A World in Flames A Short History of the Second World War in Europe and Asia, 1939-1945 Martin Kitchen .... .. ......... ... ... ~ LONGMAN London and New York Longman Group UK Limited, Longman House, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex CM20 2JE, England and Associated Companies throughout the world. Published in the United States of America by Longman Inc., New York © Longman Group UK Limited 1990 All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the Publishers or a licence permitting restricted copying in the United Kingdom issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 33-34 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7DP. First published 1990 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kitchen, Martin, 1936- A world in flames: A short history 9kt~Th~end World l:JiJ','\_\ War in Europe and Asia, 1939-1945 /~ ·' 1. World War Two :J:::"t- · ",,? I. Title ~ <\ We shall not capitulate - no never! 940 .5 3 '-5' C:CJ We may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall c:';. ~~ ~cP ~i drag a world with us - a world in flames. ISBN 0---582--03408--6 CSD ISBN 0---582--03407-8 PPR Adolf Hitler at Nuremburg, 1939 Library of Congress Cataloging in P11blication Data Kitchen, Martin. A world in flames: a short history of the Second World War in Europe and Asia. 1939-1945 I Martin Kitchen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0---582--03408--6. - ISBN 0---582--03407-8 (pbk.) 1. World War, 1939-1945-Europe. 2. World War, 1939-1945-Asia. I. Title. II. Title: World War 2. D743.K53 1990 940.53-dc20 90---5531 CIP Produced by Longman Singapore (Pte) Ltd Printed in Singapore Contents List of Maps Vlll Acknowledgements lX J. Introduction 1 LT 1 From the Outbreak of the War to the Fall of France (September 1939-July 1940) 12 2 The Battle of Britain and the Balkan_Campaign Quly 1940--June 1941) 39 3 The Attack on the Soviet Union Qune 1941-December 1941) 62 4 The War in the Mediterranean (March 1941-May 1943) 90 5 The War at Sea and in the Air 118 6 The War in Asia (September 1931-July 1944) 140 7 The.United States and the War 165 8 Europe under the Nazis 183 9 Two Countries at War: Britain and Germany 207 10 From Moscow to Kursk Qanuary 1942-August 1943) 228 11 Italy and the Balkans Ouly 1943-0ctober 1944) 250 12 The Soviet Advance (August 1943-April 1945) 270 13 From Normandy to the Elbe Qune 1944-May 1945) 292 14 The End of the War in Asia (October 1944-September 1945) 317 15 Conclusion 337 Select Bibliography 345 Maps 351 Index 361 List of Maps Acknowledgements Map 1: Germany attacks in the West: May 1940 351 The original impetus for wntmg this book was provided by the Map 2: The Eastern Front: Operation Barbarossa, 1941 352 Distance Education Department of Simon Fraser University, who Map 3: The German Summer Offensive, 1942 353 asked me to write a course on the Second World War centred around Map 4: The battle of Kursk, August 1943 354-5 a series of television films. This proved to be a challenging and Map 5: The D-Day landings, 6 June 1944 356 rewarding experience. I am particularly grateful to Colin Yer bury Map 6: The final stages in Europe, April and May 1945 357 for the help he gave me in this project. Map 7: The War in the Far East 358-9 Beate Giuffre gave me skilful and dedicated assistance in tracking down the more obscure literature on the war, particularly in foreign languages, and I am greatly in her debt. I have plundered the works and picked the brains of so many fellow historians that it would be impossible to list them all. The bibliography, which lists only works in English, is too modest a tribute. Dedications are so often a pathetic attempt to make amends for adultery, neglect or betrayal. I am in the enviable position of being able unblushingly to place this book in the hands of one for whose generosity, support and understanding it is pitifully inadequate recompense. Introduction The European war which began on 1 September 1939 was Hitler's war. Historians will continue to argue about the social, economic and..Q9litical forces which prompted him to take a series of calculated risks which led to full-scale war. They will debate the ideological roots of Nazi Germany's bid for world power, and examine the decision making process in the Third Reich. Students will no doubt continue to write endless essays on whether Hitler had a blueprint for conquest or was essentially an improviser, impetuously reacting to events. It is unlikely that any of these issues will ever be finally settled, for history is a continuing dialogue between the present and the past, but it is unthinkable that Hitler will disappear from the picture. Only a purblind ideologue can envision him as the disembodied point of intersection of mysterious economic forces, or as the spirit of world history in jackboots. Nazi Germany is unthinkable without Hitler, as is Nazi Germany's war. That the invasion of Poland led to the most destructive and extensive war in history was due to Hitler's decisions to attack in the West in 1940 and then to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. He did not get quite the war he wanted, nor could he fight it on terms of his own choosing, but it was still his war. It may