ANTONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN J. GREGORY KERR You cannot think ify ou are not separate from the subject of thought. Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am." The philosophic evolutionist reverses and negatives the epigram. He says, "I am not; therefore I cannot think." 1 -G. K. Chesterton Starting in December of 2004, a very important and puzzling sequence of events began to unfold in the world of philosophy. First, Antony Flew, dubbed by many as "the world's most famous atheist,''2 announced publically that he had changed his mind; he was no longer an atheist. Second, Flew told the world in a televised broadcast Has Science Discovered God? that he had come to the conclusion that an intelligent-designer God must exist for scientific reasons. And third, in a landmark ruling, judge john E. jones Ill, in the now-famous Dover, Pennsylvania "Intelligent Design" trial, ruled that the very nature of science was such as to make it impossible for it to arrive at such a conclusion. How did it come to pass that this British atheist, who had so often stressed a scientific outlook in his philosophical works, changed his mind for reasons judged to be scientifically impossible by an American judge? In what follows, I wish to argue that in his 2007 book, There is a God3 (coauthored with Roy Abraham Varghese), Flew gives us the answer. I will argue that although Flew maintained that his conversion 1 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Garden City, New York: Image, 1959), 34-35. 2 In the bibliography found in the much-acclaimed Atheism and Theism volume of the Great Debates in Philosophy series, Flew is listed as "one of the most prominent advocates of atheism" 0. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane,· editors, Atheism and Theism, 2"d edition [Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1996], 253). 3 Antony Flew, with Roy Abraham Varghese, There is a God: How the World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: Harper One, 2007). 80 ANTHONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 81 was inspired by scientific advances in our understanding of nature, especially advances in the biological sciences, it was largely for philosophic reasons, not scientific, that he gave up atheism. To be sure, scientific discoveries played a large role in his conversion, but it is only when they are viewed from a philosophic standpoint that we can appreciate the true nature of the reasons that led Flew to embrace theism. I. FLEW'S ATHEISM AND THE BURDEN OF THEISM Prior to his conversion to theism, Flew spent his entire career arguing that reason could have nothing to do with God, publishing more "than thirty books attacking belief in God."4 His most famous work attacking belief was a short article called "Theology and Falsification," also known as the "University Discussion," given in the summer of 1950 at one of C. S. Lewis's weekly Socratic Club meetings. It was first published in the undergraduate journal University in that same year and later published in a collection of essays.5 It had, according to Flew himself, "some claim to have been the most widely read philosophical publication of the second half of the twentieth century."6 The argument of "Theology and Falsification" can be summarized as follows: If there is no empirical difference between the assertion and denial of a proposition, then there is no real assertion at all. But all so called assertions about God seem incapable of being falsified in principle. There appears to be no difference between them and their denial. Therefore, Flew concluded, assertions about God are no assertions at all. But unlike the positivist, who rejects theological language as meaningless, Flew remained open to meaning in this area, if it could be found. Flew, therefore, challenged the believer to provide empirical evidence for God's existence and to indicate what was significantly different, empirically speaking, between holding that God exists and holding that He does not. The problem, as Flew saw it, was 4 This is from the "Has Science Discovered God" website: http://www. sciencefindsgod.com. 5 Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre, editors, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: The Student Christian Movement Press, 1955; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), 96-99. 6 http:/ /www.infidels.org/library/ modern/a ntony _flew /theologyandfalsifica tion.html. 82 GREGORYJ.KERR that there seemed to be no way for the believer to provide a possible scenario that might falsify assertions such as "God exists" or "God loves us," these and all such assertions and their denials adding nothing to our understanding of the world as it presents itself to our senses. In short, it appeared to Flew that since the disagreement between the believer and the skeptic is not about empirical facts, but about the meaning of those facts, the believer is at a distinct disadvantage, since his view is less economical than the skeptic's, invoking as it does the existence of something the skeptic's view does not. The argument of "Theology and Falsification" ends with the claim that there really seems to be no scientific difference between belief in a real God, an imaginary one, or even no god at all. From this article, as well as his recently reprinted God and Philosophy/ it is clear that Flew's whole viewpoint rested upon what is known as the Stratonician presumption, according to which all explanations of phenomena should end or begin with the experience of the physical universe. Since all explanations must terminate somewhere in brute fact, why not simply posit the universe as the ultimate brute fact? Flew claimed that there was little reason to think that our language could unambiguously reach any farther. As far as he was concerned, the burden of proof belonged to the believer in God, who had to provide evidence strong enough to override the presumption of atheism.8 As such, in essence the believer's burden is to provide evidence strong enough to show how or why a naturalistic explanation of the universe falls short of the mark. II. PHILOSOPHY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD? In Roy Abraham Varghese's The Wonder of the World: A journey from Modern Science to the Mind of God,9 Gerald Schroeder's The Hidden Face of 7 Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005). This is a reprint of his classic work in atheism, now, according to Flew, "an historical relic." With regard to the Stratonician thesis, see also his An Introduction to Western Philosophy. 8 For further discussion, see Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). 9 Roy Abraham Varghese, The Wonder of the World: A journey from Modem Science to the Mind ofG od (Fountain Hills, Arizona: TYR Publishing, 2003 ). ANTHONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 83 God/0 and, most importantly, David Conway's The Rediscovery of Wisdom, 11 Flew found just such evidence. According to an Associated Press article that appeared in the London Times, Flew had come to believe that recent scientific discoveries revealed the existence of an organizing intelligence. "The investigation of DNA," he said, "has shown, by the almost unbelievable complexity of the arrangements which are needed to produce life, that intelligence must have been involved."12 In addition, he said, "I have been persuaded that it is simply out of the question that the first living matter evolved out of dead matter and then developed into extraordinarily complicated creatures. "13 In "My Pilgrimage from Atheism to Theism: An Exclusive Interview with Former British Atheist Professor Antony Flew," an interview conducted by Gary Habermas, 14 Flew opined that both J. L. Mackie and Bertrand Russell would have been interested in these arguments and thought that Russell in particular would have regarded these recent scientific developments as evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of atheism. Like Socrates, they would have been willing to follow the argument wherever it led, even out of atheism. At this time, it appeared to many that Flew was converting to theism on account of science alone, but was the argument he followed out of his own atheism strictly scientific? Socrates, disappointed with Anaxagoras's account of the world, charged him with forgetting that mind (nous) must be the director of all things: What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disap pointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher [Anaxagoras] altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but 10 Gerald L. Schroeder, The Hidden Face of God: Science Reveals the Ultimate Truth (New York: The Free Press, 2002). 11 james A. Beverly, "Thinking Straighter: Why the World's Most Famous Atheist (Antony Flew) Now Believes in God," Christianity Today Online, April 2005. 12 Stuart Wavell and Will Iredale, "Sorry, says atheist-in-chief, I do believe in God after all," The Sunday Times (London), December 12, 2004. 13 Ibid. 14 The interview is available at www.biola.edu/antonyflew/flew-interview.pdf. 84 GREGORY J. KERR having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here (that is in prison waiting to die) because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones ... are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles ... and this is why I am sitting here in a curved position;-that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence.15 Socrates followed the argument wherever it led, and it led right out of Anaxagoras's materialism. Had Flew been so led? Flew argued that his conversion was due to scientific reasons. According to Varghese's outlook, Flew was an example of one of those who came to believe that where philosophy had failed in its quest to prove God's existence, science had succeeded. Yet, when the evidence for this thesis is carefully examined, I believe it points to a different conclusion, namely, that Flew followed the argument to a conclusion located outside the limits of the scientific worldview. Indeed, many have come to see a "god of the gaps" in Flew's position. Flew's sympathy with the world of intelligent design, a world where Michael Behe and others argue for things like the irreducible complexity of certain biochemical reactions and systems, is taken as evidence for this view. Behe and others questioned the gradual step-by step Darwinian form of evolution and insisted that the data required an intelligent designer. Behe, for example, in Darwin's Black Box/6 argued that certain biological structures and processes such as the bacterial flagella and the human blood-clotting system are difficult to account for using the gradual incremental process that orthodox Darwinian 15 Plato, "Phaedo," in Plato: The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, 98b-e, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Mineola, New York: Dover, 1992), 96-97. Emphasis added. 