Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Immanuel Kant Translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell Revised and Edited by Hans H. Rudnick With an Introduction by Frederick P. Van De Pitte Southern Illinois University Press Carbondale & Edwardsville title: Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View author: Kant, Immanuel. publisher: Southern Illinois University Press isbn10 | asin: 0809320606 print isbn13: 9780809320608 ebook isbn13: 9780585276700 language: English subject Human beings, Psychology--Early works to 1800. publication date: 1996 lcc: B2794.A572E5 1996eb ddc: 150 subject: Human beings, Psychology--Early works to 1800. cover Page iv Franciscae Catharinae Uxori Meae Hunc Librum Pia Veneratione Dedico Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kant, Immanuel, 17241804. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Translation of Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Man. 2. PsychologyEarly works to 1850. I. Title. B2794.A572E5 150 77- 10819 ISBN 0-8093-2060-6 COPYRIGHT © 1978 by the Board of Trustees, Southern Illinois University All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Designed by Andor Braun Paperback edition, 1996 01 00 99 98 5 4 3 2 page_iv Page v CONTENTS Preface viii Introduction Frederick P. Van De Pitte xi Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Introduction 3 Part One: Anthropological Didactic First Book: On the Cognitive Faculty 9 On Being Conscious of One's Self 10 On Egoism 14 On Being Arbitrarily Conscious of One's Ideas 15 On Self-Observation 18 On the Ideas We Have without Being Aware of Them 21 On Distinctness and Indistinctness in Relation to the Consciousness of One's Ideas 24 On Sensibility in Contrast to Understanding 28 Apology for Sensibility 32 On the Potentiality of the Cognitive Faculty 35 On the Artificial Games Played with Sensory Perceptions 37 On the Admissible Moral Perception page_v Page vi 40 On the Five Senses 49 On the Inner Sense 50 On the Causes of Increasing or Decreasing Sensory Perceptions According to Degree 54 On the Decreasing, Weakening, and Entire Loss of the Faculty of the Senses 64 On the Sensory Productive Faculty with All Its Branches 73 Of the Faculty of Visualizing the Past and the Future by means of the Imagination 81 On Involuntary Invention in a Sound Mental State, that is, on Dreams 83 On the Faculty of Designation (facultas signatrix) 90 On the Faculty of Cognition as Far as It Is Based on Understanding 91 Anthropological Comparison of the Three Higher Cognitive Faculties with Each Other 97 On the Soul's Weaknesses and Illnesses with Respect to Its Cognitive Faculty 118 On the Talents of the Cognitive Faculty 119 On the Specific Differences between the Comparative and the Argumentative Intelligence Second Book: On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure 130 On Sensuous Pleasure Third Book: On the Faculty of Desire 156 On Emotion in Contrast to Passion 158 On the Emotions in Particular 172 On Passions 184 On the Highest Physical Good page_vi Page vii 185 On the Highest Ethicophysical Good Part Two: Anthropological Characterization A. The Character of the Person 195 B. The Character of the Sexes 216 C. The Character of Nations 225 D. On the Character of Races 236 E. On the Character of the Species 237 Notes 255 Index 291 page_vii Page viii PREFACE Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View has been the object of about forty years of continuous work for Victor L. Dowdell and of more than five years for Hans H. Rudnick. The result of our work has gone in various stages of completion through many hands, for advice and further improvement. The Anthropology in its present form, revised word by word, phrase by phrase, and sentence by sentence, appears to have reached the level of accomplishment that can be optimally achieved. The lack of a complete English translation made Dr. Dowdell begin this work as a labor of love more than a generation ago. The strongly felt conviction that Kant's Anthropology had to be made accessible to the English reader brought Dr. Dowdell, Dr. Rudnick, and Southern Illinois University Press together for this venture. The Anthropology has to be understood as Kant's study of man, and man has to be understood in this context as part and parcel of an all-encompassing nature. The Anthropology was published at the end of Kant's life, although Kant had regularly lectured on this subject since the fall semester 1772 / 73 at the Albertus University of Königsberg. From a humanist's perspective the Anthropology can be interpreted as the capstone of Kant's entire philosophical system. It differs clearly in character from his three famous Critiques. The Anthropology provides the reader with a new and significant angle to Kant's personal character and the motivating forces of his philosophy. The Anthropology is the ideal introductory text to acquaint the student with Kant's way of thinking. The formidable intellectual giant of the categorical imperative here reveals his more human traits. We learn about Kant's personality, his way of life, his experiences, his reading, and above all, his image of man, which seems to be pertinent to the social problems of modern man. In this work Kant comes as close as possible to combining the