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Order today for more FREE book options The Independent Review is now available digitally on mobile devices and tablets via the Apple/Android App Stores and Magzter. Subscriptions and single issues start at $2.99. Learn More. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, 100 SWAN WAY, OAKLAND, CA 94621 • 1 (800) 927-8733 • [email protected] Anarchy, Sovereignty, and the State of Exception Schmitt’s Challenge F MICHAEL MCCONKEY “S overeignishewhodecidesontheexception.”Sobeginsaniconicwork byCarlSchmitt(2005),oneofthetwentiethcentury’smostcontrover- sial scholars. Schmitt, arguably also one of that century’s greatest legal theorists,posesaseriouschallengetoanarchisttheorythat,sofarasIcandetermine, hasneverbeenexplicitlyconfrontedfromwithintheanarchisttradition.Itistruethat Schmitt had liberalism in mind when he made his challenge, and anarchists would concur withpartsofhischallengeastheyrelatetoliberalisminparticular.Neverthe- less, even if he were not addressing himself to anarchists, his core challenge on the questionofsovereigntyisonethatanarchisttheorycannotdisregard.Schmittpushes us to confront the hardest case in what many would consider anarchy’s soft under- belly. In the face of the direst threat, such as a potential extinction event, would not the coordinating and coercive power of the state, with its capacity to make a univer- sally enforceable decision, be the best means of overcoming the threat? Given the gravity of such a scenario and the Schmittian solution’s necessity for central state intervention, it behooves anarchists to meet his challenge. Failure in this regard wouldleaveanarchismexposedasinadequateinthemomentofgreatesthumanneed. Iarguehere,however,thatstatistsolutionsaresubjecttoaparadoxthatsubvertstheir apparent advantages. Even in the direst circumstances, voluntary association still trumpscoercion. MichaelMcConkeyisafreelancescholarandeducatorwhodivideshistimebetweenVancouver,Canada, andHuaHin,Thailand. TheIndependentReview,v.17,n.3,Winter2013,ISSN1086–1653,Copyright©2013,pp.415–428. 415 416 F MICHAEL MCCONKEY TherevivalofSchmittianscholarshipinrecenttimeshasincludedanalltoocom- mon tendency to dismiss his critiques as a function of his practical politics. He was a relentless critic (some might say intellectual saboteur) of the Weimar Republic and apparently an enthusiastic embracer of National Socialism when it came to power. He thereafter seems to have engaged in intellectual dishonesty of Orwellian propor- tions inhis support of the Nazi regime. The final word onhis collaboration,though, remainscontested.1Nevertheless,howeverdistastefulmaybethecharacterormotives involved, ad hominem argument remains only ad hominem argument. If Schmitt’s claims are not true or their import is not what he alleges, we must demonstrate that theyaresoonintellectualgrounds,notbyresorttobiographicdemonology. HereIexploreSchmitt’sdevelopmentofthenatureandrelevanceofthestateof exception—exceptiontothelegalnormsandroutinelaw—inordertoisolatethecore challenge that he poses to anarchist theory. The key concept to grasp is his notion of sovereignty. As we unpack the historical ground of his concept of sovereignty, though,theshortcomingsofhispurviewwillbecomeevident.Hispartialstorylends itselftohisvalorizationofsovereigntyasthesolutiontothestateofexception,which is ultimately an inevitable political fact. That very partiality, however, misleads him into underappreciating the larger consequences of that same history. Where Schmitt sees only a liberalism defeated by the gruesome realities of the French Revolution, a wider purview reveals not a defeat, but a renewed radicalism of liberty’s longer revolution. In liberalism’s comeuppance, anarchism was born. Failing to recognize this historical fact or to appreciate its theoretical relevance leaves Schmitt’s claim for sovereignty, as the inescapable solution to the state of exception, inadequately