Abandoning Vietnam MODERN WAR STUDIES Theodore A. Wilson General Editor Raymond A. Callahan Jacob W. Kipp Allan R. Millett Carol Reardon Dennis Showalter David R. Stone James H. Willbanks Series Editors Abandoning Vietnam How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War James H. Willbanks University Press of Kansas © 2004, 2008 by the University Press of Kansas All rights reserved Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Willbanks, James H., 1947– Abandoning Vietnam : how America left and South Vietnam lost its war / James H. Willbanks p. cm. — (Modern war studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7006-1331-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-7006-1623-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0- 7006-2717-2 (ebook) 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975. 2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—United States. I. Title. II. Series. DS557.7.W55 2004 959.704'3373—dc22 2004003407 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 The paper used in the print publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer waste. It is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48–1992. This book is dedicated to Lt. Col. William B. Nolde, U.S. Army, killed in An Loc eleven hours before the cease-fire went into effect in January 1973; Warrant Officer Anthony Dal Pozzo Jr., U.S. Army helicopter pilot from the 1st Aviation Brigade, killed one hour and fifteen minutes after the cease-fire; and Cpls. Darwin Judge and Charles McMahon Jr., U.S. Marines, both killed during the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in April 1975. It is also dedicated to my father, James E. Willbanks, U.S. Army (Ret.), a great soldier who fought on the frozen battlefields of Korea as a member of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division. Contents List of Illustrations Preface to the Paperback Edition Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Vietnamization 2. Implementing the New Strategy 3. The RVNAF in Action 4. Raising the Stakes 5. Lam Son 719 6. The Ultimate Test of Vietnamization 7. Cease-Fire and “Peace with Honor” 8. The Fateful Year 9. Collapse in the North 10. The Fall of Saigon Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index Photo Gallery Illustrations MAPS 1. RVN CTZs and major South Vietnamese units, 1972 2. RVNAF schools, 1969 3. Ho Chi Minh Trail 4. Attack into the Fishhook, May 1970 5. Attack into the Parrot’s Beak, May 1970 6. Communist sanctuaries and base areas in Laos, 1971 7. Operation Lam Son 719, February-March 1971 8. 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive 9. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, I Corps 10. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, III Corps 11. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, II Corps 12. South Vietnam at cease-fire, January 1973 13. Battle of Phuoc Long Province, December 1974 14. President Thieu’s briefing map, 11 March 1975 15. Fall of the Central Highlands, March-April 1975 16. Fall of MR I, March-April 1975 17. Loss of the coast, March-April 1975 18. Battle of Xuan Loc, April 1975 19. Ho Chi Minh Campaign, April 1975 CHARTS 1. RVNAF military organization, 1966–67 2. Province advisory team, 1968 3. U.S. Advisory chain of command, 1969–70 TABLES 1. RVNAF, 1968 2. Evolution of RVNAF force structure plans 3. Approximate U.S. field advisory strength, 1969–70 4. Comparative military casualty figures 5. Redeployment of major U.S. Army units from Vietnam 6. U.S. troop redeployments from Vietnam 7. Materiel captured during Cambodian incursion, 1970 8. Fixed-wing strike sorties in South Vietnam, 1972 9. Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus 10. NVA strength in the South at cease-fire onset 11. RVNAF and Communist forces in South Vietnam, 1973 Preface to the Paperback Edition When I began this book, there was no indication that the United States would become involved in a war in Iraq. The purpose of the book was to look at the long disengagement of the United States fromVietnam, focusing on Vietnamization, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the aftermath of the American departure from the war. The book sought to examine Vietnamization as an exit strategy. Part of the impetus for the book was that I had personally been involved in this process as an advisor with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in 1971–72. Historians are reluctant to draw lessons learned from historical events. History never repeats itself; there are just too many variables involved in situations that are separated in time. This is particularly true when comparing the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. There are more differences than similarities between the two wars, and because they differ in so many important ways, attempting to apply any lessons fromVietnam to the situation in Iraq is fraught with peril. That being said, however, there are some broad, general lessons learned in Vietnam that can inform U.S. actions, not only in Iraq, but in any contemporary situation in which the government of the United States—or any other nation, for that matter— contemplates intervention and the use of military force. In such cases, just as the United States did in Vietnam, that government will eventually have to confront the issue of extricating itself from the conflict situation. Leaving aside the complex and much-debated issues of why forces were committed to Iraq in the first place and how our effort there serves our national security interests, the U.S. focus in the beginning was on major combat operations: the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regular forces. Once that was accomplished, the focus of the American effort in Iraq shifted to building a democratic Iraqi government and ensuring the presence of viable security forces that could take on the burgeoning insurgency. President George Bush said that