L C S P . ES AHIERS EUROPEENS DE CIENCES O > N° 04/2012 The political life of prediction The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era > Jenny Andersson > Eglė Rindzevičiūtė Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. n° 04/2012 December 2012 JENNY ANDERSSON EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ The political life of prediction The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era Jenny Andersson is CNRS researcher at CEE, Sciences Po. She is the author of several studies on the transformation of social democracy (Between Growth and Security. Swedish Social Democracy from a Strong Society to a Third Way, Manchester University Press, 2006, The Library and the Workshop. Social Democracy and Capitalism in an Age of Knowledge, Stanford University Press, 2010) and a number of articles on the history of prediction and futures studies, most recently “The great future debate and the struggle for the world”, in American Historical Review, vol.117, nr 5 December 2012, p. 1411-1431. Contact: [email protected] Eglė Rindzevičiūtė received her PhD in Culture Studies from Linköping University, Sweden in 2008 and is currently a Researcher at CEE, Sciences Po within the ERC-funded research project FUTUREPOL. She is the author of Constructing Soviet Cultural Policy: Cybernetics and Governance in Lithuania after World War II (2008) and many peer reviewed articles and book chapters about the history of contemporary governance in Europe. Contact: [email protected] Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 2 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era The political life of prediction The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era Abstract This working paper explores the role of the future as a space of scientific exchange and dialogue in the Cold War period. We argue that in East and West the governance of the future were understood as both intellectual and technical problem that, importantly, challenged existing notions of the nature of liberal democratic and communist political regimes. Casting the future as a governable sphere led to the development of new forms of scientific governance which sought explicitly to depoliticize the future and turn it into a new transnational domain of technocratic politics. The paper focuses on the parallels and exchanges among American and Soviet futurologists. East-West collaboration was essential to the invention of the future as a governable technoscientific space, situated beyond political dispute. Citation : Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė (2012), “The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era”, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po, n°04. Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 3 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era Introduction Problems to do with prediction, futurity and anticipation are rapidly coming to the forefront of social science in a range of different disciplines, for instance in political sociology and social studies of science and technology (STS) and anthropology (Brown and Michael 2003, Adam 2005, Mallard and Lakoff 2010). To this we can add a number of key works in the history of science (Rosental 2003, Dahan Dalmedico 2007, Hartmann and Vogel 2010).This emerging interest in the history of prediction has been underpinned by a growing focus on the circulation of ideas (Kott 2008, Connelly 2009) and on the transnational as a particular site of production of knowledge and policy (Guilhot 2008). However, the emergence of forecasting, futurology, or futures studies, activities that shared their interest in predicting or scientifically enacting long term changes, on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the 1960s and 1970s, are hitherto little studied. Holding that these developments have ever so much to say about the interplay between new manifestations of scientific production and constellations of political power in this period (see Andersson 2012), this paper pinpoints predictive knowledge and technologies and their role in shaping a particular scientific approach to policy making in the period from the 1960s on. A particular focus is on the role of prediction as a new form of transnational science in this period and the idea of the future as a particular space of neutral or apolitical governance. We focus on forecasting, a particular type of predictive knowledge, a transnational field that developed in and through a range of contacts between scientists, experts and policy makers in the transnational arena. In addition, not only did such expert activity take place beyond the boundaries of the nation state, but forecasting also emerged as a particular form of expertise that was specifically about world order and the global. We explore the ways in which forecasting was developed to intervene into world order, particularly East West relations, and the way that it aimed to structure a common field of intervention for scientists and policy makers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As shown in recent Cold War studies, East-West collaboration was indeed constitutive for the creation of specific scientific expert knowledge practices (Sarasmo and Miklossy 2011). Framed as rational (although both sides understood rationality in clearly ideological and political terms) and as a neutral space of possible interaction, forecasting was in fact an instrument that facilitated emerging structures of global governance, as we show in the case of the IIASA. Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 4 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era From the late 1960s and early 1970s forecasting systematically articulated an idea of common futures, of future challenges that would impact countries, populations and natural environments around the globe. The idea of common long-term problems for all Mankind was used as a device to establish connections between the opposing political regimes in East and West. Such projections of world futures as global, i.e. originating in common challenges that could not be coped with on the national level of governance, were to a large extent dependent on key breakthroughs in science and technology as well as the organisation of technoscientific production from the 1960s on. Here the key breakthroughs were the rise of computer modelling that allowed for simulation of the future states and interdependences of increasingly complex system, as well as the emerging global networks of scientists. It is therefore very interesting to explore the way in which forecasts postulated that some future issues were global and suggested that these issues had to be governed on a transnational level. Since the global was ridden by ideological and military confrontation between capitalism and communism, the new “policy sciences” (see OECD 1964) were invented as a possible politically neutral ground for managing global futures. Within this realm, potentially divisive issues not only within but also between countries could be addressed. Cold War technoscience developed not only as a kind of diplomatic language of expertise, used by both the governments and private foundations, as suggested by a previous historic orientation around diplomatic and cultural history (Ninkovich 1981, Dittman 2001, Yale 2003, Riska Campbell 2011), but as a quintessentially political form of depoliticizing of control and constructions of world order by placing them in the field of science (see a similar argument made by Clemens 1990). In line with recent studies of scientific transfers in East West relations, we suggest that Cold War struggle for super power supremacy assumed particular forms that involved defining global issues and tackling them through collaboration in spheres that were constructed as non-ideological (Rindzeviciute 2010). Forecasting, being a form of technical expertise for resolving highly strategic issues of control, planning, security and military interests on both sides, was particularly indicative of this. Forecasting relied on cybernetics and systems analysis: theoretical frameworks that incorporated prediction as an essential component of governance and control and emerged in the 1940s.In the field of forecasting, there was mutual interest from American and Soviet scientists to follow the methodological advances of the other, and governments shared this interest in an area understood at the time as strategic not least because of the nuclear threat. Such interactions, ranging from espionage and monitoring to translation of texts and even direct collaborations, were in place in the period from the mid-1960s on, and they set the scene for collaboration at a later stage Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 5 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era of Cold War relations when more direct forms of interaction at co-organised conferences, publications and even institutions were developed. We suggest that this shift in the content and use of prediction, from a tool of war (radar tracking, arms race), competition (market research) and rivalry (technological innovation), to ideas of common challenges was made possible through re-invention of technoscientific governance. The history of this new type of governance was tightly connected to the development of systems analysis. The idea of East-West institute, which was to become the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, established by the US and Soviet governments in Laxenburg, Austria in 1972), was initiated by John F. Kennedy’s and Lyndon B. Johnson’s governments in the mid-1960s. A sustained East-West collaboration at IIASA was envisioned as a platform to forge a new mode of interaction between authoritarian and liberal democratic regimes. While part of our paper focuses on the role of IIASA, our intention is to write neither an institutional nor diplomatic history of prediction. Instead we will lay out the simultaneous construction of new scientific knowledge (forecasting and systems analysis), a new political world order (where non-state actors take an increasingly important role) and a new type of governance (which relies on scientific expertise that transcends national boundaries). In our view, this pushes the analysis of prediction from the genealogies of scientific production as such, to an analysis of the way that both the construction and use of prediction is a matter of power and political play, particularly in the East West relations that we study. This paper consists of three sections: first, we discuss the emergence of a global field of prediction, and the actors and networks that structure it in the long period of the Cold War on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Second, we lay out the idea of common future challenges which emerged in the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, and third, we focus on the creation of the IIASA as an embodiment of these ideas of a neutral space of scientific governance. The emergence of a global field of prediction: from war games to the post-industrial society The interest in various forms of prediction – forecasting, scenario methods, technology assessment, systems theory, cybernetics, futurology or futures studies – boomed in the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s with a surge in reports emanating from scientists associated with a number of institutions such as the American RAND corporation, the OECD, and eventually, the IIASA. From the mid-1960s, following the publication of a Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 6 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era number of reports aimed at a high level of policy planning, such as the 1964 Delphi study at RAND (Helmer and Gordon 1964). Eric Jantsch’ OECD paper on technological forecasting (Jantsch and OECD 1967), or the OECD report on science policy in 1964, forecasting emerged as what might really be described as a new