Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? by Marlene Laruelle KENNAN Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars O C C A S I O N A L PA P E R # 2 9 4 One Woodrow Wilson Plaza INSTITUTE 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 Tel. (202) 691-4100 Fax (202) 691-4247 www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan The Kennan Institute is a division of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Through its programs ofresidential scholarships,meetings,and publications,the Institute encourages scholarship on the successor states to the Soviet Union, embracing a broad range of fields in the social sciences and humanities. The Kennan Institute is supported by contributions from foundations, corporations, individuals, and the United States Government. Kennan Institute Occasional Papers The Kennan Institute makes Occasional Papers available to all those interested.Occasional Papers are submitted by Kennan Institute scholars and visiting speakers. 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I n studying contemporary Russian hour radio broadcast, Finis Mundi, which was Eurasianism—both as a doctrine and as a prohibited after he commented favorably on the political movement—one constantly comes early 20th-century terrorist Boris Savinkov.2 across Aleksandr Dugin. One of the main rea- Dugin also regularly publishes articles in numer- sons that he is relevant to any such study is the ous dailies and appears on several television pro- quasi-monopoly he exercises over a certain part grams.In 1998, he took part in the creation of of the current Russian ideological spectrum. the “New University,” a small institution that This spectrum includes a plethora of right-wing provides Traditionalist and occultist teachings to groupuscules that produce an enormous number a select few, where he lectures alongside noted of books and an impressive quantity of low-cir- literary figures such as Yevgeny Golovin and culation newspapers, but are not readily distin- Iurii Mamleev.Since 2005, he has been appear- guishable from each other and display little the- ing on the new Orthodox TV channel Spascre- oretical consistency or sophistication. Dugin is ated by Ivan Demidov, where he anchors a the only major theoretician among this Russian weekly broadcast on geopolitics called radical right.He is simultaneously on the fringe Landmarks [Vekhi].3 He also regularly takes part and at the center of the Russian nationalist phe- in round table discussions on Russian television nomenon.He provides theoretical inspiration to and occupies a major place in the Russian many currents and disseminates precepts that can nationalist Web.4 be recycled at different levels. Above all he is Several intellectual tendencies manifest striving to cover every niche on the current ide- themselves in his thought: a political theory ological marketplace. He proceeds from the inspired by Traditionalism,5 Orthodox religious assumption that Russian society and Russia’s philosophy,6 Aryanist and occultist theories,7 political establishment are in search ofa new ide- and geopolitical and Eurasianist conceptions.8 ology:he therefore owes it to himself to exercise One might expect this ideological diversity to his influence over all the ideological options and reflect a lengthy evolution in Dugin’s intellec- their possible formulations. tual life. Quite to the contrary, however, all Beyond the doctrinal qualities that make him these topics did not emerge in succession but stand out among the spectrum of Russian have co-existed in Dugin’s writings since the nationalism, Dugin is noteworthy for his fren- beginning of the 1990s.While Eurasianism and zied and prolific output of publications begin- geopolitics are Dugin’s most classic and best- ning in the early 1990s.He has published over a known “business cards”for public opinion and dozen books,either original texts or thematical- the political authorities, his philosophical, reli- ly rearranged articles initially printed in various gious and political doctrines are much more journals or newspapers.He has also edited sev- complex and deserve careful consideration.The eral journals: Elementy (9 issues between 1992 diversity of his work is little known, and his and 1998), Milyi Angel (4 issues between 1991 ideas are therefore often characterized in a rash and 1999),Evraziiskoe vtorzhenie(published as an and incomplete way. We therefore ought to irregular supplement to the weekly Zavtra, with look for his intellectual lineage and try to six special issues in 2000), and Evraziiskoe understand his striving to combine diverse ide- obozrenie (11 issues from 2001 to 2004).1 In ological sources. Dugin is one of the few 1997, he wrote and presented a weekly one- thinkers to consider that the doctrinal stock of Marlene Laruelleis an Associate Scholar at the French Center for Russian, Caucasian, and East European Studies in Paris. In 2005–2006 she was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. This paper was translated byMischa Gabowitsch. ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 1 Russian nationalism has depreciated and must leader, Eduard Limonov.The two men shared a be revitalized with the help of Western input. desire to develop close ties with the counter-cul- Dugin is thus “anchoring”Russian nationalism tural sphere, in particular with nationalistically- in more global theories and acting as a mediator minded rock and punk musicians, such as Yegor of Western thought. It is this aspect of Dugin Letov, Sergei Troitskii, Roman Neumoev or that will be the focus of this paper. Sergei Kurekhin.9In 1995,Dugin even ran in the Duma elections under the banner of the NBP in DUGIN’S SOCIAL TRAJECTORY a suburban constituency near Saint-Petersburg, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE but received less than 1 percent of the vote.10 It is particularly important to understand However, this electoral failure did not harm him, Aleksandr Dugin’s complex place within Neo- as he was simultaneously busy writing numerous Eurasianism, since, to a certain extent, his posi- philosophical and esoteric works to develop what tion is representative of certain more general he considered to be the Neo-Eurasianist “ortho- phenomena and thus helps trace the evolution of doxy.”Limonov would thereafter describe Dugin Russian nationalist ideas over the past twenty as “the ‘Cyril and Methodius’offascism,since he years or so.Between 1985 and 1990, Dugin was brought Faith and knowledge about it to our clearly in favor of a “right-wing” Neo- country from the West.”11 Eurasianism, and close to conservative or even Dugin left the National Bolshevik Party in monarchist circles.In 1988, he joined the ultra- 1998 following numerous disagreements with nationalist and anti-Semitic orgnization Pamiat’, Limonov, seeking instead to enter more influen- but did not feel intellectually at home there, tial structures. He hoped to become a “counsel since his ideas for a doctrinal renewal of the to the prince”and presented himself as a one- right were out of place in this fundamentally man think tank for the authorities.He succeed- conservative organization. He therefore left ed in establishing himself as an advisor to the Pamiat’the following year, condemning its nos- Duma’s spokesman, the Communist Gennady talgic monarchism and vulgar anti-Semitism.In Seleznev, and, in 1999, he became chairman of 1990–1, he founded several institutions of his the geopolitical section of the Duma’s Advisory own: the Arctogaia Association, as well as a pub- Council on National Security, dominated by the lishing house of the same name, and the Center ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of for Meta-Strategic Studies. During this period, Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii. At the Dugin drew closer to Gennadii Ziuganov’s time, Dugin appeared to exert a certain influ- Communist Party, and became one of the most ence on Zhirinovskii, as well as on Aleksandr prolific contributors to the prominent patriotic Rutskoi of the Social Democratic Party and newspaper Den’ (later renamed Zavtra), which Gennady Ziuganov of the Communist Party12. was at that time at the height ofits influence.His The latter, for example, borrowed from Dugin articles published in this newspaper contributed the idea that Russian nationalism does not con- to the dissemination of Eurasianist theories in flict with the expression of minority national Russian nationalist circles. At first he was sup- sentiments. Indeed, Ziuganov presented the ported by the nationalist thinker Aleksandr CPRF as the main defender ofTatar nationalism Prokhanov, who thought that only Eurasianism and Kalmyk Buddhism.His book Russia after the could unify the patriots, who were still divided Year 2000:A Geopolitical Vision for a New State into “Whites” and “Reds,” but Prokhanov was directly inspired by Dugin’s ideas on the dis- quickly turned away and condemned tinctiveness of Russian geopolitical “science” Eurasianism for being too Turko-centric. and his idea that Russia’s renewal provides the From 1993–4, Dugin moved away from the only guarantee ofworld stability.Dugin also reg- Communist spectrum and became the ideologist ularly publishes on Russian official web sites, for the new National Bolshevik Party (NBP). such as www.strana.ru, where he expresses his Born of a convergence between the old Soviet ideas on the opposition between the re-emerg- counter-culture and patriotic groups, the NBP ing Eurasian empire and the Atlanticist model. successfully established its ideology among the Dugin’s entry into parliamentary structures young. Dugin’s Arctogaia then served as a think was largely made possible by the publication (in tank for the political activities of the NBP’s 1997) of the