Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 18, Issue - 2, 2011: 55-76 An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron: Shift in the Pakistan-US Relations during the ‘War on Terror’. Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi∗ Abstract The Cold War period witnessed Pakistan and the United States as “staunch allies” with patron-client bond. The end of the East-West confrontation, however, began a new era in Pak-American relations due to the changing priorities of the long-time ties amongst the departments of bilateral allies- CIA, State Department, the White House, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Main concerns of these policy-making bodies/agencies clashed with their counterparts in their policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt following the 9/11 events. The divergence of approaches toward the future of Afghanistan and giving a casual response to the sensitivity of Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India has further aggravated tension between the Pakistan Army and the US policy making bodies. The war on terror especially along Pakistan’s Western border in the tribal areas is infuriating the already volatile situation. The sources of policies which have brought the two countries to the brink of wrangling are the stumbling blocks in winning the war on terror. Key words: South Asia, US, Pakistan Army, diplomacy, Kerry Lugar Bill Events of the past two decades- the end of the cold war in 1989, the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 2003- have drastically changed the types of                                                              ∗Author is Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and Director of the South Asian Centre for International and Regional Studies (SACIRS), Peshawar.  55 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi  international issues the US faces. The South Asia is the major arena in this new era of international diplomacy and warfare. As the US attempts to address the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other major security issues in the Middle East and South Asia, a positive relationship with Pakistan could prove to be the most important asset. However, the traditionally strong patron-client relationship the US has had with the Pakistan Army has fundamentally changed. A new paradigm of US-Pakistan relations has evolved over the past two decades. Only the events of the past few years- the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, blatant and blunt support to former President Musharraf and the passage of Kerry-Lugar Bill 2009- have illuminated this new reality. A staunch supporter of the US- Pakistan has grown economically, militarily, and diplomatically- dependent upon the US to play its regional role in South Asia. Because the people and the Army under General Kiyani of Pakistan are asserting their independence from the US by expressing their opposition to the Karry-Lugar Bill, support to the Pakistani Taliban, and the US policies in Afghanistan as well as its drone attacks on Tribal belt, while the government of Pakistan is still collaborating on every issue, the relationship between the Pakistan Army and the US is most accurately categorized as ‘Estranged Client’. This study will trace the evolution of the US-Pakistan Army relationship from its patron-client bond to the current ‘Estranged Client’ stage. After looking at the reasons for the creation of the patron-client relationship, this paper will show how the annoyed Pakistan Army and perceived decline of the US have eroded the foundation of the patron-client relationship. Then, recent strains on the US- Pakistani public relationship will be examined in order to establish the degree of independence Pakistanis are asserting. Finally, this analysis will evaluate the possibilities for the future of US-Pakistan relations. Theoretical Framework Bilateral institutional relations between two states in the modern era can be conceptualized in a number of ways. Most salient to this discussion is the theoretical framework referred to as patron-client relationship. Christopher Carney, in a piece entitled ‘International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework’, outlines three characteristics of patron-client relationships: “First, there must be a decided asymmetry between the military capabilities of the states   56 An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron  involved’; second, the client plays an important role in patronal competition’; a third critical aspect of patron-cliency involves the perception of the relationship by other parties.” (Christopher, 1989:46). The presence of these three attributes in a bilateral relationship signifies power disparity between two nations and the dominance of the more powerful nation over the weaker nation- a patron-client relationship. While the United States and Pakistan had some diplomatic exchanges during 1940s, they did not enter into close relationship until initial 1950s. At this point, the two nations entered into a client-patron relationship according to the three parameters outlined above. There was a clear asymmetry of military power, since Pakistan was almost completely dependent on the US for defense against outside threats- India, Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union. The main impetus for the creation of strong US-Pakistan ties was the Truman Doctrine’s central tenet of containment of the Soviet Union. (John, 1982:45). Pakistan, like many other client nations in that era, was a pawn in the larger struggle between the US and USSR- the two major patrons seeking clientage in the region. Specifically, the US valued Pakistan for its geo-strategic position to such an extent that Pakistan was ‘the most important military factor in the South Asia’. Therefore, the Pak- US relationship conforms to