No. 18-15 __________________________________________________________ IN THE Supreme Court of the United States —————¨————— JAMES L. KISOR, Petitioner, v. ROBERT L. WILKIE, Respondent. —————¨————— ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT —————¨————— BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER —————¨————— MARTIN S. KAUFMAN Counsel of Record ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION 500 Mamaroneck Avenue Suite 320 Harrison, NY 10528 (914) 834-3322 [email protected] Counsel for Amicus Curiae January 2019 _____________________________________________________ i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). ii TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE. . . . . . . . . . . 1 INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 I. Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. Should Be Overruled. . . . 10 A. Seminole Rock and Auer Contravene the APA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B. Seminole Rock And Auer Violate Separation of Powers Principles. . . . 10 C. Auer Undermines the APA’s Important Safeguards of the Public Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 D. Auer Encourages Agencies to Promulgate Ambiguous Regulations. 14 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).. . . . passim Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).. 18 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 13 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 499 (2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). . . . . . . . . 12 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 16 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) Page Cases (cont’d) Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 16 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 14 United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). . . . . . . . 2 Statutes and Regulations Administrative Procedure Act, §55, Rule making, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). . . . . . . . . 7, 14 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §701, et seq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Administrative Procedure Act, Section 706, 5 U.S.C. §706. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8, 10 Consumer Products Safety Commission, Safety Standard for Bassinets and Cradles 16 C.F.R. Part 1218. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Federal Trade Commission, Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. Part 453.. . . . . 3 Other Authorities A. Alan Moghissi, et al.,. Innovation in Regulatory Science: Evolution of a New Scientific Discipline, 16 Technology and Innovation 155 (2014), doi:10.3727/194982414X14096821477027. . 18 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d) Page Other Authorities (cont’d) Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 9, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 67 (Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter, eds., 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bryce E Esch, et al., Using Best Available Science Information: Determining Best and Available, 116 Journal of Forestry 473 (September 2018) https://doi.org/10.1093/jofore/fvy037.. . . . . . 18 James Madison, Federalist 51, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 318 (Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter, eds., 2003). . . 12 John F. Manning, “Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,” 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 674-75 (1996).. . . . . . 6 Natalie Lowell and Ryan P. Kelly, Evaluating Agency Use of “Best Available Science” Under The United States Endangered Species Act, 196 Biological Conservation 53 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2016.02.003. 18 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 397 (1986) 1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 The Atlantic Legal Foundation is a non-profit public interest law firm founded in 1976 whose mandate is to advocate and protect the principles of less intrusive and more accountable government, a market-based economic system, and individual rights. It seeks to advance this goal through litigation and other public advocacy and through education. Atlantic Legal Foundation’s board of directors and legal advisory committee consist of legal scholars, corporate legal officers, private practitioners, business executives, and prominent scientists. Atlantic Legal’s directors and advisors are familiar with the pervasive federal regulations and agency interpretation of those regulations have on businesses, professions, voluntary organizations, and individuals. They are frequently called upon in their business, professional and personal lives to gauge the impact of federal regulations on their lives and the lives of themselves, their family members, their employers, employees and colleagues. Many of Atlantic Legal’s directors and 1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, which consents have been lodged with the Court Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae or its counsel made a monetary or other contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 2 advisers have wide experience interpreting federal statutes and regulations. The Foundation has an interest in ensuring that agencies do not overreach their constitutionally limited roles and regulate only in a lawful, fair and clear manner. The Foundation also has an interest in seeing that courts perform their constitutional function of limiting the power of the other branches; to do so the courts should not defer to agencies when deference is not due. To this end, Atlantic Legal Foundation files amicus briefs in this Court in cases involving issues of agency overreach and judicial deference, most recently in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT “The administrative state ‛wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life.’” City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). Virtually all persons, natural and legal, from infant to pensioner, from individual proprietor to Fortune 50 company, from subsistence farmer to cutting nano technology entrepreneur, is untouched by federal regulation. Federal regulations affect us, literally, from “cradle to grave.:” See Consumer Products Safety Commission regulations, 16 C.F.R. Part 1218 (Safety Standard for Bassinets and Cradles) and 3 Federal Trade Commission regulations, 16 C.F.R. Part 453 (Funeral Industry Practices). Regulated persons and entities are affected when an agency reinterprets its regulations in a manner that changes settled understandings without using the mechanisms and safeguards provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) – principally notice-and-comment rulemaking – that provides a check on regulatory overreach by requiring public participation and the development of an administrative record that facilitates judicial scrutiny of agency action. The principles of deference adopted in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), and in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (hereafter “Auer deference”) has immense impact on individuals and corporations who are part of the “regulated community” – almost all individuals, companies, associations who are subject to ever- growing federal regulation. “The canonical formulation of Auer deference is that [the Court] will enforce an agency’s interpreta- tion of its own rules unless that interpretation is ‛plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula- tion.’” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). If a regulation has multiple plausible readings, an agency’s preferred interpretaion, rather than the most logical, the one with the best linguistic meaning, or most legally relevant, will prevail. An executive branch agency will have displaced the judiciary’s role in scrutinizing 4 executive agency claims of jurisdiction and authority. Id. The Court “offered no justification whatever” when it adopted this interpretive rule, id., and cited no statute, constitutional provision, or precedent, and advanced no logic to support this doctrine. Id. The Auer doctrine vests in administrative agen- cies expansive lawmaking authority. The continued application of Seminole Rock and Auer, gives the executive branch opportunities to usurp judicial and legislative powers that the Constitution gives to other branches. The Auer doctrine also is an improper delegation of authority, creates incentives for agencies to adopt vague regulations, and disrupts reasonable expectations of regulated parties. See Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Decker, 568 U.S. at 615 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-11 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213-25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). When agencies adopt regulations through no- tice-and-comment rulemaking, regulated persons have an opportunity to shape the regulatory environment and ameliorate the burdens of excessive regulation. Auer deference does not assist a court in understanding a regulation’s meaning: