Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) Type of Organization: insurgent; non-state actor; religious; social services provider; terrorist; transnational; violent Ideologies and Affiliations: ISIS–affiliated group; Islamist; jihadist; Qutbist; Salafist; Sunni; Takfiri Place(s) of Origin: Tunisia Year of Origin: 2011 Founder(s): Abu Iyad al-Tunisi Place(s) of Operation: Tunisia; Algeria; Libya Also Known As: ● Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation1 ● Ansar al Sharia2 ● Ansar al-Sharia3 ● Ansar al-Shari’ah4 ● Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T)5 ● Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia6 ● Partisans of Islamic Law in Tunisia7 ● Partisans of Sharia in Tunisia8 ● Shabab al-Tawhid (ST)9 1 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 2 Patrick Markey, “Tunisia Signals Local Al Qaeda Links to Bardo Museum Attack,” Reuters, March 26, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/26/uk-tunisia-security-idUKKBN0MM1LU20150326. 3 “Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 10, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140110.aspx. 4 “Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 10, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140110.aspx. 5 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 6 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 7 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 8 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 1 ● Supporters of Islamic Law10 ● Supporters of Islamic Law in Tunisia11 ● Supporters of Sharia in Tunisia12 Executive Summary: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) is a violent jihadist group that seeks to implement sharia (Islamic law) in Tunisia. It works to achieve this goal by performing dawa (proselytizing, including both religious education and provision of social services) domestically to increase its base of support for future violent jihad, enforcing strict modesty laws under the banner of hisbah (the duty to command moral acts and prohibit immoral ones, in accord with sharia), and carrying out jihad by instigating and executing violent attacks. While AST shares the name “Ansar al-Sharia” (Supporters of Islamic Law” with like-minded groups in Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, each organization operates independently. Former prisoner Abu Iyad al-Tunisi founded AST in April 2011 following the Tunisian revolution that year. AST has initiated several violent protests, including the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis. AST militants assassinated secular Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in February and July 2013, respectively. Consequently, the Tunisian government cracked down on AST. Since then, AST and the Tunisian government have been locked in a low-intensity war with casualties on both sides. AST complements its goal of establishing an Islamist state in Tunisia by pushing young Tunisians to go fight alongside jihadists in Iraq and Syria. In July 2014, AST spokesman Seifeddine Rais declared loyalty to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Many AST leaders have themselves gone to Iraq and Syria to pledge allegiance to ISIS and fight alongside it. AST maintains close ties with al-Qaeda (AQ), AQ affiliate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), and ISIS. AST has been designated a terrorist group by the United States, the United Nations, and Tunisia, among others. 9 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Shabab Al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 9, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/shabab-al-tawhid-the- rebranding-of-ansar-al-sharia-in-tunisia. 10 “Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 10, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140110.aspx. 11 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 12 “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Fourteen Individuals and Two Entities to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, September 23, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11575.doc.htm. 2 Doctrine: AST’s ideology combines Salafism—belief in a “pure Islam”13 practiced by Muslims’ pious ancestors (salaf) at the time of the Prophet Muhammad—with jihad.14 AST supports the creation of an Islamic state governed by sharia (Islamic law).15 AST long focused on waging jihad mainly through non-violent activities like dawa (proselytizing through both religious education and providing social services), while leaving the option open to resort to more violence in the future.16 AST spokesman Hassen Brik said in 2012 that dawa built AST’s base of support for future violent jihad. “This is a long-term vision to prepare society,” Brik said. “We are for jihad, armed revolution, but we cannot do this if the people are not with us. It will only be possible when everyone is behind the vision.”17 An unnamed AST member stated in an interview that “[t]he state that we imagine is based on God’s laws. This is the [sic] not up for discussion. We are Muslims and we want to act according [to] the Quran and sunna [body of legal practice].”18 AST claims democracy and sharia cannot exist simultaneously—according to jihadist group scholar Aaron Y. Zelin, AST “believe[s] democracy is a separate religion from Islam.”19 AST members in Europe have reportedly “flocked” to listen to al-Qaeda’s “most influential” cleric, Abu Qatada, who was also known as Osama bin Laden’s “European ambassador” for a time.20 The group focuses on creating an Islamist state in Tunisia, though AST has adopted al- Qaeda’s worldview of global jihad.21 “With our religion we can dominate the world, just like we used to in the past,” an anonymous AST member declared in 2013.22 13 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 14 Mohammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniya, “Ansar al-Sharia: Al-Qaeda’s Response to Arab Spring,” Al- Monitor, January 7, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/politics/2013/01/history-ansar-al-sharia-arab- spring.html#. 