JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:1 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:36FF4F0D /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 1 Altruism: a brief history Almost everyone wants to be an altruist, and most of us lament the fact that we are not more altruistic than we are. Non-altruists feelanurgetojustifytheirbehaviourtotherestofus,andperhaps they show a little altruism in doing even that. The number of people in the world who unashamedly celebrate their egoistic behaviour is rather small. In this short book we investigate what thisthingisthatsomanyofuswanttobe.Isaltruismthemorally best thing? Not always, as we shall see. Altruismisasimpleidea.Manyconceptsinphilosophyandthe social sciences, by contrast, are quite complex. In some cases they arose only with specific forms of social and economic organization and can only be understood in these contexts (think of socialism or citizenship or the state).With others, their adher- ents argue vehemently over the best conceptions of the basic concept and competing theories are constructed under common names: democracy, social justice, or multiculturalism, for exam- ple.Otherconceptsarenotcomplexbutaresubjecttodenials,on thepartoftheirenemies,thatthereisanyvalueorutilityinthem at all: postmodernism, welfare, or nationalism, for example. Altruismisnotlikethesecases.Itisvaluedby(almost)everyone anditscoremeaninguniversallyagreed.Altruism,initsbroadest sense, means promoting the interests of the other. That, at least, was what was first meant by the idea. The French term ‘altru- isme’ was coined byAuguste Comte in his Système de Politique Positive([1851]1969–70):itcombinedtheLatinalterwithuiand literally meant ‘to this other’. The English ‘altruism’ was first introduced into Britain by George H. Lewes, a popularizer of Comte’s work, in 1853 (Brosnahan 1907). Altruism, as Comte KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential1 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:2 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:3E790030 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 2 Altruism intended it (see below), is therefore a moral concept, indeed this may seem to be its central usage. However, while altruism is an elemental moral idea, it is, nonetheless, embroiled in some thorny questions of right and wrong.Considertheracistorgandonor,forexample,whowishes to donate their organs, but only to those of their own race, regardless of the need others may have. They are altruistic, but hardlymoral.Moreover,whileitiseasytocondemnthisperson’s racism,considerthehugesumscharitablydonatedbyUScitizens tobeneficiariesintheirownsocietywhoare,byglobalstandards, still quite well off. This altruism may not be racist, but it still arguablyoffendsthemoralidealofimpartiality.Furtherproblems stemfromtheself-sacrificialelementboundupwiththevernacu- lar understanding of altruism. Consider the heroes who rescue children from the proverbial burning building or – an important reallifecaseweconsiderinChapter4–rescuersofJewsinNazi Europe. Did such people have a duty to incur these risks? If they did not, then should they have displayed such heroism? If they did, then does altruism sometimes ask too much of us? If we believethatsomesacrificeofone’sowninterestsforotherscanbe required then we need to know how much can reasonably be asked for. Altruism is a general phenomenon that involves taking the interests of the other as one’s own; it is often identified with the Golden Rule (present in many religious and ethical traditions as weshallshortlysee)–dountoothersasyouwouldhavethemdo unto you. The Golden Rule seems to identify altruism with morality, but it is far from clear whether acting from the golden rule is always moral. Hobbes endorsed the Golden Rule, but interpreteditegoistically:apersonfirstdecideshowtheywantto be treated and then they treat others on this basis. How about the masochist, for example, or religious zealots, or others with peculiartasteswhichtheywouldlike‘altruistically’tosharewith others. Altruism, to make the point a final time, is a fundamen- tallysimpleideabut(perhapsforthatreason)itsimplicationsand its association with morality, are far from simple. Investigating altruism,mayseemabitliketakingasweateraparttoseewhatit is made of, leaving us with all yarn and no sweater. In this book we shall do some of this unstitching, but in a way that tries to preserve what is left. KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential2 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:3 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:43825500 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 Altruism: a brief history 3 We shall consider altruism from a number of disciplinary perspectives since it is in the engagement between its moral meaning and these perspectives that the most interesting ques- tionsaboutaltruismlie.Besidesethics,then,weshallexplorethe contributions of evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology, economics and political science, to the study of altruism. All of these