page_viii Page ix qualities of English and Continental philosophy. The power of the intellect and the attraction of the imagination both merge into a system of common human concern which has more relevance today than it has ever had before. Kant has the answer to the question of how man should live in order to enjoy a humane life on an overpopulated planet on the verge of self-destruction. He writes about the evolution of man within the framework of an ecologically responsible system. He speaks to us from the end of the eighteenth century. We learn about his world, but we also feel how strongly his thought still influences us today. He is the originator of the critical attitude which prevents us from becoming dogmatic and intolerant. His thinking frees us from dogmatism and slavery to ideas. He asks the question "What is man?" all through the Anthropology, and, while he does so, it becomes obvious that Kant himself is also a human being with prejudices and "hang ups" similar to everybody else's. The text of this translation is based on the definitive edition of the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht as prepared by Oswald Külpe for the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften. The Anthropology is volume 7 (Berlin: Reimer, 1907) of Kants gesammelte Schriften. In order to provide the most accurate translation, and to supply the critical reader with relevant information about the different versions of available texts, notes have been provided at the end of this translation. These notes have been prepared by Dr. Dowdell when factual statements within the text were concerned, whereas Dr. Rudnick has provided those notes that refer to different textual versions and related problems of translation. The most clarifying and helpful source for a clearer understanding of Kant's sometimes very enigmatic passages has been the text of the only existing manuscript of the Anthropology. This manuscript was written by Kant in, approximately, 1796 or 1797 and is held by the Rostock University Library. The text of the Rostock manuscript is not completely identical with the first edition of the Anthropology which was published in 1798 (A edition). The manuscript of 1796 / 97 has been of particular help to the editor in reconstructing Kant's original intentions and preparing the textual notes, since the genesis of the Anthropology could be traced from Kant's deletions, emendations, and remarks on the page_ix Page x margins of the manuscript. As far as these marginalia had any relevance to the understanding of the text, or if they were characteristic of Kantian thinking, they have been incorporated into the notes by the editor. The B edition of 1800, which is a stylistically revised version of the A edition, served as the basis for Külpe's edition of the Anthropology in the Akademie Ausgabe. Ernst Cassirer's edition of the Anthropology (prepared by Otto Schöndörffer) and the B edition (1800) were the most helpful compilations and sources besides the Rostock manuscript. Bracketed numbers within the text of this present translation refer to the respective page numbers of the Anthropology as found in volume 7 of the Akademie Ausgabe. It was decided, with the regrets of the editor, that the great number of italicized words found in Kant's original text should not be reflected in this translation in italicized form. Technical terms in Latin which were frequently given by Kant in parentheses have not been translated into English; however, other, mostly proverbial, quotations from Latin which Kant used in order to make succinct elucidating or summarizing statements have been translated for the reader's convenience. Brackets used in this edition indicate references or phrases added by the editor. The parentheses are mostly Kant's, except when translations have been provided by the editor or when Kant's words in the original German are quoted in the text. To express gratitude to all who have helped in one way or another would involve an exceedingly long list of names. Yet, we must name Allen Webster Brown, Marie Josephine Hartford Bryce, Frances Catherine Kivell Dowdell, Florence K. Dowdell, and Harold Martin, as well as many renowned professors of philosophy, among whom are Foster Partridge Boswell, Walter S. Gamertsfelder, Frank Thilly, Ernest Albee, Harold Smart, John E. Smith, Lewis White Beck, Paul A. Schilpp, and Willard Enteman. V. L. D. H. H. R. January 1977 page_x Page xi INTRODUCTION Frederick P. Van De Pitte When Kant began lecturing on Anthropology in the winter of 177273, he correlated a good deal of material that he had already been using in his lectures on Ethics, Metaphysics, and Physical Geography. An examination of these earlier lectures indicates that he had been reading the travel reports of famous voyagers, and whatever scientific material was available on anthropology for a number of yearsat least since 1755 or 1756. Perhaps at first this interest was merely a pastime, a vicarious participation in great adventures by one who had very little experience with travel, but a great deal of curiosity about the various peoples and places of the world. The purely scientific aspects of anthropology would, of course, be interesting in their own right to one trained in science as he had been. For while Kant's course