Anarchism and the Myth of the 1 Primitive: Godwin and Kropotkin Samuel Clark Anarchists are commonly assumed to hold deeply optimistic views about human nature, and to be nostalgic for ‘primitive’ (as opposed to ‘civilised’) societies. I shall argue here not only that these assumptions are false but also that it is worthwhile reveal- ing them as such, both as a means of recovering some interest- ing thought from misrepresentation, and because a more pre- cise account of primitivism is useful in other contexts. ‘Traditionally, anarchists are seen to possess an optimistic conception of human nature, an optimism essential to the success of their vision of a state- less society’ (Morland, 1997: vii). For example, according to James Joll ‘[t]he fundamental idea that man is by nature good and that it is institutions that corrupt him remains the basis of all anarchist thought’ (1979: 16). For Joll then, anarchists share the mental pathology of heretical Christians who demand and expect ‘a return to the Golden Age of the Garden of Eden before the Fall’ (Ibid.: 6). Similarily, Roger Scruton claims that ‘typical anar- chist beliefs’ include that ‘men are benign by nature and corrupted by gov- ernment’ (1983: 15). For Irving Horowitz ‘Anarchism has as its theoretical underpinning an idealization of natural man in contrast and in opposition to civilized man […] What is offered is a belief in “natural man” as more fun- damental and historically prior to “political man”’ (1964: 16). Finally, Norman Barry argues that ‘Communitarian [as opposed to libertarian] anar- chism depends upon an optimistic view of human nature as essentially benign and cooperative’ (1991: 5). These examples could easily be continued and all impute one or both of two claims to anarchists: that they believe, first, in a pure and good human nature which is distorted or masked by current cir- cumstances; second, in a long-lost golden age. In sections one and two below I set out these claims in more detail, and then show how in each case they do Page 6 Studies in Social and Political Thought Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive not apply to two representative anarchists, William Godwin and Peter Kropotkin. Claims that anarchists are primitivists have often been used to ground wider criticism of anarchist thought. Robert Dahl, for instance, offers as ‘a critique of anarchism’ the thought that ‘[w]hile some romantic anarchists may imag- ine our returning to the tiny autonomous groups of some preliterate soci- eties, short of a cataclysm that no sane person wants, a return to the infancy of the species looks to be impossible or, if not impossible, highly undesir- able’ (1989: 43; 46). Benjamin Barber attacks anarchists because ‘their view of actual men is wildly romanticized. Hunger, greed, ambition, avarice, the will to power, to glory, to honour, and to security which have played some role in all traditional ethnologies find no place in the anarchist portrait of man’ (1972: 18). Barber directs this attack specifically against twentieth-cen- tury American anarchists such as Abbie Hoffman, but is explicit that he believes the entire tradition from Godwin onwards to be implicated in this ‘wild’ romanticism. His evidence in fact consists of unsupported claims about the elitist psychology of individual anarchists and a few, out-of-context quotations. Similarly, the only support Horowitz can give for his characteri- sation (quoted above) comes from Denis Diderot, who, in Horowitz’s own words, ‘advocated a parliamentary monarchism in which representation would be elected by the propertied classes’ (1964; 65-6) and was therefore clearly not an anarchist. In the face of evidence this weak, it is tempting to dismiss the whole line of attack as a self-sustaining polemic. However, there are two forms of this criticism which require a more detailed response; I call them accusations of ‘primitivism’, for convenience and because each can be related to one of the various meanings of ‘primitive.’ ‘Primitive’ is a complex term: it can mean unsophisticated, savage, stupid or childish; pure; original or primary; low or simple; an early stage of evolution or progress; a relic or survival in a world that has moved on. It can refer to people or societies without technology or without institutions; ‘primitive’ here stands in a complex relation to a cluster of terms including ‘savage’, ‘native’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘undeveloped’, ‘un-evolved’ and ‘prehistoric’, and also to opposing terms like ‘civilised’, ‘developed’, ‘complex’, ‘sophisticated’ and ‘modern’. We should note the term’s ideological weight: calling societies or people ‘primitive’ has often been involved in, and even stood in for, justifica- tions of marginalisation, oppression and extermination. It can also be used in a less extreme but still polemical way, to indicate a comfortable value judge- Studies in Social and Political Thought Page 7 Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive ment: ‘we are civilised, they are primitive.’ The two meanings of the term which relate to the criticisms of anarchism under discussion here are primi- tive as that which is pure, and primitive as being original or primary. The criti- cisms which involve these meanings are, respectively: the claim that anar- chism depends on an unrealistic notion of uncorrupted human nature (‘human nature primitivism’); and the claim that anarchists are nostalgic for a mythical golden age (‘golden age primitivism’): I define and respond to each in turn. 1. Anarchism and Human Nature Primitivism Ideas of human nature are various, important and contested, including for instance, Christian, liberal, conservative individualist, Rousseauian, Darwinian, Freudian, existentialist and feminist human natures (see Chaney, 1990; Loptson, 1995; Stevenson and Haberman, 1998). Such conceptions are important because so much can depend on them, for an individual the answer to the question about the human nature she shares will shape how she under- stands the meaning of her life, what she ought to do, what she might be able to achieve or become, and what limits she must respect or accept. For groups, it will shape our understanding of our history, the changes we ought to make, and the vision of the future we can reasonably hope to realise: that is, ideas of human nature are important because very different and often very powerful individual and political aims and understandings are based on dif- ferent accounts of human nature. They are also important because claims about human nature entail an often effective means of criticism, both of cur- rent arrangements and of schemes for their reform: current arrangements can be condemned as corrupting or as not living up to the best in human nature; suggested reforms, as not taking the constraints of human nature into account. Ideas of human nature are contested because of both their variety and their importance. Human nature is the locus of a continuing argument, both in its own right and as a battleground of ideologies which involve par- ticular claims about it. Existentialist and other negative claims about human nature (at the limit, that there is no such thing) can also perform these func- tions of grounding aims and analysis, and of criticism. Historically and typically, an idea of human nature is a set of claims that a specified character: is real or permanent or transhistorically present in humans; is shared by all humans; distinguishes humans by kind, and not merely by degree, from the rest of the world, and especially from (other) animals; is Page 8 Studies in Social and Political Thought Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive separate from the distortion and masking which can be created by current cir- cumstances; and stands as a moral, social or political norm for all humans. These five components are not necessarily connected. What is real or per- manent, rather than merely apparent or transitory, in an individual human might not be shared by all or only other humans. What is shared by all humans might not have any normative force. What distinguishes humans from other animals might be the distortion caused by current circumstances. However, these five claims do form a group which repeatedly appears in the history of thought. Different ideas of human nature make this set of claims about different characters; negative ideas deny that some or all of them are true of any character. Some ideas have both positive and negative elements: some post-Darwinian thinkers, for instance, have made the negative claim that humans are not distinct in kind from other animals, because all evolved by natural selection, and the positive claim that what is shared by all such creatures is being vehicles for ‘selfish genes’ (see Dawkins, 1989). If anarchists are human nature primitivists, then their shared idea of human nature must be that what is real, permanent, ahistorical, shared, distinguish- ing, separate and normative in humans is a nature which is wholly pure and good. That is, which is virtuous, benevolent, altruistic, reasonable, peaceable, cooperative or loving (or some combination of some or all of these), and not vicious, malicious, selfish, irrational, aggressive or hateful. Even if this is the anarchist idea of human nature, this is a criticism of anarchism only if it is inaccurate, and its inaccuracy renders it unusable as a norm. The second cri- terion is needed because the fact that a claim or story is literally false does not, by itself, disqualify it as morally useful: it need not be the case that someone called Raphael Hythloday really visited a place called Utopia for the idea of Utopia to be a standard of criticism for the real world. Similarly, that an account of human nature is literally false does not necessarily mean that it is unusable. There are therefore three ways of defending anarchism against the critical accusation of human nature primitivism: first, to show that anarchists do not, in fact, share that idea of human nature; second, to show that the idea is true; or, third, to show that although it is false, it is still useful as a moral, social or political norm. I take the first path, and defeat the accusation by counter-example. Some anarchists think it enough, when stating their views on human nature, to distance themselves from other anarchists who, they suppose, do hold the Studies in Social and Political Thought Page 9 Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive primitivist view. Jacques Ellul, for instance, distinguishes himself from (what he believes to be) mainstream anarchism on two grounds: he is a Christian, and he does not believe that ‘an anarchist society – with no state, no organi- sation, no hierarchy, and no authorities – is possible’ (1991: 19). This ‘anar- chist vision or