15 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 16 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/08/meeting-tunisias-ansar-al-sharia/. 17 Louisa Loveluck, “Planting the Seeds of Tunisia’s Ansar Al Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 27, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/27/planting-the-seeds-of-tunisias-ansar-al-sharia/. 18 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 19 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/08/meeting-tunisias-ansar-al-sharia/. 20 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 21 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/08/meeting-tunisias-ansar-al-sharia/. 22 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 3 Organizational Structure: While AST shares the name “Ansar al-Sharia” (Supporters of Islamic Law” with like-minded groups in Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, each organization operates independently. Jihadist group scholar Aaron Y. Zelin notes that “Although there are no known formal or operational links between these disparate organizations, it is possible they may try to link up in the future based on ideological affinity and similar end goals.”23 AST’s founder and leader is Seifallah Ben Hassine, a.k.a. Abu Iyad al-Tunisi. Beneath him, AST is divided into various compartments, including offices for dawa (proselytizing), social services, media, and tactical coordination.24 According to an alleged AST leader, the group is a “lightweight and decentralized movement, with an extended autonomy for the local groups, which are the real core of the movement.”25 The leader goes on to describe the organization’s lowest level as being “its most important,” where local groups “comprised of around twenty people” coordinate the group’s activities neighborhood by neighborhood. The organization is reportedly divided into northern, central, and southern branches.26 Counterterrorism scholar Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has noted that although AST is divided into small, autonomous sub-groups, the group’s senior leadership is not “irrelevant or lacking any means of control.” Gartenstein-Ross explained that “sources loyal to AST have an incentive to portray it as decentralized… by emphasizing this decentralization, AST can engage in violence without triggering a state crackdown.”27 Financing: 23 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/. 24 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba, and Jihad,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague, May 2013, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al-Sharia- Tunisia%27s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf. 25 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 26 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 27 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba, and Jihad,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague, May 2013, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al-Sharia- Tunisia%27s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf. 4 AST’s principal fundraisers are “[Tunisian] charities that raise financial and in-kind donations,” according to Tunisian journalist Nebil Zaghdoud.28 Tunisian researcher Sami Brahem said AST profits from smuggled goods and from “more than 120 legal organisations that distribute subsidies,” many of which operate overseas.29 The Tunisian and U.S. governments claim AST receives funding from al-Qaeda, particularly its affiliate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In August 2013, Tunisia’s Director General of National Security, Mustapha Ben Amor, said that AST “is a member of the parent terrorist al- Qaeda” and that its financing comes from “certain Arab countries, such as Yemen, Libya and Mali.”30 David Cohen, then–U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated that “AQIM…has provided funding for other terrorist groups including Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia.”31 Key Leaders: ● Seifallah Ben Hassine (a.k.a. Abu Iyad al-Tunisi)—leader32 ● Seifeddine Rais—spokesman33 ● Wael Amami—deputy leader34 ● Kamel Zarrouk—deputy leader35 ● Sami Ben Khemais Essid—former head of operations for al-Qaeda in Italy 36 ● Mehdi Kammoun—senior leader37 ● Hassan Ben Brik—head of dawa committee38 28 Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals,” AllAfrica, August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html. 29 Mona Yahia, “Ansar Al-Sharia Threatens Tunisia,” AllAfrica, December 13, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201312150228.html. 30 Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals,” AllAfrica, August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html. 31 “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,’” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx. 32 Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Ally Orchestrated Assault on US Embassy in Tunisia,” Long War Journal, October 2, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/al_qaeda_ally_orches.php. 33 Jemal Arfaoui, “Tunisia: Ansar Al-Sharia Spokesman Backs Isis,” AllAfrica, May 14, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201407090299.html. 34 “The Salafist Struggle,” Economist, January 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/01/dispatch-tunisia. 