CHAN LAU KIT-CHING ANGLO- CHINESE DIPLOMACY 1906-1920 in the careers Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-kai HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS ANGLO-CHINESE DIPLOMACY in the careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-k’ai 1906-1920 CHAN LAU KIT-CHING HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS 1978 © Hong Kong University Press, 1978 ISBN 962-209-010-9 Printed in Hong Kong by LIBRA PRESS LTD. 56 Wong Chuk Hang Road 5Z), Aberdeen CONTENTS Preface - - - - - - - - vii Abbreviations - - - - - - ix I. British policy towards China and Jordan’s career BEFORE 1906 - - - - - - - I II. Jordan, Yuan and Chinese politics, 1906-1911 - 10 III. The 1911 Revolution _ _ _ _ _ 30 IV. Yuan’s presidency, 1912-1915 - - - - 55 V. The Monarchical Movement - - - - 76 Postscript _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 101 Notes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I08 Select Bibliography _ _ _ _ _ 144 Glossary of Names - - - - - - 157 Index - - - - - - - 161 PREFACE Y uan Shih-k’ai (1859-1916) has inspired much historical discussion, writing, and scholarship. One recurrent theme is that he was respected, admired, and even fervently supported by the foreigners in China. In short, from the turn of the century Yuan was regarded as the strong man to whom foreign missionaries, as in the Boxer Uprising, looked for protection, and on whom foreign merchants and governments depended for the peace and stability which they recognized as vital for their economic prosperity in China. Chinese Communist and Nationalist historians have denounced this foreign attitude to Yiian. They see it as a major contribution to his political influence, which brought about the decade of warlordism following his death and China’s ensuing political tumults. To the Communist writers the harm was only undone in 1949 when the Communists took over control in China. The Nationalists, on the other hand, still feel themselves experiencing bitter consequences of Yuan’s influence. Impartial historians have generally agreed on the crucial importance of foreign backing in Yuan’s political career. This book attempts to explain this aspect of Yuan Shih-k’ai’s political power by analysing the relationship between him and Sir John Newell Jordan, British minister at Peking from 1906 to 1920. To say that Jordan was an important foreigner, when he was representing a nation which at least until Yuan’s death was still regarded as the most influential power in China, is an understatement. The interaction between Jordan and Yuan mirrors not only Anglo-Chinese relations but also international diplomacy in China during this fascinating period. That this study should in the main be undertaken from the point of view of Jordan, is largely determined by the available source materials. Jordan’s opinions, attitudes and emotions emerge clearly from his telegrams and dispatches to the Foreign Office and to the consular staff in China, and from his private correspondence. The same, however, are not available for Yiian. Accessible materials attributed to him are mostly official statements and public announcements which are no guarantee, to say the least, of genuine feelings and intentions. The story begins in the year 1906 when Jordan arrived in China as British minister, and Yiian Shih-k’ai was governor-general of Chilhi, the viii Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy igo6-ig20 capital province of China. The first chapter deals with the period from 1906 to the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution, when Jordan’s views on Chinese politics in general and Yuan Shih-k’ai in particular were formed. The second chapter concentrates on Jordan’s strenuous efforts after the 1911 Revolution to have Yuan Shih-k’ai accepted as the de facto ruler within the framework of continued Manchu sovereignty. Jordan failed. The retention of the Manchu dynasty, in whatever reduced or humiliated form, was anathema to the revolutionaries and their collaborators whose control grew rapidly with the outbreak of the revolution. Chapter three is concerned with the years 1912-1915, undoubtedly Jordan’s most rewarding time as British representative in China. The last chapter, in contrast, follows Jordan’s anxiety as he watched the progress of Yuan’s monarchical movement, which ended in tragic failure and with Yuan’s death in June 1916. In 1920, however, Jordan did not leave China in despair. He had recovered from the events of 1916 and, despite the divided state of China at the time of his departure, his goodwill towards the Chinese continued. For instance, even in his retirement as a member of the British delegation sent to the Washington Conference, he was devoting himself to what he regarded as a good cause for China—as he had done in supporting Yuan