hope of a society with neither authorities nor institutions rests on the twofold conviction that people are by nature good and that society alone is corrupt’ (Ibid.), but Ellul does not accept such a primitivist account of human nature; he thinks that the ‘anarchist fight’ (Ibid.) is worth fighting, but that its goal is unreachable, because of flawed (that is, fallen) human nature. Ellul shows that his Christianity distinguishes him from other anar- chists with a concrete example: Guy Debord and his situationist comrades refused to let him join: ‘since I was a Christian I could not belong to their movement’ (Ibid.: 3). But in the case of Ellul’s view of human nature, the parallel evidence is unsupported attribution of the view with which he dis- agrees to the un-named ‘true anarchist’ (Ibid.: 19). Other anarchists, writing before the accusation of human nature primitivism became widespread, simply state quite different ideas of human nature. The accusation is the generalisation that anarchists, as a group, share and use the particular idea of human nature defined above. One counter-example is enough to falsify a generalisation, but to make the point more strongly, and for further reasons which will become clear below, I give two: the ideas of human nature in the work of William Godwin and of Peter Kropotkin. William Godwin was born in 1756, was brought up as a Calvinist, and initial- ly followed his father and grandfather into Independent ministry. During periods as minister to congregations in Ware, Stowmarket and Beaconsfield, he lost or transformed his faith. He moved to London in 1782, and would spend the rest of his life there, supporting himself by writing novels, plays, political journalism and philosophy. He married Mary Wollstonecraft in 1797, when she became pregnant (they had been openly a couple, although maintaining separate households, for some years previously). She died a few days after giving birth to their daughter Mary, later Mary Shelley. Godwin lived until 1836, and gradually modified or repudiated much of the radicalism of his earlier work (see Godwin, 1992; Marshall, 1984; 1986: 9-48; St Clair, 1989; Woodcock, 1946). Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, first published in 1793, made Godwin first famous, then caricatured, and finally, in combination with his frank memoirs Page 10 Studies in Social and Political Thought Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive of Wollstonecraft, reviled. It presents several problems of interpretation, the first of which is how to understand its project and claims as a whole. It can be read as utilitarian; as extreme rationalist; as the effort of a lapsed Christian to restate his faith in secular terms; as a celebration of the French revolution; as an abstract mirroring of working-class social radicalism; as a product of the enthusiasm of a recent convert to enlightenment atheism and determin- ism; as the philosophical expression of beliefs current in the intellectual and social circles of late-eighteenth century Rational Dissenters; and finally as the 2 bible of anarchism. I shall not attempt a resolution of these tensions: what is important here is the idea of human nature which the book asserts. Godwin’s idea of human nature is twofold, and essentially critical. He makes two claims, and the point of each is that it refutes an objection to his pre- scription for and prediction of future human sociability: I shall attempt to prove two things: first, that the actions and disposi- tions of mankind are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of any original determination that they bring into the world; and, secondly, that the great stream of our voluntary actions essentially depends, not upon the direct and immediate impulses of sense, but upon the decisions of the understanding (1985: 97). That is, first, ‘the characters of men originate in their external circumstances’ (Ibid.: 96), and not in any innate characteristics; second, ‘our prospects of melioration depend on the progress of enquiry and the general advancement 3 of knowledge’ (Ibid.: 116). Knowledge is motivating; future knowledge about human good will motivate people to act for it; and there are no bars to the gradual creation of people capable of this radical transformation of human life. This means that through progress in moral, social and political science, through the exercise of individual judgement, and through the con- sequent transformation of human thinking and political institutions, Godwin’s anarchic utopia is realisable. That this claim is perhaps unconvinc- ing is irrelevant here: according to the accusation of human nature primi- tivism anarchists are supposed to hold a particular idea of human nature, but Godwin’s stated idea is utterly unlike it. For him, the only things which are permanent and shared in humans are the absence of innate limitation and the possibility of true and motivating judgement. This conception of human nature does moral and political work only in that it supports the practical pos- sibility of a utopia of rational, sincere, mutually censorious neighbours work- Studies in Social and Political Thought Page 11 Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive ing, without partiality but using their own individual judgement, for universal human flourishing. That utopia does further work in providing both a target for social change, and a critical