July–August 2014 Volume 28, No. 4 AFRP 10-1 Senior Leader Perspective A New Era for Command and Control of Aerospace Operations ❙ 5 Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF, Retired From the Guest Editor Describing the Elephant ❙ 17 Framing a Discussion on Command and Control Col Henry Cyr, USAF Features C2 Rising ❙ 26 A Historical View of Our Critical Advantage Lt Col Paul J. Maykish, USAF The Rest of the C2 Iceberg ❙ 56 Lt Col Dave Lyle, USAF The Imperative to Integrate Air Force Command and Control Systems into Maritime Plans ❙ 92 Maj Gerrit H. Dalman, USAF Capt Daniel M. Kopp, USAF LT Gary A. Redman Jr., USN 119 ❙ Views Command and Control in Africa ❙ 119 Three Case Studies before and after Tactical C2 Maj Damon Matlock, USAF Maj Jonathan Gaustad, USAF Maj Jason Scott, Georgia ANG Capt Danielle J. Bales, USAF Examining the Importance of the Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) ❙ 139 Maj Gregory M. Blom, USAF Capt Matthew B. Chapman, USAF 151 ❙ Merge Crossing the Streams ❙ 151 Integrating Stovepipes with Command and Control Maj Matt “Radar” Gaetke, USAF 157 ❙ Historical Highlight A Concept for Directing Combat Air Operations ❙ 157 Major General Sam J. Byerley 171 ❙ Book Reviews Realizing Tomorrow: The Path to Private Spacefight 171 Chris Dubbs and Emeline Paat-Dahlstrom Reviewer: Capt Valentino A. Diaz, USAF True Faith and Allegiance: An American Paratrooper and the 1972 Battle for An Loc 173 Mike McDermott Reviewer: 1st Lt Brandon W. Temple, USAF Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s Big-Unit War against the U S , 1965–1966 175 Warren Wilkins Reviewer: Harry Knight In the Shadow of Greatness: Voices of Leadership, Sacrifce, and Service from America’s Longest War 178 US Naval Academy Class of 2002 Reviewer: Lt Col Aaron Burgstein, USAF Afghanistan: The Perfect Failure 179 John L. Cook Reviewer: Capt Robert M. Whitney, USAF Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War 181 Benjamin S. Lambeth Reviewer: Nathan Albright When Biospheres Collide: A History of NASA’s Planetary Protection Program 183 Michael Meltzer Reviewer: Maj Brent D. Ziarnick, USAFR A Fearful Symmetry: A New Soldier in the Age of Asymmetric Confict 186 Rumu Sarkar Reviewer: Satgin S. Hamrah, MA, MPA July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 2 Editorial Advisors Allen G. Peck, Director, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus) Reviewers Dr. Kendall K. Brown Dr. Tom Keaney NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Johns Hopkins University Dr. Mark Clodfelter Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired National War College Department of Homeland Security Dr. Conrad Crane Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Director, US Army Military History Institute Burke, Virginia Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (professor emeritus) Mr. Douglas E. Lee Air Force Space Command Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired Duke University Dr. Richard I. Lester Eaker Center for Professional Development Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF USAF Academy Dr. Adam Lowther Air Force Research Institute Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Westport Point, Massachusetts Mr. Brent Marley Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Air Force Research Institute Air Force Research Institute Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Ohio State University West Chicago, Illinois Dr. Amit Gupta Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF Air War College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Dr. Grant T. Hammond Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University USAF Center for Strategy and Technology Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Dr. Dale L. Hayden Civil Aerospace Medical Institute Air Force Research Institute Dr. Steve Rothstein Mr. James Hoffman Colorado Springs Science Center Project Rome Research Corporation Milton, Florida Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Naval War College Dr. Thomas Hughes USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Isle of Palms, South Carolina Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired CyberSpace Operations Consulting and Education Dr. Christopher H. Toner Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired University of St. Thomas Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Auburn University Dr. Mark P. Jelonek, Col, USAF, Retired Col Mark E. Ware, USAF, Retired Aerospace Corporation Twenty-Fourth Air Force Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Dr. Harold R. Winton Navarre, Florida USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Xiaoming Zhang USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF Air War College July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 3 Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Mark A. Welsh III Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Robin Rand Commander and President, Air University Lt Gen David S. Fadok http://www.af.mil Director, Air Force Research Institute Allen G. Peck Editor and Chief of Professional Journals Lt Col Michael S. Tate Managing Editor L. Tawanda Eaves Professional Staff http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Vivian O’Neal, Prepress Production Manager Billy Barth, Electronic Publication Manager The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published electroni- cally bimonthly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open fo- rum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, http://www.au.af.mil readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offcial sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com- Air and Space Power Journal 155 N. Twining Street mand, Air University, or other agencies or departments Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 of the US government. e-mail: Senior Leader Perspective A New Era for Command and Control of Aerospace Operations Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF, Retired Te AOR will become a CAOC. Gen “Hawk” Carlisle —Commander, Pacifc Air Forces ontrol of the aerospace environment is a fundamental prerequi- site to successful operations in the physical domains of air, sea, Cland, and space. Once established, such control facilitates the freedom of action and movement for all joint forces. Accordingly, com- mand and control (C2) of aerospace operations are critical functions that must be a priority for the Department of Defense. Disclaimer: Te views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carry- ing the ofcial sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Tis article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. suguA–yluJ t 4102 Air & Space Power Journal | 5 eS oin r eL eda r eP sr ep tc evi Our ability to C2 air and space forces will be affected by three major interrelated trends: emerging threats, new technologies, and the veloc- ity of information. The changes in these three areas since the design, establishment, and operation of the air and space operations center— the AN/USQ-163 Falconer—have been dramatic and are accelerating. Therefore, it is time to determine whether we can achieve success in future operations by evolving our current concept of operations (CONOPS), organizations, and acquisition processes for moderniza- tion—or if we must seek fundamental change to each of these ele- ments that affects our theater air control system (TACS). Before pro- viding an answer, let’s take a brief look at each of the trends affecting our ability to C2 our aerospace operations effectively. Emerging Treats The organization, size, and confguration of the AN/USQ-163 Fal- coner have basically remained the same since its inception. Further- more, we have essentially been on a holiday from large-scale C2 air- power activities; for over two decades, we have had the luxury of not being contested in the air and space domains. Those days are rapidly changing. According to the Department of Defense’s report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force “is pursuing modernization on a scale unprecedented in its history and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities including air- craft, command and control (C2), jammers, electronic warfare (EW), 1 and data links.” Such developments present a fundamental threat to the current American C2 construct. Additionally, other potential ad- versaries have studied the American way of war and have determined that it would be most advantageous to keep us out of their neighbor- hood rather than face our combat power. Operations such as Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Odyssey Dawn have repeatedly demonstrated the overwhelming prowess of American airpower. Therefore, possible ad- July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 6 eS oin r eL eda r eP sr ep tc evi versaries are adopting (and proliferating) antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) expertise—new generations of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles; antisatellite weapons; and cyberspace capabili- ties intended to deny US forces freedom of action. Failure to respond with new C2 thinking to these evolving A2/AD threats will force us to 2 operate with greater risk and farther away from our areas of interest. A2/AD threatens our ability to C2 air and space operations in three ways. Near-peer adversaries can employ kinetic and nonkinetic weap- ons to deny us communications and intelligence, surveillance, and re- connaissance (ISR) from our space-based assets, thereby isolating our forces and blinding our leadership. Cyber attacks—now evolving be- yond mere hacking or denial of service—are becoming more sophisti- cated and may be used to intentionally disrupt operations at the com- bined air and space operations center (CAOC). Accurate, long-range cruise and ballistic missiles are growing in their potential to threaten large, fxed, and exposed CAOCs. As the most senior organizational element of the TACS and the fac- tory for generating the air tasking order—the administrative vehicle for translating the combatant commander’s air strategy into executable plans—the CAOC becomes an extremely lucrative target. This situation poses a question that challenges our conventional approach to C2. Can we deliver information to the war fghter at the tactical edge without having to rely on the traditional C/AOC model of hundreds of people organized in stovepiped divisions around segregated mission areas? The answer will have cascading effects on the architecture that we build to organize and operate C2 in the future—and the degree to which we enjoy operational success. New Technologies Innovative technologies, which enable new capabilities, will require novel ways to C2 as a means of optimizing the production of desired ef- fects. We need to think beyond the constraints that traditional culture July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 7 eS oin r eL eda r eP sr ep tc evi imposes on new technology. For example, ffth-generation aircraft are termed “fghters,” but, technologically speaking, F-22s and F-35s are not just fghters—they are F-, A-, B-, E-, EA-, RC, AWACS-22s, and -35s. They are fying “sensor strikers” that will allow us to conduct information-age warfare inside a contested battlespace whenever we desire—if we fully exploit their “nontraditional” capabilities in a fashion that becomes the new “traditional.” Doing so will demand leading-edge networking capabilities and dif- ferent approaches to