicheletal.,2009,Study3). McGregor,andPrentice(2010)foundthattheacademicandrela- McGregor et al. (in press) drew a similar distinction between tionship threats used in the present research aroused particularly vulnerability to anxiety and propensity toward RAM in research strong RAM when preceded by domain-relevant implicit goal showing that high uncertainty aversion (disposition related to primes. For example, academic anxious uncertainty inductions anxiousvulnerability)andhighself-esteem(andothertraitsrelated aroused the strongest RAM when preceded by a word search toapproachmotivation)eachpredictreligiouslyzealousreactions puzzle with words such as achieve, succeed, and compete. Con- tothreat.Thus,themostdefensivelyreactiveindividualsappearto versely, relational anxious uncertainty inductions aroused the bebothdispositionallyvulnerabletoanxiousuncertaintyanddis- strongest RAM when preceded by a word search puzzle with positionallyapproach-motivated.Insomecases,highdispositional words such as love, friend, and belong (see Bargh, Gollwitzer, approach motivation may itself be an adaptation to experiential Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001, for evidence that the word vulnerability, as in the case of narcissism (cf. Foster & Trimm, searchpuzzlesprimedomain-specificgoals).Thedependentmea- 2008) or hypomania (Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones et al., sureofRAMinthatresearchwastheextenttowhichparticipants’ 2002).Indeed,peoplewhoreportbeinghighlysensitivetoanxiety personalprojectswereself-ratedasmoreapproach-motivatedand and who have the most pronounced neural aversion reactions to promotion-focused than avoidance-motivated and prevention- stressors (i.e., immediate situational deflections toward relative focused. right-frontal cerebral hemisphericity) are particularly high in Ourbasicgoal-regulation-basedRAMaccountofidealisticde- chronic relative left-frontal cerebral hemisphericity, suggesting fense is consistent with other research showing that people with chronicapproachmotivation(Heller,Nitschke,Etienne,&Miller, approach-motivation-relatedpersonalitiesareparticularlyinclined 1997). towardidealistic,ideological,andapproach-motivatedreactionsto various threats. High self-esteem is significantly correlated with Self-Affirmation and TMT various approach-motivation-related dispositions, such as promo- tionfocus,behavioralactivationsystemdrive,andactionorienta- TheRAMaccountofspontaneousidealisticreactionstothreats tion (McGregor, Gailliot, Vasquez, & Nash, 2007, Study 2; see may help inform self-affirmation and TMT research. Self- also Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006), and each of these scales affirmationresearchdemonstratesthatidealisticaffirmations(usu- similarly moderates ideological reactions to threat (McGregor et ally of participants’ highest values) prevent closed-minded, hos- al., in press). Specifically, the catalyzing effect of dispositional tile, partisan, and worldview defensive responses to threatening self-esteemonreligiouslyzealousreactionstoanxiousuncertainty experiences and information (McGregor et al., 2001, Study 1; threats replicated with three dispositional variables related to ap- Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). From a proach motivation in place of self-esteem (McGregor et al., in RAMperspective,idealisticvalueaffirmationsshouldbeexpected press).Inallcases,aswithself-esteem,threatenedhighsweremost torelievesuchdefensivereactionstothreatsbecausetheidealistic zealous.Highself-esteemalsopredictsRAM-relatedbrainactivity and meaningful aspects of self-affirmations should preemptively (McGregor,Nash,&Inzlicht,2009)andasurgeinpersonalproject consolidatetheapproach-motivatedstatesthatthedefenseswould approach motivation (McGregor et al., 2007, Study 3) after anx- have provided (Amodio et al., 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones, iousuncertaintythreats.Moreover,highself-esteeminclinespeo- 2009;Urryetal.,2004). pletowardself-idealizationandheightenedvalue,ideological,and TheRAMaccountmaysimilarlyhelpexplaintherelatedissue religious conviction after threats (Dunning & Beauregard, 2000; ofwhymanipulatedself-esteemanddispositionalself-esteemdif- McGregor et al., 2007, Study 1; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; ferentiallymoderatedefensivereactionstothreats.Aswithsitua- McGregoretal.,2005;McGregoretal.,inpress;Schmeicheletal., tionalmanipulationsofidealisticvalues,situationalaffirmationsof 2009). Other researchers have also found that among high self- stateself-esteemtendtoreducedefensivelyidealisticreactionsto esteem participants, threats to romantic relationships arouse not threats(Steele,1988).Incontrast,however,andasreviewedinthe onlyrelationshippromotiveideals(e.g.,Murray,2005)butalsoa previous section, dispositional high self-esteem predicts the most generalized risky shift and self-reported approach motivation defensively idealistic reactions to threats. This paradox may be (Cavallo,Fitzsimons,&Holmes,2009;seeLandau&Greenberg, informedbythepronouncednegativeskewinexplicitself-esteem 2006, for similar self-esteem moderation of risky reactions to scores in North America (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, mortalitysaliencethreats). 1999), which suggest that North Americans’ self-esteem may be Suchdispositional-approachmoderationsupportstheRAMhy- moreareflectionofidentificationwithself-idealsthananexpres- pothesis but might raise the question of why such empowered sionofobjectiveself-worthiness(Baumeister,Campbell,Krueger, individuals (i.e., high in approach motivation) would experience &Vohs,2003).Situationalaffirmationsofself-worth,thus,likely anxiousuncertaintyinthefirstplace.Theanswerappearstobethat affirm such self-worth ideals and provide the same kind of 142 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS approach-motivation-derivedinsulationfromdistressasdovalue- presented here, however, there are limitations that should be ideal affirmations. As described in the previous section, the link probed in future research. Perhaps foremost is the link to action. betweendispositionalhighself-esteemandmorepronouncedide- AlthoughwedemonstratethelinkbetweenRAMandgoalinten- alismafterthreatappearstobedrivenbythelinkbetweendispo- tions in Study 3, future research with behavioral dependent mea- sitional self-esteem and an inclination to respond to threats with sures could help to more clearly ground the RAM account in the approach motivation. This interpretation is consistent with EEG suggestedgoalregulationprocesses(Gray&McNaughton,2000). research showing a relative surge in left-frontal (approach- After anxious uncertainty threats, the relative draw of idealistic motivation-related) brain activity after threat among individuals (e.g.,religious)RAMopportunitiescouldbepittedagainstenticing with high but not low explicit self-esteem (McGregor, Nash, & temporal RAM opportunities (e.g., toward chocolate, gambling, Inzlicht,2009). pornography,orotherincentivestoapproach).4 TheRAMaccountmayalsoprovideaparsimoniousaccountfor Further, given the unreliability of self-reported anxiety, in the results in the TMT literature. Dozens of studies have found that future researchers could further highlight the role of anxiety in mortalitysalienceheightensadherencetobothidealisticsourcesof RAM processes in experiments with a misattribution of anxious meaning (worldviews, romantic relationships, political and reli- arousalcondition.Theopportunitytoattributeanxiousarousalto gious norms) and self-enhancement. Such findings are consistent aplacebowouldbeexpectedtoeliminateRAM.Empiricalassess- with the TMT view that worldviews and self-esteem are twin ment of palliative RAM assumption could also be assessed with pillars of an “anxiety buffer” against anxiety. From the present self-reportedsubjectivesalienceoftheelicitinganxiousuncertain- perspective,worldviewandself-enhancementreactionstomortal- ties (as in McGregor, 2006b) or through neural assessment of ity salience would interchangeably activate the insulating effects anxious reactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (as in Inzlicht, ofRAM.TheRAMinterpretationisthusentirelyconsistentwith McGregor,Hirsch,&Nash,2009). TMTresearchfindingsbutmaybemoreparsimonious,asitdoes Future research could also further investigate conditions under notrequirethatdefensivereactionstomortalitysaliencebeinter- which RAM serves a merely palliative function, much like dis- preted as quests for symbolic immortality. The parsimony of the placement behaviors for other animals, or