defended.ItisnecessaryfirsttounderstandthishistoricallacunainSchmitt’sanalysis ifhismoregeneralblindnesstothefree-marketalternativeistobeappreciated. Faced with the state of exception, the decentralized, spontaneous, emergent, adaptivesystemofthefree-marketlaboratoryofexperimentaltrialanderrorturnsout to be not merely an alternative, but the only viable option that is not susceptible to becoming a cover for advancing special interests—that is, the only option that does not actually derail genuine solution seeking. This system’s rewards for successful discoveryofwidelypreferredoptionsaloneprovidethemeansfor themostcommit- ted to pool their effort and resources toward finding the solution that the state of exception requires. And, indeed, this conclusion holds ever more strongly as the threat converges toward a truly existential one. Like Schmitt, those, such as the global- warming lobbyists, who presume that only the sovereign state has the integrity, disinterest, and social benevolence necessary to carry out this mission suffer from inadequateacquaintancewiththeanarchisttheoreticaltradition.Theythereforemust receivethesameverdictasheatthehandsofreason. 1. ForaparticularlyvigorousandharshverdictonSchmitt’sroleintheseaffairs,seeWolin1990.More nuancedtreatmentsoftheseeventsappearinBendersky1987and2007andGottfried1990. THEINDEPENDENTREVIEW ANARCHY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION F 417 Sovereignty and Schmitt’s Challenge The concept of sovereignty developed along a winding route through the thoughtof themedievalscholastics,but,buildingonMachiavelli’sinnovations,JeanBodinbegan to give the concept its peculiarly modern meaning. Schmitt picks up the story at this point.2InthehandsofBodinandlaterHobbes,incontrasttoearlierversionsinwhich something like sovereignty was always subject to natural law and obedience to god, the sovereign comes to be seen as above the law. A logical argument might be made alongtheselines.Afterall,howcanthesovereigngiveandenforcethelawtoeveryone else if he is himself a mere equal to his subjects? If he were, then any of his subjects wouldbethoughtequallycompetentandentitledtogiveandenforcethelaw. Only because thesovereignisabovethelaw can hebesovereign.After all,ifthe law has to be changed, it cannotbe changed from within because doing so would be breaking the law. Only someone above the law can change it. This principle of the sovereign’sstandingabovethelawwasimportantforSchmittandhiseventualarticula- tionofthestateofexceptionbecauseinhisviewthesovereignnotonlyhadtodecide how to respond to a state of emergency but also had to determine when such a state existsormustbeinvoked.Again,authoritysuperiortothenormallawisrequired. ThissuperiorpowerofthesovereignarrivedthroughatransitionoftheChristian conceptofthetwobodiesofChristintothesecularrealm,sothatonestartstospeakof thetwobodiesoftheking:theonethatcandieasanindividualmanandtheonethat lives on eternally, embodied in his heirs and rightful successors to the throne. Along withthisnotionofthetwobodies,theideaof“themysticalbody”wassmuggledinto the language of sovereignty (Kantorowicz 1981)—the notion that the subjects are somehoworganicallyjoinedintotheking’senduringbody.(He,ofcourse,isthebody’s head.) This conceptual leap would become important a little later in the modern developmentofsovereigntytheory.ItisprominentinSchmitt’sVolkvalorizationinhis “conceptofthepolitical”(Schmitt1996). ArguablyinBodin,butcertainlyinHobbes,animportantthemeofthelegitimi- zation of the sovereign is its role as an umbrella for liberty. Precisely because such sovereignauthoritycreatestheconditionsforeveryoneelsetoliveinliberty—decisively for Hobbes, because this authority provides security—it has legitimacy as a proper consequenceofthesocialcontract.3Theotherimportantdevelopmentforthishistory 2. SomemightarguethatchoosingthisbeginninggivesSchmitt’s“politicaltheology”aparticularcharac- ter that does not necessarily do justice to the larger picture of his analysis. Indeed, a more historically attentiveapproachmighthaveprovidedgreaterbenefitforhistheoreticalproject.Exploringthisdimension ofthequestionexceedstheboundsofthecurrentarticle,thoughitmaywellprovetobeavaluablepartof thelarger intellectualenterprise ofwhich thisarticleisapreliminaryeffort.Foratasteofwhat kindof considerationswouldinformthismorehistoricallyattentiveapproach,seeJouvenel1949andGray2007. 