AMIGOS DEL RÍO GUAYNABO, INC. CIUDADANOS EN DEFENSA DEL AMBIENTE COMITÉ BASURA CERO ARECIBO MADRES DE NEGRO DE ARECIBO SIERRA CLUB DE PUERTO RICO November 12, 2015 Via Email and Certified Mail Ms. Lauren McGee Rayburn, Rural Utilities Service 84 Coxe Ave., Suite 1E Ashville, North Carolina 28801 [email protected] RE: Comments on “Arecibo Waste-to-Energy and Resource Recovery Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement” Dear Ms. Rayburn, Amigos del Río Guaynabo, Inc., Ciudadanos en Defensa del Ambiente, Comité Basura Cero Arecibo, Madres de Negro de Arecibo, and Sierra Club de Puerto Rico submit these comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Rural Utility Service (“RUS”) for RUS’s proposal to provide financial support to Energy Answers to construct a municipal waste incinerator in Arecibo, Puerto Rico (“the Incinerator” or “the Project”). See Dep’t of Agric., Rural Utilities Serv., Arecibo Waste-to-Energy and Resource Recovery Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (July 2015) (“DEIS”). Despite the availability of more economically beneficial and less environmentally harmful ways to handle waste and despite a current over-capacity of electricity generation in Puerto Rico, RUS is considering whether to financially assist the proposed waste incineration facility—one of the most expensive and polluting ways to address waste and one of the most expensive and polluting ways to produce electricity. This Project, a source of lead emissions, would be sited in one of the country’s few lead non-attainment areas and in a territory identified as an “extreme poverty area” with a predominantly minority population. In addition, the Project will serve an area that is decidedly not rural, in contravention of RUS’s statutory mandate. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (“NEPA”), requires that RUS take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of its planned action. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). Before committing millions of federal taxpayer dollars to this Project, RUS must “carefully consider[] detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). As explained below, the DEIS does not reflect a hard look or careful consideration of the Project, feasible alternatives, and impacts. Unless RUS addresses the numerous and significant failures outlined in these comments, any decision it makes to financially assist the Project would not be fully informed and in violation of NEPA. TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................1 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................................2 I. THE PROJECT DOES NOT SATISFY RUS’S STATED PURPOSE AND NEED. ......................................................................................................................2 A. The Electricity Generated by the Project is Not Needed. ............................3 B. The Project Likely Will Not Receive the Solid Waste it Needs to Operate at Capacity. ..................................................................................................3 C. Without a Water Supply, the Project Will Not be Feasible. ........................7 D. Significant Legal Obstacles Raise Serious Questions about the Legal Status of the Project. ....................................................................................8 E. RUS Has Failed to Explain How Funding the Project is Within its Authority. .....................................................................................................9 II. THE DEIS FAILS TO CONSIDER REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES. ...........11 A. RUS Failed to Consider Reasonable Alternatives to Divert Waste from Puerto Rico’s Landfills and Extend the Life of Existing Landfills. ..........12 1. Source reduction ............................................................................12 2. Reuse ..............................................................................................13 3. Recycling .......................................................................................13 4. Compost-to-energy/Anaerobic digester facility .............................14 B. RUS Failed to Consider Reasonable Alternatives to Reduce Puerto Rico’s Dependence on Oil-Fired Electric Generation. ..........................................15 1. Cleaner renewable energy sources .................................................16 2. Energy efficiency ...........................................................................17 3. Landfill gas energy ........................................................................18 C. RUS’s Assessment of Different Site Locations and Alternative Waste Incineration Technologies is Inadequate. ..................................................18 D. The No-Action Alternative Presents an Inaccurate Baseline for Comparison with the Action Alternative. ..................................................19 i III. THE DEIS FAILS TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE INCINERATOR’S IMPACTS. .............................................................................................................21 