the second characteristic of patron-client relationship. Finally, the close Pak-US relationship during the Cold War was an observable and well-known arrangement: the most allied ally of the US. Numerous other examples of exchanged favors between the US and Pakistan substantiate the notion of a strong bilateral relationship between the two to other nations around the world. While the US-Pakistan relationship at its inception was a patron-client arrangement, later developments altered this arrangement, as will be seen in subsequent sections of the paper. The characteristics and dynamics of patron-client relationships have been analyzed by a number of authors. However, the phases that follow a patron-client period of bilateral relations have not been specifically addressed. Carney only briefly touches on the existence of post-patron-client phases of a bilateral relation: The availability of the exit option is another important trait of patron- cliency. In as much as the relationship was entered into voluntarily, it can be abandoned the same way. Patron-client relationships may   57 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi  simply die a natural death or may end amidst conflict and dashed expectations. Or, as is sometimes the case, they can evolve into something more akin to an instrumental friendship, shedding the other traits of cliency ((Christopher, 1989:45) Furthermore, Carney does not define ‘instrumental friendship’ or how it differs from a patron-client relationship. In order to argue that Pakistan is assuming this role as an ‘Estranged Client’, the other possible outcomes of a patron-client relationship must be outlined clearly and ultimately rejected. Patron-client relationships can evolve into one of five arrangements: • Progressive Decline: In this situation the ties between the patron and client weaken gradually as a result of mutual disinterest in the relationship. As times goes on, the two nations become essentially indifferent to each other. • Sudden Cessation: In this situation, some disagreement or problematic event results in the immediate end of the patron- client relationship. Afterwards, the two nations may be either indifferent or inimical to each other. • Estranged Client: In this satiation, the patron and client maintain a cooperative relationship; however, the client asserts much ore independence. In certain situations, the client may oppose the patron and the stability of the relationship is a constant concern. • Role Reversal: In this situation, the patron weakens and the client strengthens such that the confluence of these two trends results in the former patron assuming the role of the client and the former client assuming the role of the patron. This role reversal can be a short phase in the overall relationship or a longer term arrangement. • Sustainable Equality: In this situation, the patron weakens, the client strengthens, or both occur. This results in a roughly balanced relationship between the two nations. They will cooperate when it is mutually beneficial and not cooperate when they have a disagreement- but the overall relationship will be strong. It is important to note that these five states of affairs are also not definite arrangements. For example, the cause for a Sudden Cessation may be remedied and a patron-client relationship may be resumed-   58 An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron  only to be followed by an Estranged Client arrangement with periods of Role Reversal. With this theoretical framework established, it is possible to apply it to Pak-US relations. Pakistan’s Decent in the post 9/11 Scenario Pakistan Army has paid heaviest price for the war on terror. It deployed 140,000 troops along Pak-Afghan border, thus weakening and risking its position on its Eastern front vis-à-vis India. Till 9/11, Pakistan’s western border was guarded by few soldiers only. Similarly, till to-date, more than 8700 Pakistani troops have been killed or wounded in curbing the menace of terrorism while more than 21000 civilians killed or wounded (The Nation, 2010). As if to drive home the point, Daily Times reported that "Pakistan has suffered economic losses amounting to $6 billion during 2007-08 while supporting the global war on terror." Dr. Hafiz Pasha (Pakistan’s Finance Minister), heading a panel of Planning Commission economists last year, told the Pakistan Institute of Development Economists' annual meeting, ‘This loss to the economy, according to the government of Pakistan, is over $8 billion,’ said Pasha, adding that the US should double the funds being given to Pakistan for its support to the war on terror in view of the massive losses. He said the prevailing economic situation was "not very positive", as tax collection had fallen, imports were very high, real effecting exchange rate was functioning at the level of last year and the ministries' expenses had increased by Rs.100 billion (Chaudhry, 2009). The losses for Pakistan do not stop here. As analyst Pepe Escobar points out in Asia Times ‘Last but not least, the energy wars. And that involves that occult, almost supernatural entity, the $7.6 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which would carry gas from eastern Turkmenistan through Afghanistan east of Herat and down Taliban-controlled Nimruz and Helmand provinces, down Balochistan in Pakistan and then to the Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Arabian Sea. No investor in his right mind will invest in a pipeline in a war zone, thus Afghanistan must be "stabilized" at all costs (Pepe, 2009).   