be objected that such an argument is crudely personalistic and shifts the blame for all the evil done in the name of the German people on to one man. By being presented as a superhuman demon, Hitler becomes a convenient scapegoat. In fact, Hitler could never have done what he did had he not articulated so many of the desires and longings of his followers. He did not descend from the skies, nor was he the product of .some arcane historical accident. His foreign 1 Introduction A World in Flames Hitler march into the Rhineland, were disgusted at the supine atti policy, in spite of its excesses, its breathtaking changes of course and tude of the French Government. Belgium, fearing that the Franco its daring gambles, was at least in part within the traditions of Soviet pact was needlessly provocative to the Germans, announced German foreign policy since Bismarck and was conducted, with a its neutrality. This left France wide open to attack as there was no few notable exceptions, with the approval of the diplomatic and money available to extend the heavily fortified Maginot Line, which military elites as well as the vast majority of the German people. ran from Switzerland to the Belgian border, as far as the Channel. There were objections to his rapprochement with Poland in 1933, In both Britain and France the military were violently opposed many feared that the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 was far to serious talks with the Russians, so that the Franco-Soviet too risky a gamble, and there were similar misgivings over the pact greatly weakened the Wes tern pact, which was rapidly invasion of Austria and the Sudeten crisis of 1938 which led to the Munich conference. There was, however, precious little opposition disintegrating. The Spanish Civil War, with its ideological frenzy and its to the general direction of his policy, merely to his precipitous style. appalling brutalities, had a profound effect on world opinion. For the right, the activities of the Soviet secret police, coupled with the Such objections from on high clearly show that Hitler was fully in blood-letting in the Moscow show trials, was further proof of the command of Germany's foreign policy, a fact that even·the sternest evils of communism. The left felt that the struggle against fascism of structuralist historians. is unable to deny. A dictator, however would be won or lost in Spain. When it was lost, the gloomy powerful, is forced to operate within a given social setting, is comrades fatalistically resigned themselves to the inevitable triumph constrained by economic forces, and has to rely on the active support of fascism, comforting themselves with the thought that some of his underlings. Hitler was no exception. He made history, but not in circumstances of his own choice. corrupt bourgeois states would be crushed in the process, and that after a brief if unpleasant interlude the Red Dawn would finally Hitler's gamble that he could move into the Rhineland without break. Some of the more spectacular horrors of the war, skilfully France or Britain reacting was a triumphant success. The Stresa front exploited by master propagandists on the left, provided a hideous of Britain, France and Italy had collapsed when the British and reminder of the likely consequences of a European war. The Basque French gave singularly lukewarm support to the League of Nations town of Guernica had been flattened by German bombers and it was sanctions against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia. The French widely believed that Paris and London would meet a similar fate. would not act without the full support of the British. The British The Spanish Civil War thus provided compelling arguments for would not act until there had been full consultation. The talks those who wanted to appease the dictators, and further weakened the between Britain, France and Belgium were inconclusive. The case of those who still argued for collective security. political right wing in Britain and France felt that Hitler was In May of 1937 Neville Chamberlain became British Prime perfectly justified in looking after his own back yard and accepted his Minister. He laboured under the unfortunate illusion that Hitler and argument that the Franco-Soviet pact, which was ratified by the Mussolini were reasonable men with whom it was possible to French Chamber ofDeputies on 27 February 1936, was a violation of negotiate in good faith. There were a number of reasons why he the treaty of Locarno which guaranteed the Franco-German status quo. believed that war had to be avoided at all costs. He felt that money was better spent on social welfare than on armaments, for otherwise Hitler skilfully exploited this widespread sympathy for his anti the Labour Party was liable to win the next election. He detested the Soviet stance, which had made it seem that he had mar.ched into the Soviet Union and all that it stood for, and regarded the French as Rhineland in order to stand up to the threat of world communism. unreliable and spineless. He knew that he could not count on any In July he agreed to support Franco against the Spanish· Popular support from the United States in its present isolationist mood. The Front Government, determined that Spain should not become part of service chiefs warned him that Britain was in no position to fight a a Franco-Soviet bloc aimed at Germany. Also in July he signed the war against Germany, Italy and Japan, and he was treated to horrific anti-Comintern pact with Japan. Meanwhile, the system of collective accounts from the military experts of the likely effects of a bomber security began to collapse. Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of whom had expressed their willingness to support France should offensive against London. 3 2 A World in Flames Introduction In France the Popular Front Government was sent packing and the the irresponsible daring of Hitler's policies. Schacht, who felt that new administrations of Chautemps and Daladier, wishing to make the forced armaments programme after 1936 and the desire to their peace with the propertied classes, set about appeasing the achieve autarky at almost any price were a disastrous mistake, was fascists both at home and abroad. In Moscow the show trials reached replaced as Minister of Economic Affairs. The War Minister and the absurd new heights as . Stalin set about slaughtering his Officer Chief of General Staff, Blomberg and Fritsch, were dismissed and Corps, thus further lessening both his desirability and his effective Hitler appointed himself Minister of War. The subservient Keitel ness as an ally against Nazi Germany. Hitler looked around at the was made chief of the Armed Forces' High Command (OKW) and steady disintegration of the forces opposed to his schemes, and Brauchitsch was appointed chief of the Army High Command decided to push ahead. (OKH). The conservative nationalist Foreign Minister, von Neurath, On 5 November 1937 he called a meeting of the service chiefs, the was replaced by the frightful Ribbentrop whose diplomatic skills as War Minister, von Blomberg, and the Foreign Minister, von ambassador to Britain had earned him the nickname of 'von Neurath. The protocol of the m~eting was kept by Colonel Brickendrop'. Hitler now h!d personal command over the armed Hossbach, whose memorandum was written from memory but there forces and had a completely free hand in foreign policy. There was is no serious reason to doubt its accuracy. In the course of a long and no further serious discussion at the top of major policy issues or rambling tirade, Hitler insisted that 'living space' (Lebensraum) would about how Hitler's decisions were to be implemented. have to be found for the German people by 1943-45 or the German The invasion of Austria was a typical example of the new economy would collapse, the Nazi movement run out of steam and approach. The Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, was invited to the armed forces become obsolete. He argued that Britain and France Hitler's mountain retreat at the Obersalzberg in Bavaria on 12 had already 'tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the February 1938 where he was treated to an astonishing harangue from fact that this question would be cleared up by Germany in due the Fuhrer, who was surrounded by his generals for greater effect. course'. Hitler also believed that Austria could be annexed without Schuschnigg was given three days to sign an agreement which would intervention from the powers. allow a number of Nazis to enter his Government, one of whom was The German High Command immediately set about revision of to be given the key Ministry of the Interior. Schuschnigg gave way 'Operation Green', the plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. As under such massive pressure, but on 9 March he announced that soon as Germany was prepared, Czechoslovakia was to be attacked there would be a plebiscite in Austria to decide whether the people 'so that the solution of the German problem of living space can be wished for 'a free, German, independent, social, Christian and united carried to a victorious conclusion even if one or other of the great Austria'. Hitler flew into a terrible rage when he heard of powers intervene against us'. Hitler still hoped that this would be Schuschnigg's move, and ordered the army to prepare for an possible without a war, even though Chamberlain was not prepared invasion. Schuschnigg then agreed to abandon the idea of a plebiscite to give him a completely free hand in the east. The Lord President, but the Austrian Nazi Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart, was Lord Halifax, assured l-litler that the British Government had full ordered by Goering to insist on replacing Schuschnigg as Chancellor. understanding of Hitler's revisionist ambitions in Austria, Czecho Schuschnigg appealed to France and Britain for help, but the British slovakia and Danzig, but when he suggested that it would then be were anxious not to provoke Hitler, the ambassador, Henderson, possible to reach a general European peace settlement Hitler declined implying that his Government had no objections in principle to an to discuss the matter any further. Back in London the Foreign Anschluss. The French would do nothing without British support. Secretary, Eden, urged the French to persuade the Czechs to Schuschnigg saw no alternative but to resign, thus leaving the 'demonstrate their good will' towards Nazi Germany, and the Prime problem to the unfortunate President, Miklas. The President at first Minister suggested that Britain might well be unable to support the refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, and when he relented it was too French guarantee to Czechoslovakia were Germany to go to war in late. Hitler had already ordered the invasion of Austria, which began support of its claim to the Sudetenland. in the early morning of 12 March 1938. It was a cheap and bloodless In the course of 1937 Hitler made some important personnel victory. Hitler returned to Vienna to address an adulatory crowd on changes, removing a number of leading figures who were critical of the Heldenplatz. In a plebiscite, 99 per cent of those voting favoured 4 5 A World in Flames Introduction the red uct1· 0n of Austria to a mere German province with the prepared to launch a world war to bring these unfortunates back into unattractive name of 'Ostmark'. . the fatherland. Chamberlain agreed in principle that the Sudetenland The annexation of Austria further weakened Czechoslovakia by should be returned to the Reich, but urged Hitler to desist from the exposing its southern flank to German attack. The Su~eten German use of force. Back in London, Chamberlain received Daladier who Nazis, prodded by their extremist leader Konrad Hen~em, clamoured was concerned that Hitler was intent not merely on seizing the for the return of their native land to the German Reich. The Czech Sudetenland but on destroying the whole of Czechoslovakia. He Government decided to begin talks, but they were labouring under therefore proposed a joint guarantee of rump Czechoslovakia which two serious illusions: first that the Germans genuinely wanted to Chamberlain, who had always argued that Hitler was a man who settle the problem, and second, that the British and French would kept his word, had no alternative but to accept. help them out if things went seriously wrong. . On the following day, 19 September 1938, the British and French Confident that the British and the French would do nothmg, Governments urged the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland to Hitler ordered provocative troop movements along the Czech border Germany. President Benes initially rejected this suggestion, but gave on 19 May. The Czechs responded by begining to mobilize their way when told that the British and French would not support him if army, and the British and French Governments issued un~harac­ he refused. teristically firm statements. This merely provoked Hitler t~ mform Chamberlain visited Hitler again on 22 September at Bad his top military, state and party officials on 28 May that he mtended Godesberg, only to be told that his proposed solution to the Sudeten to smash Czechoslovakia before attacking in the west. Two days German problem was unacceptable and that Hitler wanted im later further changes were made to 'Operation Green' which mediately to occupy the Sudetenland, to hold plebiscites in as yet expressed Hitler's 'unalterable intention to smash Czechoslovakia by undefined areas and to meet the territorial demands against military action in the near future'. Meanwhile the French Gover~­ Czechoslovakia of both Hungary and Poland. Hitler ended by ment hastily began to retreat, warning the Czechs to stop theu assuring his guest that this was his last territorial demand, adding, mobilization and telling the British that they had no intention of somewhat ominously, 'in Europe'. supporting the Czechs, in spite of their treaty o~ligations, if_ they Chamberlain still believed Hitler, but in Whitehall there was a were 'unreasonable'. The British sent Lord Runciman, the Liberal growing feeling that he had gone too far. The Foreign Secretary, leader, to report on the situation of the German minorities. Halifax, persuaded Chamberlain not to cave in completely to Hitler's Runciman greatly enjoyed the hospitality of Sudeten German demands and the Prime Minister agreed to send his closest adviser, landowners, but otherwise found Czechoslovakia an 'accursed Sir Horace Wilson, to see Hitler. Hitler told Sir Horace that any country'. Predictably he reported that 'Czechoslovakian rule in the further talk was pointless and that he would destroy Czechoslovakia Sudeten areas for the last twenty years has been marked by if necessary. In a second meeting, Chamberlain's envoy first tactlessness, intolerance and discrimination'. His conclusion was that threatened Hitler that Britain and France would be prepared to fight the Sudetenland should be handed over to Germany. to defend Czechoslovakia, and then spoiled any effect ihis might At the begining of September the British Government persuaded have had by assuring the Fuhrer that the British Government would the Czechs to accept Henlein's proposal for a Sudeten German use every means at its disposal to 'try and make those Czechos parliament. Henlein was horrified at this suggestion, fearing that ~t sensible'. In such a spirit, Chamberlain informed Benes on 27 would bring the crisis to an end. In the Reich, Hitler worked up his September that there was nothing Britain and France could do to audience at the Nuremberg