Shih-k’ai as the most dependable man to safeguard the interests of both China and Britain. I dedicate this book, unworthy though it is, to Professor W. G. Beasley, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Dr I. H. Nish, London School of Economics and Political Science, who have been sources of strength, support, and inspiration in my academic life, and to whom I am deeply grateful. Dr Peter Lowe of the University of Manchester has patiently read through the manuscript and given much good advice. Thanks are also due to Miss Natalie Graham for her diligent editing of the manuscript. K.C.L.C. ABBREVIATIONS CCST : Shen Yiin-lung (ed.) xfcjtti, Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts’ung-k’an N T 13j£L14M:M [Collection of materials relating to modern Chinese history], Taipei, 1966-. Cheng-chih shih : Li Chien-nung $ ffi, Chung-kuo chin pai nien cheng-chih shih 41 44 jfi 1? if-ik in iii [Political history of China in the past century], 2 vols., Taiwan, 1957. CHST : Wu Hsiang-hsiang (ed.) 'Tt filiffl, Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih-liao ts’ung-shu [Collection of materials relating to contemporary Chinese history], Taipei, 1962- . CUT : Wu Hsiang-hsiang (ed.), Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts’ung-k’an [Collection on Chinese contemporary history], 6 vols., Taipei, 1960-64. HHKM : Ch’ai Te-keng xitc tii[ii etc. (ed.), Hsin-hai ke-ming V 4C VA [The 1911 Revolution], 8 vols., Shanghai, NGB : Japanese Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaiko bunsho 0 ^ [Documents relating to Japan’s foreign relations]. Treaties : J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and agreements with and concerning China, 2 vols., New York, 1921. YSH : Shen Yiin-lung (ed.), Yuan Shih-k’ai shih-liao hui- k’an [Collection of materials relating to Yuan Shih-k’ai], 17 titles, Taipei, 1966. CHAPTER I BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND JORDAN’S CAREER BEFORE 1906 From the Opium War until the early twentieth century Britain’s policy in China aimed at maximum economic benefit with minimum political involvement. However, on many occasions either her economic activities were endangered, or Britain was unwilling to undertake greater political involvement in order to protect her interests. There were times when troubles were caused by China, but they often resulted from inter­ national rivalry to control and influence her. Whatever the situation, Britain always took the same cautious con­ sideration. Thus, after much indecision, Britain actively intervened on the side of the Manchus towards the end of the T’ai-p’ing Rebellion, 1850-1864, at the same time trying to minimize the scale of intervention. This intervention is attributed by J. S. Gregory to ‘a simple issue of commercial advantage’. By 1862 it had become obvious that only direct foreign involvement could ensure ‘a Manchu victory’ which was impor­ tant to Britain ‘in defence of the treaty rights she had exacted from the Manchu government since 1842 and of the trading interests which had developed and, it was believed, would develop under their sanction’.1 For the rest of the nineteenth century Britain’s aim in China was thwarted many times by the so-called ‘missionary problem’. Anti­ Christian and anti-missionary violence incited by Chinese xenophobia threatened the British economic position on both immediate and long­ term levels. Such disturbances disrupted trade. The Boxer Uprising would have done so on a large scale had it not been for the protective policy towards foreigners, adopted by high Chinese officials in the central and southern provinces where British interests were most deeply entrenched. There was, however, a more far-reaching repercussion of the missionary question. In pressing for compensation after anti­ missionary incidents generally instigated by anti-dynastic elements, Britain was undermining the prestige of the Manchus who had in the first place conceded her privileged claims in China. The British government’s reaction to this dilemma was ambivalent: while it refused the Manchu request to curb missionary activities for fear of influential opposition from the churches, on the other hand it did 2 Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy igo6-ig20 discourage further missionary work in China. Most British missionaries saw their government’s ambiguous attitude as an important cause of the growth of Chinese anti-Christian hostility.2 The problems mentioned so far were essentially situations arising in China. One has also to consider international rivalry, which challenged Britain’s privileges and threatened her chance of expansion in China. Foreign encroachment and competition increased towards the end of the nineteenth century with the growing weakness of Ch’ing China. The climax came in 1897-1898 