comparison with current arrangements. Godwin not only makes no assertions about the innate purity and goodness 4 of humans, but explicitly denies that any such claim could be true. For Godwin, ‘pure’ humans exist only in the imagined future, and only then as a result of the transformation of current humans, and their institutions, by the progress of knowledge. Anarchists are supposed to be human nature primi- tivists: but the Godwin of Enquiry, at least, was not. We have our first counter-example. Peter Kropotkin was born in 1842, a younger son of the Russian aristocracy. A geographer, naturalist and mathematician, at nineteen a personal page of Tsar Alexander II, and in the 1860s a military administrator in Siberia, he repudiated his privilege and scientific career to become a revolutionary, polit- ical exile and anarchist writer. The major influences on his life and theory were his older brother Alexander; the serfs on his family estate; the socialist movements, and in particular the Bakuninite Jura Federation, which he encountered in Europe; and, most importantly here, Charles Darwin, as understood through the Russian evolutionist tradition which rejected 5 Darwin’s Malthusian metaphor of individualist struggle. Kropotkin approaches the idea of human nature in two main ways: as a defender of the possibility of anarchism and communism, and as a Darwinian naturalist. In the first case, Kropotkin notes that a common objection to ‘communism, and socialism altogether’ is that: […] the idea is so old, and yet it has never been realised. Schemes of ideal states haunted the thinkers of ancient Greece; later on, the early Christians joined in communist groups; centuries later, large commu- nist brotherhoods came into existence during the reform movement. Then, the same ideals were revived during the great English and French Revolutions; and finally, quite lately, in 1848, a revolution, inspired to a great extent with socialist ideals, took place in France. ‘And yet, you see,’ we are told, ‘how far away is the realization of your schemes. Don’t you think that there is some fundamental error in your understanding of human nature and its needs? (Kropotkin, 1995: 4). Page 12 Studies in Social and Political Thought Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive We might expect a human nature primitivist to respond to this pseudo-his- torical derivation of an idea of human nature – the idea that it renders us incapable of communism – with a positive counter-assertion. We might expect an anarchist primitivist to reply that real, pure and good human nature, which is capable of anarchist communism, has been corrupted and thwarted by state reaction. Kropotkin does nothing of the sort. Instead, he suggests a more careful reading of history, which leads him to argue that ‘hundreds of millions of men have succeeded in maintaining amongst themselves, in their village communities, for many hundreds of years, one of the main elements of socialism – the common ownership of the chief instrument of produc- tion, the land, and the apportionment of the same according to the labour capacities of the different families’(Ibid.). The historical evidence does give partial support to the possibility of communism, and certainly does not sup- port the sweeping anti-communist generalisation about human nature and its potential. So, ‘all we are authorized to conclude is, that mankind has not yet found the proper form for combining, on communistic principles, agriculture with a suddenly developed industry and a rapidly growing international trade’ (Ibid.: 5). Far from asserting any permanent characteristic of human nature, Kropotkin tentatively interprets the empirical evidence of human history. His interest is not in such permenent characteristics at all, but in some tem- porary, changing and potentially changeable features of human social activi- ty, as they have appeared. Human nature appears only in a criticism of com- munism, in order that Kropotkin can refute it. This concern with history, and with the tentative conclusions that can be drawn from it, runs throughout his work. In the second case, Kropotkin approaches human nature as a naturalist and Darwinian. In his theory, humans are seen as part of the wider natural world, 6 and in Mutual Aid he attempts to show that cooperation within a species, including the human species, is a major factor in evolution (but not, as has sometimes been asserted of him, the only factor: Kropotkin wanted to cor- rect Thomas Huxley’s over-emphasis of a gladiatorial struggle for existence). The details and force of this argument are not relevant here, what is impor- tant is that, far from asserting a permanent and pure human nature, Kropotkin uses detailed empirical evidence of change and its causes to derive tentative conclusions about current humans and their social characteristics. 