The Bible • St. Thomas Aquinas • St. Augustine Karl Barth • St. Bonaventure • }ohn Calvin Rene Descartes • Austin Farrer • John Hick St. Ircnaeus» St. John of the Cross * C. S. Lewis St. Thomas More • E. F. Schumacher Albert Schweitzer • Paul Tillich • Leo Tolstoy Alec Vidler • John Wesley and Others Edited by l> Andrew Linzcy and Tom Regan ANIMALS and CHRISTIANITY A Book of Readings ♦ Edited by ANDREW LINZEY and TOM REGAN CROSSROAD . NEW YORK 1988 The Crossroad Publishing Company 370 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017 Selection, arrangement, and introductions copyright © 1988 by Andrew Linzey and Tom Regan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written permission of The Crossroad Publishing Company. Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Animals and Christianity : a book of readings / edited by Andrew Linzey and Tom Regan, p. cm. Bibliography: p. ISBN 0-8245-0902T (phk.) 1. Animals—Religious aspects—Christianity. I. Linzey, Andrew. II. Regan, Tom. BT746.A55 1988 24T.693—dcl9 88-16181 CIP Contents Introduction: ‘A Great Ethic’ ix Acknowledgments xvi Part L ATTITUDES TO CREATION 1 Introduction 3 The Bible: On Creation, Covenant and Interdependence 6 John Austin Baker, Old Testament Attitudes to Nature 10 St Thomas Aquinas, Man as Master over Creation 17 John Calvin, The Pre-eminence of Man 21 John Burnaby, The Purpose of Creation 23 Paulos Mar Gregorios, Christology and Creation 25 St Bonaventure, The Life of St Francis 28 Vladimir Lossky, Cosmic Awareness 34 Part 2, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 37 Introduction 39 The Bible: On the Pains and Status of Animals 42 Rene Descartes, Animals Are Machines 45 Peter Geach, Divine Indifference 52 C. E. M. Joad and C. S. Lewis, The Pains of Animals 55 John Hick, Explaining Animal Pain 62 Austin Farrer, Providence and Compassion 66 A. Richard Kingston, Theodicy and Animal Welfare 71 Part 3. THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL REDEMPTION 79 Introduction 81 The Bible: On Afterlife and Cosmic Redemption 85 V vi • ANIMALS AND CHRISTIANITY St Augustine, The Peace of the Rational Soul 87 Bishop Joseph Butler, The Immortality of Brutes 88 St Irenaeus, All Things in Christ 91 St John of the Cross, Beautifying the Creatures 93 Edward Quinn, Animals in Heaven^ 94 St Athanasius, Christ as the Saviour of the Universe 97 John Calvin, Speculation about Animals 100 John Wesley, The General Deliverance 101 Keith Ward, Sentient Afterlife 104 Paul Tillich, Redemption of Other Worlds 106 C. S. Lewis, Animal Resurrection 107 Part 4- REVERENCE, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS 111 Introduction 113 The Bible: On the Right Treatment of Animals 116 Albert Schweitzer, The Ethic of Reverence for Life 118 Karl Barth, A Reply to Schweitzer 121 St Thomas Aquinas, The Lawful Treatment of Animals 124 Humphry Primatt, The Duty of Mercy 127 Henry Davis, Animals Have No Rights 130 Andrew Linzey, The Theos-Rights of Animals 131 Richard Griffiths, A Critique of Animal Rights 137 Tom Regan, A Reply to Griffiths 140 Stephen R. L, Clark, Positive and Negative Rights 143 Part 5. PRACTICAL ISSUES 145 Introduction 147 The Bible: On Animal Sacrifices and Killing for Food 152 L Animal Experimentation 156 Donald Soper, The Question of Vivisection 156 John Canon McCarthy, Justified Use of Animals 158 C. S. Lewis, A Cose for Abolition 160 Cardinal Manning, Obligations to the Creator 165 Contents • vii IL Fur-Trapping 167 Bishops in Northern Canada, In Defence of Fur-Trapping 167 Andrew Linzey, A Reply to the Bishops 170 III Hunting for Sport 174 St Francis de Sales, Lawful Recreations 174 St Thomas More, Why Utopians Do Not Hunt 175 Edward Carpenter, Christian Faith and the Moral Aspect of Hunting 176 James B. Whisker, The Right to Hunt 179 IV. Intensive Farming 183 Ruth Harrison, Ethical Issues in Intensive Farming 183 E. F. Schumacher, Animals Are Ends-in-Themselves 187 Karl Barth, Justifiable Killing 191 V. Killing for Food 194 Leo Tolstoy, The First Step 194 Alec R. Vidler, Sermon on Vegetarianism 197 John Calvin, The Tyranny of Vegetarianism 199 Stephen R. L. Clark, Empty Gluttony 201 For Further Reading 203 Notes on Contributors 206 Introduction: 'A Great Ethic' ANDREW LINZEY and TOM REGAN I believe that pity is a law like justice, and that kindness is a duty like uprightness. That which is weak has a right to the kindness and pity of that which is strong. In the relations of man with the animals, with the flowers, with all the objects of creation, there is a great ethic, scarcely perceived as yet, which