DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTA wings at War Series, No. 4 Approved for Public Release Airborne Assault on Holland An Interim Report Published by Headquarters, Army Air Forces Washington, D. C. Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence New Imprint by the Center for Air Force History Washington, D. C. 1992 20050429 006 Wings at War COMMEMORATIVE EDITION Originally published shortly after key air campaigns, the Wings at War series captures the spirit and tone of America's World War II experience. Eyewitness accounts of Army Air Forces' aviators and details from the official histories enliven the story behind each of six important AAF operations. In coopera- tion with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Center for Air Force History has reprinted the entire series to honor the airmen who fought so valiantly fifty years ago. "10Ae liefor Air Force History Washington, D.C. 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REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - TO) 1992 naA 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Airborne Assault on Holland n/a 5b. GRANT NUMBER n/a 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER n/a 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER n/a 5e. TASK NUMBER n/a 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER n/a 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Air Force History Support Office 3 Brookley Avenue Box 94 n/a Bolling AFB DC 20032-5000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) n/a n/a 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) n/a 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES n/a 14. ABSTRACT Highlights the role of air power as the Allies attempted to penetrate German defenses at the Siegfried Line. Part of the Wings at War Commemorative Booklets series. 85 pp., maps, photos GPO Stock No.008-070-00674-0 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE ABSTRACT OF Richard I. Wolf PAGES STJU 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) UUU85 202-404-2186 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 Foreword Airborne Assault on Holland highlights the role of air power as the Allies attempted to penetrate German defenses at the Siegfried Line. The work reflects the circumstances of the time and the desire to find good even in unfortunate circum- stances and should be read with this in mind. Allied airborne paratroops and glider-borne units converged on Arnhem. Unfortunately, stiff German resistance forced their eventual withdrawal; Allied tactical air power prevented even heavier friendly losses, but could not turn defeat into victory. This boldly conceived operation involved the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces in a variety of missions: troop transport, fighter escort, flak neutralization, air cover, and resupply of ground forces. CONTENTS PACE T h e Situ ation ............................................. I N arrative of the Operation .................................. 10 The Epic Struggle of the First Airborne Division ............. 45 ILLUSTRATIONS Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton ........................ Frontispiece 82d D -Da y Paradrop ....................................... 9 iOlst D -Da y Paradrop ..................................... 13 Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams ...................... '9 Navigation Diagram, No. i.................................... 26-27 British D-Day and D+i Paradrop ........................... 33 ioist D + i G lider Release ............................ ..... 41 82d D + I G lider Release .................................... 45 V OflfcIal Photo USAAF Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army. Airborne Assault on Holland The Situation ONFUSED and disorganized, the Wehrmacht was retreating across France and the Lowlands. Ever since the St. Lo break- through Allied pressure had been relentlessly applied, giving the enemy no time to rally his forces for a stand. He was careening toward the Siegfried Line where, if permitted, he could be expected to catch his breath and establish a defensive position. To the Allies the Siegfried Line presented a formidable obstacle. To penetrate the heart of the German homeland it was necessary to pass, not only this system of fixed defenses with its artfully constructed tank traps, minefields, and fire-control points, but also that natural barrier, the river Rhine. Why not accomplish both aims at once? Why not do it now, while enemy forces were still reeling? The logical place to achieve the double result of flanking the Sieg- fried Line and crossing the Rhine was at Arnhem, on the Neder Rijn in Holland. Once across the river here, Allied troops would be beyond the right flank of the Siegfried defenses and in position to swing be- hind them and on into the Fatherland. The flat terrain of northern Germany remaining beyond Arnhem offered a favorable route for armor. Just as Arnhem was the most likely point of attack, the most feasible method was an airborne operation. With paratroops and glider- borne units to seize strategic bridges and landing fields, it was esti- mated that armored and infantry forces could push rapidly forward The ranks of officers mentioned in this booklet are those they held at the time of the events described herein. and take over control. The all-important factor was to hit the enemy at this most vulnerable point before he could gather his resistance. It is well for those inclined to criticize the timing of the operation to consider this imperative need for immediate action. Had the attack proved completely successful, the results of this boldly conceived plan would have amply justified the risks involved. Not that the Holland assault can be deemed a failure; it was possibly 8o per cent successful, since the Allied front was advanced 48 miles in the northern sector and only one difficult river crossing remained. It was the consensus of both United States and British airborne staffs and of the IX Troop Carrier Command (IX TCC) staff that of all airborne operations in the European theater to date, this was the most brilliantly conceived, planned, and executed. Not only did the air component and the forces it carried perform