work at the University of Königsberg (174046) had given him a sound background in metaphysics and morals, as well as physics and mathematics, there is good reason to believe that his primary orientation was, and for a long time remained, in the area of the exact sciences. Soon, however, his interest spread to all aspects of anthropology, and he ultimately decided that it should be ranked among other studies as a regular academic discipline. Yet, in this early period there is no reason to believe that Kant recognized the essential role that anthropology was to play in his own development. It would be impossible in a brief outline to give an accurate account of the progress in Kant's thought prior to the writing of the great Critiques. But one can understand a great deal by keeping in mind the one dominant interest which became more and page_xi Page xii more pronounced in this periodhis concern for the proper method to be employed in metaphysics. And perhaps the traditional oversimplification of the history of philosophy in this period will serve well enough to indicate the character of this problem. The "rationalist" philosophers (from Descartes forward) had employed essentially a mathematical method, depending upon reason with its clear and distinct ideas for the true source and criterion of knowledge. The "empiricists," on the other hand, maintained that reason was miscast in this role, and that while it could effectively compare and evaluate information, only experience could serve as the genuine source and criterion of knowledge. It was Kant's virtue that he avoided both these extremes. Gradually he came to the awareness that metaphysics could not follow the method of pure mathematics. Mathematics has ideal entities as its objects, and the principle which it follows is that of ground and consequence. Metaphysics, in contrast, has real, existing entities as its objects, and its principle is that of causality. Thus, while mathematics can proceed synthetically, moving from definitions by purely rational arguments to certain conclusions, metaphysics must proceed analytically in an attempt to clarify what is given indistinctly in experience. Kant concludes, therefore, that "the true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by Newton into natural science and which had such useful consequences in that field." 1 Roughly this would mean that speculation must be based upon experience, and always checked against experience. It was Kant's special use of this method that saved him from falling into a simple empiricism. But while this procedure might avoid the errors of the extreme rationalist-empiricist dichotomy, it came accompanied with its own set of inherent difficulties. The traditional objects of metaphysics (God, freedom and morality, and the immortality of the soul) are not objects of experience in any ordinary sense of the term. The adoption of this new method would seem to frustrate the very purpose of metaphysical investigation. Not just a new method, but a revised conception of the task of metaphysics was being formulated. An additional difficulty resulted from the fact that meta- page_xii Page xiii physics requires absolute certainty. With the mathematical method this had been thought to be assured by the principle of contradiction, and the rigorous process of logical argumentation from basic definitions. But if metaphysics now was to begin in experience, where would it find the fixed principles in terms of which it could build with assurance? As Kant himself expressed it, the variations in taste and the different aspects of man give to the flow of experience an uncertain and delusive character. ''Where shall I find fixed points of nature which man can never shift and which can give him indications as to the shore on which he must bring himself to rest?" 2 It is a curious and remarkable fact that both of these problemsthe revised conception of metaphysics and the fixed points which could serve as a reliable guidewere resolved under the influence of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Some of the most important works of Rousseau were published during this transitional period in Kant's life. Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse appeared in 1761; the Contrat social ou principes du droit politique in 1762; and this was followed in the same year by Émile ou de l'Education. Combined with the earlier essay on the arts and sciences, Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les moeurs (1750), these provided Rousseau's full conception of human nature, and it is certain that these views profoundly impressed Kant.3 In his home as a youth, and in his early school years, Kant had been given a rigorous moral training. The dignity of man and the essential importance of morality had not simply been preached to himit was a living fact in the home due to the extraordinary example of his parents. But for some years, during and after his university training, Kant was caught up in intellectual pursuits and the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. He thought for a while that such knowledge constituted the real worth of mankind, and despised the common people who know nothing. But then, as he said, "Rousseau set me right. . . . I am learning to honor men, and I would