AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS by WILLIAM LILLIE ~ ~ METHUEN & CO. LTD. LONDON 36 Essex Street, Strand, W.C.2 First publi.shed Sep1m1ber 2nd 1948 Su:ond edition 1951 Third edition 1955 Reprinted 1957 .. , CATALOGUE NO. 5031/U Prinled and bound iD Great Britain by Buller & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London PREFACE This book makes no claim to originality of thought, for its purpose is only to introduce beginners to what the great moralists have thought in the past and are thinking to-day about ethical matters. It differs from other elementary text-books in giving a larger place to the work of living writers on ethics, and to do so seems advisable even in an introductory text-book, because of the rich contributions made by twentieth century moralists both to the interpretation of their predeces sors and to original ethical speculation. Most teachers to-day feel that the older introductions, the best of which were written in the now unfamiliar language of late nineteenth century Idealism, are out of date, and the conviction that a more modern introduction in simple language is needed by undergraduates during their first year's study of ethics has been my chief reason for writing this book. It is fitting that I should thank all those whose teachings and writings have been used in this book; the frequency with which the names of some moralists occur in the text or foot notc!'s indicates those to whom I owe most. The arrangement of topics has been largely determined by their order in the syllabus for the first year's course in ethics, prescribed by the University of the Panjab, in which I have been privileged to be a teacher, and my own presentation of the subject has probably been influenced more than I realise by a long use of Mackenzie's Ma11ual of Ethics, the text-book prescribed for that course. I am especially grateful to my wife who, after carefully reading my script, has pointed out many passages which in their original form were likely to be misunderstood by begin ners, and has helped me to amend them, and to my sisters, Misses Isobel and Mary Lillie, who have undertaken the wearisome task of correcting proofs. An Introduction to Ethics In this third edition, I have added a chapter on ' The Language of Ethics', which has occupied a large place in ethical discussions in the last few years. I wish to express my gratitude to my colleague, Dr. R. W. Hepburn, of the Department of Moral Philosophy in this University, who read the chapter in manuscript, and made several most helpful suggestions. King's College, Aberdeen. March, 1955. CONTENTS PAGE Chapter I. THE NATURE OF ETHICS I. A Provisional Definition. 2. Moral Sciences. 3. The Data and Method, of Ethics. 4. The Uses of Ethics. Chapter II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL ACTION 22 I. Psychology as Explaining Conduct. 2. The Nature of Desire. 3. Motive and Intention. 4. The Process of Willing. 5. PsycholoRical Hedonism. 6. Reason as Motive to Action. 7. The Freedom of the Will. Chapter III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY 56 1. Levels of Development. 2. The Level of Instinct. 3. The Level of Custom. 4. The Level of Conscience. 5. A Comparison of the Level of Custom and the Level of Conscience. 6. The Historical Development of Morality. Chapter IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MORAL JUDGE• • MENT 80 1. Conscience---the Subject of the Moral Judgement. 2. Theories of Conscience. 3. The Nature of the Moral Judgement. 4. The Object of the Moral Judgement. Chapter V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL THEORY 102 1. The History of Ethics. 2. Greek Ethics. 3. Medieval Ethics. 4. Modern Ethics. 5. Classification of Theories of the Moral Standard. Chapter VI. RELATIVE, SUBJECTIVE AND NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF THE MORAL STANDARD I 13 t. Absolute and Relative Ethics. 2. The Standard as Subjective. 3. Non-subjective Naturalism. 4. The Naturalistic Fallacy. 5. Conclusion. A11 /11/roduction to Ethics PACE Chapter VII. THE STANDARD AS GIVEN BY INTUITION 131 1. The Nature and Objects oflntuition. 2. The Moral Sense School. 3. The Theory of Butler. 4. Individual Intuitions. 5. General lntuition9, 6. Universal In tuitions. 7. Conclusion. Chapter VIII. THE STANDARD AS LAW q.g 1. The Meaning of Law. 2. The Moral Law as a Political Law. 3. The Moral Law as a Law of Nature. 4. The Moral Law as a Law of Reason. 5. The Theory of Kant. 6. Conclusion. /Chapter IX. THE STANDARD AS PLEASURE I 77 I. The Nature of Pleasure. 2. Ethical H~donism. 3. Egoistic Ethical Hedonism. 4. Utilitarianism. 5. The Theory of John Stuart Mill. 6. The Theory of Sidgwick. 7. The End as the Pleasure of Others. Chapter X. THE STANDARD AS DETERMINED nY F.vou1- TION 201 1. The Concept of Evolution. 2. The Theory of Herbert Spencer. 3. Evolution without Teleology. 4. Natural Selection in Ethics. 5. Modern Theories of Evolution. 6. Creative Morality. Chapter XI. THE STANDARD AS PERFECTION 218 1. Self-Realization. 2. Spiritual Evolution. 3. The Theory ofT. H. Green. 4. My Station and its Duties. 5. Eudaemonism. 6. Conclusion. ' Chapter XII. THE STANDARD AS VALUE 230 1. The Concept of Value. 2. Intrinsic Value. 3. Intrinsically Good Things as the Aim of Moral Action. 4. Good Character as the Moral End. 5. Right Actions as Intrinsically Good. Chapter XIII. THEORY AND PRACTICE 249 , 1. The Purpose of Ethical Study. 2. Casuistry. 