disciplines have advanced our understanding of the nature of altruism, even if some of them – in particular evolutionary biology and economics – have expressed some scepticism over whether it genuinely exists. In the remainder of this chapter we shall survey the history of altruism in moral thought. Although the term altruism is a nineteenth century one, the concept has a long pedigree. The historical excavation of altruism’s meanings will reveal how different thinkers construed the relative value of altruism and egoism, and the relationship between altruism and moralityinadiversityofways.Oneimportantissuewhichaffects the latter is whether we believe that when people act in altruistic and/ormoralwaystheyaremotivatedprincipallybyreasonsorby their emotions. This is the subject of intense debate among ethicists, and we explore it in Chapter 2. As we shall see there, one’s view of whether the needs of others are thought to provide reasons for action, or touch us in more empathetic ways, also influences our view of reciprocity (a concept closely related to altruism) and impartiality, the view that every person’s interests count the same – we consider these too. In Chapter 3, we examine whether humans engaged in evolu- tionary struggle can remain altruistic. At first blush, there is a tension between the other-regardingness which altruism involves and the ‘survival of the fittest’ which evolution forces upon us. Evolutionists of various stripes have developed sophisticated models to explain the abundant evidence we have that humans and other animals do engage in behaviour that puts others first. These models are suggestive, especially when they seek to explain the evolutionary and anthropological origins of morality, but ultimately we reject the evolutionary approach since it bypasses perhaps the most distinctive feature of altruism in human beings: a person’s motivation to assist another. Chapter4considersadisciplinewhichdoeshavemotivationat its centre: social pyschology. Most pyschologists make similar assumptions about the self-interested roots of human behaviour, butsomeofthemoreinterestingworkinpyschologyinvestigates KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential3 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:4 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:436328D9 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 4 Altruism the kinds of personalities (or ‘traits’) and circumstances (or ‘states’) in which altruistic motives are engaged. Studies show that people like helping those like themselves. But in emergency situations,especiallywhenitisnotclearwhoshouldbedoingthe helping,individualswillgotoenormouslengthstoavoidaidinga stranger. Notwithstanding this, we also discuss the research on one of the most inspiring group of altruists there are, rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. We consider whether socialization and family background explains the enormous risks they took, or whetherthereis,asKristenMonroearguesinherimportantbook, The Heart of Altruism (1996), a distinct perspective on human social life that only altruists possess. Chapter 5 begins by considering the contribution of economic thoughttothestudyofaltruism.Manyeconomistsmakeassump- tions about the self-interested nature of individuals, though this has not prevented them from explaining why we exhibit altruism too. We argue, however, that this reveals more about theoretical weaknesses of the dominant rational choice model of individual behaviour that most of them work with than it does about the reality of social behaviour. After considering again ideas of reciprocity and exchange (closely related to altruism not just for economists, but also for early anthropologists, such as Malinowski and Mauss), the chapter examines in some detail the arguments for altruism found in Richard Titmuss’s classic work of social policy, The Gift Relationship ([1970] 1997). Titmuss’s work offers a powerful socialist-communitarian defence of the welfare state still of relevance today, though we argue that he is ambivalent over whether giving or exchange is at the heart of it. The chapter concludes by analysing whether states are avenues for altruism or, on the contrary, institutions which crowd out people’s other-regarding motivations. In the final chapter, we take up again the question of whether the evolutionary perspective is combinable with a genuinely moral altruism and argue that a basic tension remains. Moreover, much of the in-group altruism in contemporary social life is, we maintain, morally suspect just because the favour it bestows on one’sowncommunityisincompatiblewiththeimpartialdemands of morality. We explore whether communitarian altruism, an antidote to the selfishness of today’s market societies, is extend- able to citizens and strangers, and express some scepticism over whether it is. Altruism and justice, we want to say, are two KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential4 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:5 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:435B1484 