regard myself as of much less use than the common laborer if I did not believe that this speculation can give a value to everything else to restore the rights of mankind."4 It must be noted as well that this encounter with Rousseau was not merely a brief infatuation, or momentary page_xiii Page xiv inspirationit was a profound and lasting revelation which eventually resulted in the elaboration of a complete philosophical program. In the announcement of Kant's lectures on ethics for 176566 we find the statement that he will set forth the method by which man must be studied, not in the varying forms in which his accidental circumstances have molded him, or in the distorted form in which even philosophers have almost always misconstrued him, but that which is enduring in human nature, and the proper place of man in creation. 5 Rousseau is not mentioned at all, but Kant speaks of this new method of investigation as a "brilliant discovery of our time, which, when considered in its full scheme, was completely unknown to the ancients."6 There can be no doubt that he is referring to the work of Rousseauespecially when we turn again to comments in his notes. There he mentions explicitly that just as the theories of Newton had brought order, regularity, and great simplicity into our conception of the universe, so Rousseau had provided the key which would permit a neat and orderly philosophy of man. "Rousseau was the very first to discover beneath the varying forms which human nature assumes the deeply concealed nature of man and the hidden law in accordance with which Providence is justified by his observations."7 Rousseau had made Kant realize (as Cassirer has so nicely pointed out) that "what is truly permanent in human nature is not any condition in which it once existed and from which it has fallen; rather it is the goal for which and toward which it moves."8 Thus it is vitally important to understand not simply what man is or has been, but what he can, and therefore ought to, become. From this time forward, Kant realized that man's rational capacity alone is not sufficient to constitute his dignity, and elevate him above the brutes. If reason only enables him to do for himself what instinct does for the animal, then it would indicate for man no higher aim or destiny than that of the brute, but only a different way of attaining the same end.9 However, reason is man's most essential attribute, because it is the means by which a truly distinctive dimension is made possible for him. Reason, that is, reflective awareness, makes it possible to distinguish between good and bad, and thus morality can be made the ruling purpose page_xiv Page xv of life. Because man can consider an array of possibilities, and which among them is the most desirable, he can strive to make himself and his world into a realization of his ideals. This insight is simple and clearbut it opened enormous possibilities for the speculative mind of Kant. In the past, metaphysics had been mere speculation, full of chimerical insights which could only increase the amount of folly and error in the world. 10 But now Kant realized that metaphysics could proceed in terms of clearly defined absolute principles derived from man's potential. The moral dimension of man would serve as the most important element in the projected structure, but since reason is the essential condition for morality, its potential must be determined first. The force of this latter consideration was so strong when it first struck Kant that he seems to have considered it to be the main (and perhaps the only task) of metaphysics. In his notes we find: "One might say that metaphysics is a science of delimiting human reason."11 And again: "Metaphysics is useful in that it abolishes illusion which can be dangerous."12 But from this time on Kant moves gradually toward his mature view of metaphysics as serving a dual role: First in establishing the limits of reason, and thereby eliminating the misconceptions of previous rationalist systems; and secondly, in laying the foundations of pure philosophyof physics with respect to the material order, and of morality with respect to the intelligible order. This may be expressed differently by saying that the two branches of metaphysics, of physics and of morality, encompass the two aspects of man's nature, since he is a member of both the physical and the intelligible worlds. And to set limits to, and define clearly, the kinds of experience he can have in these two spheres is at the same time to determine the full range of experience open to him, and thus the limits of reality with which he can and should be concerned. It may at first seem curious, but it is perfectly legitimate to assert that, with respect to a rational entity, to determine the full range of its possible experience is precisely to determine its "nature." Kant realized at this time that knowledge of God based upon speculative principles is inferior to that achieved through morality and faith,13 and that in general it is far better to base religion on morality than to do the reverse.14 He saw, as well, that true page_xv Page xvi virtue is the fulfillment of one's duty toward humanity (one's self as well as others) and that this virtue must be based upon principles which are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling which lives in every man's breast. "I hope that I express this completely when I say that it is the feeling of the beauty and worth of human nature." 