3. Thealternative,ofcourse,isHobbes’snotoriouswarofallagainstallinwhichlifeisnasty,brutish,and short.ItisstrangethatmanystilltakethisargumentatfacevalueeventhoughinHobbes’sowncentury SamuelvonPufendorfdemonstratedthecentralflawinHobbes’sfailuretoappreciatethecivilizingroleof tradeinservingmutuallycompatiblepreferences(Hont2005).Foranargumentthatarrivesatthesame VOLUME17,NUMBER3,WINTER2013 418 F MICHAEL MCCONKEY of sovereignty theory, combining the social contract for the common good and the glossed-over but always immanent mystical body, was Rousseau’s contribution, in which sovereignty comes to be embodied in all and only in all in the form of the GeneralWill.Intheguiseoftransferringsovereigntyfromthedictatorshipoftheking tothepeople,whatreallyevolvesisthedictatorshipofthecollectiveovertheindividual: anobservationdevelopedbybothJouvenel(1949)andMaritain(1951).Absolutismis not overcome, but transposed, so it makes perfect sense to shift discussion from the divine right of kings to the divine right of majorities. Both Bodin and Hobbes, although preferring kings, acknowledged that sovereignty could still be exercised in aristocraciesordemocracies.Rousseaumerelytookthemattheirword. Rousseau’stwistonsovereigntyhaditsdecisivehistoricalmomentintheFrench Revolution. Although Schmitt perhaps failed to analyze Rousseau’s contribution adequately,hecertainlypaidcloseattentiontotheFrenchRevolution.Alas,fromthe anarchist’s perspective, he learned the wrong lesson. It is true, of course, as Schmitt observed, that the French Revolution became the cauldron and template for liberal- ism’sstateofexceptionandtaughtavividlessoninliberaldemocracy’sdilemma.He criticizedliberalismandliberaldemocracyfor theirpredispositiontotalkrather than todecide.Whentherubberhittheroad,though,andeverythingwasontheline,only a decision would do: sovereignty was essential and inescapable. In Schmitt’s estima- tion, the liberals and democrats should have learned this lesson from the French Revolution.ThislandmarkcataclysmservedtovalidateSchmitt’sdecisionism. In anarchist theorists’ estimation, of course, a very different lesson from the FrenchRevolutionandforSchmittwasmanifest.4Before1789,thelibertymovement hadastrongelementthatsoughttousestatesovereigntytoachieveliberty.Through the seventeenth century and most of the eighteenth century, of course, some—for example, the Levellers, John Locke, the spontaneous order strain of the Scottish Enlightenment, and many involved in the independence movement of the thirteen colonies—tookamuchmorecautiousviewofsuchastrategy.Yetadistinctbranchof the cause hoped precisely to harness sovereignty to the liberty revolution. Especially inFranceinthedecadesleadinguptotheRevolution,thePhysiocratswerenotorious forthisstrategy;Turgot’sreformplatformasministeroffinanceunderLouisXVIwas thebestprospectforrealizingthishope,thoughitfinallycametonaught.Theliberal BurgundyCirclehadearlieraspiredtoeducatethedukeofBurgundy—eventuallyto benextinlinetothethroneofLouisXIV—inlaissez-faireprinciples,onlytohavehim dieofmeasles(Rothbard2006).Indeed,theinternalstoryoftheFrenchRevolution, rarelytoldinhighschooltextbooks,tellshowtheprojectofharnessingsovereigntyto conclusionsaboutthecivilizingroleoftrade,withoutPufendorf’saidbutbysimplyapplyingpraxeological reason,seeMcConkey2012b. 4. Murray Rothbard’s seminal essay “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty” (1965) has greatly influenced my understanding of the role of the French Revolution in the context of a longer libertyrevolution. THEINDEPENDENTREVIEW ANARCHY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION F 419 the liberty revolution morphed into the widespread delusion that capturing sover- eigntyitselfconstitutedfulfillmentofthatrevolution.5 Thehorrors intowhich theFrench Revolution descended putthis sovereignty- masteringdelusioninanentirelynewlight.Itisnocoincidencethatinmultipleplaces inthedecadesthatfollowedtherevolutionandNapoleon’sdefeatthefirstunambig- uously anarchist thinkers began to advance new conceptual models that no longer represented the ancien re´gime as the primary object of struggle, but rather the sovereign state itself—the effective tool of the parasite class, old and new. William Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Modern Morals and Manners (1793) is widely considered the first work of explicit anarchist theory. Under theFrenchRestoration,CharlesDunoyerandCharlesComtefirstarticulated anarchistclasstheory.SoonafterwardBelgiane´migre´toParisGustavdeMolinariwas the first to argue explicitly that every function of the state—even that perennial last holdout, defense and law enforcement—should be privately performed in the voluntarymarket.SimilardevelopmentswereevidentinGermanyinJuliusFaucher’s circle, in England in the work of Herbert Spencer and eventually Auberon Herbert, and then in the United States in the Boston circle around Benjamin Tucker and LysanderSpooner. Schmittwasnotoblivioustothepossibilityofanarchy.Onthecontrary,toward the end of Political Theology are several pages that pertain to what he calls atheistic anarchy(2005,55–57,66).Hisobjectofanalysisthere,however,isthecommunalist (what I would not consider it unfair to call “cryptostatist”) “anarchy” of Babeuf, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin.6 Because these writers are cryptostatists, though, Schmitt’s dismissal of their antistate posturing (wanting the political recti- tudeofstatepower withoutbeingwillingtoacceptitsdecisionistimplications)isnot entirely unfair. However, he does not consider the libertarian or free-market anar- chismofMolinari,Spencer,orSpooner.Thedecisionistcritiquecannotsticktotheir views as it can to communalist anarchy. This historical lacuna in Schmitt’s analysis suggeststhetheoreticalcul-de-sacthathisapproachevokeswhenconfrontedwiththe free-marketalternativetosovereignty. Challenging Anarchy’s State of Exception Without recognizing this dimension of the story, Schmitt’s evaluation of the French Revolution’s legacy and its implications for sovereignty theory are fatally flawed in 5. GaryKates’sarticle“FromLiberalismtoRadicalism:TomPaine’sRightsofMan”(1989),afascinating case study of thesematters, nicely illustrates the conceptual trajectoryfromliberty-through-sovereignty tosovereignty-as-libertyinThomasPaine’sthoughtbetweenthewritingofthetwopartsofTheRights ofMan.YetKateshimselftellsthestoryinarhetoricfullyimmersedintheassumptionsofthesovereignty- as-libertyposition. 6. How,afterall,canoneeffectivelyopposecapitalismandfreemarkets,asallofthesewritersdotoonedegree oranother,withouttheveryapplicationofrulershipthattheverytermanarchyetymologicallyexcludes? VOLUME17,NUMBER3,WINTER2013 420 F MICHAEL MCCONKEY regard to a consideration of the modern world’s prospects. The point here is not to resuscitate or valorize Schmitt’s political conclusions. None of that qualification, though, allows even market anarchy a free pass from Schmitt’s challenge: the state of exception as an extraordinary possibility cannot simply be wished away, however misconstrueditsrootsinSchmitt’shistoriography.AlthoughSchmitt’sfailuretoexplic- itly consider free-market anarchy does not provide the latter a free pass, this failure constitutes a fatal flaw in Schmitt’s confident dismissal of the French Revolution’s legacy. As correct as his decisionist critique may be for liberalism and communal anarchy, itcollapsesinthefaceoftheradicalalternative of free-marketanarchy.How- ever, to appreciate the quality and strength of this alternative, it is important not to be waylaid by the red herrings