A. The DEIS’s Assessment of Impacts on Public Health Does Not Withstand Scrutiny. .....................................................................................................21 1. The DEIS cannot lawfully rely on the Human Health Risk Assessment conducted by Energy Answers. ..................................22 2. The projected emission rates underlying the HHRA are erroneous and substantially underestimate risks.............................................23 a. Air emissions from Energy Answers’ SEMASS facility in Massachusetts are likely to be less toxic than air emissions from the proposed Project. .................................................23 b. The HHRA is based on an arbitrarily deflated particulate matter emissions rate..........................................................26 3. Even apart from its erroneous inputs, the HHRA’s analysis is fundamentally flawed.....................................................................28 4. The DEIS does not take a hard look at the impacts of lead exposure posed by the Incinerator. ................................................................32 a. Contrary to the DEIS’s apparent assumption, there is no safe level of lead. ...............................................................32 b. Any reliance on the HHRA for conclusions about lead impacts is misplaced. .........................................................35 c. The DEIS has no basis for any conclusion that lead emissions in Arecibo are declining. ...................................36 B. The DEIS Does Not Comply with NEPA’s Mandate to Consider Cumulative Impacts. ..................................................................................37 1. The DEIS unlawfully omits any consideration of the Project’s cumulative impacts on human health. ............................................38 2. The DEIS’s purported cumulative impacts analysis fails to satisfy NEPA. ............................................................................................42 C. The DEIS’s Cursory Analysis of the Project’s Ash Production and Proposed Management Methods Fails to Take the Hard Look Required by NEPA. ........................................................................................................43 ii 1. The DEIS accepts as true, without further study or analysis, Energy Answers’ claim that it can effectively make the ash waste stream nonhazardous. ................................................................................44 2. To satisfy NEPA’s hard look, RUS must analyze the possibility that the Incinerator’s ash will be hazardous. ..................................47 D. The DEIS’s Consideration of Impacts on Water Resources Falls Short of the Hard Look Required under NEPA. ......................................................49 1. The DEIS’s assessment of the impacts of required water withdrawals is unsupported, arbitrary, and capricious...................49 2. The DEIS also fails to adequately consider impacts on the quality of surface water and groundwater. .................................................52 3. RUS is not in compliance with Executive Order 11988 and CEQ Guidance concerning floodplain management and flood risks. .....56 E. The DEIS Inadequately Assesses the Project’s Impacts on Biological Resources and Federally Protected Species. ..............................................58 F. The DEIS Fails to Take a Hard Look at GHG Emissions from the Incinerator. .................................................................................................60 1. The DEIS incorrectly concludes that the Incinerator will reduce GHG emissions. .............................................................................60 2. RUS did not use a readily available tool for analyzing the social cost of carbon from the proposed Incinerator. ...............................63 G. The DEIS’s Socioeconomic and Environmental Justice Section Are Inadequate. .................................................................................................64 1. The DEIS’s employment estimates are grossly overstated. ...........64 2. The DEIS fails to fully analyze the economic implications of the Project from both a waste management and energy generation perspective. ....................................................................................65 3. RUS must conduct a proper environmental justice analysis. .........68 H. The DEIS Fails to Adequately Analyze the Project’s Impacts on Historic and Cultural Resources. .............................................................................70 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................73 iii BACKGROUND Energy Answers’ efforts to construct an incinerator in Arecibo began more than half a decade ago, when it sought to fast-track its proposed project pursuant to Puerto Rico Executive Order 2010-034, which declared an “emergency with respect to the electricity energy generation infrastructure of Puerto Rico.” P.R. Exec. Order No. 2010-034 (July 19, 2010). More than five years later, well after that Executive