solving our data-bandwidth issues. For example, to accommodate the explosion in data growth from new sensors, instead of building bigger pipes to transmit all the collected information, we should process it on board and transmit only the data of interest to the users. This approach inverts our current ISR processing methodology. Existing service-component integrated capabilities could enable ad- vanced joint operational concepts. For example, ffth-generation sensor strikers—F-22s and F-35s—could be used to cue Aegis feet missile de- fense batteries to engage adversary antiship ballistic missiles launched against US carrier strike groups. Fully capitalizing on these capabilities calls for an innovative way of designing our force. As we bring a new long-range ISR/strike aircraft into the Air Force inventory to capitalize on the impact of long-range precision effects, we must amplify those effects through integration with the array of other forces by means of networked sensor/shooter capability from seabed to space. Velocity of Information Signifcant advancements in telecommunications, sensors, data stor- age, and processing power are emerging every day. As a result, the tar- geting cycle has evolved from months to weeks to days to minutes, and from multiple, specialized, and separate aircraft assigned to sepa- rate commands, to “fnding, fxing, and fnishing” from one aircraft in minutes. July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 8 eS oin r eL eda r eP sr ep tc evi Consider just one example from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A Predator piloted from Nevada by the Air Force successfully spotted and identi- fed a sniper who had pinned down a Marine ground force. The re- motely piloted aircraft delivered video of the sniper’s location directly to an on-site Marine controller who used it to direct a Navy F/A-18 into the vicinity. The Predator laser-designated the target for the Navy jet’s bombs, eliminating the sniper. The entire engagement took less than two minutes. That is the synergy of precision and information we must achieve routinely. With an MQ-9 Reaper, the engagement could have been shortened further by combining the ISR sensors, designator, and weapons on one aircraft. Although the increase in information velocity dramatically enhances the effectiveness of combat operations, we must contend with a down- side. As a result of modern telecommunications and the rapid trans- mission of information to, from, and between various levels of com- mand, we have many examples of “information age” operations in which commanders at operational and even strategic levels usurp tactical-level execution. This devolution of the construct of centralized control / decentralized execution to one of centralized control / cen- tralized execution has reduced effectiveness in accomplishing mission objectives. We need discipline to ensure that “reachback” does not be- come “reachforward.” Centralized control / centralized execution rep- resents the failed Soviet command model that stifed initiative, in- duced delay, moved decision authority away from execution expertise, and bred excessive caution and risk aversion. The results of such a model against a more fexible command structure were evident in 1991, when Soviet-sponsored Iraq unsuccessfully applied similar C2 constructs against the US-led coalition. Higher-level commanders who are unwilling to delegate execution authority to the echelon with the greatest relevant situational knowl- edge and control suffer from their remote perspective, create disconti- nuity, and hamstring the capability of commanders at the tactical level to execute a coherent, purposeful strategic plan. Growing acces- July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 9 eS oin r eL eda r eP sr ep tc evi sibility to information requires the restructure of C2 hierarchies to fa- cilitate rapid engagement of perishable targets and capitalize on our technological advantage. Information synthesis and execution author- ity must be shifted to the lowest possible levels, and senior command- ers and staffs must discipline themselves to stay at the appropriate level of war. As described earlier, advancing threats demand that we move beyond large, centralized, and static C2 facilities. Replacing them with a mobile, distributed C2 structure that can handle the same volume and diversity of information as today’s regional CAOC will call for a reappraisal of how we deal with information fow. The “art of command” will morph to realize Metcalfe’s Law network values while the “science of control” will continue to demonstrate Moore’s Law by expanding technology to 3 extend human capacity. The path for optimal growth of both is found through a focus upon gaining and maintaining a decision-cycle advan- tage as the critical path guide. Elements of a New Architecture for Aerospace C2: Novel Concepts of Operations and Organizational Change Concepts of Operations The US military is now at a juncture where the velocity of informa- tion, advances in stealth and precision-engagement technologies, sen- sor developments, and other technologies will permit it to build com- pletely new CONOPS from those based on legacy “combined arms warfare” models that simply align segregated land, air, and sea opera- tions. We now have the potential to link information-age aerospace ca- pabilities with sea- and land-based means to create an omnipresent de- fense complex that is self-forming and, if attacked, self-healing. Such a complex would be so diffcult to incapacitate that it would possess a conventional deterrent quality that would exert a stabilizing infuence wherever it is deployed. The central enabling idea is cross-domain July–August 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 10