LLoouuiissiiaannaa SSttaattee UUnniivveerrssiittyy LLSSUU DDiiggiittaall CCoommmmoonnss LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1976 AAlleexxaannddeerr FF.. KKeerreennsskkyy;; TThhee PPoolliittiiccaall CCaarreeeerr ooff aa RRuussssiiaann NNaattiioonnaalliisstt.. Michael James Fontenot Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Fontenot, Michael James, "Alexander F. Kerensky; The Political Career of a Russian Nationalist." (1976). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 3015. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3015 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATION TO USERS This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document . photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If if was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. 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Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR I 77-10,367 FONTENOT, Michael James, 1943- ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY; THE POLITICAL CAREER OF A RUSSIAN NATIONALIST. The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1976 History, Europe Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 © 1977 MICHAEL JAMES FONTENOT ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY; THE POLITICAL CAREER OF A RUSSIAN NATIONALIST A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Michael James Fontenot M.A., Louisiana State University, 1967 December, 1976 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people had a part in the appearance of this paper— more, in fact, than I can properly acknowledge— and I certainly owe them a great debt of gratitude. Dr. George Putnam and Dr. James Hawkes offered needed advice during the preliminary stages of research, ami Dr. Thomas C. Owen, who directed this project throughout the main phase of research ami writing, provided excellent guidance and sound advice. Needless to say, their influence was only beneficial, and any errors are my own. The staff members of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University and the Humanities Research Center at the Univer­ sity of Texas should also be mentioned, for they offered willing aid. The Graduate School, which presented me with a Dissertation Year Fellowship, and the History Department, which made teaching assistant- ships available several times, allowed the continuation of my work at crucial periods. But I am especially indebted to my parents, who offered invaluable moral and financial support; without their concern and affectionate help, the conclusion of this paper would have been greatly delayed. I would also like to thank my fiancee, Karen Anding, for her practical aid and warm encouragement. Finally, I must mention my son, Joel, and my brothers, John and Chris, for they have endured my preoccupations with patience and considerable good humor. ii FOREWORD Standard difficulties exist regarding the treatment of Russian history, and the approach adopted in this paper requires a short explanation. The Julian calendar, which was abandoned only in 1918, was thirteen days behind the western one in 1917* Since the Russians themselves prefer to use the old style calendar in their works on the revolution, that system of dating will be used consistently within the text. But citations from western sources, such as the New York Times, will remain in conformity with the Gregorian calendar. The system of transliteration will follow System II, cited in J. Thomas Shaver, The Transliteration of Modern Russian for English Language Publications (University of Wisconsin, 1967)* Exceptions will be made in the cases of well-known political figures, such as Leon Trotsky and Alexander Kerensky, whose names have become standardized in western usage. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................... ii FOREWORD iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . ..................... v ABSTRACT vi INTRODUCTION 1 I. ALEXANDER KERENSKY'S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CAREER 10 II. KERENSKY AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION ............ 43 III. KERENSKY AND THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 74 IV. THE COALITION EXPERIMENT ............ Ill V. THE FINAL BID FOR POLITICAL STABILIZATION 154 VI. THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 192 VII. CONCLUSION .................................... 238 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .................... 251 VITA .................... 261 iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ARR Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii GD Gosudarstvennaia Duma KA Krasnyi Arkhiv NZ Novyi Zhurnal SZ Sovremennye Zapiski WP Vestnik Vrenennogo Pravitel'stva ABSTRACT An investigation of Alexander F. Kerensky’s political activities is of vital importance, for his public career affected perhaps the most crucial period in modern Russian history; the years that spanned the enfeeblement and collapse of tsarism, the February revolution of 1917* and the Bolshevik seizure of power. As a radical deputy in the State Duma and then as a minister in the various provisional regimes that attempted to guide the revolutionary state in 1917, he exercised an increasing degree of influence upon political events. Because of his offices, personal inclination, and initial prestige, Kerensky managed to dominate the Russian Provisional Government and, through it, to determine state policy. While Kerensky was a populist and a revolutionary, he was also a fervent nationalist. Because of his nationalism, he became the primary advocate of political moderation as a means of preserving national interests in the midst of war and still bringing to his country a demo­ cratic, egalitarian order based on agrarian socialist principles. In pursuit of those aims, he distorted the interplay of political parties and the course of the revolution. His refusal to adopt a partisan posture when the internal and external pressures upon the country de­ manded such a stance contributed significantly to the Bolshevik victory in October of 1917.- Kerensky failed to recognize the dangers inherent in his mediative policy because he underestimated the power of class interests and overestimated the self-discipline of the population. His populist belief in the virtues of the people and his fiery patriotism combined to blind him to the true depths of popular discontent. Because he expected too much of the revolution, and too much of the Russian people, he relied upon his undoubted talent as a political tactician to solve problems through the creation of coalition regimes; confusing appearance with reality, he thought that parliamentary devices would assure the effective cooperation of socialists and non-socialists. He succeeded only in isolating the government from the populace and antagonizing the parties on the Right and the Left. Ultimately, the results were political turmoil, attempted counterrevolution» the disintegration of the army, spreading anarchy, and the seizure of the state by an extreme leftist party, the Bolsheviks. By October, Kerensky's moderate policies were in such disrepute that his presence within the government actually hindered efforts at resisting the Bolshevik insurrection of October vii