16 Michael J. Be he, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996). ANTHONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 85 theory demands. Like a mousetrap, all of the elements must be in place for these biological mechanisms to work. Absent any of their elements, they would be useless. Moreover, whatever elements might be in place would confer no survival advantage to the organism possessing them unless all the elements were in place. In the case of bacterial flagella, for instance, intermediate developmental changes would not have conferred any traits making the organism better adapted for survival and the passing on of its genes. The only rational way to account for the extraordinary and irreducible complexity seen in living things, Behe et al. conclude, is to posit the existence of an organizing "intelligence." Now the primary aim of the intelligent design theorists was to attack neo-Darwinists, such as Daniel C. Dennett and Richard Dawkins, who argued that the study of evolution carries with it philosophically materialist implications. Darwin's great idea is, to use Dennett's phrase, like a "universal acid" that burns away everything. For Dennett, Dawkins, and many others, evolution is not just a scientific conclusion, it is a metaphysical or philosophical one. Evolution accounts for everything. It is just these sorts of claims that provoke the intelligent design theorists. They object to the dogmatically uncritical promotion of the methodological naturalism suitable to the scientific method to the status of a full-blown philosophy and world-view, which is then fed to children in school as scientific fact. As Behe complains rather cogently in a letter to the editor: The Catholic News Service editorial on the Kansas evolution controversy (reprinted Sept. 2 in the A.D. Times) mistakenly framed the issue as Christian fundamentalism v. science. Actually, the struggle is theism vs. scientism. Scientism is a philosophy that often disguises itself as science and asserts that reality is restricted to what can be known through scientific measurements. For example, in 1995 the National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT) issued a statement defining evolution as "an unsupervised, impersonal, unpredictable and natural process." It is not hard to see whom they are trying to exclude with words such as "unsupervised" and "impersonal." Nor is it hard to see that such statements are philosophy clothed as science, since 86 GREGORY]. KERR no scientific experiment has shown evolution to be unsupervised.17 And Behe seems to be right. It does seem to be a philosophy masquerading as science. Scientists, as scientists, should be wary of making any metaphysical claims. All talk of the lack of supervision and supernatural guidance might be nothing more than the result of science bumping up against a wall erected by the scientific method. At the same time, science is as incapable of discerning the presence of supernatural guidance as it is its absence, a possibility of especial significance if such guidance is unevenly distributed throughout the universe. All these considerations lead one to ask what exactly the limits of scientific enquiry are and who, if anyone, is competent to discern then. . Flew insisted that he followed the argument wherever it led. But could he have followed it all the way to theism had it led no farther than the limits of the scientific method? This is an important question, for in limiting the scope of our enquiry to what science can prove, we might find ourselves unable to follow Flew all the way to the end of the argument. For there is good reason to believe that science by itself cannot lead us beyond physical and measureable realities. In Darwin's Black Box, Behe argues that science is about the search for the truth about the world.18 It is more true to say that it is the search for physical truths about the world. For science, as it has been understood since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, does not promise to supply answers capable of satisfying our unrestricted desire to know, but only a very restricted portion of that desire. This restriction found expression in the National Academy of Sciences comment found in the now famous decision rendered in the Dover Intelligent Design Trial by the presiding judge, john E. jones, III: This self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to by philosophers as "methodological naturalism" and is sometimes known as the scientific method. (5:23, 29-30 (Pennock)). Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in 17 Michael Behe, letter to the editor, A.D. Times, September 16, 1999. 18 Behe, Darwin's Black Box, 240. ANTHONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 87 the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify. (1:59-64, 2:41-43 (Miller); 5:8, 23-30 (Pennock)). As the National Academy of Sciences (hereinafter "NAS") was recognized by experts for both parties as the "most prestigious" scientific association in this country, we will accordingly cite to its opinion where appropriate. (1:94, 160-61 (Miller); 14:72 (Alters); 37:31 (Minnich)). NAS is in agreement that science is limited to empirical, observable and ultimately testable data: "Science is a particular way of knowing about the world. In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred from the confirmable data-the results obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of science" (P-649 at 27).19 At this point, one must choose between accepting the explanatory limitations imposed on science by its methodological naturalism, on the one hand, and placing science on a broader foundation than the one afforded by naturalism. If one were to choose the former, one could set about to better inform the public at large as to the limited range of scientific knowledge, so that people would understand that all spiritual agents, human or divine, are ruled out by "convention" from the start as possible scientific causes of physical phenomena. If some Neo-Darwinists would wish, on that basis alone, to claim a victory for atheism, theirs would be a hollow victory, at best. For the opposing views would have been bound and gagged from the start by the methodological naturalism that science requires. If one were, instead, to choose the latter, one could argue that science should be broader than methodological naturalism