Order expired and was not renewed, Energy Answers’ permitting process limps along with no end in sight, plagued by multiple legal challenges and substantial public opposition, including from the very municipalities whose waste is required for the Project’s operation. In 2010, the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (“PRIDCO”) prepared an EIS (the “2010 PRIDCO EIS”) for Energy Answers’ proposed project pursuant to Puerto Rico Environmental Public Policy Law, Law No. 416 (Sept. 22, 2004), which was subject to an expedited evaluation process that denied the public an adequate opportunity for review. Public notice of the availability of the 2010 PRIDCO EIS was published on October 26, 2010.1 The document was more than 300 pages and contained appendices totaling more than 2,000 pages, but the public comment period closed a mere two weeks later on November 9, 2010.2 On November 26, 2010, one month after the draft EIS was made available to the public, PRIDCO transmitted the final EIS to the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board.3 The 2010 PRIDCO EIS contained 18 appendices, including a Human Health Risk Evaluation (Appendix K) and an Ecological Risk Evaluation (Appendix L), both of which are heavily relied on by RUS’s DEIS.4 RUS’s involvement in the Project as a result of Energy Answers’ request for federal financial assistance has only exacerbated the public mistrust stemming from the deeply flawed process that characterized the 2010 PRIDCO EIS. Thus far, RUS has not made “diligent efforts to involve the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6. At both its January 28, 2015 scoping meeting, which was attended by about 150 individuals, and its August 20, 2015 public hearing on the DEIS, which was attended by more than 550 individuals, RUS failed to provide a translator, despite the fact that Spanish is an official language—and the predominant language—in Puerto Rico. As a 1 Letter from José Ramón Pérez-Riera, Exec. Dir., PRIDCO, to Pedro J. Nieves Miranda, President, Envtl. Quality Board (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.rd.usda.gov/files/2PRIDCO-EISpt1eng.pdf. 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 In the Federal Register notice announcing availability of the DEIS, RUS vaguely notes that it “incorporates by reference the environmental impact analyses and associated documentation prepared by . . . [PRIDCO] and the USEPA where appropriate.” 80 Fed. Reg. 47,452, 47, 452 (Aug. 7, 2015) (emphasis added). But the DEIS itself nowhere indicates which particular parts of the PRIDCO and EPA analyses and supporting documents have been incorporated by reference. To comply with NEPA, the final EIS must identify and describe the incorporated material. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21. 1 result, at both public meetings, hundreds of members of the public who had shown up to voice their concerns about the Project could not communicate at all with the RUS staff in attendance.5 RUS’s failure to engage the affected public also is reflected in the agency’s refusal to disclose the nature of Energy Answers’ request for assistance. Although RUS prepared the DEIS because Energy Answers “indicated its intent to obtain a loan or a loan guarantee” and RUS “determined that the issuance of a loan or a loan guarantee would constitute a major federal action,” DEIS at 1-1, RUS has refused to disclose any information to the public about the scale of the federal taxpayer dollars at stake. The DEIS makes no mention of the amount of the requested assistance, and RUS has insisted that it possesses no documents in response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for all information regarding a possible or actual request for financial assistance from Energy Answers. An appeal of RUS’s FOIA determination is pending. See Letter from Jonathan Smith et al. to RUS Adm’r (Oct. 13, 2015) (attached as Exhibit 1). DISCUSSION I. THE PROJECT DOES NOT SATISFY RUS’S STATED PURPOSE AND NEED. RUS’s description and assessment of the proposed Project and of its purpose and need is incomplete and misleading.6 The DEIS sets forth two categories of purpose and need for the EA Incinerator, one related to municipal solid waste (“MSW”) landfills and the other related to energy generation. DEIS at 1-8 to 1-9. With respect to waste, the DEIS claims the incinerator is needed to address long-term landfill constraints and to extend the lifespan of existing landfills. Id. at 1-8. With respect to energy, the DEIS claims the Incinerator would displace existing oil- fired generation on the island, reduce mercury emissions, and reduce methane emissions by diverting waste from landfills. Id. at 1-9. Although the DEIS notes that RUS agency actions include “[e]valuat[ing] the financial ability of the borrower to repay its potential financial obligations to RUS” and “[e]nsur[ing] 5 Executive Order 12,898 and USDA’s own policies require more. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 § 5-5(b) (Feb. 11, 1994) (“Each Federal agency shall work to ensure that public documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health or the environment are . . . understandable, and readily accessible to the public.”); Council on Envtl. Quality, Environmental Justice: Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act 13 (1997), http://www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf (“Participation of low- income populations [and] minority populations . . . may require adaptive or innovative approaches to overcome linguistic . . . barriers to effective participation in the decision-making processes of Federal agencies under customary NEPA procedures.”); USDA Departmental Regulation 5600-002, Environmental Justice 35 (Dec. 15, 1997), http://www.ocio.usda.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012/DR5600-002%5B1%5D.pdf (“Documents [and] meetings . . . should be translated to facilitate participation by persons who do not speak or understand English.”). 6 The DEIS contains numerous internal inconsistencies that do not provide the public with a concrete description of the Project and its scope. For example, the DEIS alternately refers to the Project burning 2,100 tons of waste per day and 2,300 tons per day, compare DEIS at 2-11 with id. at 1-2; provides unclear projections of the Project’s electricity generation that range from 67 MW to 80 MW, id. at 1-1, 2-27, 3-46; and alternates between a Project lifetime of 30 years and 50 years, id. at 2-36, 3-9. For purposes of these Comments, we refer to a 2,100 ton capacity, 67 MW of electricity generation, and a 30-year lifespan. 2 adequate fuel supply and waste streams are available to meet the Project needs,” DEIS at 1-10, there is no indication in the DEIS that RUS actually has done so. In describing the Project and reaching a determination that there is a “demonstrated need” for the Project, id. at 3-29, RUS misleadingly omits key information, presented below, that is critical to an informed decision. A. The Electricity Generated by the Project is Not Needed. First, the DEIS makes no mention of the fact that Puerto Rico currently possesses 50 percent more electricity-generating capacity than the island currently needs.7 The DEIS’s description of energy needs on the island begins misleadingly instead with reference to an energy “emergency.” DEIS at 1-9. The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), the sole utility delivering all of the island’s electricity, recently released a draft Integrated Resource Plan (“IRP”) covering the fiscal years 2016 to 2035. In this plan, which “comprehensively evaluates all existing and future generation resources to identify the most efficient plan to meet its electric power requirements,” PREPA tellingly makes no mention of the Incinerator.8 To overcome an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, RUS must incorporate consideration of the actual energy need and generation capacity in Puerto Rico in reaching its determination of whether the Project is, in fact, needed. B. The Project Likely Will Not Receive the Solid Waste it Needs to Operate at Capacity. Even if the Project’s 67 MW of energy were needed on the island, there is no evidence to show that there will be enough waste for the Incinerator to operate at capacity. First, the municipalities that are expected to provide the stream of MSW as fuel for the Incinerator have indicated their refusal to do so. Moreover, even if the municipalities could be lawfully compelled to send their waste to the Incinerator, the likelihood is quite high that Puerto Rico will not generate enough MSW to sustain the Incinerator over a 30-year lifespan. The Mayors Association of Puerto Rico, representing 47 of the 78 municipalities in Puerto Rico, has voted unanimously to pursue legal action against Puerto Rico’s Solid Waste Management Authority (“SWMA”) challenging the contract between SWMA and Energy 7Power Problems: Puerto Rico’s Electric Utility Faces Crippling Debt, NPR (May 7, 2015, 3:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/07/403291009/power-problems-puerto-ricos-electric-utility-faces-crippling-debt (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (quoting Puerto Rico’s top energy official). See also Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Energy Transition Initiative 2 (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62708.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (showing that Puerto Rico’s generation capacity is 5,839 MW, and its peak demand is 3,685 MW). 