Algeria in France: French Citizens, the War, and Right-wing Populism in the Reckoning of the Republic in Languedoc, 1954-1962 Lee Whitfield Wheelock College Paying tribute to Alexis de Tocqueville for his seminal acuity on the history of France is nothing new. The Algerian War offers fresh justification to do so, for it demonstrates that his classic theory about the dialectic between centralization and resistances to it has lost none of its authority. On this question, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie pursued his cultural history of the peripheral regions of the hexagon in search of what lent their resistance to statist administrative rationalization such traction. He found that the attempts of a millennium of regimes to pulverize, seduce, or constrain these far-flung regions have failed to obliterate their distinctive identities and local autonomy. Consider the recent clash between the national government and its regions over the prosecution of the Algerian War. Evidence shows that in certain marginal regions a majority of citizens acted in ways specific to their local affinities generating tactics that offset the strategies of their national leaders. For example, in the Rhône-Alpes citizens sought alternative ideas of the Republic framed by referents to their own region.1 A minority in the south conspired against 1 Lee Whitfield, "Exorcising Algeria: French Citizens, the War, and the Remaking of the Republic in the Rhône-Alpes, 1954-1962," in The View from the Margins: Creating Identities in Modern France, eds. 412 Algeria in France 413 the government to keep Algeria French, even after a vast national majority approved the referendum to concede Algerian independence. Such practices illustrate Michel de Certeau's concepts of the strategies and tactics inherent in everyday life, whereby individuals recombine existing rules to create distance for themselves from institutional power.2 The Algerian War (1954-1962) resuscitated a clash of exceptional passion between Paris and Languedoc citizens. While historians have increasingly turned an eye toward the French-Algerian conflict, few have taken off their national lens to look at perspectives from the regions. What were views of the eight-year war in the Languedoc periphery? How did a regional identity – geographic, cultural, political, and economic affinities – affect attitudes to the war and citizens' idea of national identity? In Languedoc, along France's Mediterranean boundary, questions about autonomy versus national integration figured prominently in citizens' wartime attitudes. Important leaders of the most radical camps rose out of Languedoc's hotbed of activism: those committed to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) and those who galvanized the right-wing ultranationalists to hold fast to French Algeria no matter the cost. Languedoc historians have since concluded that no other war in the twentieth century has had such a far-reaching impact on the fate of this region.3 The Algerian War erupted over the Muslim majority's demands for the independence of France's largest and Kevin Callahan and Sarah Curtis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming). 2 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 3 Histoire de Montpellier, ed. Gérard Cholvy (Toulouse: Privat, 1985), 378. Volume 33 (2005) 414 Lee Whitfield oldest North African possession and its most important European settlement overseas. The Fourth Republic capsized amidst the leadership's uncompromising zeal for repressing the revolt. Its subsequent collapse brought General Charles de Gaulle to the helm in May 1958 and the Fifth Republic thereafter. De Gaulle's mythic and real authority led to a transformed Algerian policy that divested France of Algeria and the imperial vocation. What historians like John Ruedy and Alistair Horne4 have taken to be axiomatic – that only de Gaulle's persuasions turned the French public against the military policy for retaining French Algeria – has proven erroneous. Newly available evidence shows that the majority had rejected the war in Algeria prior to de Gaulle's return from political exile. This shift did not, however, take place on the nation's periphery in Languedoc. Here the citizenry adamantly opposed any alternative even as the war ground on, paralyzed the nation, and fueled vigilantism, atrocities, and wanton destruction in Algeria and in France. When push came to shove – as it did when de Gaulle pressed on to terminate the war – the Languedoc minority bucked national authority and fostered lawlessness instead. The Character of regional identity in the south of Languedoc, 1954 Languedoc lies in the south of France, encased to the north in a landscape of gorges and rugged mountains and to the south, still in the 1950s by a coastline of mosquito- infested swamps that largely obstructed the area's Mediterranean advantage. The region boasted a long 4 John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); and Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977). Proceedings of the Western Society for French History Algeria in France 415 tradition of unrepentant resistance to centralizing conformity. In the Middle Ages papal authority ferociously repressed the fiercely independent Cathars, and in the sixteenth century Calvin himself had to rein in Languedocian Calvinists for being too revolutionary.5 In Languedoc in the 1950s on the eve of the Algerian rebellion the flush of France's postwar economic boom, les trentes glorieuses,6 was barely visible. No doubt this fact contributed to the existence of an imagined community of fierce independents critical of the impersonal modernizing state. Languedoc's relationship to Paris was ambivalent, fluctuating between enthusiasm for the treasure chest of handouts and antipathy for Paris' powerful tentacles. No other entity was a more useful canvas onto which citizens could project their own inner conflicts. Paris as the centripetal giant had for generations serviced their apprehensive discussions of French self-understanding. If Paris had not existed, it would have had to be invented. This discomfort with a capitalist, rationalist, and consolidating state favored conservative elites who were willing to obstruct the evangelism of Paris and its schemes for development and economic restructuring. The region produced over half of the nation's low-quality wine (vin ordinaire); wine accounted for most of the local revenue, but that revenue was thirty-five percent below the national average.7 Still, the vintners staged riots rather than compromise with the state on prices. Moreover, any 5 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc, trans. John Day (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 165. 