Architectural Challenges in Countering Existential Terrorist Threats: Lessons from a decade of studying “Loose Nukes” Presentation by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper 46th IEEE International Carnahan Conference On Security Technology October 16, 2012 Boston Marriott Newton S1SP ARA0127-1 Architectural Challenges in Countering Existential Terrorist Threats: Lessons from a decade of studying “Loose Nukes” • Drawn from studying how to counter terrorist threat of smuggling a nuclear weapon to attack the US: – Camp Lejeune Unconventional Nuclear Weapon Defense (UNWD) Test Bed Demonstration • Successful legacy being extended to protect other Marine Bases – DHS/HSARPA—DHS/DNDO Architecture Study • Bottom Line: Give priority to overseas countermeasures – DTRA Bosporus Study • Early (“Left of go”) Indications and Warning (I&W) is the key to success • Key Bottom Lines: – Technology is important but there is no silver bullet – Bureaucratic Impedance is a big problem – Empowering Local Authorities is the key to success Starting Point: Camp Lejeune/Onslow County, NC Layered Detection Concept • Camp LeJeune UNWD Testbed – Operational since Feb 03 – Includes JSIPP Sensors – Fully integrated military and civil law enforcement and disaster response activities – DSB: MCTFER “Best of Class” Military-Civilian Task Force for Emergency Response (MCTFER) • Layered Detect/ID Sensors – Front Gate to 30 miles out – Highway, rail, and water – Passive tracking with cameras – Red-Blue-White Team design Successfully transferred to Marines for operations—sensor im pr ovements now included and operations being extended to other Marine bases—perhaps including Pacific bases Camp Lejeune-Onslow County UNWD Sensors Radar for Tracking Boats Portable Rail Rad Sensors MobileRad in Electrical Box Detector Police Car Automatic Tag Photo @ 70 mph Hand-Held/Gate NaI Gamma Detector Inspections Jersey Barrier Detector Sneads Ferry Bridge Notional Sensor Distribution – Out to ~30 Miles • 4 Radiation Sensor Layers – Detect, ID and Track • Camera/Radar/Seismic Aid Tracking • Alarm/Alert System Informs EOC/Responders • Respond in Time to Prevent Attack on Base Onslow Beach Bridge Neutron Detector – By Road, Off-Road, Water, or Rail 4 Key Lessons from Camp Lejeune UNWD Effort • Demonstrated/Validated Red-Blue-White Team Design Approach • Unattended Ground Sensor Suites Feasible – Synthesized RN & Other Sensor Data • Unshielded and Lightly Shielded Devices • On Open Highway and at Portals (Slow and Not-So-Slow Traffic) – This Important ARA Conclusion was Controversial • Marines/Onslow County Officials Very Impressed • Operations continue after a decade and are being improved and extended • Heavy Shielding to Avoid Detection – Precludes Manhandling Weapons Off-Road – Provides an Exploitable Signature (Concentrated Mass) • Most Difficult Threat Scenarios Involve “Light” Devices – Man-Portable/ATV Transport to Avoid Choke Points – Water Approaches Particularly Troublesome, Especially with Effective Shielding – “Upstream” Tip-Off Information Very Useful • Excellent Military-Civilian Operations Possible – Train Together to Operate Together The bad news: After effective DoD and DHS operations were demonstrated as a congressionally mandated program, and as the Marines accepted and expanded the Force Protection aspects, 5 bureaucratic interests disconnected the DHS and DoD support for off-base operations. Missed Opportunity to Extend Force Protection to Norfolk: Critical to Deploying Marines Hampton Roads-Norfolk Essential to 2nd MEF Deployment Langley AFB (ACC) Ft. Eustis (TRANSCOM) Ft. Monroe (TRADOC) Newport News Shipyard Norfolk Naval Station SACT/JFCOM Little Creek Little Creek Coast Guard Key Hampton Roads-Norfolk Commands Oceana  Four 4-star Service, Joint and NATO Commands  12 Military Bases – 5 Guardian Bases in Red Camp Lejeune – 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)  Nation’s Only Shipyard Building A/C Carriers  UNWD/JSIPP CBN Detectors On & Off Base  Medical, Research, Intel & Training Facilities Exploiting Camp Lejeune Proving Ground Recommended UNWD Program Extension Camp Lejeune Testbed – Only UNWD/JSIPP Base: FY2005 Objective: Within 12 Months for $20 million  Military Civilian Task Force for Emergency Response  Expand Camp Lejeune Sensors to Morehead City (MTFER) Distinctive – Called “Best-of-Class” by 2003 DSB  Deploy Norfolk Testbed Using Camp Lejeune Pattern  Significant Off-Base “Outside the Fence” Operations  Integrate Defense & Homeland Security Dept. Efforts – A Rare Capability Recommended by 2003 DSB  Establish/Validate Military-Local/State/Federal Regional  CBRNE Protection Model to be Followed  Protection – In Support of Critical National Security Mission – Being Done by Fairfax County EOC Follow-on Long-Term Objectives: – Prove Technology/Response Architecture at Lejeune  Integrate with Coast Guard/Navy Operations – Validate