15 As his moral philosophy developed, Kant eliminated this psychological element of feeling, basing morality entirely on man's awareness of the moral lawthe sole fact of pure reason.16 But what is important to note in this early period is that Kant had clearly determined that the traditional objects of metaphysics can be dealt with adequately without employing the traditional form of speculative metaphysics. Natural theology and religion were to be based upon morality, and morality in turn was to be based upon the concept of the inherent dignity and worth of human nature. The importance of this commitment is clear when it is realized that such a philosophic scheme leaves nothing for metaphysics (or pure philosophy) except the analysis of the essential (a priori) aspects of that human nature on whichor in terms of whichthe rest of the system will be built. And it is not surprising, therefore, that this is precisely what Kant's Critical Philosophy attempts to do. It is often forgotten that Kant's critique of pure reason is not restricted to a critique of pure speculative reason. While that task is the purpose of the first Critique, the second and third Critiques continue to develop the critical analysis of man's pure cognitive faculties. The intention of the Critique of Pure Reason is to establish the conditions which alone constitute experience as a unified, coherent awareness. At the same time, consequently, it determines the limits of possible experience. But this is experience in the scientific sense of fact. The Critique of Practical Reason has as its primary purpose to establish that there is a pure practical reason,17 and the nature of the moral experience imposed on man by the moral law. These two works, therefore, set out the general nature of man as a rational being.18 His sensuous nature is an existence under empirically conditioned laws, and from the standpoint of reason, therefore, it is heteronomy. But his supersensuous nature consists in his existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions, and these laws belong to the autonomy of pure reason.19 Autonomy, of page_xvi Page xvii course, is self-legislationthe power which man has to impose upon himself values which he recognizes and accepts. But precisely the fact that he can and does impose such values on himself constitutes the essential nature of morality. It forces man to postulate freedom as a fact of his own moral experienceand it is freedom which is the key to the true nature of man, and which Kant employs as "the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason." 20 But at this point man may appear to be a curious dual personality. One element of his nature is enmeshed in the causal necessity of a purely mechanical order of physical nature. The other is absolutely free and requires him to impose moral order on his world. Can he really bring both aspects of his nature into a unified and coherent pattern? It was a recognition of this difficulty within his system that prompted Kant to write the Critique of Judgment, "as a means of combining the two parts of philosophy into a whole."21 In this third Critique Kant employs reflective judgment and the principle of teleology to link together the speculative dimension of man presented in the first Critique with the practical or moral dimension revealed in the second. Teleology, or purposiveness, is seen as an interpretive principle by which reflective judgment supplements the constitutive role of the categories in organizing nature. It is understood to reveal nothing new in the order of objective factbut only how a mind such as man's must interpret the world of nature with which it is confronted. And because nature is conceived in this way as not hostile to purposeful activity, and even fully comprehensible only when we assume it, we are encouraged to believe that we can effectively impose our own purposeful activity upon naturerealizing the ends which morality demands. Thus, it is a fact that our mind necessarily imposes a teleological interpretation on reality which serves as the ultimate principle of unity and integrity in the Kantian system. Only in this way can mechanical causality and causality through freedom be conceived of as compatible, and man's physical and intelligible aspects be brought into harmony. But it would be wrong to think of Kant's system merely in terms of its neat logical structure. And the third Critique must be seen as a great deal more than an ingenious device by which Kant page_xvii Page xviii could impose organic unity on this structure. In it we find revealed the principles according to which man can achieve aesthetic awareness; can grasp natural objects as organic wholes, rather than mere mechanical entities; and can comprehend the whole of nature as an organic, interrelated system. Moreover, here Kant shows how man is able to grasp his own dichotomous nature (and the two spheres in which he expresses that nature) as a unified wholeand how he is able to impose conceptual unity on his own development within this integrated system, so as to project his fulfillment and destiny as a realistic goal. It is clear in this context, and in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, that if Kant's method involves the investigation of the a priori principles of human nature, his purpose is to establish the destiny which these principles reveal, and to provide the prescription by which that destiny can be attained. It must be acknowledged that much of what has been said here does not sound like the normal description of Kant's thought as it is encountered in a summary of the history of philosophy. But neither the spirit nor the letter of Kant's work is violated by this formulation. 