FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil cARLISLE pApERS Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013 An Evaluation of counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War Baucum Fulk Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. CARLISLE PAPER AN EVALUATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AS A STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING THE LONG WAR Lieutenant Colonel Baucum Fulk March 2011 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. 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SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming confer- ences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-484-8 ii PREFACE The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect on and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research conducted by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers” series. ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II Director of Research Strategic Studies Institute iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR BAUCUM FULK is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He is a member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2010, attending The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, as a Senior Service College Fellow. Lieutenant Colonel Fulk is an Active Guard Reserve judge advocate, currently serving as a professor in the Administrative and Civil Law Department at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Lieutenant Colonel Fulk is a graduate of Harvard College and the University of Arkansas School of Law. His most recent deployment was to Afghanistan, serving with U.S. Forces – Afghanistan. iv ABSTRACT The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgen- cy, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a military, economic, or political perspective. It is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the United States may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. These three strategies each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. However it is considerably less likely that the United States will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incom- petent through engaging in one or more of these three strategies than by engaging in counterinsurgency. Support to insurgencies is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. Thus, an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism. v AN EVALUATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AS A STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING THE LONG WAR INTRODUCTION The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Com- mand Authority is choosing the best, sustainable strategy to combat al Qaeda and its af- filiates.1 The U.S. national strategy against al Qaeda is far broader than the Department of Defense (DoD) mission.2 Nonetheless, DoD’s contribution to the fight is substantial, both in terms of resource allocation and the net effect in reducing the al Qaeda threat.3 The National Command Authority has at least four broad means of employing military resources in the overall strategy to combat al Qaeda. These choices include conducting counterinsurgency, waging counterterrorism, supporting insurgency, and strengthening antiterrorism. This Carlisle Paper focuses on counterinsurgency because that is the strategy through which the United States has expended the greatest level of military resources since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The paper also briefly highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the other three strategies. Counterinsurgency does not appear to be a wise, long term strategy for the United States to employ in combating al Qaeda. As discussed in detail below, focusing U.S. military resources on counterinsurgency ignores historical lessons in successfully com- bating terrorism and fails to utilize military resources in the most efficient, sustainable manner possible. DEFINING AND BRIEFLY EXPLORING COUNTERINSURGENCY, COUNTERTERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND ANTITERRORISM Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, eco- nomic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”4 COIN is well known from its use during the latter stages of the second U.S. war in Iraq and from General Stanley McChrystal’s 2009 recommendation as to the best means to prevail in Afghanistan.5 The most notable characteristics of COIN are its indirect ap- proach to combating terrorism and its cost. COIN focuses on the local civilian popula- tion, seeking to secure the population from the enemy and to obtain popular support through effective governance, including public services,6 eventually defeating insur- gents or making them irrelevant.7 Counterinsurgency’s high cost begins with the large number of counterinsurgents required to provide security.8 Large expenditures for personnel, equipment, and materi- als also are required for civil works programs to support the host government.9 COIN conducted in a remote, rugged, insecure area, such as Afghanistan, increases costs ex- ponentially, based on transportation and transportation security costs.10 Ideally, COIN should be conducted by the whole of government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), not merely military forces. In practice, the DoD has conducted the vast major- ity of the U.S. Government’s portion of the COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for a variety of reasons, including DoD resources and its ability to operate in unsecure envi- ronments. 