will at length break through into the light, and which will be the corollary and the complement to human ethics. Are there not here unsounded depths for the thinker? Is one to think oneself mad because one has the sentiment of universal pity in one’s heart? VICTOR HUGO It is necessary and urgent that following the example of the poor man (St Francis) one decides to abandon inconsiderate forms of domination, capture and custody with respect to all creatures. POPE JOHN PAUL II A century separates the words of Victor Hugo and Pope John Paul 11. Within the institutionalized church it has been largely a hundred years of neglect of all the objects of creation Hugo mentions, the an- imals in particular. Indifference has been the dominant response to ‘inconsiderate forms of domination,’ with few church leaders speaking out or acting boldly in the name of that ‘great ethic’ Hugo envisaged. It has not always been so. When the Victoria Street Society was formed in London, in November 1875, it counted the Archbishop of York among its four original members, and by early 1876 the progressive ix X • ANIMALS AND CHRISTIANITY Roman Catholic thinker, Cardinal Manning, had joined. The Society’s objectives were ambitious: to regulate vivisection, then only in its infancy, with a view to bringing about its total abolition. Agreement on the desirability of these goals superceded whatever theological and other differences there might have been, so that even so unlikely a pair as Cardinal Manning and Lord Shaftesbury, the latter being one of the founding members and an unyielding evangelical, were able to work harmoniously in the name of animal protection. In this effort they were joined by the major writers and poets of the day—^Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle and Ruskin, for example. More than fifty years earlier, in 1824, the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) had been founded, again with Christian lead' ership, this time in the person of the Reverend Arthur Broome. It was Broome, moreover, who had overseen the reprinting of what was then the definitive work on issues relating to animal abuse: The Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals, by the Reverend Dr Humphry Primatt, first published in 1776. Religious involvement in animahprotection efforts was a matter of course in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as was the active participation of those who had achieved feme in their own lifetime. In those hopeful days it was not unusual that so renowned a figure as Victor Hugo, already recognized as a remarkable writer, would be asked to be the first president of the Societe frangaise contra la vivisection, formally constitued in June 1883, or that when he accepted he is reported to have said, ‘My name is nothing. It is in the name of the whole human race that you make your appeal.’ It was in this same spirit, ‘in the name of the whole human race,’ that Cardinal Manning, the Archbishop of York, Arthur Broome and the other Christian members of the respective Societies spoke. Thus *do we have a paradox certain to challenge every thoughtful Christian: On the one hand, we find vital, visionary Christian in^ volvement in the creation of animahprotection organizations during the past century; on the other hand, we witness a century of all but official silence and neglect on the part of almost all Christians, in^ eluding, most conspicuously, those in positions of power and authority. How might we explain this ascendency of Christian indifference over Christian compassion? A variety of possible answers comes to mind. To begin with, it cannot be irrelevant that during the more than one hundred years since the formation of the Victoria Street Society (now the National Introduction • xi Anti'vivisection Society, UK) we have seen the slow but steady ad' vance of secular humanism in the Western world. The enormous power and influence of this philosophy, embodying as it does the Protagorian maxim that ‘Man is the measure of all things,’ has not been kind to the ‘great ethic’ glimpsed by Hugo. The plain fact is, most humans don’t place much value on the nonhuman world, animals included; those ‘inconsiderate forms of domination’ of which Pope John Paul II speaks are easy to defend when the creatures who are exploited are denied all, or allowed little, independent value. Because a boastful, arrogant humanism has become such a powerful force in the contem^ porary world, one might view Christian indifference to the many ‘in^ considerate forms of domination’ animals are made