35 Bill Roggio, “Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia Deputy Leader Reportedly in Syria,” Long War Journal, February 27, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ansar_al_sharia_tuni_7.php. 36 Thomas Joscelyn, “From Al Qaeda in Italy to Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia,” Long War Journal, November 21, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/from_al_qaeda_in_ita.php#. 37 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba, and Jihad,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague, May 2013, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al-Sharia- Tunisia%27s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf. 5 ● Ahmed al-Akrami—medical and humanitarian coordinator39 ● Youssef Mazouz—leader of AST’s youth wing40 Recruitment and Training: AST claims to have recruited as many as 70,000 members from April 2011 to January 2014.41 AST youth wing leader Youssef Mazouz believes these recruits were attracted to AST because of its charity work, proselytizing campaign, and distribution of aid to poor areas.42 AST also appears to attract recruits by capitalizing on popular frustration with the Tunisian government.43 Tunisian prisons and schools are major recruitment feeders for AST. AST founder Abu Iyad al- Tunisi was released from prison as part of a general pardon of prisoners following the Tunisian revolution in 2011 and he recruited many other former inmates to AST.44 Indeed, a spokesman for Tunisia’s Interior Ministry stated that most members of AST “were among those released from prison” under the general pardon.45 Like other Salafist groups, AST appears to have expanded its membership by recruiting through “preaching tents” on school campuses. These tents attract students by discussing popular topics, like how to support the revolt against the Syrian regime.46 AST also recruits through social media, although this process has proved challenging. The group’s media wing, al-Qayrawan Media Foundation, used a Facebook page and Twitter account until both were removed. Al-Qayrawan later reemerged on those sites under other names.47 38 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba, and Jihad,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague, May 2013, 3, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al- Sharia-Tunisia%27s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf. 39 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba, and Jihad,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism–The Hague, May 2013, 3, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al- Sharia-Tunisia%27s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf. 40 S.J. “The Salafist Struggle,” Economist, January 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/01/dispatch-tunisia. 41 S.J., “The Salafist Struggle,” Economist, January 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/01/dispatch-tunisia. 42 S.J., “The Salafist Struggle,” Economist, January 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/01/dispatch-tunisia. 43 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar Al-Sharia,” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 44 Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals,” AllAfrica, August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html. 45 Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals,” AllAfrica, August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html. 46 Yasmine Najjar, “Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals,” AllAfrica, August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html. 6 Although AST members mainly work to promote the group domestically, thousands of AST recruits have gone on to training camps in Libya. From there, these recruits have travelled to Syria to fight alongside other jihadist groups, like ISIS.48 History: ● 2000: Abu Iyad al-Tunisi founds the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) “in coordination with Al-Qaeda.”49 ● January 2001: Italian authorities thwart an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Rome. According to the U.S. Department of State and Italian authorities, the plot was directed by Sami Ben Kemais Essid, then-head of al-Qaeda operations in Italy.50 ● September 9, 2001: Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud is assassinated. TCG is later implicated in the assassination.51 ● March 2003: Turkish authorities deport Abu Iyad al-Tunisi to Tunisia, where he is imprisoned and charged with various terrorism-related offenses. He remains imprisoned until early 2011.52 ● January 2011: Political upheaval in Tunisia culminates in the ousting of President Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali.53 ● April 2011: Abu Iyad al-Tunisi founds AST.54 ● May 2011: AST launches its Facebook page.55 ● October 2011: After Nessma TV airs the animated film Persepolis, which briefly depicts God in human form, AST launches a “Day of Rage” against the broadcaster. Abu Iyad al- 47 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Sharia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 8, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/meeting-tunisias-ansar-al-sharia. 48 Thomas Joscelyn, “UN recognizes ties between Ansar al Sharia in Libya, Al Qaeda,” Long War Journal, November 19, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/un_designates_ansar.php; Carlotta Gall, “Tunisia Fears Attacks by Citizens Flocking to Jihad,” New York Times, August 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/africa/tunisia-in-political-transition-fears-attacks-by-citizens- radicalized-abroad.html. 49 “QE.T.90.02. TUNISIAN COMBATANT GROUP,” United Nations, April 7, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQDe090E.shtml. 50 Thomas Joscelyn, “From Al Qaeda in Italy to Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia,” Long War Journal, November 21, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/from_al_qaeda_in_ita.php#. 