22 In fact, once the suggested perspective is adopted, there are several additional arguments to support it. Several times in his correspondence Kant speaks of his Critique of Pure Reason as a propaedeutica necessary introductory measure which will pave the way for the proposed metaphysics of physics and of morals.23 He also says that this new system will provide a firmer foundation for philosophy, and one which would be more advantageous for religion and morality. In the first Critique itself, he mentions that in a system of philosophy there can be only one highest end; and other ends, while essential, must nonetheless be subordinated to that highest end as a means for its achievement. The first Critique is clearly the means in this context, while the ultimate end "is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy."24 This statement is not a casual or ill-considered comment, but rather expresses a fundamental commitment on the part of Kantone that we find both early and late in his writings. In 1765 we find among his notes: "If there is any science which man really needs, it is the one I teach of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and page_xviii Page xix from which he is able to learn what one must be in order to be a man." 25 We find in the Introduction to his Anthropology that Kant recognizes as science only those disciplines which are organized philosophically. Thus the description which he offers here is precisely that of a philosophically ordered study of man and his place in realityor a philosophical anthropology. And when, in the same place, Kant describes his "pragmatic" anthropology as a study of what man can and should make of himself, how can we fail to recognize it as dealing with the "whole vocation of man"? All of Kant's philosophy is ordered to a single purpose: By means of an analysis of the essential principles of human nature, it discloses his proper destiny, and indicates how he must work toward its fulfillment. If this is true, then Kant's Anthropology is a much more important work than has traditionally been recognized. It will involve a rough outline of his entire system, and serve as an excellent introduction to his complex thought. Unfortunately the Anthropology was the last major work that was edited by Kant himself, and his age and the state of his health compelled him to do little more than correlate his lecture notes for publication. The richness and intensity which the younger man had imparted to this material in the classroom was lost forever when he retired. And, of course, Kant himself acknowledged that the lectures were on a popular levelfull of examples and humorous elements to provide a light and varied fare. But these facts should not cause one to conclude, as some writers have, that the Anthropology is not worthy of serious attention. In this work we find clues of several kinds which help us to understand both Kant and his system more completely. First, and of primarily historical interest, we find a great deal of information about Kant as a man. There is much evidence to confirm the comments of his biographers: concerning his great love for the classics, and his voracious reading of contemporary works in science and literatureeven the purely entertaining novels of the period, such as those of Fielding. There are many expressions of personal taste, and evidence of a great deal of concern for correct form in matters of social intercourse. And finally, there is the combination of great shallowness and equal profundity in this extraordinary man. One is amazed at the page_xix Page xx uncritical views which are expressed about women, and about certain religious and racial groups. Nor can one fail to note the contrast between such views and the emphasis upon the correct use of man's reflective capacity, awareness of duty, and proper conduct toward our fellowman. But Kant was a man of goodwill, and any failure on his part to live up to the moral ideal must be ascribed to a lack of experience which permitted his prejudices to remain undetected. From the philosophic standpoint, however, information about Kant as an individual is the least interesting aspect of the Anthropology. Here it is more important to seek out definitions, comments and distinctions which will throw light on other aspects of Kant's work. And there are a good number of these. In the first portion of the work there are several interesting comments on the precise interrelation of the distinct cognitive faculties. The statements on affinity in section 31 are particularly helpful to one who has found this notion rather obscure in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason where it plays such an important