AMIENS AND MUNICH "Great wonders there are to a sieve," says the beetle in an old Russian story, "so many holes and no way out." AMIENS AND MUNICH COMPARISONS IN APPEASEMENT by ERNST L. PRESSEISEN • I978 MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE / BOSTON / LONDON © 1978 by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague. Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1978 All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, P.O.B. 566,2501 eN The Hague, The Netherlands. ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9720-2 e-ISBN -13: 978-94-009-9718-9 DOl: 10.1007/ 978-94-009-9718-9 TO R.A YMOND J. SONTAG Teacher par excellence TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface IX I. POINT OF DEPARTURE II. APPEASEMENT DEFINED 9 III. ON MOTIVES AND SIMILARITIES 30 IV. IDEOLOGICAL ANGST 72 V. PORTRAITS OF Two EpOCHS 98 VI. THE BALANCE SHEET 128 Bibliography 133 Index 149 PREFACE It has not been my intention to write a definitive study of appeasement. Such a work would have to include the French variety, Stalin's appeasement of Hitler between 1939 and 1941, or the appeasement of Japan in 1938 and 1939. I chose the British case for a number of reasons. The opportunity of a comparative model was a challenge, British appeasement was well known, and the structure of the British government remained rather the same in the intervening period between Waterloo and Dunkirk. I admit that Amiens and Munich represent the most dramatic episodes in the story of appeasement, but then the British struggles against Bonaparte and Hitler were of epic proportions. It was of course unnecessary "to prove" appeasement at Munich, but very few historians had looked at the treaty of Amiens in this way. Much of my research effort was therefore devoted to examining the published material of the earlier period. While I have used some original Addington documents, this work is not primarily an inquiry into unpublished sources but a rein terpretation of well known events that were made public long ago. The flood of publications and revelations of the 1930's continues unabated. I have tried to use the latest studies, especially those that have benefited from the thirty year rule. My debts of gratitude extend over a long period since two stints as chairman of the department have delayed this book by at least four years. Financially I have received support from the Council of Deans of Northern Illinois University, the American Philosophical Society, and especially from Temple University. The latter made available two grants-in-aid and study leaves in 1970 and 1975. Without this important encouragement I could not have completed my work. I would also like to thank a number of institutions for their help: the Public Record Office, London; the manuscript division of the British Museum; the Public Record Office in Exeter, Devonshire; the Newberry Library in Chicago; the Library Company in Philadelphia and last but not least the Samuel Paley Library of Temple University. My wife and son x PREFACE have borne the rigors of my scholarship with patience and have become the experts in appeasement. Philadelphia August 1976 CHAPTER I POINT OF DEPARTURE Whether another study of appeasement can be justified depends largely on the importance of the subject and the approach that is taken. Appeasement is a highly complex phenomenon - subtle, full of crosscurrents and conflicts. It is also a stubborn topic that will not go away, '~ither in historiography or politics. In the political arena it remains a fighting word; witness the state ment by the Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, preferring a blood bath to "appeasement of the students." It will not help to call this an isolated 1 incident in politics; the two decades of the Cold War and the fighting in Vietnam were punctuated by charges of appeasement. The continuing importance of the word "appeasement" in the political world owes much to its imprecision. In the political rough-and-tumble slip shod vocabulary is to be expected, can indeed be quite useful. But why should historical studies indulge in a similar luxury? A later chapter will attempt to define the term. Our first intention is to demonstrate appeasement's impor tance for historiography by describing the circumstances in which it occurred. As part of this approach the recurrence of appeasement in rather similar periods should add a perspective to our understanding of the subject. Few will deny that the age of the French revolution and Napoleon, and the Nazi era with its Fiihrer, produced men and movements of revolutionary character. Both periods are usually associated with mass participation in politics and war, as well as the start in one and the perfection in the other of the medias of mass communication. So sharp was the break with previous life styles, both public and private, that those outside the revolutionary circle found it almost impossible to comprehend the turmoil in standards, habits and values. Diplomacy may have suffered more than any other activity in the revolutionary age since tradition occupies so large a part in its procedures. 1 The National Observer, April 13, 1970, p. 6. Recently George Meany called detente with Russia" ...a policy of appeasement, just plain, ordinary appeasement." Time, March 3, 1975, p. II. 2 POINT OF DEPARTURE Finally, the "lottery of revolutions" produced its share of "adventurers" (as Pitt said), of which Bonaparte was one and Hitler a later version. Diplomacy at work in such times and with such men would have to make many accommodations. The English islands, bending under the revolu tionary storms, had nevertheless to deal with them, and we find its diplomats in Paris and Berlin working for peace in traditional ways. At least they tried. Yet even the Earl of Malmesbury thought it best to wear the national (tricolor) cockade during his stay in Paris while Sir Nevile Henderson an swered the Hitler salute with his " Rule Britannia!" If they had succeeded the 2 diplomatic method would have triumphed over revolutionary dynamism. Since they did not diplomacy was reduced to accommodations which we call appeasement. The link between appeasement and two revolutionary periods has provided the perspective for appreciating its importance. Our approach to its study disagrees with the efforts of those historians who see appeasement as a constant feature of diplomacy. 3 It may be, but we do not recognize it by that name. Appeasement, as we know it, was practiced during specific periods under revolutionary circumstances and reached its apogee with the treaties of Amiens and Munich. Nor can we accept the statements of Professor Med licott who prefers to deny it as a policy altogether.4 To deny the existence of appeasement is to deny the existence of Napoleon and Hitler. But alas, both did exist, and so does our subject. All along, however, we have proceeded on an assumption: that a clearer understanding of history can be reached by comparing apparently similar periods of history. Comparative history is not foolproof, it certainly will not attract those who insist on the uniqueness of each historical event, but as a method of studying the past it offers exciting possibilities to the open mind that is willing to give it a try. 5 It is the peculiar character of history that it does not permit the instant recall or replication available to the scientist. We all know that history does not repeat itself, but can parallels in history be as readily dismissed? Ob viously, differences will exist side by side with similarities. No two periods are exactly alike and the comparative method does not seek to straightjacket two distinct eras into a wholly confining mold. Nevertheless, once this is admitted 2 Diaries and Correspondence ofJ ames Harris, First Earl ofM almesbury, edit. by the third Earl (London, 1845), III, p. 260; Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure ofa Mission (New York, 1940), p. 41. 3 Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York, 1966), passim. 4 W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963 (London, 1968), xix. 5 For the best discussion about comparative history, see C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, a study in comparative history (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1966), pp. 35-46.