whether under some RAM account is particularly clear when interpreting heightened circumstancesRAMmayinsteadhelprestorethethreatenedgoal tenacityandrisk-takingreactionstomortalitysalience,whichhave or a more general goal that the threatened goal was serving clearlinkstoapproachmotivation(e.g.,Gianottietal.,2009)but (Kruglanski et al., 2002). It appears that, on the basis of the null more seemingly convoluted links to the concept of symbolic results for domain specificity in Study 3, RAM may at least immortality (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999; Landau & sometimesbemerelypalliative.Indeed,themediation/moderation Greenberg,2006;McGregoretal.,2007).TheRAMaccountcould byidealsinStudies3and4suggestsageneralprocessthatseems economicallyallowfortheconceptofsymbolicimmortalitytobe to reflect an attempt to transcend temporal conflicts rather than droppedfromTMT. repair them. This palliative interpretation could provide an eco- The RAM account may also help clarify an aspect of TMT nomical explanation for the sometimes remarkable distance be- related to self-esteem. Dozens of studies have found that people tween the domains of threats, reactive extremes, and antidotes in tend to strive for self-enhancement after mortality salience (re- viewed in Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). These findings are consistent with the TMT view of self- 3Incontrast,highimplicitself-esteemseemstofunctionaspredictedby esteemaspartofananxietybufferandalsowithourRAMaccount the dispositional self-esteem hypothesis forwarded by TMT (i.e., as an ofideals(inthiscaseabouttheself)asawaytoactivateRAMfor anxiety buffer that makes people less defensively reactive to mortality insulationfromdistress.TMTfurtherposits,however,thatdispo- salience).Thus,justasisfoundinresearchwithothermanipulatedanxious sitional self-esteem should be associated with less worldview uncertaintythreats,themostreactivelydefensiveindividualsarethosewho defense after mortality salience because people with high self- aredispositionallyvulnerabletotheexperienceofanxiety(e.g.,thosewith lowimplicitself-esteemorhighuncertaintyaversion)andthosewhoare esteem should be buffered by their dispositional esteem (Pyszc- alsopredisposedtoapproachmotivation(seeSchmeicheletal.,2009,for zynski et al., 2004). Consistent with our approach-motivation- empirical evidence of differential joint moderation of mortality salience facilitating view of high explicit self-esteem, however, the effects by implicit and explicit self-esteem; see McGregor & Marigold, preponderanceofresearchhasindicatedthathigh,notlow,explicit 2003,andMcGregoretal.,2005,forthesamepatternwithotheranxious self-esteem predicts more worldview defense after mortality sa- uncertaintythreats;seeMcGregoretal.,inpress,forconvergingevidence lience(Baldwin&Wesley,1996;McGregoretal.,2007,Study1; ofdifferentialmoderationwithotherdispositionalmeasuresofvulnerabil- Schmeichel et al., 2009; cf. Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, for a ityandapproachorientation). reversed pattern using an unusual measure of self-esteem). Mor- 4ArecentdemonstrationofthefluidityofRAMfromourlabassessed tality salience also causes a surge in approach-motivation-related specificcorrelatesofanxiousuncertaintyfollowingaprolongedstrikeata personalprojectsamongparticipantswhoarehighbutnotlowin majorCanadianuniversityduringwhichstudents’coursesweresuspended explicitself-esteem(McGregoretal.,2007).3 (McGregor,2010).Resultsindicatedthatanxiousuncertaintywasspecif- icallycorrelatedwithundergraduateextremesofappearance,eating,par- tying,relationships,andspecialgroupinvolvement(neithernegativenor Limitations, Future Directions, and Speculations positiveaffects,norboredom,norfreetimepredictedtheextremes).These resultsareconsistentwiththeviewthatanxiousuncertaintycausesRAM The present research suggests that many of the idealizing and toward whatever alternative ambient goals or ideals are salient. Future ideological extremes of pride and conviction found in the threat workshouldprobetheextenttowhichRAMprocessesmighthelpexplain and defense literature might be fruitfully understood through the otherformsofeagerextremismineverydaylife(e.g.,addictiontowork, lens of goal theory. Despite the promising convergent results fantasy,orgambling).