role. The distinction between propensity and inclination (sections 73 and 80) helps one to understand more clearly certain of the more concrete aspects of Kant's moral theory. The extended discussions of imagination and of genius cannot help but throw light on the inadequate treatment which these vital aspects of man receive in other contexts. And the notion that the faculty of taste, in which the sensible and intelligible elements of cognition are conjoined, can serve as the ground for the external advancement of morality (section 69) is surely one which will help the student of Kant to bring together some of the apparently loose ends in his system. This last point, of course, brings us back to our primary point of emphasis. There can be no doubt that the most important philosophic impact of the Anthropology is in its ability to clarify for the student of Kant the precise purpose which his philosophic system is intended to fulfill, and the manner in which the parts of that structure are related. Kant sees himself not only as indicating to man the kind of program of self-education which must be undertaken if he is to fulfill his destiny, but also as having removed the primary impediments to that education, and having page_xx Page xxi outlined the social and political programs which would enhance and promote it. It would not be surprising if the contemporary reader were to judge the anthropology of Kant a curious anthropology indeed. But that is only because the English-speaking world has too long restricted its consideration to a purely empirical anthropology. Such an anthropology can, of course, only describe man as he has expressed his nature in the course of historical events. But this will only give us the various roles that man has played, the various masks that he has worn from time to time. We will still know nothing of his essential nature, and of what man ought to be. Kant's formulation, on the other hand, is a prescriptive, and even a creative anthropologyit emphasizes man's responsibility to become what he can be, that is, to fulfill his potential. This prescription is based upon a combination of pure a priori principles, and an enormous amount of carefully considered empirical data. And if it is incorrect in certain of its conclusions (as any scientific work is likely to be in retrospect), it is by no means incorrect in its general conception of manor for that matter, of anthropology. Anthropology must be the study of what man is and has been, in order that he may more efficiently direct his energies toward fulfilling his potential in the future. And Kant realized as clearly as we do today that there is no way to know where this development will end. In the Critique of Pure Reason he says: What the highest level might be at which humanity may have to come to rest, and how great a gulf may still be left between the idea [of human perfection] and its realization, are questions which no one can, or ought to answer. For the matter depends upon freedom; and it is in the very nature of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit. 26 European scholars have since Kant's time kept up a continuous flirtation with the notion of a genuinely philosophical anthropologyand a bibliography on the topic would require an entire volume in itself. But curiously enough it has only been within the last fifty years or so that this particular aspect of Kant's work has been given important emphasisby writers like Max page_xxi Page xxii Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Cassirer. Gradually, however, there has been an increase of interest in the area, and it now seems likely to take on major proportions. In a recent bibliography of works on Kant 27 there were more articles and books on anthropological topics than on any other theme in his work (i.e., more than on anything other than the individual Critiques themselves). Of course, very few of these works were in English, since little of Kant's anthropological thought had been translated, and there was apparently an unwillingness to work with it in the original. But now that Kant's major anthropological work has been made available in English, one may hope to see a significant increase in enthusiasm for the task. Of course, a great deal of work remains to be done in this area. There are two large volumes of "anthropological notes" in the Akademie Edition of Kant's work. Careful scholars have been making isolated references to these notes for years, but their significance is far from exhausted. And when the task of correlating and evaluating this material has been completed, there still remains the need for a detailed commentary on this aspect of Kant's work. There is a rather brief contribution to this cause by J. H. von Kirchmann in the old Philosophische Bibliothek series. But this is perhaps the only commentary available. Michel Foucault had planned a work which would relate the Anthropology to Kant's critical works,28 but unfortunately his interests in other areas of thought have forced him to cancel the project. Thus there is a surprising amount of work left to be done on the anthropological aspects of Kant's thought, and the present translation will be valuable indeed if it encourages its readers to contribute their energies to the task. page_xxii Page 3