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 Altruism: a brief history 5 different ideas. The chapter concludes by taking up again Mon- roe’s idea of an altruistic perspective.We argue that the altruistic perspective, which unites reasons and emotion, is a distinctive view of human life and of morals and one which we ought to try to cultivate. We offer some small scale examples of how this might be achieved.Altruism, we conclude, though it has a more limited role in social life than many would like, remains funda- mental for a human future. Aristotelian and religious altruism Altruism and morals have an intertwined history. Aristotle, with whom (together with Plato) so many moral questions start, certainly had a conception of something that looks much like altruism. This occurs in his discussion of friendship. Friendship, for Aristotle, contains components of altruism in that it is a relationshipwhereonewishesgoodforone’sfriendfortheirsake (Aristotle 1976: 452). Aristotle was interested in whether good men act for the benefit of others or for themselves. This is a question about people’s motives in ethical behaviour, of course, but it is also about the objects of our behaviour: self or other. Aristotlerecognizesthatpeopleoftenseektobenefittheirfriends but also to benefit themselves. Selfishness, he goes on to point out,intheNichomacheanEthics,isoftentreatedasanattributeof the bad man (Aristotle 1976: 454). But things are not so simple, because in acting in a way that is motivated by the interests of one’s friends one is acting both for the friend’s sake and, by an extension of one’s feeling, for oneself. Each person is, Aristotle thought, a sort of friend to themselves, and thus he blurs the distinction so central today between self and other. (He is not concerned with our obligations to strangers, something simply beyond his moral purview.) Aristotle draws a distinction between self-love that is virtuous and self-love that is contrary to virtue, such as pure self- gratification.Thepursuitofvirtueinvolvesdevelopingoneselfas avirtuousperson:inacting(aswewouldtermit)altruisticallyso astobenefitone’sfriends,apersonpromotesvirtueinthemselves and so becomes a better person. But if even altruism has a concern for self at its centre, the question arises of whether it is genuinely possible to be motivated solely out of a regard for the other’s interests? According to Aristotle: ‘It is true to say of the KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential5 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:6 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:3FEB97AB /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 6 Altruism manofgoodcharacterthatheperformsmanyactionsforthesake ofhisfriendsandhiscountryandifnecessaryevendiesforthem. For he will sacrifice both money and honours and in general the goods that people struggle to obtain in pursuit of what is morally fine’(Aristotle1981:456).InthispassageAristotleshowsusthat virtuous (altruistic) action does not merely benefit one’s friends. As we shall see later on, one could do that on a whim or caprice. Virtuousactionisrationalmoralactioninpursuitofthatwhich,in addition to the good it does its beneficiaries (one’s friends), is also ‘morally fine’. How the former motive relates to the latter one is an interesting question. Part of the ethical tradition of both Judaism and Christianity is the importance of promoting the interests of the other, expressed intermsoftheloveofone’sneighbour.Forbothtraditions,thisis an important point of departure for moral behaviour. The com- mandment in Leviticus to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ was written as a command against revenge (Leviticus, ch.19, v.18); andexpandsonthecommandmentnottocovetone’sneighbours’ possessionsorgivefalsetestimonyagainstone’sneighbour(Exo- dus, ch.20, v.16–7). These commandments amount to an ethic of how one ought to treat others in a manner that secures their interests, but they also relate to one’s own perception of how one wouldwanttobetreated,andthustheyinvolveideasofreciproc- ity (to which we shall return). This eventually became known as the Golden Rule. In the Jewish rabbinic tradition, the phrase the ‘Golden Rule’ is not thought to have come into use until the eighteenth century, but it originates in the Talmud: A certain heathen came to Shammai and said to him: ‘Make me a proselyte, on condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I stand on one foot’. Thereupon he repulsed him with the rod which was in his hand. When he went to Hillel, he said to him, ‘what is hateful to you do not do to your neighbour: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn’. (Talmud, Shabbat, 31a) In Matthew and Luke, the Golden Rule is given in positive terms as, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (Matthew, ch.7, v.12; Luke, ch.6, v.31). In the gospels, Jesus, addressing his disciples at the last supper exhorts them to: ‘Love KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential6 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:7 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:441D5911 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 Altruism: a brief history 7 oneanotherasIhavelovedyou.Noonehasgreaterlovethanthis than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends’ (John, ch.15, v.12–3), which is repeated in John, ch.3, v.16. Here again, as in Aristotle, we have the ultimate expression of love for another in terms of being prepared to sacrifice one’s life. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the phenomenon of altruism involves taking the interests of another as the goal of one’s actions, not only in relation to the expression of love of another human being, but also as an expression of love to God, so ‘the other’ involves the Divine as well. It must be noted that the Golden Rule is not unique to this tradition, but is found in many other religions as well. For example, the Hindu Mahabharata holdsthat:‘Oneshouldnotbehavetowardsothersinawaywhich is disagreeable to oneself. This is the essence of morality. All other activities are due to selfish desire’ (Mahabharata, Asusa- nasa Parva, 113.8). Confucianism instructs each person to: ‘Try yourbesttotreatothersasyouwouldwishtobetreatedyourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to benevolence’ (Mencius,VII.A.4). In the medieval period,Aquinas exploredAristotelian thought on virtue, where in addition to the Christian ethic of charity, courage was an important component too in pursuing happiness and the good in being virtuous (Aquinas 1964: II–II.129.2). Indeed, as Jordan points out, for Aquinas there is no virtue without charity since the highest human end is supernatural and cannot be realized without charity (Jordan 1993: 242). This is especially the case when one is confronted with the need to perform an act that is likely to endanger oneself physically or harmotherthingsthatonevalues.However,thiskindofactionis onlyvirtuousiftheactorreflectsuponthedangerorriskinvolved in the act. The spontaneous act is not praiseworthy (Aquinas 1964: II–II.123.1.2).The elements of risk and danger in virtuous actionarecomponentsofthatcertainkindofaltruisticactionthat is defined by sacrifice or by the need for the agent to give something up in performing the act. This action is, for Aquinas, directed ultimately towards the end of achieving divinity. He assumes that with the love of charity, the truly courageous directtheirintentions,bothproximateandremote,toGod(Aqui- nas1964:II–II.123.7;I–II.65.2).Heassumesthatwiththebenefit of the Holy Spirit’s gift of courage they act confidently and without fear, certain that they will finish whatever difficult work KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential7 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:8 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:3CA8C240 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 8 Altruism theybeginandmindfuloftheinsignificanceofthegoodstheyput at risk when compared to the everlasting they hope to achieve (Aquinas 1964: II–II.139.1; Bowlin 1999). Having everlasting life or divinity as an end again brings into question the motivational state of the agent in understanding the nature of altruism. A common criticism of Christian altruism is that it is not really altruistic at all. The action is performed with the primary motivation coming from the possibility of reward of everlasting life. At any rate, altruism was certainly not yet understood in the way we think of it today. Thomas Hobbes: egoism and its critics In the mid-1600s, Thomas Hobbes argued for a view of human nature starkly at odds with moralities centred on other-regarding behaviour.Thetraditionofnaturallawwhichdominatedthework ofAquinas and the scholastic tradition continued for other schol- ars,andisevidentinsomeofHobbeswriting,butHobbes’smain aim was to appeal to intellect and reason as the foundation of morality.AccordingtoHobbes,therewasnotranscendentnorma- tive order; rather humans had to create their own order to suit their biological and psychological natures. Political society was structured by the individualist need for survival. Hobbes’ empiricist theory of morality presented humans as motivated by self-interest,stemmingfromhisviewofhumansconstantlystriv- ing to satisfy their own selfish desires, of which the main desire was, of necessity, survival. Hobbes retained some notion of natural law, which for him amounted to the ability to exercise freedom in placing one’s own interests above that of another, thus generating competition and theopportunityforexploitation.Topreventthisoutcome,Hobbes argued that human beings, despite being governed by subjective preferences and their own self-interest would, through means– ends reasoning, recognize certain common interests. These, he believed, would be adopted in order for individuals to maximize their own security. Thus Hobbes arrived at a list of natural laws, of which the last was, interestingly enough, the Golden Rule. ‘The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinketh unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe’(Hobbes [1651] KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential8 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:9 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:42954B4B /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 Altruism: a brief history 9 1996: 109). In contrast to Christian ethicists, for whom the Golden Rule was altruistic, Hobbes grounded it in the overriding needtosecureone’sowninterests.Itisquestionablewhetherthis is an expression of altruism. This is because the motivational reasons why people act so as to treat another’s interests as their own in Hobbes’s Golden Rule is quite different from that than in earliertreatments.Whenreadinthecontextoftheprecedinglaws of nature, the emphasis is on how I would want to be treated rather than how I treat the other. One treats the other person in order to elicit (on grounds of reciprocity) one’s preferred treat- ment from them. Hobbes’s view is thus thoroughly egoistic.This is evident from his definition of a law of nature; it is a rule according to which a person is forbidden to do anything that is self-destructive or removes their ability to preserve their own life (Hobbes [1651] 1996: 91).The negative aspect of the expression is different from the Biblical expression, reading ‘do not that to another’, rather than ‘do unto others’. In other words, do not do anythingtoothersthatyouwouldn’twantdonetoyou;thethings that you would have done to you being those things that secure your own survival. It is a rule that is to be understood in the context of the overriding goal of securing one’s own interests. The Golden Rule can therefore be read as the expression of a reciprocal ethic rather than a purely altruistic one. Hobbes’ egoism was opposed by Richard Cumberland, who wanted to return the ethics of natural law back to the Christian tradition. Cumberland believed that Hobbes made an error in his assumption that the object of every person’s will is what one thinks is good for themselves. Hobbes presumes that everyone pursues their own good, and that justice and peace are accidental pursuits (Cumberland 1672). In other words, according to Cum- berland,Hobbesfailstorecognizethepursuitofgoodforthesake ofothers,agoodthatisnotself-directed.InHobbes’stheoryitis only accidental that peace and justice emerge in the securing of good for oneself. Cumberland’s own view supports a view of humannaturewherereason,understoodinasubstantivesense,is central, and where morality is grounded in human rational abil- ities,ratherthantheemotions.ForCumberland,therationalgives rise to the moral, which for him was understood as the discovery of the laws of nature. Samuel Pufendorf wrote a more detailed defence of an altruis- tic attitude towards others following on from Cumberland, in his KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential9 JOBNAME:SM−MSEL PAGE:10 SESS:14 OUTPUT:FriJul2705:52:122007 SUM:37EF93D8 /production/mcgraw−hill/booksxml/scoseg/chap01 10 Altruism ‘The Duty of Man and Citizen’, in which the human tendency towards selfish behaviour is counteracted by human social living where various duties to others are to be upheld. These included, under the specific heading of ‘Common duties of Humanity’, the duty: that every man promote the advantage of the other, so far as he conveniently can. For since nature has established a kind of kinship among men, it would not be enough to have refrained from injuring or despising others; but we must also bestow such attentions upon others – or mutually exchange them – that thus mutual benevolence may be fostered among men. Now we benefit others either defi- nitely or indefinitely, and that with a loss or else without loss to ourselves. (Pufendorf [1673] 1991: bk.I, ch.VIII) Here we have a clear expression of altruism, combining ideas oftakingtheinterestsoftheotherasone’sown,togetherwiththe idea of mutual aid and, more significantly, together with the likelihood that taking others’interests as one’s own will involve some cost to oneself. ChristianWolff, whose 1738 work, Philosophia Practica Uni- versalis was referred to by Kant in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant [1785] 1996: 46), held that duties towards others were the same as duties towards oneself, an idea that not only revisits the expression of the Golden Rule as it appearsintheGospels,butalsoSt.John’sexhortationthatoneis toloveothersasoneself(Wolff1720:796).Wolffemphasizesthe obligationtohelpthosewhoareinneed,insofarasoneiscapable of doing so, what they are limited by their situation and ability. This duty does not extend to putting oneself in danger. Wolff expresses this clearly in his reflections on rendering assistance. The ethic of the good Samaritan, however praiseworthy, does not extend to failing to meet the duties one owes to one’s self: The utility of these rules is great and extensive. For through them we can judge in all cases whether or not we are obligated to help someone. For example we see a man on the road that has been attacked by a robber, who is robbing him and trying to kill him. We are by nature KerrypressLtd–TypesetinXML A Division:chap01 F Sequential10