51 “Al Qaeda Ally Orchestrated Assault on US Embassy in Tunisia,” Long War Journal, October 2, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/al_qaeda_ally_orches.php. 52 “Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar Al Sharia Releases Pictures of FBI Agents,” Long War Journal, December 23, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/ansar_al_sharia_tuni_1.php. 53 “Tunisia: President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced Out,” BBC News, January 15, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12195025. 54 “Tunisia Declares Ansar Al-Sharia a Terrorist Group,” BBC News, August 27, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23853241. 55 Aaron Zelin, “Tunisia: Uncovering Ansar Al-Sharia,” Think Africa Press, October 25, 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com/tunisia/uncovering-ansar-al-sharia. 7 Tunisi calls on his followers to attack and destroy Nessma’s owner’s home. Some 300 Islamist protesters descend on the station’s offices intending to set fire to the buildings.56 ● May 23, 2012: More than 5,000 Salafists attend AST’s annual conference in Kairouan. AST leaders call on attendees to boycott the media, which they accuse of slandering the Salafist movement. Al-Tunisi also calls for the creation of an Islamic workers syndicate to challenge the secular Tunisian General Labor Union.57 ● June 2012: AST organizes riots in Tunis in protest of the “Spring of the Arts” exhibit in Tunis’s La Marsa suburb. Thousands of Islamists throw rocks and gasoline bombs at police stations, secular political offices, and courthouses. One person is killed, 65 police officers are injured, and 162 rioters are arrested.58 ● September 14, 2012: AST organizes protests in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. AST leader Abu Iyad al-Tunisi participates in the protest and allegedly initiates violence against the embassy’s security guards.59 ● December 21, 2012: The Tunisian government announces the arrest of 16 members of a Tunisia-based, AQIM-affiliated terrorist cell known as the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa. Authorities say the cell members “were known for their active participation in events organized by [AST].”60 ● February 6, 2013: AST gunmen assassinate secular Tunisian politician Chokri Belaid on the doorstep of his home.61 Al Jazeera describes his funeral as “one of the largest outpourings of grief in Tunisian history, with an estimated one million people taking to the street.”62 The assassination causes the country’s biggest upheaval since the 2011 revolution that ousted former president Ben Ali.63 ● March 26, 2013: Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh accuses Abu Iyad al-Tunisi of being “deeply involved in issues of violence and arms trafficking.” Al-Tunisi responds with a 56 Aaron Zelin and Vish Sakthivel, “Tunisia Designates Ansar Al-Sharia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 28, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/tunisia-designates-ansar-al- sharia; “Protesters Attack TV Station over Film Persepolis,” BBC News, October 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15233442. 57 Houda Trabelsi, “Salafist Congress in Kairouan Draws Thousands,” Eurasia Review, May 24, 2012, http://www.eurasiareview.com/24052012-tunisia-salafist-congress-kairouan-draws-thousands/. 58 Tarek Amara and Lin Noueihed, “Protesters Attack TV Station over Film Persepolis,” Reuters, June 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/us-tunisia-salafis-clash-idUSBRE85B0XW20120612. 59 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, “Tunisia’s War with Ansar Al-Sharia: New Revelations About Al- Qaeda’s North African Network,” War on the Rocks, October 21, 2013, http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/tunisias- war-with-ansar-al-sharia-new-revelations-about-al-qaedas-north-african-network/. 60 Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian Government Arrests Al Qaeda Cell Tied to Ansar Al Sharia,” Long War Journal, December 22, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/tunisian_government.php#. 61 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, “Tunisia’s War with Ansar Al-Sharia: New Revelations about Al- Qaeda’s North African Network,” War on the Rocks, October 21, 2013, http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/tunisias- war-with-ansar-al-sharia-new-revelations-about-al-qaedas-north-african-network/. 62 Yasmine Ryan, “Who Killed Tunisia’s Chokri Belaid?” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201394183325728267.html. 63 Yasmine Ryan, “Who Killed Tunisia’s Chokri Belaid?” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201394183325728267.html. 8 warning to the Tunisian government: “To your wise men we say: Keep your sick [or diseased] ones from us, or we will direct our war against them until their downfall and their meeting with the dustbin of history…”64 ● May 20, 2013: In a massive show of force, Tunisian police and military block the third AST conference in Kairouan. One person is killed in ensuing clashes, which draw 40,000 rioters.65 ● July 25, 2013: AST assassinates secular politician Mohamed Brahmi. The Interior Ministry accuses AST militants of using the same gun to kill both Brahmi and Tunisian politician Chokri Belaid.66 ● July 29, 2013: Militants ambush and kill at least eight Tunisian soldiers near the border with Algeria, allegedly cutting the throats of three soldiers.67 ● August 27, 2013: Tunisia designates AST a terrorist organization and accuses the group of assassinating politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.68 ● August 29, 2013: Tunisian security forces seize an assassination list allegedly compiled by AST. The list includes the names of politicians, anti-Islamist media figures, and academics.69 ● October 17, 2013: AST militants kill two Tunisian policemen during clashes in Goubellat, Tunisia.70 ● October 20, 2013: The Tunisian military kills nine and captures four alleged AST figures suspected of involvement in the October 17, 2013 murder of two policemen.71 ● October 30, 2013: AST members attempt to carry out two separate suicide attacks. One bomber blows himself up at the Riadh Pal hotel in Sousse, with no reported casualties. Security forces foil the other attempt and arrest a suspect allegedly targeting the mausoleum of former Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba.72 64 Thomas Joscelyn, “War of Words Escalates in Tunisia,” Long War Journal, March 27, 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/war_of_words_escalat.php#. 