8 See PREPA, Integrated Resource Plan Volume I: Supply Portfolios and Futures Analysis, Draft for the Review of the Puerto Rico Energy Commission (July 7, 2015) (“PREPA IRP Vol. I”), http://www.aeepr.com/Docs/Ley57/PREPA%20IRP%20Volume%20I%20%E2%80%93%20Draft%20for%20PRE C%20review%20-%20July%207-2015.PDF. 3 Answers that places obligations on Puerto Rico’s municipalities to send waste to the Incinerator without their consent.9 In an August 2015 letter to RUS, the Mayors Association noted that: Financial assistance to Energy Answers should be denied by RUS in absence of sound and credible information to draw conclusions on the economic feasibility of the project, particularly when the municipalities of Puerto Rico, with their respective wastes and tipping fees, are not willing partners in this project and will not support with their municipal funds Energy Answers’ loan payment capacity.10 Likewise, the Federation of Mayors of Puerto Rico, representing the other 31 municipalities in the Commonwealth, also has advised RUS that the economic feasibility of the Project is “based on the erroneous assumption that the affected Municipalities will passively sit idle while their operational budgets and MSW resources get virtually obliterated. USDA/RUS . . . can be certain that this shall not be so.”11 Members of the United States Congress, too, have called into question RUS’s ability “to recoup any funds invested in the project,” given the widespread municipal opposition.12 Beyond such strong municipal opposition to sending waste to the Incinerator, there also remains the very real question whether Puerto Rico will generate enough waste to make the Incinerator viable. The DEIS relies on stale data to conclude that enough waste will be generated to supply the Incinerator’s needs—an error that casts serious doubt on the feasibility of the Incinerator, which requires 2,100 tons per day of processed refuse fuel to operate at its generation capacity. 9 Jenifer Wiscovitch Padilla, Alcades Rojos Irán a Tribunal para Evitar Quemar Basura en Incineradora [Red Mayors Will go to Court to Avoid Burning Trash in Incinerator], Visión (Sept. 30, 2015), http://periodicovision.com/?p=8273 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 10 Letter from Rolando Ortiz Velázquez, President, Puerto Rico’s Mayors Ass’n to USDA/RUS 2 (Aug. 20, 2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByisPzvuK1UBaHpWeldjVXlUdjg/view. 11 Letter from Reinaldo Paniagua Latimer, Executive Dir., Federación de Alcaldes de Puerto Rico, Inc. to USDA, RUS (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.corrienteverde.com/incineradora%20RUS%20presentation%20Federacion%20Alcaldes%2020%20agost o.pdf. 12 Letter from Nydia M. Velázquez and José E. Serrano to USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack (emphasis added) (Sep. 30, 2015), http://puertoricotequiero.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Misiva-Nydia-Vel%C3%A1zque-y- Jos%C3%A9-Serrano.pdf. This would not be the first time strong public opposition has effectively killed an incinerator proposed by Energy Answers. See, e.g., Timothy Wheeler, Trash-Burning Power Project Hits New Snag, The Baltimore Sun (February 22, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/green/blog/bs-md-incinerator- 20150216-story.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); see also Letter from Leah Kelly, Attorney, Envtl. Integrity Project, et al. to Benjamin Grumbles, Sec’y of the Env’t, Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t (Aug. 12, 2015) (explaining that Energy Answers Baltimore, LLC allowed its air permit to expire by failing to construct within 18 months), http://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015.08.12_FINAL_Letter_to_MDE.pdf (letter), http://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015.08.12_FINAL_Attachments_to_MDE_Letter.pdf (attachments). 4 The DEIS relies on 2006 projections that show an increase in Puerto Rico’s population between 2012 and 2025, and on 2008 data that project an increase in the amount of waste generated in Puerto Rico over the same time period. See DEIS at 2-12, Table 2-1 (using an increasing population over the next decade with a static daily waste-generation rate of about 5.6 lbs/day per person to calculate the available waste in the service area). But these projections are no longer valid. As the DEIS itself later recognizes in a separate section, more recent data show that the population of Puerto Rico declined from 2000 to 2013 and is “projected to continue to decline through 2030.” Id. at 3-121. Specifically, the island’s population is declining at about 0.6% per year, with some years showing a 1% decline.13 At the same time, Puerto Rico’s per capita waste production is also declining and would be expected to continue to decline with implementation of recycling policies. See DEIS at 1-5 (noting that Puerto Rico’s current 14% recycling rate falls far short of the mandated 35% target rate). The DEIS relies on SWMA’s 2008 Dynamic Itinerary for Infrastructure Projects (“Dynamic Itinerary”) for a per capita waste production estimate of 5.56 lbs/day, based on 2003 waste production estimates that SWMA expected to remain constant.14 Id. at 2-12, Table 2-1.15 In 2015, SWMA revised this per-person estimate to 5.0 lbs/day in 2014. Id. at 1-5. For reference, the current U.S. average per capita waste generation is 4.4 lbs/day. Id. RUS uses the following formula to determine how much waste will be available for incineration each year: {[Population x (MSW (in lbs)/person/day)] / 2000 lbs/ton} x (1 - recycling rate) = Total MSW per day to incinerator (in tons)16 The DEIS makes clear that “2,100 tons per day of processed refuse fuel . . . is needed for the proposed Project to operate at its generation capacity.” Id. at 2-11. But applying the Puerto Rico Solid Waste Reduction and Recycling Act (Act 70) goal recycling rate of 35% to a smaller population that has a per capita solid waste production of 5.0 lbs/day or less shows that the applicable waste stream will fail to meet the Incinerator’s capacity as early as 2028. Using 2010 census data,17 the Puerto Rico Planning Board’s population decline estimates,18 and the Central Intelligence Agency’s population growth rate for Puerto Rico (- 13 The World Factbook, Central America and Caribbean: Puerto Rico, Cent. Intelligence Agency (“CIA World Factbook”), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rq.