first version of his most influential 2 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 work, The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia’s pated in the Rossiia movement led by the Geopolitical Future.13 It is considered to be a Communist Gennady Seleznev and wrote its major study of geopolitics, and is often present- manifesto, before leaving due to disagreements ed as the founding work of the contemporary with its leadership. Putin’s election as president Russian school of geopolitics. By 2000, the in March 2000 caused an even stronger shift in work had already been re-issued four times, and Dugin’s political attitudes, as he began to move had become a major political pamphlet, enjoy- closer to country’s new strong man. ing a large readership in academic and political On 21 April 2001 he resolved to put his circles. Indeed, Dugin has always hoped to cards on the table and created a movement influence promising young intellectuals as well named Evraziia, of which he was elected presi- as important political and military circles. He dent. During its founding convention, has stated that his Center for Geopolitical Evraziia—often described as a brainchild of Expertise could quickly become an “analytical presidential counsel Gleb Pavlovsky, who is instrument helping to develop the national close to Dugin—officially rallied to Putin and idea”14 for the executive and legislative powers. proposed to participate in the next elections as Since the beginning of the 1990s, he has part of a governmental coalition. The move- been especially keen on getting in touch with ment’s goal, according to Dugin’s declarations, acting military officers: coming from a military is to formulate the “national idea” that Russia family, he regularly asserts that only the army needs:“our goal is not to achieve power, nor to and the secret services have a real sense of patri- fight for power, but to fight for influence on it. otism.Thus, in 1992, the first issue of Elementy Those are different things.”18 On 30 May 2002, carried texts by three generals who were then Evraziia was transformed into a political party heads of department at the Academy of the that Dugin defines as “radically centrist,” an General Staff.15 In addition, The Foundations of ambiguous formulation that springs from his Geopolitics seems to have been written with the Traditionalist attitude. Dugin accepts the com- support of General Igor’ Rodionov, who was bination of “patriotism and liberalism” which minister of defense in 1996–7.16 Thanks to this he says Vladimir Putin is proposing, on the con- book, Dugin has been invited to teach at the dition that the liberal element remains sub- Academy of the General Staff as well as at the servient to state interests and to the imperatives Institute for Strategic Research in Moscow.He of national security.As he affirms, “our patriot- offered them a certain vision of international ism is not only emotional but also scientific, politics colored by an “isolationism that only based on geopolitics and its methods,”19a classic serves to disguise a project of expansion and claim of Neo-Eurasianists.According to its own conquest.”17 Following this best-seller, Dugin data, the new party has 59 regional branches considerably expanded his presence in the main and more than 10,000 members.Its creation was Russian media; to some, he became a publicly welcomed by Aleksandr Voloshin, then respectable personality of public life. The suc- the head of the presidential administration, and cess of his geopolitics book, now used as a text- Aleksandr Kosopkin, chief of the administra- book by numerous institutions of higher educa- tion’s Internal Affairs Department. tion, as well as his lectures at the Academy of Dugin also enlisted the support of another the General Staff and at the so-called New influential figure close to the president, Mikhail University, satisfies his desire to reach the polit- Leont’ev, the presenter of Odnako (broadcast by ical and intellectual elites. Pervyi kanal, the first channel of Russian state Thus the years 1998–2000 saw the transfor- TV), who joined the party’s Central Committee. mation of Dugin’s political leanings into a spe- Strengthened by his success after these public dis- cific current that employs multiple strategies of plays of recognition, Dugin hoped to acquire entryism, targeting both youth counter-culture influence within a promising new electoral for- and parliamentary structures. Dugin moved mation, the Rodina bloc, and use it as a platform away from opposition parties such as the CPRF for a candidacy in the parliamentary elections in and the LDPR and closer to centrist groups, December 2003.This alliance, however, was tac- lending his support to the then prime minister, tically short-lived, and questionable in its ideo- Yevgeny Primakov. In 2000, he briefly partici- logical import.Thus, Dugin never concealed his ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 3 disdain for the monarchist nostalgia and the Dugin’s own convictions:he has never hidden his politicized orthodoxy embodied by Rodina lead- disdain for the present Communist Party, does ers such as Dmitrii Rogozin and Natalia not appreciate the emotional attitude of the Narochnitskaia. Indeed, it seems that Sergei Orthodox in matters of international politics, Glaz’ev20was the one who was responsible for the rejects all Tsarist nostalgia, has always denounced rapprochement with Dugin.Although Glaz’ev can- the racialism of Barkashov’s theories, and con- not be considered a Neo-Eurasianist, he did par- demns electoral populism.The second set ofcrit- ticipate in the founding convention of Evraziia in icisms seems more opportunistic: a close reading 2002.The two men share an interest in econom- of Dugin’s works clearly reveals his fascination ic policies leaning toward socialism, and Dugin with the National Socialist experience and his acknowledged his sympathy for Glaz’ev’s eco- ambiguous anti-Semitism. Today, Dugin is nomic ideas (which he calls “healthy”) even after attempting to play down these aspects of his the latter left Rodina in March 2004. thought in order to present himself as a “politi- Dugin and Glaz’ev met as early as February cally correct”thinker waiting to be recognized by 2003 in order to constitute a party they defined the Putin regime. as “left-patriotic.”In July, Evraziia declared itself In return, instances of Dugin borrowing ide- ready to support the creation of this electoral ologically from Rodina seem rather rare. His bloc.However, internal arguments over person- Traditionalist, National Bolshevik and esoteric alities ensued: the bloc needed to choose three ideas, which constitute an important part of his leaders who would be sure to become deputies thinking,are not appreciated by Rodina and have if it passed, and would benefit most from the not exercised any influence on the bloc’s con- campaign’s publicity.Dugin hoped to be chosen, ceptions. Indeed, Rodina is more conservative but was hampered by his political marginality than revolutionary, and cannot take up Dugin’s linked to his reputation as an extravagant theo- provocative suggestions, which often aim to retician whose ideas are too complex to inform break the social order. The strictly Neo- an electoral strategy.21 At the end of September, Eurasianist aspect of Dugin’s ideas—his best- the disappointed Dugin left the Rodina bloc, known “trademark”in Russian society today— explaining at a press-conference that Rodina’s is in tune with some of Rodina’s geopolitical nationalism was too radical for him—a statement conceptions, but this concurrence is actually that must draw a smile from those familiar with founded on the anti-Westernism that is common his work. This nationalist setting had not dis- to both, not on a shared vision of Russia as a turbed him until then. Nor did he move closer Eurasian power. For this reason, despite their to Rodinawhen certain overly virulent national- attempted alliance, Rodina may not be said to ists such as V. I. Davidenko, leader of the small have adopted elements of Neo-Eurasianist Spas party, were expelled from Rodina’s list of thought in the strict sense of the term. candidates under pressure from the Kremlin. Nevertheless, these difficult relations did not Dugin’s accusations against Rodina fall into stop Dugin from being delighted with the results two categories.He condemns the bloc for being of the December 2003 elections, which carried too close to the CPRF and its oligarchy,and crit- four nationalist parties (the presidential party icizes its “irresponsible populism.”He also takes United Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, and to task those he calls “right-wing chauvinists”: Rodina) into the Duma. Dugin has connections Sergei Baburin and the Spas movement.22 By with every one of them, and some members of contrast, Dugin insists on the conciliatory and each ofthese parties openly acknowledge having multinational mission ofhis Evraziia party,which been inspired by his theories. “represents not only the interests ofthe Russians, After this personal failure in Rodina, Dugin but also those of the small peoples and the tradi- reoriented his strategies away from the electoral tional confessions.”23 Dugin has also accused sphere, and toward the expert community. some Rodina members of racism and anti- Hence the transformation of his party into an Semitism,stressing that the party includes former “International Eurasian Movement”(IEM), for- members of Russian National Unity24 as well as malized on 20 November 2003.The new move- Andrei Savel’ev, who translated Mein Kampfinto ment includes members from some twenty Russian.The first set of criticisms is justified by countries, and its main support seems to come 4 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 