3. The Influence of Ethical Theory on Practice-the Evi dence of Experience. 4. The Authority of the Moral Standard. 5. The Various Ethical Theories in their Relation to Practice. 6. A comparison of Ethics and Logic. 7. Conclusion. Con/mis PAGE Chapter XIV. TUE INDIVIDUAL AND soGIETY 2GG 1. Society as the Background of the !\!oral Life. 2. The Individual and the State. 3. Egoism, Vni\'crsal~ ism and Altruism. 4. Theories of Punishment. Chapter XV. RIGHTS .,ND DUTIES 288 1. The Nature of Rights. 2. The Rights of Man. 3. Rights and Duties. 4. The Determination of Duties. 5. Dut}' and Virtue. G. Duty as Moral Obligation. 'C:lrnpter XVI. VTRTt;F. or 1. The f\.,{caning Virtue. 2. Plato'~ Treatment of the Virtues. 3. The Cardinal Virtues. 4. Aristotle'• Conception of Virtue. Chapter XVII. ETHIC'S, METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 323 1. The Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics. e. The Postulate, of Ethics. 3. The Universe Regarded as Possessing Moral Relations. 4. Religion and Morali1y. Cl!apter XVIII. THE LANGUAGE OF ETHICS 343 1. The Use of Language. 2. The Language used in Ethics. 3. Evaluative Language in Ethics. 4. Emotive Language in Ethics. 5. Prescriptive Language in Ethics. 6. Descriptive Language in Ethics. APl'ENDIX 365 INDEX 373 Chapter I THE NATURE OF ETHICS § r. A Provisional Definition In ordinary conyersation we often hear such statements as: 'He ought not to have done this', 'It is a good thing to help one's neighbours', 'He is a thoroughly good man', 'His character is bad', 'He was only doing his duty', or 'It is always right to speak the truth.' When such statements arc made they arc frequently contradicted by someone hearing them, and this by itself suggests that they are not as simple as at first sight they appear to be. If a friend disagrees with my statement that Smith is a thoroughly good man, he may do so for one of two reasons. (a) He may know facts about Smith's behaviour which are unkno"n to me; and if he tells me these facts and convinces me that they are true, I shall then be ready to admit that Smith is in some respects not a good man. (b) It may be the case, however, that my friend and I both know the same facts about Smith, and yet I continue to hold that Smith is thoroughly good, while my friend considers him to bC bad. Now we are using the words 'good' and 'bad' with different meanings, and, until we come to some agree ment as to their meanings, we are not likely to agree in our opinion of Smith. This is just the kind of question with which ethics deals-what is the true meaning of such words as 'good' and 'right" and 'ought' which are used so commonly in everyday conversation. When we come to an agreement as to the meaning of such words, other questions will arise. \-Ve may ask whether it is possible for us to know whether Smith is good or bad; we may ask on what grounds Smith should give up those activities which we have agreed to call bad, and should engage in those which we have agreed to call good. All these and many other similar questions are within ,the scope of ethics. An Introduction lo Ethics Vic may define ethics as the normative science of the con duct of human beings living in societies-a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar way. This definition says, first of all, that ethics is a science, and a science may be defined as a systematic and more or less complete body of knowledge about a par ticular set of related events or objects. In this account of science, the important word is systematic; scientific knowledge differs from the ordinary, haphazard knowledge of unedu cated people in being arranged in a definite cohere~t system. A science also aims at providing as complete a knowledge of its subject-matter as it can, although, in the present slate of knowledge, no science is perfect in this respect. At the same time, the scientist may leave out details that he knows, in order to give a simpler and clearer presentation of the im portant connexions of the facts which he studies. It is generally agreed that a piece of knowledge cann::-t be re garded as 'scientific' until it is accepted by those who arc learned in the particular science concerned : in medicine, for example, the new cures which arc so convincingly advertised cannot be regarded as scientific until they have been recog nized as effective by capable doctors. Finally, the sphere of a science is limited to one set of facts or objects; no science deals with all the facts known about the universe; to deal with the universe as a whole is the work of metaphysics or philosophy, which is nor a science. Each science has its own particular sphere; botany deals with plants, psycholog)' with minds, and ethics with certain judgements that we make about human conduct. The sciences which arc studied in the laboratories of our universities are clescriptivc or positive sciences. Positive sciences describe objects or phenomena as we observe them with our eyes and other sense-organs, or in the case of mental processes like desiring and willing as we observe them by introspection or looking inside our minds. ('Phenomenon' is just the technical term for anything that can be observed in this way.) There is in a positive science no question of judg ing its objects in any way. If the botanist judges a certain plant to be good or bad, or even to be beautiful or ugly, he is no longer doing the work of a botanist, whose business it is