gospel. Pervasive spread of forecasting in many diverse disciplines and sectors could be compared with scientific management and rationalization discourse that came to dominate the interplay between social science and policy in the interwar period. The promise of this new gospel was to provide new analytical tools for understanding “complex societies” or societies that were perceived, in the mid- to late 1960s, as moving rapidly and confusingly from stable forms of industrial capitalism to much more chaotic and unforeseeable post-industrial structures, where the role of politics as the central organising mechanism was reduced. Post-industrial societies, wrote the sociologist and forecaster Daniel Bell in his 1973 book, A Venture in Social Forecasting, which by then recapitulated thoughts that Bell had first advanced in the networks of forecasters in the mid-1960s , were societies of complexity, that could not be coordinated by existing forms of planning, but required an extension of the horizon both in time and complexity. Post-industrial societies, societies in which information flowed freely, required forecasting, in Bell’s interpretation a form of decision theory which could lay out the multitude of potential futures facing decision- makers (Bell 1973). It can be suggested that the breeding ground for the forecasting was the idea of complexity and uncertainty, the dismissal of linear or evolutionary accounts of growth or progress, and the idea of social development as potentially chaotic. Linear forms of planning were not sufficient in complex systems; hence new forms of anticipation, encompassing ever more factors and ever longer stretches of time, had to be developed. It is important to note that such complexity was perceived as being beyond traditional class-based political ideology – which had in any case by now been dismissed as dead. Forecasting was, like its intellectual sibling systems analysis , often perceived as a quintessentially technocratic activity: at the early stage, forecasts were geared to the producing of closed futures, i.e. reducing complexity and outlining singular paths of development (see Armatte 2007). For instance, as Schmidt Gernig has suggested, a key purpose of forecasting was the creation of new forms of expertise of “policy science”, in other words, ways of scientificising policy making (Schmidt Gernig 2003). This effort was well reflected in the design of the Delphi study, produced by Olaf Helmer and Theodore Gordon at Rand in 1964, which was presented as a crucial step in a new scientific approach to policy issues, and this idea of Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 7 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era delineating, in a scientific, systematic and rational way, the options available for decision making, was a central impetus of the new science (Helmer and Gordon 1964). By its own advocates, forecasting was indeed understood as a new science, which offered the promise of accurate prediction. RAND forecaster Olaf Helmer optimistically argued in a range of papers and articles that forecasting made prediction possible, since science could now, with the help of new analytical tools of computers, amass the totality of available information about ongoing developments. Debates on forecasting were conducted in technocratic terms, meaning that they approached social and political problems as issues of management. In this vein, production of the knowledge about the future was understood as a “social technology” aimed at perfecting human society by forging individual and social choices to better future use. “Selecting among the array of possible futures” was a matter of “great social responsibility” for a new generation of scientists, most of them mathematicians or astrophysicists (Helmer 1964). The rise of forecasting in the 1960s was linked to several key developments in science going back into the first decade after the war. Already in the 1950s scientists wrote about on-going “cybernation” or a spread of cybernetic sciences as a new universal and transdisciplinary approach (George 1959, Dechert 1966). The influence of cybernetics to great many disciplines has been outlined by, for instance, Celine Lafontaine (2004) who analysed cybernetisation of linguistic structuralism and post-structuralism. In turn, Jon Agar (2003), Slava Gerovitch (2002), Paul N. Edwards (1996) and Philip Mirowski (2002) suggested that origins of “cyborg science”, in other words the computer-driven (both technologically and metaphorically) shift in mathematics and economics towards game theory and rational choice theory can be found in the experiments in prediction that stemmed from attempts during the Second World War with cybernetic modelling of airstrikes. Forecasting was directly related to both the methods and broader mentality of governance as shaped by the cybernetic approach. The father of cybernetics, the American mathematician Norbert Wiener, was rather strongly against using statistical time series to predict other than strictly technical phenomena, e.g. economic or social developments. He held this kind of prediction as being technically flawed, because one could never have the complete data about the initial state of the system in question, be it a population or society (Wiener 1965: 25). However, many other scientists were much more optimistic about the breadth of the uses of prediction. In addition to cybernetic theory of control via information loops, rationalist approaches such as the development of game theory and simulation following the book by John von Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 8 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern set an influential paradigm in thinking about rationality of political behaviour (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Amadae 2003). Drawing on rules of formal logic, game theory claimed to predict at least several possible moves of the opponent. The possibility of prediction offered by “gaming” was based on the presumption of the rational behaviour of actors, but also on the condition that the actors shared the knowledge about the rules. Game theory was used in a wide variety of approaches to prediction from the 1960s on, maybe most importantly in nuclear strategy and military war games as they were developed particularly at the American RAND Corporation from the early 1960s, but also in the USSR (Kaplan 1991, Connelly et al 2012, Moiseev 1993/2002). It became a central impetus on international relations, where the new scientific methods of prediction were instrumental to the creation of a new field organized around the study of a multitude of different actors whose moves were made predictable based on the presumption of rational material interests of nations (Guilhot 2008). Despite its self-representation, forecasting was not a neutral activity: it was permeated with political ambitions to increased control. It could be argued that forecasting developed, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, with an eye to both domestic and international struggles over direction and future. In the West, forecasting spread from its origins in military planning, nuclear strategy and war games to cover a range of different activities, including industrial developments and technological forecasting or so called technology assessment, particularly around military technologies and information systems. Forms of social forecasting became prominent particularly from the mid-1960s, drawing on Lazarsfeld’s and Parsons’ work in applied sociology, tracking patterns of social behaviour, preference formation, electoral shifts (Bell 1973). In the Soviet Union, forecasting of social development was included in the agenda of the Institute for Concrete Social Research at the Soviet Academy of Sciences (est. 1968), theoretical and methodological issues of social forecasting were discussed in the numerous seminars organised by the Soviet Association for Scientific Prognosis (1969-1971) (see also Firsov 2012). In political science, behaviourism and decision theory was at the heart of a range of new approaches. Forecasting was thus not just a particular activity of science, but also allowed for key shifts within the (social) sciences at large – moving them closer to policy and claiming an influence on decision making. In fact the claim to prediction was at the heart of the post war generation of social science, turned to application, use, and decision – and arguably, it was central in new configurations between science and policy East and West. As we will show, the question of collaboration and bridge-building is crucial, but in the first half of the 1960s, forecasting was dominated by security concerns of the blocs and the Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 9 Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė – The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era question of rivalry and domination of world order. On the American side, forecasters ranging from the nuclear strategists at RAND to the more dovish sociologists, lawyers or economists – Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Stephen Graubard, Eugene Rostow – were part of a security political nexus linking the State Department, the Council for Foreign Relations, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (and through the latter the CIA) and the Ford Foundation. This network of actors joined by anticommunism and scientific positivism played a key role in structuring an international field of prediction. From 1960, the Ford Foundation, under the leadership of first Shepard Stone (previous high commissioner for occupied Germany), then McGeorge Bundy (previous national security advisor to Johnson on East West relations, NATO and nuclear strategy), targeted the area of forecasting as one of particular importance for the social sciences. The Ford Foundation had been instrumental in exporting management studies as part of the new post war social sciences to Western and Eastern Europe since the early 1960s, meanwhile Bundy was, according to Gemelli, a strategic mediator in the establishment of IIASA (Gemelli 1998, 2001:197). Forecasting was the next step in this programme, in which management techniques were now to be applied to politics in the domestic as well as the international field. From the point of view of these American actors, forecasting was a form of modernization theory (Gilman 2003). The “modernization theorists”(Shils, Yale Law School Dean Gene Rostow and his brother Walt, Kenneth Arrow, Karl Deutsch, John Neumann, Oscar Morgenstern) were keenly interested in forecasting, which seemed to offer possibilities for prediction of nuclear strategy and events in international relations, but also in preference shaping and value systems of Western masses, potentially disturbing aspects such as non- conformist social behaviour (for instance, the so-called Commission for the Year 2000 chaired by Bell was highly concerned with the emerging protests against the Vietnam war and the problem of the hippie generation). Forecasters were thus part of a network which was organized around the belief in the foreseeability of tensions between the two different world systems as well as within the world system as a whole (Andersson 2012 and Andersson ongoing). The development of forecasting in the West was thus strongly influenced by the shifting foreign policies and the American interest in the re-creation of Europe in general. Numerous power struggles, both political and institutional ones, marked the creation of this new domain of knowledge, and it would appear that the perceived need to control potentially volatile and unforeseeable developments domestically and in the international arena went hand in hand, despite the way that previous research has usually targeted the idea of nuclear control. In this context the development of forecasting as a device of technoscientific Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 10