59 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi  Hence, Operation Enduring Freedom adversely affected the already fragile economy of Pakistan. Major losses were caused to the civil aviation, tourism, investment and shipping due to rise in the rates of insurance. US Decline The cold war era of international relations was defined by the state of bipolarity; the US and the USSR were the two major rival poles of global war. However, at the end of the cold war, with the collapse of the USSR, the US became the sole super power and the world entered into a period of uni-polarity (Charles, 1990:23-33). The 1990s was an era of US primacy in world affairs, able to operate in an arena devoid of true power equals. However, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 called into question US invulnerability. Subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have overstretched the army (www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4649066.stm), and lack of appropriate equipment has curtailed the viability of American armed forces (McMichael, 2007). Additionally, the US economy has had several down-turns in the past decade, the most recent credit crisis being only the worst in a series that does not appear to be ending in the near future. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts ‘that financial losses stemming from the US mortgage crisis might approach $1 trillion’ (Bloomberg News, 2008). These military and economic issues have been exacerbated by the world’s growing distrust and dislike of US foreign policy. Even though there was a high point of global support for the US invasion of Afghanistan, subsequent actions- the US invasion of Iraq- have sent global opinion of the US plummeting (www.nola.com/frontpage/t-p/index.ssf?/base/news-5/1147846451601 50.xml). These indicators, as well as numerous other small issues, have converged to diminish the global standing of the US. To say that the US has declined is not to say that it is not still the global power. However, as the US declines relative to other nations, the shrinking power differential gives the US less of a decisive leadership role. The goal of this paper is not to gauge this decline by any metric. Rather, it only discussed to point out that something fundamental has changed and the debate about it signifies this reality (Fox, 2007:643-53). Additionally, this fundamental change is recognized by the rest of the world, and the mechanics of international   60 An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron  relations are being affected by this new reality of uncertain US supremacy. A New Relationship The two previous sections established the downward trajectory of Pakistan and the stagnant if not downward trajectory of the US. The established trajectories of both countries are dependent upon each other. How, the examination will look at three issues on which the two diverge, and analyze these diversions to determine the nature of the new relationship. Each of these issues- the Afghanistan, US drone attacks on Pakistan’s tribal belt and the Kerry-Lugar Act (KLA) – demonstrates that the patron-client relationship between the US and Pakistan Army has ended and that the two have entered a new type of relationship-‘Estranged Client’. 1. Historiographic Triangular Relationship between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a turning point in super-power rivalry after detente. The invasion was at once denounced by the Americans. Pakistan and the US supported the armed resistance by the Mujahideens against Soviet Union. The Mujahideens were given holy accords and the roles of national heroes by the Pak-US alliance. The US president Ronald Regan named these ‘freedom fighters’ as “the moral equivalent of our own Founding Fathers” (Kurt, 1993:161). However, the true inside story of the Afghan war has come to the limelight just recently. Truth not only negates the ‘official version’ of events (Brzezinski , 2003:273), but also exposes how the US induced the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan in structuring the Afghan jihad (Kristian , 1999:182-83). True story of Afghanistan reveals that the US started its campaign to aid the Afghan fighters in Pakistan against the Soviet Union during April, 1979 (Anwar, 1988:229-236). Weapons were imported from the Middle East and China to aid rebels much before April 1979 (Smith, 1995:583-93). Jimmy Carter authorized U.S. covert action on July 3, 1979, six months before the Soviet intervention on December 24, 1979. The reasons were outlined in 1998 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, who revealed that CIA gave military   61 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi  support to the Afghan Mujahideens so that it may induce a full military reaction from the Soviet’s side. The reason for the military support to the Afghan freedom fighters was not for the democracy and against the soviet styled system of government but rather, as Brzezinski said, “to give the USSR its own Vietnam,” by pulling it “into the Afghan trap.” Afghanistan government and the Soviet Union always condemned the CIA’s role in the region (Ashitkov, et al., 1986). But it was mostly denounced and rejected by the western scholars and internationalists alike (Garthoff, 1985). CIA and the Saudi government provided six and nine billion dollars of weapons to the Afghan Jihadis (Faltas, et al., 2001:13). On the other hand, the Soviets added 5.7 billion dollars of weapons to the Afghan puppet regime. Thus Afghanistan became the most militarized state with changed political, military and economic results (Smith, 1995:62). The CIA fought the war in Afghanistan in the name of religion- A Jihad (Carpenter, 1994:79). Americans were here to fight a proxy war against the Soviet troops. Afghanistan became, as a result, a warring land where the US supported the Afghan Mujahideens in the name of Jihad against the Soviets. The Jihad also attracted other Muslims of the world including Osama Bin Ladin. This converged Afghans and Arabs fighting in the name of Islam and Allah (Rubin, 1997:179). Perhaps Afghans were not that radical. However, the arrival of the Arabs turned picture of Jihad here. Afghans turned into fundamentalist radicals (Carpenter, 1994:79) During Afghan Jihad of 1979-91, Pakistan was turned into a base- camp where recruiting, training, and arming of the Mujahideens took place. This was taking place under the command of Pakistan’s military general Zia ul Haq. General Zia’s shrewd futuristic approach kept Americans as client and Pakistan as a driving force or patron in the Afghan Jihad. He knew American weaknesses and Pakistan’s bargaining position. Americans wanted to win Afghan war against Soviet Union to take revenge of Vietnam and for that matter they were ready to sacrifice anything ($$$) in any amount. This increased Pakistan’s bargaining position which mustered weapons and money for its own defence.   