Original citation: Koinova, Maria. (2008) Kinstate intervention in ethnic conflicts : Albania and Turkey compared. Ethnopolitics, Volume 7 (Number 4). pp. 373-390. ISSN 1744-9057 Permanent WRAP url: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/51499 Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Publisher’s statement: "This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnopolitics on 03 Dec 2008, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449050802243384” A note on versions: The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the ‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of the article: Koinova, Maria (2008) “Kinstate Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Albania and Turkey Compared” Ethnopolitics.Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 373-390. Article available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449050802243384?journalCode=reno20#.VVW 4nPNwYdU 1 Kinstate Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Albania and Turkey Compared Abstract Albania and Turkey did not act in overtly irredentist ways towards their ethnic brethren in neighboring states after the end of communism. Why nonetheless Albania facilitated the increase of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia, while Turkey did not with respect to the Turks of Bulgaria? I argue that kin-states undergoing transition are more prone to intervene in external conflicts than states that do not do so, regardless of the salience of minority demands in the host- state. The transition weakens the institutions of the kin-state. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, self-seeking state officials create alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. Such alliances are often utilized to advance radical domestic agendas. Unlike in Albania’s transition environment, in Turkey there were no emerging elites that could potentially form alliances and use external movements to legitimize their own domestic existence or claims. Keywords: kin-states, irredentism, transition, state weakness, Albanians, Turks, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo Introduction Research on ethno-national violence in countries emerging from communism has largely focused on elite or group-based dynamics or on the role of the international community. The impact of kin-states has been discussed either in the context of the large-scale violence that 2 ensued after the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, or with respect to non- violent minority-majority interactions in Eastern Europe. Almost no theoretical accounts exist about the gray zone: when kin-states do not clearly make irredentist claims, but still facilitate the escalation of ethno-national conflict in host-states. Particularly puzzling is why some kin-states which historically made strong irredentist claims ceased to do so after 1989. This article aims to address these gaps. An empirical puzzle observed in the Balkans after the end of communism will assist in deriving theoretical insights: As a kin-state of the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia, Albania proper was not outwardly irredentist, neither was Turkey as a kin-state to the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. However, Albania significantly contributed to the increase of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo during the 1990s, less so in Macedonia, while Turkey did not in the Bulgarian case. One could be tempted to voice the most obvious explanation: Albania intervened in Kosovo due to humanitarian reasons – the Kosovars endured severe human rights violations from the Serbian regime and needed backing from abroad. By contrast, the Albanians of Macedonia and the Turks of Bulgaria had much more peaceful interactions with their majorities, the Macedonians and the Bulgarians respectively. While this explanation certainly makes sense, it is limited to the issue of need for intervention and does not address the actual mechanisms involved. Over the past decades – with humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Somalia and the Congo – we have seen that the need for intervention rarely translates into action. Concerning our puzzle, if Albania acted primarily on humanitarian grounds, it could have taken a much bolder stance. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Turks of Bulgaria were subjected to a severe cultural assimilation and expulsion, Turkey reacted much more boldly on the diplomatic front than Albania did in the 1990s vis-à-vis Kosovo. 3 This article argues that kin-states undergoing transition from totalitarian rule are much more likely to facilitate the rise of ethno-national conflict in host-states than kin-states experiencing no transition, regardless of the salience of the minority demands in the host state. Albania, which underwent transition, did not intervene in the internal conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia because of a clearly expressed irredentist agenda, but in line with the following logic: As a state undergoing transition, Albania was much more prone to support the principle of national self-determination externally as the latter affected other countries from the communist bloc. In addition, it was exposed to dual pressures stemming from the international community, on the one side, and its own need for domestic reform on the other, both weakening its state institutions over a short period of time. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, self- seeking state officials created alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. As a result, Albania exhibited a Janus-faced foreign policy. Officially, it gave in to the pressures exerted by the international community to maintain a non-interventionist stance. Unofficially, it pursued an interventionist agenda to various degrees. By contrast, a kin-state that did not undergo transition, such as Turkey, was less likely to intervene in the conflicts in the host-state. It was cautious about supporting self-determination abroad. Also, since there was no need for rapid domestic reforms, Turkey did not become vulnerable to strong international pressures, and could maintain a level of institutional strength that would allow it to formulate and implement a coherent foreign policy on the national question. Unlike in Albania’s transition environment, there were no emerging elites in Turkey that could potentially utilize external secessionist and autonomist movements to legitimize their own domestic agendas. 4 This article considers a temporal cut-off point 1999 for Kosovo and 2001 for Macedonia and Bulgaria. The minority-majority dynamics in Kosovo changed drastically after NATO’s 1999 military intervention with Albanians becoming a majority and Serbs a minority in Kosovo. In 2001 there was an internal warfare in Macedonia which finished with a peace agreement increasing significantly the rights of the Albanians. For temporal compatibility purposes my research on Bulgaria finishes in 2001 as well. The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss the degree to which existing theories explain the empirical puzzle. Second, I explore the process by which Albania’s dualistic attitude increased the level of internal conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia. Third, I look at how Turkey intervened in the majority-minority relations in Bulgaria without increasing the level of internal conflict. I conclude by discussing future avenues for research. Theoretical Accounts and the Empirical Puzzle In the three cases examined only the actions of the Kosovo Albanians can clearly be classified as ‘secessionist’. After Kosovo’s autonomy was forcefully abolished by Milosevic in 1989 Albanian deputies secretly adopted the “Kaçanik” Constitution, and declared Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia started collapsing in 1991 and there was no longer a state in which Kosovo could become a federal republic, a Kosovo-wide clandestine referendum legitimized its independence. In contrast, the Albanians of Macedonia actively sought territorial autonomy. They boycotted the adoption of the new Macedonian constitution in 1991, and organized a clandestine referendum on autonomy of Western Macedonia in 1992. During the most intense fighting in 2001 both Albanians and Macedonians raised claims about the territorial 5 division of Macedonia, yet their demands subsided after the end of the violence. On their part, the Turks of Bulgaria sought primarily non-territorial solutions. While during the assimilation campaign of the 1980s they raised claims for autonomy, during the 1990s such voices existed, but were rare and marginal. How would theories on irredentism interpret the positions of Albania and Turkey? Weiner’s classical model, derived from the interwar period and highlighting the formation of inter-state alliances across borders and the popular-based incentives for the redemption of ethnic brethren, is weak in addressing the puzzle related to the 1990s (1971: 670-682). After the end of the Cold War neither Albania nor Turkey started forming inter-state alliances to redeem ethnic brethren abroad, although the international system changed from bi-polar to multi-polar and provided grounds for increased regional instability. Neither were there popular incentives to aid the struggle abroad. During communism Albania was highly isolated from the entire eastern bloc, thus the connections between Albanians in Albania proper and those in former Yugoslavia faded away over the decades (CEDIME-SE, 2002). Similar dynamics were observed between the Turks in Turkey proper and those in Bulgaria, divided by a thick Iron Curtain: Bulgaria was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union and Turkey was a NATO member. Theories about the international system allow us to better understand Turkey’s and Albania’s behavior in the 1990s. As Ambrosio argues, the nature of irredentism has changed from the era of nation-state formation (late 19th - early 20thc.), when pressures for boundary changes came from ‘within’ the irredentist states. In the second half of the 20thc they came from external secessionist movements (2001: 20-21). The lack of overt irredentism could possibly be explained by Horowitz’ dictum that ‘foreign policy goals [of an irredentist state] can be achieved better by encouraging secessionist movements…than by encouraging irredentism’ (1991:10-11). 