that can be mistakenly offered as answers to Schmitt. Hischallengeismoreresilientthanitmightseematfirst. Inthefree-marketanarchist(hereafter,simply“anarchist”or“anarchy”)paradise, everyone goes about his own business, engaging in exchanges with others that allow himtosatisfybesthisownsubjectivepreferences.Thereisideallynoviolenceortheft. Yetifthereis,anarchisttheoryhasthiscontingencycovered,too,becausemanytheo- rists going back to Molinari have explored different methods by which systems of justice can work well or even better on the free market (e.g., see Friedman 1973 and Hoppe 2009). Schmitt’s exception, however, is an ontological hound. Whatever the anarchistsaysthathehaspreparedfor,thestateofexceptionsays,isnottheexception because,bydefinition,theexceptionisthethreatagainstwhichnoonehasplannedor canhaveplannedinadvance. Schmitt was concerned primarily with the dangers posed by war in its various forms. The anarchists may well reply that sovereignty itself is the main cause of war in all its various forms (Hoppe 2003). Again, however, this response amounts to skirting the challenge rather than confronting it. There are surely other kinds of exceptions for which anarchy—on the surface or in popular perception at least— would seemto benot nearly sowell equipped. Forexample, one hardly need accept the hysterics of the worst global-warming scare mongers to imagine a scenario in which widespread human practices, such as some kind of pollution, might possess both the qualities of mass terminal danger and observational inconclusiveness. Even if we posit the terminal danger as an objective given, the lack of observational conclusiveness might easily leave enough people unpersuaded of the objectively true danger that they would persist in the danger-generating activity. This scenario might indeed be the occasion for an unwitting creation of an extinction event for humanity. To deny this possibility categorically is to engage in Panglossian denial on an epic scale. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, I ask all professors Pangloss to suspend their disbelief in the human capacity for tragedy and grant the prospect that unintended and generally unknown consequences might in fact constitute such an existential threat for our species. If we grant this prospect, it surely is an exception for which many will insist that the strong power of the sovereign is THEINDEPENDENTREVIEW ANARCHY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION F 421 notonlyjustified,butnecessary.7Onlyapowerabovetheroutinelawcanactrapidly, decisively, thoroughly, and disinterestedly enough to avert such an extinction event. Even those fully cognizant of Julian Simon’s (1996) pioneering post-Malthusian insights into the market as the guarantor against nonrenewable resource exhaustion under normal conditions might harbor serious reservations about the validity of identifying markets as the optimum instrument of crisis resolution in the state of exception.Ifanysituationrequireseffacementofself-interestanddemandsuniversal self-sacrificeintheinterestofthecommongood,thestateofexceptionposedbythe existentialthreatofanapproachingextinctioneventwouldseemtobethatsituation. Indeed, in many people’s minds this situation may well be the limiting case for deontologicalanarchism:theoneinwhichanarchismdefinitivelyfailsthelitmustest. Ifthechoicetrulyisonebetweensacrificinglibertyandextinction,howcaninsisting on liberty be the morally superior choice? Surely some liberty has to be sacrificed so that not all liberty is lost. One hears this argument often enough, admittedly more among minarchists (not to mention disingenuous enemies of liberty), but pointedly directed at anarchists. If this case is not the defining one for the argument in favor of Schmittian sovereignty, what case possibly can be? If nothing else, this situation well represents Schmitt’s state of exception for anarchy. However, the sovereign exceptionalists must counter two major