to endure as one among a number of tangible signs of the triumph of secular humanism. But this explanation, correct though it is in noting the rise of secular humanism during the past hundred years, is incorrect at deeper levels. It is incorrect, first, in underestimating the staying'power of committed Christian belief. For Christians do not surrender articles of considered faith merely because powerful voices speak against them. Just the op' posite. The history of the Christian experience teaches us this if it teaches us anything. The preceding explanation also is incorrect in supposing that ChriS' tian neglect of the nonhuman created order is to be attributed to the triumph of forces outside Christianity. In point of fact Christian faith is a house divided against itself on the most fundamental issues arising in this context. The ascension of Christian indifference over Christian compassion is far more likely due to sources from within, rather than those from without, the community of Christian believers. The materials collected in the present volume more than confirm this judgment. Among the thinkers represented here, some believe that the proper relationship between humans and the rest of the created order is fundamentally the same as the relationship favored by secular humanism: The world and all its nonhuman inhabitants, on this view, because they lack independent value, are to be regarded and treated as so many resources to be used by human beings; what value the rest of nature has, in other words, is to be determined by how well it meets or advances human needs and interests. In practice, therefore, ‘ChriS' tian humanism’ (if we may use this expression thus) yields results that coincide with those sanctioned by any form of ‘secular humanism’ worthy of the name. There is, however, a quite different way to read the sacred Christian xii • ANIMALS AND CHRISTIANITY texts and interpret the Christian experience. Roughly speaking, this involves yiewing the animals, the flowers and the other objects of creation, as having independent value—^value in their own right, apart from human needs and interests. On this reading, therefore, any ex- clusively ‘humanistic’ ethic must fall short of prescribing the kind of life to which Christians are called and in which they are to find (and live) the Truth. A ‘greater ethic,’ one that is at once more demanding and encompassing, one that speaks directly to those ‘inconsiderate forms of domination’ of which the Pope reminds us that we are capable, must be found. Whatever the letter of its principles, the renunciation of all forms of humanism captures its spirit. The resolution of that paradox noted earlier, therefore—the paradox of passionate Christian concern for animals at an earlier time, on the one hand, and, on the other, the more recent triumph of Christian indifference regarding the ill-treatment of these creatures—the reso- lution of this paradox most likely is to be found inside our Christian traditions, not outside them. In the days of Cardinal Manning, the Archbishop of York, Lord Shaftesbury and the other Christians who in the nineteenth century demanded justice even for the animals, we see discernible hints of a more encompassing ethic, one that would have us protect the interests and integrity of nonhuman animals; and it would have us do this in the name of Christian duty, independently of our measuring how human needs and interests will be affected. In the years since, by contrast, we witness the increasing dominance of a second strand of Christian thought, the one that fixes the value and integrity of nonhuman creation, animals included, by asking what ad- vances our species or our individual needs and interests. Arguably, in short, those pioneering Christians of the nineteenth century, as well as those others, like Primatt, who pre-dated them, glimpsed ‘the great ethic’ Hugo imagined, while their successors for the most part have seen things differently, which is why they have acted differently. Not for them the cause of ‘animal rights,’ whether in the pulpit or in the streets. Which one of these interpretations of the Christian ethic, if either, is closest to the truth cannot be settled in this Introduction. Which, if either, is to be preferred, one might say, is the central question to be answered after, not before the selections collected here have been read. What is clear, and what can be asserted confidently even in advance of coming to terms with the central question, is that to read these selections is to be reminded again and again that there are al-