6 Jean Fourastié, Les Trentes glorieuses ou la Révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979). 7 John Ardagh, The New French Revolution: A Social and Economic Study of France, 1945-1968 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 135-46. Volume 33 (2005) 416 Lee Whitfield government inducement to pull up the vines was regarded as flagrant attack on Languedoc's heritage. The depression in the wine industry affected every aspect of life, for over half the citizenry depended on wine, with others touched by its fate.8 The Mediterranean port of Sète provided an important source of regional revenues. It was the only significant harbor between Marseille and Barcelona, and the oil tanker traffic, refineries, fishing boats, and cargo vessels between Africa and the Middle East reflected the area's strategic importance. Apart from these resources, antiquated textile and pottery industries persisted almost entirely thanks to the protected market in Algeria. Municipal leaders nonetheless rebuffed attempts to modernize the local economy.9 Pervasive distrust of the new technocrats and the tenacity of local interests favored right-wing populist Pierre Poujade who counted three out of every ten shopkeepers and small tradesmen as supporters of his anti-government movement. Chain stores like Monoprix, Prisunic, and LeClerc were effectively pulverizing their profits.10 Against all odds, modernization did make inroads. Rural leaders like Philippe Lamour had successfully lobbied the state for an irrigation canal from the Rhône to Montpellier. The tributaries that fed farmlands and the dams in the Cévennes created a fertile, fruit-growing zone in the lower Rhône and in the formerly dry plains below Nîmes. A six- fold increase in production emboldened cultivators to 8 Archives Nationales [hereafter AN] FIcIII 1273, Rapport sur la situation dans l'Hérault (Sept.-Dec. 1955). 9 AN FIcIII 1269, Rapport sur la situation dans le Gard (Nov.-Dec. 1954, Mar.-June, Sept.-Dec. 1955); and AN FIcIII 1254, Rapport sur la situation dans les Bouches-du-Rhône (Dec. 1954, Jan.-Feb. 1955). 10 AN FIcIII 1254, Rapport sur la situation dans les Bouches-du- Rhône (Dec. 1954, Jan.-Feb. 1955). Proceedings of the Western Society for French History Algeria in France 417 organize cooperatives, which brought higher profits. To the west, however, farmers in the poor soil above Béziers denounced the irrigation system and blocked dissident neighbors' access to state development.11 A core of intellectual vitality in the region revolved around the University of Montpellier.12 The liberal arts faculty and the faculties of medicine and law attracted students of different socioeconomic and ethnic origins to this enclave of ideas and cultural diversity. Local politics found their way into the institution, but faculty and institutional politics formed out of wider networks that affected students and town alike. Attitudes toward Algeria mirrored these political and economic realities. The Impact of the Algerian conflict in Languedoc, November 1954 to March 1956 The war exploded irrepressibly at the southern periphery of France where the integrated population of locals, Pieds-Noirs, and Algerian Muslims lent immediacy to the crisis. In 1954 after the loss of Indochina, over a third of the French public had conceded that all the colonies would eventually break away.13 But citizens made a sharp distinction between the colonies and Algeria. When rebellion erupted there, the overwhelming majority shared the view of their leaders like Prime Minister Pierre Mendès- France who announced that "Never will any French government yield on the principle that Algeria is France."14 11 Ardagh, 136, 137. 12 Renamed University of Paul Valéry. 13 Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les colonies devant l'Opinion publique," Cahiers de l'Institut d'histoire de la presse et de l'opinion 1 (1973): 1-40. 14 Pierre Mendès-France, speech to the National Assembly, 12 Volume 33 (2005) 418 Lee Whitfield Similarly, Minister of the Interior François Mitterand maintained, "In Algeria, the only possible negotiation is war."15 Republican education had done a superb job of imparting this "Algeria is France" fiction to generations of French citizens, but the struggle soon revealed a colonial legacy of greed, racism, and brutality in France overseas. Two months into the rebellion, pollsters at the private firm the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) began their systematic canvassing of public opinion on the war. At that time only five percent of the French followed the news on Algeria in the press.16 Le Monde, l'Humanité, and the rest of the national media noted the outbreak of terrorism but dedicated minimal coverage to les événements.17 Even the prime minister delivered his regular radio chats on subjects like the fight against alcoholism rather than the insurgency in Algeria.18 In Languedoc, however, citizens were immediately riveted to the events unfolding across the Mediterranean. Their regional press put Algeria on the front page and made the conflict a frequent subject of editorials. For example, Max Martin proclaimed that "The defense of the Republic" was at stake in Algeria.19 In that same vein, La Dépêche du Midi warned its readers: "The situation in the departments of Algeria deteriorates hourly. The acts of the terrorists intensify at a dramatic pace. Insecurity abounds, and Muslim and French Nov. 1954, quoted by Horne, 99. 