anarchist counterpunches before the anar- chistscanbeexpectedtograntanyberthonthisclaim. Sovereignty’s Nirvana Fallacy The two counterpunches are the critiques of the state—the modern embodiment of sovereignty—as bothtooincompetentandtoocorrupttorisetothechallenge.Ifthe offering of sovereignty as the solution to the exception rests only on the Nirvana fallacy—thecondemnation ofanythingthatfallsshortofafantasticallyperfectedcon- dition unencumbered by reality—it hardly constitutes the solution it purports to be. Even among the general public with no education in anarchist theory, stories of state bureaucracy’sinertiaandsmotheringredtapearelegendary;onecanhardlypickupany newspaper (assuming a remotely free press) in the world on any given day without findingatleastacoupleofarticlesdocumentingsuchself-inflictedincompetence. However, the framing of bureaucratic inefficiency often takes for granted both capacity and intentions that are unwarranted assumptions. Ludwig von Mises (1935) andFriedrichHayek(1945)describedinseminalworksthecalculationandknowledge 7. AlthoughinthisarticleIamusingthelongerandmoreconventionaltraditionofreadingSchmitt’sview of sovereignty as a justification for a strong central state, some Schmittians (neo-Schmittians?) have interpretedtheimplicationsofglobalizationascallingnotforcentralizedbutfordecentralizedstatepower. AsalientcaseinthisregardhasbeentheNorthernLeagueinItaly,whoseprogramhasbeentheoretically contextualizedbytheneo-SchmittianGianfrancoMiglio(1993,1994).However,smallerstates,ifinfact stillstates,remainassusceptibletothecaptureandfailureproblemsIdiscusshere.Theextentoftheharm maybelesswithsmallerstates,butthedynamicsoftheprocessremainunchanged. VOLUME17,NUMBER3,WINTER2013 422 F MICHAEL MCCONKEY problemsthatmakeeventhebest-intendedcentral-stateplanningimpossibleasrational undertakings. This situation is gloriously evident in the domain of state central plan- ningthatissupposedtobethemostrationalandscientific:regulation(Winston2006). Someiconicexamples ofregulatory failure, stretchingoverdecades, thatillustrate the calamity of such central planning include Hurricane Katrina, both preparation and response(Anderson2005);theincreaseincoal-generatedairpollutionasadirectresult ofscrubbertechnologymandates(AckermanandHassler1981);increasedelectrocution ratesasaresultofstrengthenedelectricianlicensingstandards(CarrollandGaston1981); and the unnecessary deaths of tens of millions of people, mostly in Africa, from the decades-oldDDTban(Seavey2002). As these examples illustrate, regulatory failure is not merely a lack of success in achieving the central planners’ stated aims; it also comprises perverse outcomes in diametrical opposition to stated aims: a phenomenon so common that it has taken on the name of the economist who theorized the effect, the “Peltzman Effect” (Peltzman 1975). This outcome is hardly surprising when one considers the wide- spreadprevalenceoftheBaptist-and-bootleggereffect,inwhichthebenefitingspecial interests in any regulatory initiative are already embedded in the process, however invisibletheymaybetogeneralpublicscrutinyowingtothedistractionsprovidedby the virtuous “Baptists” (Yandle 1983). No discussion of the standard calamity of regulatory“failure”wouldbecompletewithoutacknowledgingthedegreetowhich sovereign regulation by the state does not and never was intended to serve the ostensible public good but rather has been part of the collaborative pilfering by the rulers’ capitalist cronies (Kolko 1963). Indeed, in a real sense, what is called regulation is in fact antiregulation because it interferes with the actual processes of regulationbuiltintothemarket(McConkey2011). Thus,eventoassumestateactors’goodintentionsonehastowillfullyignorea long history of rent seeking, regulatory capture, discretionary bailouts , and general cronyism that is endemic to any rent-generating opportunity and that was well displayed in the creation of and response to the 2008 housing-finance