from Kazakhstan and Turkey.Whereas the orig- ation of an “anti-orange front.” Dugin is thus inal organization founded in 2001 comprised pursuing, with relative success, his objective of mainly figures from civil society,25 the Supreme building up a global cultural hegemony: he is Council of the new Eurasian Movement trying to gain a foothold in alter-globalization includes representatives of the government and movements (which promote alternatives to parliament: Mikhail Margelov, head of the American-led globalization) and to participate in Committee for International Relations of the international ideological regroupings.This right, Federation Council (the Parliament’s Upper which Dugin modernizes and profoundly House),Albert Chernyshev,Russia’s ambassador renews in his theories, seems therefore to suc- to India,Viktor Kalyuzhny,vice-minister offor- ceed in its strategy of entering into left-wing eign affairs, Aleksey Zhafyarov, chief of the structures that are badly informed and looking Department of Political Parties and Social for any and all allies in their struggle against Organizations in the justice ministry, etc. The American domination. IEM even officially asked Vladimir Putin and Thus Dugin’s regular but always temporary Nursultan Nazarbaev to head the movement’s presence in the political field cannot, it seems, Supreme Council. Dugin congratulates himself be considered a new phase of his life that would on having moved beyond a mere political party build on an already completed body of doctrine. to an international organization. He now culti- Although Dugin currently seems to be concen- vates his image in neighboring countries, heavi- trating on his involvement in the Eurasianist ly publicizing his trips to Turkey, but also to movement and publications on the topic of Kazakhstan and Belarus. Dugin has become a Eurasianism, one should not forget that a similar zealous supporter of the Eurasian Economic combination had been in place from 1994 to Union and is pleased to think that he has influ- 1998, when his membership in the National- enced Aleksandr Lukashenko’s and Nursultan Bolshevik Party went hand in hand with publi- Nazarbaev’s decisions in favor of a tighter inte- cations on the concept of National Bolshevism. gration of their countries with Russia.His web Dugin thus seems to adjust his strategy in accor- site also presents the different Eurasianist groups dance with the available opportunities to influ- in Western countries. Italy is particularly well ence public opinion. Moreover, he continues represented, with numerous translations of even today to disseminate the Traditionalist ideas Dugin’s texts, several Eurasianist-inspired web that have been his mainstay since the beginning, sites, and a journal, Eurasia. Rivista di studi displaying a high degree of doctrinal consisten- geopolitici. France is represented by the “Paris- cy.What has evolved is his public status, marked Berlin-Moscow” association, while Britain has by his desire no longer to be considered an orig- long had a Eurasianist movement of its own. inal and marginal intellectual, but rather to be Austrian, Finnish, Serbian, and Bulgarian asso- recognized as a respectable political personality ciations, and of course organizations in other close to the ruling circles. post-Soviet republics, especially in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are presented as “fraternal parties”. A RUSSIAN VERSION OF ANTI-GLOBALISM: Having enthusiastically welcomed Vladimir DUGIN’S GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES Putin as a “Eurasian man,”26 Dugin now, since All the Neo-Eurasianist currents that emerged in early 2005, appears to be deeply disappointed by the 1990s share an imperial conception of the president.According to him, Putin hesitates Russia, but they are all based on different pre- to adopt a definitively Eurasianist stance, and his suppositions.Aleksandr Dugin occupies a partic- entourage is dominated by Atlanticist and over- ular position inside this group, and is sometimes ly liberal figures.In current affairs, Dugin is try- criticized virulently by the other Neo- ing to play on the wave of anti-Westernism that Eurasianists.Indeed, Dugin “distorts”the idea of swept part ofthe Russian political scene after the Eurasia by combining it with elements borrowed revolutions in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in from other intellectual traditions,such as theories 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.He thus set up of conservative revolution, the German geopoli- a Eurasianist Youth Union, led by Pavel tics of the 1920s and 1930s, René Guénon’s Zarifullin, which became highly visible in Traditionalism and the Western New Right. September 2005 with the heavily publicized cre- Nevertheless, Dugin has enjoyed the greatest ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 5