6 Also, the kin-states experienced constraints by a post World War Two international legal principle of respect for territorial sovereignty, and by the actual resistance of the international powers to legitimize secessionist movements in defense of this principle. While these explanations account for existing domestic and international constraints, they still do not explain why Turkey acted with more constraint than Albania. Other theories highlight domestic motivations. Defeated in wars in the early 20th century, the two kin-states could have learned that irredentism is too costly. They could act in line with common affective, instrumental, and structural factors facilitating external intervention.1 Albania clearly supported the Kosovars and Albanians of Macedonia because of national affinity, but also because it was relatively easy to do so as the ethnic brethren was located in compact areas right across the Albanian border, which is also highly porous. By contrast, the Turks of Bulgaria were concentrated in two areas, not in one, and the borders were highly guarded. Also, as kin-states that are ethnically diverse, they may feel vulnerable that secessionism can spring from within their own diverse population should they aid secessionism abroad (Carment and James, 1997: 194-231). Turkey – highly attacked because of its mistreatment of the Kurds - could have felt vulnerable to intervene in Bulgaria. Yet it did intervene in the Caucasus, as did Albania in Kosovo despite claims from its Greek and Macedonian minorities. This renders a ‘vulnerability argument’ vulnerable to criticism itself. My own explanation builds on two accounts that seem unrelated at first glance. On the one hand, Ganguli argues that a kin-state may pursue a strategy of ‘inaction’ towards its ethnic brethren because of its own lack of capabilities, funds, and cost-benefit calculations (1998:11- 31). On the other hand, Carment and James argue that an autonomous state – where state institutions are strong - is more likely to formulate a clear-cut foreign policy. Yet in the absence 7 of such institutionalization, domestic elites experience little constraints and are highly likely to formulate an aggressive foreign policy using international opportunities to promote their own domestic agendas (2000: 173-177). Both accounts put their finger on the state strength as a variable important for ethnic conflicts abroad. Yet both remain reluctant to engage it in dynamic exploration of relationships over time. Two models have looked more thoroughly into dynamic relationships. Brubaker (1996) argued that minorities, ‘nationalizing states’ and kin-states are bound in a triadic nexus, where each actor closely monitors the change of stances of the other two and reacts accordingly. Jenne built on his ideas by delineating sequences in which the triadic relationship evolves. Once a minority receives some signals that its lobby state might be supportive, it radicalizes to obtain concessions from its host state even if the majority guarantees protection to the minority (2004: 729-756). These two approaches primarily focus on the empowerment of minorities by external actors and consider the kin-state as a coherent unit, although Jenne (2007) is more sensitive to the various projections of kin-state stances in time. My approach shifts attention to processes taking place within the kin-state that become relevant for the conflict in the host-state. Traveling through a number of theoretical arguments this article identified three major gaps. First, the literature on irredentism and secessionism has remained insensitive about kin- states undergoing transition from totalitarian rule and exhibiting weakness or strength of state institutions. Second, a focus on processes is still rare. A third gap is related to the empirical data: while Albania’s intervention in Kosovo has been more discussed in the press, less attention has been paid to Albania’s relationship to Macedonia, and even less to Turkey’s relationship towards the Turks of Bulgaria in the 1990s. This article aims to fill these gaps. 8 Albania: A Janus-faced Intervention in Kosovo and Macedonia Despite its ambiguous stance towards intervention, Albania as a kin-state in transition was much more prone to intervene in the ethno-national conflicts in host states than Turkey which did not undergo any regime change.2 A complex causal chain took place to explain Albania’s intervention in the conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia. The chain was originally triggered by the transition from authoritarian rule and was sustained by it throughout the research period. The right to national self-determination resurfaced as a political principle with the regime changes at the end of the Cold War (Heraclides 1990, 1991, Moore et al. 1998, Bianchini and Schöpflin, 1998, Bunce 2005). At the time when Albania – a laggard in its transition process as of 1991 – was pressured by events in former Yugoslavia to take a stance on Kosovo’s self- determination, countries in the post-communist world had already exercised this right. Germany had unified in 1990, and former Yugoslav republics and successors of the Soviet Union had declared independence in 1991. Prompted by an international demonstration effect rather than by the resurgence of internally driven territorial revisionism, Albania followed suit. It was only a day before the ratification of Kosovo’s bid for independence in September 1991 that Albanian Foreign Minister Muhammed Kapllani used the words “Republic of Kosova” for the first time addressing the UN General Assembly (Kola, 2003:222). Moreover, it was an act of Albania’s parliament, and not of the government, that issued a declaration in support of Kosovo’s independence. A pro-independence stance gathered momentum in 1992 during the presidential campaign of Democratic Party candidate Sali Berisha, when he promised to unify Kosovo and Albania. Shortly after he won office, he also spoke of Kosovo’s right to self-determination (Jenne, 2007:171). He argued that the Kosovo Albanians should be entitled to holding free 9