15 François Mitterand, speech to National Assembly's Commission of the Interior, 5 Nov. 1954, in Ibid. 16 Sondages 4 (1958): 36. 17 French leaders denied that France was fighting a war in Algeria. Instead, they referred to the eight-year conflict as "les événements." 18 Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendès-France, trans. George Holoch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984), 306. 19 Le Midi Libre, 11 Feb. 1955. Proceedings of the Western Society for French History Algeria in France 419 blood flows with no let up in sight."20 In contrast to the national media, this early attention to Algeria in the local press indicates awareness among municipal authorities of popular concern. It is not that astonishing that Languedoc's citizens should have been fascinated with the fate of French Algeria. They were relatively poor and sympathetic with their compatriots on the other side of the Mediterranean who, like them, resented the condescending attitude of national leaders. The influx of Pieds-Noirs to the region gave its politics a distinct flavor.21 Algeria was the destination for the bulk of regional production and the source of strong wine to beef up their own weak version. Agricultural and commercial goods were shipped to Algeria, and the distribution and sales of products from Languedoc depended on favorable Algerian networks. Algeria provided the revenue that propped up the mediocre vineyards in Languedoc, funded the small landholders, and kept the tottering manufactures alive. In effect, Algeria permitted the persistence of independent conservatism that kept the modernizing state at bay. Neither the farmers nor the shopkeepers or vintners alone set this relationship in motion, however. Rather, it was geography: the Mediterranean flowed between the two populations and allowed easy shipment of goods and people. For these reasons, the Algerian rebellion was a crisis for Languedoc of monumental proportions. Economic ties, however, are not enough to explain local politics. Another striking feature of the region was its integration of locals with immigrants of diverse ethnic and geographic origins. In Languedoc, the tactics of wine- producing organizations maneuvered and consolidated 20 La Dépêche du Midi, 27 Feb. 1955, 7. 21 Ardagh, 140. Volume 33 (2005) 420 Lee Whitfield beliefs that France should spare nothing to repress the nationalist insurgency.22 There was an influential Pied-Noir population at the University of Montpellier, which aimed to energize or antagonize anyone willing to listen, inevitably including the numerous North Africans in their midst. Their raucous demonstrations and outbursts of jingoism, militarism, and racist aggression met with consistent reserve from the several hundred North African students and workers in the area. Beneath the exterior calm of the Muslim population were their leaders who worked locally and internationally with Algerians and those sympathetic to their cause.23 One of these leaders, law student M. M. K., slipped in and out of France to London and Algeria. At the Bandung conference in Indonesia, he served as the FLN delegate to secure recognition for an independent Algeria from the leaders of the Third World. Another Algerian, Mohammed Khemisti, a student in the faculty of medicine and general secretary of UGEMA, the national Muslim student union, eventually became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Algeria's first government. With the exception of some student activists, however, the region generally reacted angrily to rebels' demands for an independent Algeria.24 Imperialist nationalism as regional identity: the war escalates in 1956 In August 1955 Prime Minister Edgar Faure ordered reserve forces to Algeria in the wake of the insurgents' 22 Ardagh; François Goguel, Chroniques électorales. La Quatrième République: les scrutins politiques de 1945 à nos jours (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1981), 162. 23 Ardagh. 24 M. M. K., interview by the author (granted on condition of anonymity), Apr. 1989; AN FIcIII 1273, Rapport sur la situation dans l'Hérault (Nov.-Dec. 1954, Jan.-Aug. 1955). Proceedings of the Western Society for French History Algeria in France 421 Constantine massacre. The escalation of the violence belied official claims that France controlled Algeria. Popular opposition to Faure's deployment policy was swift with the mothers, wives, and fiancées of the soldiers joining numerous citizens troubled by the deployment.25 In Languedoc, however, the reservists and their families embraced the call to serve as their patriotic duty and denounced any other conviction as betrayal.26 The rebellion intensified despite the deployment, and the ensuing months revealed French inability to thwart the mobilization of the Algerian population into the insurgents' camp. The number of attacks multiplied: two hundred rebel attacks took place in April 1955, but October saw nine hundred incidents, and the count in December climbed to a thousand. Moreover, the geography of the rebellion expanded from Constantine to Oran, and rural engagement deepened in Kabylia and Constantine. Only 20,000 strong, the fellagha compensated for their small numbers with superior mastery of the terrain and the FLN's tightening control over the masses. Further aid from abroad came in arms and freshly trained fighters who streamed across the permeable borders from Tunisia and Morocco.27 Despite this situation, national voter preference on Algerian policy in the January 1956 elections was clear. The unusually large turnout elected leaders who opposed the military solution. Poujadists and Communists won a share of the vote, however, that sufficed to spoil the success of the new Republican Front government and handed Prime Minister Guy Mollet a fragile coalition with which to 25 AN FIcIII 1273 (Aug. 1955). 26 AN FIcIII 1273 (July-Oct. 1955). 27 Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962 (Paris: Seuil, 1984), 7, 125. The Arabic fellagha refers to the armed guerrilla bands. Volume 33 (2005)