Operations For More Complex Military-  Fill-in Jacksonville, NC to Norfolk Regional Defense Civilian Environments, e.g., Norfolk  Complete Full Spectrum CBRNE Protection Recommended Strategy:  Improve by Spiral Development  Enable Camp Lejeune/MCTFER as a Proving Ground  Extend to Entire East Coast & Gulf Coast  Demonstrate Prototype at Major Port – Norfolk  Proliferate Proven Capability 6 Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasure System Architecture (RNSAA) Analysis for DHS/HSARPA and DHS/DNDO • Worldwide Threat Context End-to-End RNCSAA Architecture Elements – Maritime/Overseas Threat Analysis Global Capabilities The operational goal of the – Complementary ARA NORTHCOM Futures Effort layered defense is to detect, deter and/or defeat RN • Red-Blue-White (RBW) Team Approach terrorist threats before they can reach high value targets – Independent Red Team within the U.S. –as far as – Blue Team Architect possible from the target. – White Team Referee US Capabilities • Phase I Focused on RN Threats to the National Capitol • Phase II – Proposed to Extend Upstream as far as possible If the layered defense fails to defeat detonation of an RN weapon, the goal is to manage the consequences and provide forensics information to identify the terrorists –capabilities that help deter attack. Objective – Prevent attack, as far away and as early as possible; “Keep the terrorists in a re-planning mode.” Layered Defense Architecture is the Key No Wide Open Paths to Targets! Architectural Layers •Point of Origin •Transit to POD/Border/Coast •Exit from POD/Border/Coast •Transit to US (Including Intermediary Stops) •Entry to US (POE/Border/Coast) •Transit to Target •Terminal Layer Key Conclusions: - Camp Lejeune concept of proliferated sensors very expensive - Very difficult to counter “loose nuke” once within the US 7 - Priority should be given to stopping loose nuke overseas Infiltration– Key Red Team Considerations of Threat to Washington, DC Careful, Deliberate, Patient - Avoid high traffic areas - Continuously monitor approach routes – Avoid choke points - Armed response/escorts keep device in sight Device - Movement not likely surrendered to Key Observations commercial transportation - Armed and multi-triggered for - Air transport/delivery best choice immediate detonation while in-transit - Pleasure water craft (20-26’) - Shielded as necessary (Pu device) - Rail transport not attractive and effectiveness checked with high- - Few if any contingency options quality radiation detector equipment - Lack of positive control - Channelized routes - SUV, Utility Trucks, and Limousine- type vehicles for roadway delivery preferred - Avoid Interstates; likely choke points - Off-road vehicles/routes where possible - Adopt Diversionary Tactics - Communications protected (secure/encrypted) throughout Key Bottom Lines: - Avoid Stream-of-Commerce and obvious chokepoints, primary DHS/DNDO focuses - Red has an advantage once the weapons are on the move 8 - Effective response depends critically on local law enforcement capabilities - It is much preferred to prevent a nuclear weapon from reaching US territory Observations From 17 RBW Scenarios No Scenarios used Interstate, POEs – All avoided “Stream-of-Commerce” Rail & Roadway approaches usually produced many detection opportunities Crisis/Response Management is key problem – Beltway “Last Ditch” Case Study Safe-houses cut both ways – slower attack helps defender; intermittent “hits” help attacker Small A/C overflew sensors reducing hits – of more concern is they could fly all the way Consider Threat form Air in more detail – LAX Case Study Waterway approaches generally had fewer, intermittent detection opportunities Recreational/Fishing Boats to Delmarva Peninsula a key threat 9 Consider Threat from the Atlantic in more detail – Norfolk Area Case Study Possible Eventual Northeastern Regional Testbed to Protect Washington, DC Comprehensive Detector Array US financial and political centers 12 States and their capitols ~70M People, ~25% of US population 35 Major cities (>100,000), including Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Richmond, Norfolk Hundreds of counties, cities, small towns, etc. Significant part of potential backbone of internal US layer Internet with ports of entry (POEs) – seaports, airports, border crossing Integrate with strategy to detect crossings other than these POE Overlay with mobile/transportable detectors and strategy for decoys Integrate with intelligence, sensors & analysis Estimated Northeast US Detector “Virtual” Layout Engage Ops of Coast Guard, Navy, Border Patrol, NTM, etc. to develop & ~3500 fixed detector locations – fill as testbeds develop demonstrate detection/interdiction Reduce Costs with Fixed/Mobile Mix, Decoys & Deception CONOPS Develop local, state and federal cooperative procedures Spiral Development of S&T Obviously a very complex, expensive effort 10