1 Counterterrorism is defined as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”11 Reported U.S. counterterrorism operations include missile strikes from unmanned aerial systems (drones), and special operations raids against high value targets, including senior leaders.12 Many counter- terrorism successes are publically unknown because they are classified. Counterter- rorism also includes nonkinetic efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including those held by nonallied countries, in order to deny these weapons to terror- ists. Counterterrorism is conducted by the DoD, especially the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and also by the Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA). Insurgency is the inverse of counterinsurgency, namely, “[t]he organized use of sub- version and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”13 This definition includes the overthrow of legitimate and illegitimate governments. Almost immediately after 9/11, the United States openly supported an Afghan insurgency, the Northern Al- liance, against the Taliban, which tolerated or supported al Qaeda. Earlier, the United States more quietly provided military aid to insurgents including the Mujahedeen who fought Soviet military forces entering Afghanistan beginning in late 1979. Since 2002, U.S. support to insurgency as a means of fighting terrorism has received little public discussion. Antiterrorism is defined as “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.”14 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary U.S. federal antiterrorism agency. The DoD can and does support domestic antiterrorism efforts. DoD contributions to the U.S. antiterrorism efforts include provid- ing armed National Guard Soldiers in airports shortly after the 9/11 attacks and provid- ing support to other government agencies for high profile events, such as presidential inaugurations and Super Bowls.15 PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS Four questions are worth considering before examining COIN as a strategy to combat al Qaeda. First, do historical lessons suggest an appropriate U.S. strategy to combat al Qaeda? Second, for how long will the United States be fighting the “Long War” against al Qaeda? Third, what does al Qaeda need to function, and especially what does al Qa- eda need to function effectively in killing Americans and destroying their property? Fourth, why should the National Command Authority conduct a cost benefit analysis in selecting a particular military strategy? What Historical Lessons Exist Regarding Combating Terrorism? Historically, the vast majority of all terrorist organizations fail to achieve their objec- tives and cease to exist.16 National victories against terrorists have been achieved not by winning, but through long-term patience and avoiding losing.17 Terrorists, by a dispro- portionate amount, lack the resources of the state they are attacking. This disproportion- 2 ate lack of resources is why terrorists fight through terrorism—they lack the means to fight conventionally.18 Since terrorists lack the strength to defeat a more powerful state, they must rely on the state to make significant strategic mistakes, with the state eventu- ally defeating itself.19 The most important rule in fighting terrorism is to avoid being perceived as over- reacting.20 The perception of overreaction can make a terrorist organization’s claims ap- pear more legitimate, delegitimize the government which is perceived to be overreact- ing, or both.21 As a terrorist organization gains legitimacy, it gains resources: People join its ranks and provide financial support. As a terrorist organization gains strength, it may also gain state support through the principle of “the viable enemy of my enemy is my friend.” A government which is perceived to be overreacting stands to lose domestic popu- lar support, support from its allies, and potentially even the loss of allies. The loss of domestic support makes domestic antiterrorist actions more difficult. For example, the loss of domestic support may make it difficult to increase law enforcement powers that may reduce civil liberties. The loss of domestic support also makes it more difficult to obtain a consensus for subsequent international action. The loss of allied support or allies makes actions against the terrorist organization more costly and more difficult, or possibly even impossible. Without allies, the costs of international actions cannot be shared. Actions within a strong country’s borders may be prohibitive in cost or impos- sible without that country’s consent or cooperation. The second most important rule for a government fighting terrorism is to avoid being or appearing to be incompetent.22 An incompetent government squanders resourc- es, opportunities, or both. A government that appears to be incompetent stands to lose popular support and its allies’ support. As noted above, diminished domestic popular support makes internal and foreign initiatives more difficult to accomplish; diminished allied support or lost allies makes international actions more costly or impossible. How Long is “Long”? There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. – Sun Tzu23 Inherent in any strategy to win the “Long War” is an understanding of how long a period of time the United States will be at war with al Qaeda and its allies. When did the Long War begin? From the U.S. perspective, the Long War began on 9/11; from al Qaeda’s perspective, the Long War began many years before 2001. Of course, no one knows when the Long War will end. Reasonable estimates are that the Long War will last for decades. Michael Howard states that the Long War “may well take decades, perhaps as long as the Cold War.”24 Major General (Retired) Robert Scales has stated that the Long War “might last a generation.”25 These estimates are in keeping with historical lessons, since terrorist campaigns that surpass initial hurdles are typically measured in decades, not years.26 If these estimates are correct, in a best case scenario the war is not yet at the half-way mark, and may have only just begun. 3