65 Mischa Benoit-Lavelle, “Salafists, State Move Closer to Open Conflict in Tunisia,” Al-Monitor, May 20, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/tunisia-salafists-suppression.html. 66 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, “An Escalation in Tunisia: How the State Went to War with Ansar Al-Sharia,” War on the Rocks, February 24, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/an-escalation-in-tunisia-how- the-state-went-to-war-with-ansar-al-sharia/. 67 Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia Soldiers Killed in Ambush, Official Says,” Huffington Post, July 29, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/29/tunisian-soldiers-killed-ambush_n_3672380.html. 68 “Tunisia Declares Ansar Al-Sharia a Terrorist Group,” BBC News, August 27, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23853241. 69 Mohammad Yassin Al-Jalassi, “Tunisia Minister: Ansar Al-Sharia Linked to Assassinations,” Al-Monitor, August 29, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/08/ansar-al-sharia-connected-to-assassinations.html#. 70 “Gunmen Kill Two Tunisian Police in Northern City,” Reuters, October 17, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-tunisia-security-idUSBRE99G0LS20131017. 71 “Tunisia: 9 Believed Behind Police Ambush Killed,” Associated Press, October 19, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/tunisia-9-believed-behind-police-ambush-killed. 72 Tristan Dreisbach, “Bombing at Hotel in Sousse, Failed Bombing in Monastir,” Tunisia Live, October 30, 2013, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/10/30/attack-on-hotel-in-sousse/. 9 ● January 10, 2014: The U.S. government designates AST as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Abu Iyad al-Tunisi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).73 ● February 2014: AST deputy leader Kamel Zarrouk surfaces in Syria, waging jihad there alongside ISIS fighters.74 ● February 5, 2014: In a raid, Tunisian security forces kill seven AST militants, including the prime suspect in Chokri Belaid’s murder. An Interior Ministry spokesman says the militants had “probably [been] planning to carry out an attack.”75 ● February 9, 2014: After a brief gun battle in Tunis, authorities arrest four AST militants, including Hmed el-Melki, a.k.a. “Somali.” El-Melki is a suspect in the assassination of Tunisian MP Mohamed Brahmi.76 ● February 16, 2014: Four militants disguised as Tunisian security officials kill three policemen and a civilian, wounding another two policemen and a border guard near Tunisia’s border with Algeria. Although no group claims responsibility, Tunisian authorities implicate AST.77 The attacks trigger protests in the northwestern Tunisian city of Jendouba. More than a thousand people demonstrate in solidarity with the victims.78 ● February 17, 2014: The Tunisian Interior Ministry announces stricter regulations regarding the niqab (a veil covering the hair and face, worn by Muslim women). The ministry states, “In light of the terrorist threats that the country is witnessing and as some suspects and fugitives deliberately wear niqab for disguise and to escape from security units, the ministry… will tighten procedural controls on every person wearing a niqab within the framework of what is authorized by law.” The statement comes under harsh criticism. The government responds citing the case of Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, who reportedly evaded capture by wearing a niqab.79 73 “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar Al-Shari’a Organizations and Leaders,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219519.htm. 74 Bill Roggio, “Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia Deputy Leader Reportedly in Syria,” Long War Journal, February 27, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ansar_al_sharia_tuni_7.php?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss& utm_campaign=ansar-al-sharia-tunisia-deputy-leader-reportedly-in-syria#. 75 “Tunisia Takes Out Top Terrorists,” All Africa, February 5, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201402061024.html. 76 Agence France-Presse, “Tunisia Arrests Suspect in Murder of MP,” Al Jazeera, February 9, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/tunisia-arrests-suspect-murder-mp-20142952137498819.html. 77 “Fighters Kill Policemen in Tunisia,” Al Jazeera, February 16, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/fighters-kill-policemen-tunisia-201421693036139272.html. 78 “Tunisians Protest against Attack on Police,” Al Jazeera, February 18, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/tunisians-protest-against-attack-police- 2014217224610567113.html. 79 Robert Joyce and Asma Smadhi, “New ‘Controls’ on Niqab Spur Alarm in Tunisia,” Al Jazeera, April 26, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/new-controls-niqab-spur-alarm-tunisia- 2014319111436498101.html. 10