creditably, but losses were far smaller than anticipated. The units carried out their as- signed missions, according to plan as modified by weather and enemy reaction, in such manner as to clear the way for Lt. Gen. Miles C. Dempsey's armor, in case it came through close to schedule. .Tactical air preparation was thorough. Troop carrier operations, depending heavily upon available radar and radio aids, were precise and definite, utilizing to great advantage the experience of IX TCC in other thea- ters. Due to air preparation and the high degree of saturation attained in the area, troop carrier and glider losses were not only lower than expected, but were probably not one-quarter so great as would have been incurred by night, when higher operational losses may be looked for. The airborne divisions (United States 82d and iolst and British ist) acquitted themselves as only airborne units with considerable experience could have done. The 82d Division in a series of bitter fights captured a number of vital bridges prior to the arrival of the Guards Armoured Division and then, assisted by the latter unit, en- gaged in the desperate assault on the important Nijmegen bridge so vital to the success of the ground operation and, by that time, to the relief of the hard-pressed British Ist Airborne Division. Operations of the IOlst Airborne Division, which repulsed with bazookas and artillery a charge of 30 tanks, were equally spectacular. However, while this booklet inevitably discusses to some extent the activities of the ground forces in the Battle of Holland, it is primarily the air component which concerns us here. 2 Army Supply and Airborne Training Perhaps the most persistent difficulty which the First Allied Air- borne Army (FAAA) encountered in its attempt to train for and carry through airborne operations during August and September 1944 was the drain on its troop carrier resources by the requirements for air transport of supplies to the rapidly advancing armies. It was a constant tug-of-war. The Army, needing supplies, turned to the facilities of IX TCC as best suited to produce results. FAAA tried to keep Army demands to a minimum and to suggest other means of satisfying air transport needs. In an effort to secure alternate means of transporting freight, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Commanding General of FAAA, sought to get war-weary heavy bombers about to be returned to the United States, and on 17 August asked Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) to make available 250 B-2 's with 4 their crews until 25 August. This request was rejected because it would entail diversion of combat aircraft. Some progress toward combat training was made when, on 22 August, Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Commanding General Eighth Air Force, offered to allocate heavy bombers to help in hauling freight, and turned over three B-17's and three B-2 's to IX TCC for tests on 4 types and amounts of cargo to be carried, time of loading and unload- ing, fuel consumption, and size of field required. The situation was further alleviated with FAAA's acquisition of 38 and 46 Groups (RAF) for aid in the supply-carrying assignment, and by a directive from Headquarters United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) to Eighth Air Force to set aside bombers for this purpose capable of ioo flights a day, to be placed under command of FAAA when necessary. One hundred sixty-seven B-i supply sorties 7 were flown in the week ending 2 September and 364 sorties the following week. With the Holland airborne operation impending, the hauling of freight was stopped on 15 September. It had been a period full of frustrations and difficulties, when the hydra-headed needs of an invading army had had to be met with whatever was at hand. That the airborne troops, and the crews who flew them in, did so brilliantly is all the more admirable in the face of stupendous training difficulties. 3 644063-45- -2 Preparationf or the Attack Having returned from the Mediterranean theater after completion of the invasion of southern France, IX Troop Carrier Command was immediately alerted for a possible airborne mission. Other operations had been planned to be used if desired. Although on several occa- sions some of these plans were developed to full staff studies and the actual marshaling of aircraft and troops was accomplished, the ground forces advanced so fast as to render the operations unnecessary, since the terrain in question had been overrun by friendly troops. By directive of the Supreme Commander, dated 5 September I944, FAAA was ordered to cooperate with 21st Army Group in a contem- plated northward advance. The troop carrier operation was to place airborne troops in position to seize the vital bridges of the Maas, Waal, and Neder Rijn rivers to facilitate the advance of the British Second Army along the axis Eindhoven-Grave-Nijmegen-Arnhem. (A proposed troop carrier operation against Walcheren Island had also been studied and rejected by FAAA as not feasible because of concentrated flak defenses, impossible glider landing zones, excessive water, big dikes, numerous canals, and other terrain difficulties.) IX TCC, commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams, and aug- mented by 38 Group and 46 Group, was to transport parachute and glider troops and equipment and to effect aerial resupply to British and American forces. The advanced command post, established at Eastcote, England, was used by the air commanders concerned as a combined headquarters, from which point all activities were directed. All final decisions as to route, air cover, and weather were made by General Brereton through his G-3, Brig. Gen. Ralph F. Stearley, coordinated through Combined Headquarters at Eastcote. Plans of IX Troop Carrier Command After an initial study of the capabilities of IX TCC, with application to the problem in hand, a coordinating conference was called of all air and airborne commanders involved, with a view to forming the tactical plan. At this meeting the over-all problem was studied and all commanders voiced their opinions. Selection of staging airfields was based on the then location of troop carrier fields, distance from target areas, tactical composition of air- 4