seems to allow. As Alvin Plantinga has argued for a theistic science/0 some might argue that 19 Excerpt from Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005), Case No. 04cv2688, 66.judgejohn E. jones III's decision is available at http:// www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/ kitzmiller _342.pdf. 20 "'Unnatural Science,' 'Creation Science,' 'Theistic Science'-call it what you will: what we need when we want to know how to think about the origin and 88 GREGORY J. KERR science needs to be more open-ended. Perhaps it should not be limited to the examination of physical realities. For, if scientific inquiry were open-ended and free to embrace whatever reality might come its way, then we would be able to say unequivocally that science is about the whole truth concerning the universe. Only then could we say that we were following the evidence wherever it led. I would like to argue, however, that while this latter approach might seem to be freeing and better suited to our unrestricted desire to know, it would inevitably short-circuit all scientific inquiry, confusing as it would philosophical explanations with scientific ones. With the ultimate answers to all our "scientific" questions in our possession, why would we look any further? If, for example, some version of the intelligent design argument had been widely accepted centuries ago as the fundamental scientific explanation for all physical phenomena, we might never have discovered the various mechanisms or "machines" embedded within things and people, not to mention the fantastic biochemical "machines" that Behe has made so much of. Indeed, had not Descartes redirected philosophy towards the measureable and mathematical by proclaiming that "in seeking the correct path to truth we should be concerned with nothing about which we cannot have a certainty equal to that of the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry,"21 there might not have been a ruling heuristic notion of "machines" and "mechanisms" in the first place.22 Most ironically, the proponents of intelligent design would not now be in a position even to attempt to claim that science had discovered God. Thus, there seems to be a distinct advantage to maintaining, at least instrumentally (or at least, as jacques Maritain might say, development of contemporary life is what is most plausible from a Christian point of view. What we need is a scientific account of life that isn't restricted by that methodological naturalism" (Alvin Plantinga, "When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible," in Intelligent Design, Creationism, and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, edited by Robert T. Pennock [Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001], 139). 21 Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, AT 366, translated by Laurence]. Lafleur (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 8. 22 This leaves open the question of whether or not there could have been other heuristic notions guiding scientific research. ANTHONY FLEW AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN 89 "perinoetically"23), a methodological naturalism. For, although re stricted in the kinds of answers it can give, it is also able to give us answers attainable in no other way. When we restrict the field or range of our vision in a telescope, we can see further into space than ever before. And when we restrict the field or range of our vision to a microscope, we can perceive ever more fundamental realities at the cellular and subatomic level. But, for all its advantages, it would be a mistake to suppose that these restrictions do not also narrow the range of things we can see through them. While the intelligent design theorists might be right that one should not export philosophy out of science, and while Dawkins and Dennett certainly go too far in their naturalistic assumptions, the disciplinary boundaries separating science from religion is one that holds in either direction, and philosophical thinking is required to discern them. While one might start an argument for an intelligent designer with scientific premises, the argument as a whole cannot be located within the bounds set by current science, as intelligent design theorists would claim. One might, for example, make philosophical and theological arguments based on scientific premises without thereby rendering the arguments scientific. I might hold that the complexity of DNA gives support to the idea of a God, but the argument itself, because it includes an explanatory appeal to a non-physical object, would, by the convention of methodological naturalism, be excluded from scientific reasoning. Granted the advantages of the methodological naturalism at the heart of the scientific search for truth, there still remains the question of the possibility of admitting more into our understanding of nature (an understanding, I should add, that would necessarily include more than is found in the scientific understanding of nature) than is strictly permitted by the scientific method. It is to this question that Flew turns in There is a God. It is also there, in his last book, that Flew emphasizes, 23 For further discussion, see jacques Maritain, "Philosophy and Experimental Science," in Distinguish to Unite or the Degrees of Knowledge, translated from the French edition under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan (New York: 4th Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 55. By this term, Maritain indicates that the scientist, unlike the philosopher, does not grasp the essence of things directly, but arrives at their intelligibility only in an indirect or roundabout way through the understanding of laws that involve them or by poetic constructions that signal them.