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); Lizette Alvarez, Economy and Crime Spur New Puerto Rican Exodus, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2014, at A1. 14 Autoridad de Desperdicios Sólidos [Solid Waste Management Authority], Itinerario Dinámico para Proyectos de Infraestructura [Dynamic Itinerary for Infrastructure Projects] at 3-1 to 3-2 (May 2008) (“Dynamic Itinerary”), https://noticiasmicrojuris.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/dynamic_itinerary.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 15 This table derives total available waste by assuming approximately 5.56 lbs/day per person of waste production. 16 This equation is derived from the values in Table 2-1 in the DEIS, which provides RUS’s estimates for available daily waste for 2012, 2020, and 2025. DEIS at 2-12, Table 2-1. 17 To retrieve the 2010 census data for each municipality in the service area, go to http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml. 5 0.6%),19 the service area will have a population of around 1,472,231 in 2028. Assuming that the 0.05 lbs/day decrease in per capita waste production between 2003 (5.56 lbs/day) and 2014 (5.0 lbs/day) remains constant, Puerto Ricans will only produce 4.36 lbs/day per person in 2028. Accepting the DEIS’s assumption that Puerto Rico will achieve the goal 35% by 2020,20 DEIS at 2-12, Table 2-1, then the available waste for incineration will only be 2,086 tons/day in 2028. Thus, the service area will be unable to supply the Project with enough fuel—2,100 tons/day—to reach its generation capacity within a decade or so of operation. And if the Incinerator, in fact needs to collect 2,300 tons/day of MSW in order to have 2,100 tons/day of burnable refuse, as some sections of the DEIS seem to suggest, Id. at 1-2, 3-76, the service area will fail to hit that 2,300 tons/day target as early as 2022.21 These conclusions are reflected in the following chart, which shows how many tons per day of waste will be available to the Incinerator during its lifespan. The decrease in waste production over time is a function of decreasing population, decreasing waste production per capita, and increases in recycling rate. This analysis assumes that once Puerto Rico attains a 35% recycling rate in 2020, that recycling rate will remain constant, even if higher recycling rates are certainly possible.22 18 Junta de Planficiación de Puerto Rico [Puerto Rico Planning Board], Proyección Poblacional 2015-2016, Puerto Rico [Population Projections 2015-2025, Puerto Rico], http://www.jp.gobierno.pr/Portal_JP/Default.aspx?tabid=120 (last updated May 13, 2015). 19 CIA World Factbook; see also PREPA, Integrated Resource Plan Volume III Demand and Fuel Forecasts and Demand Side Management 1-6 to1-7 (Aug. 17, 2015) (“PREPA IRP Vol III”), http://www.aeepr.com/Docs/Ley57/PREPA%20IRP%20Volume%20III%20DRAFT%20for%20PREC%20Review %20-%20Demand%20Forecast%20August_17_2015.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (Puerto Rico’s population projected to decline from 3,598,357 in 2015 to 3,329,725 in 2035, about a 0.6% decline each year). 20 The Puerto Rico legislature had originally hoped to attain this 35% recycling rate by 1992, but that deadline has since been pushed back. See 1992 P.R. Laws 70. 21 The comments on the DEIS submitted by the group CAMBIO, incorporated by reference here, contain a similar waste stream analysis that finds the service area will provide only 1,498 tons/day of MSW in 2025, under the assumption that some of the municipalities in the service area will not send their MSW to the Arecibo Incinerator and will instead send it to a second proposed incinerator in Barceloneta or to the municipality’s own landfill, where applicable. Ingrid M. Vila-Biaggi & Luis E. Rodríguez-Rivera, Comments Concerning the Draft RUS EIS Related to Energy Answers Arecibo Incineration Project 6-9 (Nov. 11, 2015); see also id. Attach. 5, at 11 (economic waste- stream analysis prepared for the CAMBIO Comments by Advantage Business Consulting). 22 Massachusetts, for example, has a recycling rate at 47%. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Overview: Solid Waste Management in Massachusetts 1, http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/recycle/solid/swminma.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). In Figure 1, the assumption that the recycling rate will no longer increase after 2020 explains why the decrease in overall waste production begins to slow down this year. 6