crisis; the pharmaceuticalindustry’ssupportfor theU.S.health-carereformsunderbothBush andObama;andtheongoingtravestyofthemilitary-industrialcomplexthatdistorts thedomesticeconomyandforeignrelationsinscoresofcountries,obviouslyinclud- ingtheUnitedStatesofAmerica. Perhaps a benevolent, efficient, incorruptible, and omniscient dictatorship wouldcoerceeveryoneintocontributingtoanextinction-avoidanceprogram.How- ever, history and logic undermine confidence that any real-life dictatorship actually possessesanyoneofthesequalities,muchlessallfour.Moreover,anotherlevelofrisk alsobesetstheunleashingofthesovereigntowardoffimpendingextinction:because, asSchmittmakesclear,thesovereigndecidesnotonlythesolutionstrategy,butalso the need to implement such strategy—thus triggering the deployment of its excep- tional powers—abuse is all too likely, as history reveals again and again. The most dramaticcaseofthisoutcome,ofcourse,istheNazi’senablinglegislation,whichgave THEINDEPENDENTREVIEW ANARCHY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION F 423 dictatorial powers to a constitutionally elected party. The past few generations of Americans have become accustomed to this tendency in the president’s creeping exercise of executive privilege on matters such as congressionally unapproved war; and Canadians had a taste of Schmitt’s solution to the exception in 1970 with Trudeau’sprecipitate overreactiontoapairofkidnappingsbyimposition oftheWar MeasuresActanditsattendantsuspensionofcivilandnaturalrights.Whenthosewho takesupremepowerinthestateofexceptionalsodeterminewhethersuchanexcep- tionexists,theluresofcorruptionaresimplytootemptingtoresist.8 Hence,lapsingintotheNirvanafallacyinregardtothestate’sutilityandmoral- ityatthelast minutebeforehumanextinction wouldhardlyseemtobearational or efficacious strategy.Desperate times may call for desperate measures, but surely they donotcallforabsurddisregardofrealityandexperience.Theanarchists’rejectionof Schmitt’ssolutionishardlysurprising,yetsuchprincipledconsistencydoesnotactu- ally answer his challenge. If reliance on Schmittian sovereignty is not the proper response to such a critical exception, can we really expect that the anarchists’ endearingfaithinthemarketwillprovideasolution? Anarchy’s Solution Thetravailsofmarket failure,thetragedy ofthecommons, andthescrounge of free ridersarerehearsedoftenenoughthat,giventheextinctioncrisiseventhypothesized here,weshouldexpectmarketresponsespoweredbynarrow,short-termself-interest simplytopileonenegativeexternalityatopanotheraswefadeintoextinction.Noone is either charged or uniquely empowered to take the problem in hand and focus on finding a solution. Is this oft-repeated truism a realistic or probable outcome in the market? Let us assume a minority in the know. We may even assume it is a small minority.But, whatever its size,we arenow discussing thosewho firmlybelievethat the existing conditions are carrying us toward an extinction event. Recall, too, that we have agreed for the sake of argument that these people are objectively correct in their assessment. Consider the options available to this dispersed group, who are convinced that certain common human practices are carrying us toward extinction. Threeobviousapproachespresentthemselvesfor thisminority:coercion,education, andsolution. Coercionwouldbetheapproachofsovereignty,whichwehavealreadyruledout on grounds of disutility arising from corruption via rent seeking. On a smaller scale, no doubt, some people may resort to various actions, from civil disobedience to sabotageandeventerrorism.However,theminoritythatcarriesoutsuchactionswill be resisted and suppressed by the majority, which is both understandable and in several instances the correctstance onthepartof themajority insofaras thefree use 8. InaturnthatSchmittmightwellfindsympathetic,GiorgioAgamben(2005)arguesthatthroughout thetwentiethcentury,thestateofexceptionhasbecomeincreasinglytheruleratherthantheexception. VOLUME17,NUMBER3,WINTER2013