62 An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron  The Soviet left Afghanistan in 1988. However, Afghanistan had become a gun-powder magazine. It was supplied with weapons from all sides- Soviet Union, Muslim world, and the US (CIA). In the build-up to the invasion of Afghanistan just after 9/11, the US had a great deal of ease creating an international coalition. Due to its long border with Afghanistan, Pakistan was seen as particularly important ally because the US military could have an easy access to Kabul as well as East of Afghanistan. When the issue of authorizing the US army operate from Pakistan soil came, the former Pakistani President Musharraf never wasted a single moment to say ‘yes’ to the US cry. It’s a very common norm that Pakistani dictators’ nod positively to the US needs to legitimise their authoritarian and undemocratic rule as well as mustering military and economic assistance from the State Department and Pentagon. In return, between 9/11 and 2007, Pakistan mustered $10 billion in US aid (The Washington Quarterly, 2007:7-19). Till to-date, Afghanistan has remained an influential issue in the US foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan and its army. With previous bad experiences in aiding US war efforts rather proxy war in Afghanistan against Communism, Pakistan having developed a regional power, agreed US military plans because they ran in congruence to Pakistan’s objectives. After the 1950s and 60s, and 1980s Cold War front line ally, it is clear that Pakistan was same malleable client of former decades, rather a substantially more dependent actor. 2. Pakistan’s Domestic Politics, Pakistan Army and the Blackwater Activities The Pakistan Army has already launched military operations against the Pakistani Taliban first in Swat named Rah-e-Rast (right path) and now in Waziristan Rah-e-Nijat (path to salvation). Pakistan exploited nearly all available non-military options before undertaking such operations. While Washington supports the GHQ in its operations in the areas mentioned above, GHQ argues that the resilience of the TTP terrorism is much related to the political and military support given to them by outside powers. There have also been military allegations that just in the beginning of operation Rah-e-Nijat in Waziristan; American helicopters were witnessed to have started an air-lift for the terrorists of the Pakistani Taliban. In both cases, one feels there is an officially   63 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi  sanctioned ‘dual policy’ practised by the US and the Pakistan Army. CIA and the ISI, once buddies of the Cold War today are at loggerhead and do not see eye to eye on several strategic issues. The Pakistan Army’s alleged support to Afghan Taliban is no secret (Ahmed , 2008) and widely supported amongst the Pakistani public. This has raised the power of attraction that GHQ holds in the eyes of activists in the NWFP, Baluchistan as well as Islamist elements everywhere in Pakistan. If GHQ in the near future gets once again closer to the US, it would most likely lose the moral ground it has gained over the past couple of years since Musharraf’s departure. The US image in the region is already in tatters. While Americans regard Pakistan and Afghanistan as separate countries, to the Afghan Taliban and Pakhtoons of NWFP, Baluchistan and especially tribal Pakhtoons, it is all one friendly, familiar piece of territory. For them the border, Durand line, is just a Western invention. It is indeed interesting to note that the people living in these places consider Afghan Taliban justified in taking up arms against the US/NATO forces, but at the same time thinks of Pakistani Taliban as terrorists (Daily Wahdat, 2009). In some respects, the move of the US to station troops as well as Blackwater and DynCorp (US non-governmental military, and mercenary companies) in Pakistan may be compared to the US troops and bases, especially the ‘Badaber base’ in Pakistan during the 1960s. But American troops and bases in Pakistan were then considered as powerful symbols of the strategic relations between the two countries. In fact, the Pakistan Army encouraged the establishments of such bases as it appeared to strengthen Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis a powerful neighbour-India. Today the situation is very different. The presence of US troops and Blackwater on Pakistani soil are considered by the Pakistan Army as posing a serious challenge to Pakistan’s security. Americans consider such ‘presence’ as a part of its global ‘War on Terror’. However, senior officers in the Pakistan Army who I had communications with; believe that the presence of American military as well as DynCorp and Blackwater (just recently renamed as Xe- Xenon) will be for extended periods. They also fear that such ‘presence’ will be a direct threat to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. My informants in the Pakistan Army also hold Blackwater responsible for the car bomb blasts in Pakistan. And believe that the US agencies are intentionally destabilising Pakistan so that, giving the   64