with the so-called ‘scramble for concessions’, when Germany controlled Shantung province, with exclusive mining and railway rights; France dominated south and southwest China around Kwangchow Bay; Russia was in the northeast, centering on Dairen and Port Arthur; and Japan in Fukien. Britain’s response to these territorial claims followed her traditional China policy. To safeguard her interests in central China, she demanded from the Chinese government the non-alienation of the Yangtze region. To avoid over-committment herself, however, Britain did not go so far as to seek conversion of the Yangtze area into her specific sphere of influence.3 With the dawning of the new century, Britain’s position in China was still plagued by the same problems—a feeble Manchu government, Chinese anti-foreignism, and international rivalry—but with greater intensity and new forms of expression. The previous century had witnessed many serious anti-Manchu uprisings, but on the whole they lacked continuity. This was no longer true in the twentieth century. The Tung-meng hui, founded in 1905, organized a series of rebellions, culminating with the 19 n Revolution which ended the Ch’ing dynasty. No less detrimental to Manchu interests, and occuring almost simultaneously, was the constitutional movement. Ironically, this movement was initiated by the Manchus, who had been forced by their dismal defeat in the Boxer Uprising to admit that reforms were necessary to save the dynasty and the country. The country, however, became dissatisfied with the government’s meagre innovations and clamoured for a more extended division of power which of course gradually diluted the absolute rule of the Manchus. The anti-foreign sentiment of early twentieth century Chinese was no longer motivated by xenophobia which resulted in the blind killing of foreigners. The seeds of modern Chinese nationalism were sown, and took the form of boycotts and demonstrations against the powers’ imperialist ambition in China, and rebellions against the Manchu government for failing to protect China’s rights. British policy towards China and Jordan’s career before igo6 3 Among concessions from China, railway rights were the most sought after by Britain. Contrary to the belief of many British traders that China would be a great market for their manufactured goods, China’s import trade until the end of the nineteenth century had remained discourag­ ingly small. However, British merchants discovered that investments in mining, shipping, banking, and especially railway construction, were extremely lucrative. In 1898 the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation associated with Jardine, Matheson and Company to form the British and Chinese Corporation for railway building in China.4 With the support of the Foreign Office, the new corporation and other British firms obtained a fair number of railway rights from the Chinese during the scramble for concessions in 1898. It is not an exaggeration to say that railways formed an integral part of Sino-British relations from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, replacing missionaries as a cause of conflict between the two countries. In fact, the so-called ‘rights recovery movement’ in China reached such intensity at the turn of the century that it made a deep impression on Sir Ernest Satow, the British minister at Peking. Shortly before he left his post early in the summer of 1906, he submitted a memorandum advising the Foreign Office to abandon the old policy of extorting railway rights from China and, if possible, refrain from implementing those agreements already obtained. Sir Edward Grey, secretary for foreign affairs since the end of 1905, seemed well-disposed towards Satow’s advice and was prepared ‘to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, meeting the Chinese half-way, as long as they showed a dis­ position to do the same’.5 International rivalry for assets in China continued in the twentieth century. The previous pattern of scrambling among the powers was replaced by co-operation to exert joint pressure on China for investment opportunities. An international consortium for obtaining railway rights was founded in 1910, which consisted of American, British, French, and German financial interests. The consortium quickly expanded, diver­ sifying into other forms of investment, and in 1912 it included Russian and Japanese participation, though not without unwillingness from some of the original members. During 1912-1914 China shared the uneasy calm before the storm of World War I. The war in Europe also upset the balance of power in East Asia. As one by one the powers became involved with the war, Japan was left with a free hand to achieve her long-cherished ambition in China. Before the war, Britain had been the most influential power in