party rally into a frenzy of indignation help him. The same evening he told the nation on BBC radio that over the grim lot of their racial comrades in the Sudetenland. On 13 the British Empire was not prepared to go to war over a 'quarrel iri a September Chamberlain, without consultii_ig the French, a~nounced far-away country between people of whom we know nothing'. In that he would visit Hitler in his mountam retreat and discuss the the middle of a long and dreary report to the House of Commons on Czech situation. these exchanges, the Prime Minister was handed a note saying that Hitler submitted to the Prime Minister a long list of Czech Hitler had agreed to host a four-power conference at Munich to atrocities against the hapless Germans and announced that he was discuss the Czech crisis. The House was wildly enthusiastic when 6 7 A World in Flames Introduction Chamberlain told them that he intended to go to Munich. There attacked by Hitler, who announced that he intended to invade were those, prominent among them Churchill, Eden and Amery, Czechoslovakia at 6 a. m. The wretched President collapsed, and who did not join in the general jubilation, but only one lone Scottish having been revived with an injection he signed a document Communist, Willy Gallagher, spoke up against Chamberlain's entrusting the future of his hapless country to Hitler. Abandoned by decision to continue to appease Hitler. Britain and France, the Czechs offered no resistance and thus on The Munich agreement gave Hitler almost everything he wanted. 15 March the Germans established the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and He was to be allowed to occupy the Sudetenland, and Polish and Moravia' and soon reduced Slovakia to vassal status with a treaty Hungarian claims against Czechoslovakia were to be respected. which set up a 'protective relationship' with the Reich. There were Britain and France gave a feeble guarantee to the remains of few illusions in either case as to what 'protection' by Nazi Germany Czechoslovakia, but Chamberlain, again without consulting the involved. French, signed an agreement with Hitler that their two countries The invasion of Czechoslovakia resulted in a slight stiffening of would never again go to war, thus rendering the guarantee virtually the attitudes of the British and French Governments. Chamberlain worthless. Benes, who had never been consulted by his supposed gave a somewhat petulant speech in Birmingham and both nations allies, was without outside help and feared civil war at home. He withdrew their ambassadors for consultation. Hitler took no notice thus had no alternative but to accept the Munich ultimatum and to of any of this. He demanded Memel from the Lithuanians, who resign on 4 October 1938. promptly gave way. These German successes encouraged Mussolini In both Britain and France the Munich agreement was rapturously to push ahead with his plans to invade Albania in an inglorious received. It was believed that war had been avoided and that campaign mounted on Good Friday, 7 April. Chamberlain had indeed secured not only 'peace with honour' but There was now mounting evidence that Romania was next on 'peace for our time'. Public opinion began to change somewhat Hitler's list and considerable concern in London and Paris that he when the appalling anti-Jewish violence on 9 November 1938 in the was out to seize the Romanian oilfields. The Polish Foreign Minister, cruelly inappropriately named 'Night of Broken Glass' (Reichskris Beck, did not want to become involved in a four-power declaration, tallnacht) and Hitler's boastful speeches about the feebleness of which might include the Soviet Union, designed to preserve the Chamberlain and Daladier and the victory of force over pusillanimity sovereignty of all European states, a move aimed at discouraging at Munich revealed the true face of National Socialism. At the end of Hitler from moving against Romania. He therefore suggested a January 1939 Hitler told the Reichstag that the 'final solution' of the secret Anglo-Polish agreement. On 31March1939 Chamberlain told Jewish problem was the 'radical, racial, ideological objective of the the House of Commons that Britain and France would lend Poland coming war'. To his henchmen he made repeated references to an 'all support in their power' if its independence was threatened. Four imminent war to secure a vast European Empire for the German days later Beck arrived in London and secured an extension of the people. All of this passed virtually unnoticed in London and Paris, interim guarantee to Poland by playing down the threat from and in spite of the mounting pressure on Czechoslovakia, Chamber Germany. lain proclaimed that Europe was 'settling down to a period of There were misgivings in London and Paris about a pact with tranquillity'. Poland: The British felt, quite rightly, that Beck was less than frank President Hacha of Czechoslovakia did what he could to keep his and prone to duplicity. The French disliked the way Poland had country together and to preserve the last vestiges of a democratic fallen upon Czechoslovakia after Munich, and some were disgusted order. He arrested the separatist Slovakian Premier, Monsignor Tiso, by fresh outbursts of a virulent anti-Semitism which had so often a man who dutifully addressed Hitler as 'mein Fuhrer'. Released from disfigured Polish life. Most of all, the French were concerned that if jail, Tiso rushed to Berlin where he was ordered to appeal to Hitler the guarantee were to go into effect it was they, not the British, who for protection, and a declaration of Slovak independence was dictated would be called upon to do most of the fighting. The French fascist to him by the German authorities. This document was accepted by Marcel Deat asked the famous question: 'Why die for Danzig?' Many the Slovak Diet on 14 March. Hacha immediately went to Berlin and felt that there was no particular reason why they should. Both was received by Hitler at 1.15 a.m. on 15 March. He was viciously Chamberlain and Daladier hoped that the guarantee to Poland would 8 9 A World in Flames Introduction force Hitler to be more moderate in his demands, and the same Poland to begin on 26 August. Prompted by British and French argument was used when extending the guarantee to Romania and offers _to negotiate, Hitler postponed the invasion of Poland, hoping Greece in April. to achieve another Munich. But by 28 August when Hitler received The Anglo-French guarantees to Poland and Romania greatly the British ambassador, Henderson, he had lost all interest in strengthened the position of the Soviet Union, which could now negotiation. His reply to the British offer was so insulting that even wait and see whether the western powers or Germany would make Henderson, an arch-appeaser and anti-Semite, lost his temper. On the better offer. The British Government never took the Soviet 31 August Mussolini proposed a conference, this second 'Munich' to approaches seriously, although stalwart anti-appeasers like Churchill be held on 5 September, but it was too late. At 4.45 a.m. German felt that they should be accepted. They disliked and distrusted the troops crossed the borders of Poland. Soviets and were overly concerned about the susceptibilities of On 2 September the British Government agreed to issue an Poland and Romania, both of which wanted nothing to do with ultimatum that would expire at midnight, but Chamberlain and communists. A major stumbling block was the Soviets' insistence Halifax still hoped that there would be a conference. In the that some states would have to be guaranteed whether they wanted Commons later that day the Prime Minister said he would welcome to be or not, and that states which became the objects of aggression, a conference if the Germans agreed to withdraw their forces. The either direct or indirect, would have to be helped even if they did not House was outraged by this statement, for he had not insisted on an ask for such assistance. Halifax thought that this would permit the actual withdrawal of German troops. When Greenwood rose to Soviets to endulge in 'naked, immoral interference' in the affairs of speak on behalf of the Labour Party, Amery called out from the their unfortunate neighbours. Military talks did not begin until Conservative ranks, 'Speak for England, Arthur!' 12 August and promptly stalled when Marshal Voroshilov asked the At number 10 Downing Street Chamberlain was told by his key question: would the Poles and Romanians allow Soviet troops Cabmet colleagues that the time for prevarication was over. 'This on their territory in order to uphold the guarantees? Britain and means war,' he gloomily declared. To heighten the dra~a there was France tried to get the Poles to agree, but Beck replied that this a sudden thunderclap. Henderson was promptly instructed to deliver would amount to yet another partition of Poland, and added: 'With the British ultimatum at 9 a.m., to expire at 11 a.m. The French once the Germans we risk losing our liberty. With the Russians we lose again followed behind. Their ultimatum expired at 5 p. m. Thus on our soul.' On 21 August the military talks were adjourned. That 3 September Britain and France were at war although there was little evening it was announced that the German Foreign Minister, fighting until May of the following year. While the German Ribbentrop, was to visit Moscow. Two days later the Soviets signed Blitzkrieg was triumphant in the east, the western Allies endured the a pact with the Nazis. boredom of the 'Sitzkrieg', or 'phoney war'. Unofficial talks between Germany ~nd the Soviet Union had been going on throughout the summer. The Germans became increasingly concerned that Britain and France would reach an agreement with the Soviets, and the Soviets were angered that the western powers would not let them have their way in the Baltic and doubted that they were interested in serious negotiations. The Germans, on the other hand, were prepared to give them everything they wanted in the Baltic, Poland and Bessarabia. The day before the pact was signed Hitler told his generals that with Germany allied with the Soviet Union, Britain and France would never dare give assistance to Poland. The same day Chamberlain urged Germany and Poland to reach an agreement over Danzig. Shortly afterwards Daladier offered to mediate between Germany and Poland. The next day, Hitler ordered the invasion of 10 11