7 He presents humans as part of the wider and changing system of nature. In an evolutionary world, there can be no human nature in the strong sense defined above, because nothing is permanent or transhistorically present in Studies in Social and Political Thought Page 13 Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive humans. Kropotkin is interested in what humans and other creatures have come to be, and how. His central conclusion is that humans, as they have evolved, have tendencies both to egalitarianism and mutual aid (good charac- teristics, for him) and to hierarchy and selfishness (bad ones). That is, that we are not wholly pure and good, but have both good and bad tendencies, ‘now the one and now the other taking the upper hand at different periods of history’ (Kropotkin, 1911: 233-47; 236). Kropotkin is not particularly inter- ested in permanent, shared, distinguishing, separate and normative character- istics in either of his approaches to human nature. Nor does he assert that human nature is pure and good. Instead he investigates the nature of current humans as an empirical fact and as a moment in a long transformation, dis- coverable by research in biology and history, and admitting only tentative conclusions. We have our second counter-example to the generalisation that anarchists are human nature primitivists: Kropotkin emphatically was not. It is unlikely that partisans of the accusation of human nature primitivism lit- erally and formally mean the generalisation that ‘all anarchists are human nature primitivists’. If any do, they have been proved wrong twice over, unless they are prepared to argue that neither Godwin nor Kropotkin was really an anarchist. If, as is more likely, they mean only that most anarchists are human nature primitivists, or that anarchism tends to partake of such primitivism, then the formal way to test their claim would be to go through 8 all anarchists, testing each. But how are we to list ‘all anarchists’? The two counter-examples given above must, at least, throw doubt on the accusation: Godwin and Kropotkin are widely recognised to be among the most impor- tant of anarchism’s theorists, and if they were not human nature primitivists then stronger evidence will be needed to make the general accusation and derived criticisms stick. In the absence of that further evidence, we must accept that anarchists are therefore not, in general, human nature primitivists. 2. Anarchism and Golden Age Primitivism ‘Golden age’ primitivism centres on a value claim about a picture of human historical development. In this picture, humanity or human society are envi- sioned as having changed from some primary, natural or foundational state to some elaborated or artificial one. This change is understood as both qualita- tive and quantitative: the qualitative change, at its simplest, is from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilised’, but has also been further divided in various ways; the quantita- tive change is typically measured on a scale of complexity (from simple to Page 14 Studies in Social and Political Thought Clark: Anarchism and the Myth of the Primitive complex) or of height (from lower to higher forms), or both. Various kinds of evidence can be used to characterise the primary state, but most often the theorist will use historical and archaeological evidence about past social forms, or anthropological evidence about current social forms which are con- ceived as relics of the primary state, or both. A golden age primitivist claims that ‘the highest degree of excellence or happiness in man’s life existed at the beginning of history’ (Lovejoy and Boas, 1973: 2). The qualitative and quan- titative change was for the worse, whether thought of as gradual (the golden age lapsing into silver) or sudden (the fall and expulsion from Eden). This type of primitivism’s central normative metaphors are of a return (or its trag- ic impossibility) and the hoped-for dismantling or destruction of the elaboration which moved us away from the primary state. Its normative focus is on an ideal past. Golden age primitivism is in direct competition with theories or stories which use the same picture of history, but make the opposite value claim: that the qualitative and quantitative change was for the better. We can now see that although human nature and golden age primitivism are analytically distinct, it is possible to hold both positions, or a position involv- ing elements of both. Apart from archaeological and anthropological evi- dence, another way of supporting a characterisation of a golden age is to use claims about an uncorrupted human nature, which was fully expressed before whatever elaboration produced our current arrangements occurred. Or we might support a characterisation of human nature as wholly good with claims about how humans lived in a primary, natural or undistorted state. The impli- cations of accepting golden age primitivism are various; we might for instance try to return to the golden age, whether individually or collectively; or lapse into quietist nostalgia; or take the ideal as reason for bitter rejection of the current world. Whatever practical conclusions anarchists are supposed to draw from their alleged primitivism, the critics’ central assertions must be that anarchists hold such an idea of a past golden age or Eden, and use the metaphors of return and dismantling or destruction; and that this idea inval- idates their theories because it is false in such a way as to make it useless as a norm. As with the accusation of human nature primitivism, there are three ways of defending anarchism against this accusation: first, to show that anar- chists do not, in fact, share such an idea; next, to show that it is true; or, final- ly, to show that, although false, it is still useful as a norm. And, as above, I take the first path and disprove the critics’ generalisation by counter-example. Studies in Social and Political Thought Page 15