A Wild West of the Mind A Wild West of the Mind GEORGE SHER 1 3 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2021 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Sher, George, author. Title: A Wild West of the Mind / George Sher. Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020053787 (print) | LCCN 2020053788 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197564677 (hb) | ISBN 9780197564691 (epub) | ISBN 9780197564707 | ISBN 9780197564684 Subjects: LCSH: Thought and thinking—Moral and ethical aspects. Classification: LCC BJ45.5 .S54 2021 (print) | LCC BJ45.5 (ebook) | DDC 153.4/2—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020053787 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020053788 DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780197564677.001.0001 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America Preface and Acknowledgments There are many ways to think of minds— as sets of states with interlocking functional roles, for example, or as coronas of sensation hovering over extremely complicated machines— but in my capacity as the lone inhabitant of one specific mind in which I take a partic- ular interest, the image that means the most to me is that of a vast, unbounded, unregulated space. That’s the image that my title’s wild west metaphor captures, and it has shaped the writing of this book by allowing me to bring together a number of attitudes that I hold dear. Perhaps the most important of these is my sheer delight in the va- riety and instinctive candor of thought— in its tendency to follow its nose, like a snuffling dog, into any pungent crevice of interest or truth. A second such attitude is my conviction that those in the philosophy business tend greatly to overmoralize—t o depart from common sense by insisting that even the most ordinary of decisions and conflicts are fraught with deep moral meaning. Yet a third is my dismay at the broader culture’s gathering hostility toward an ever-w idening range of attitudes, emotions, and beliefs that don’t fit the cultural narra- tive du jour. The book’s title, when it popped up in a morning con- versation with my like- minded wife, served immediately to highlight both the connections among these attitudes and the importance of exploring them in print. Galvanized, I went straight to work, first on a freestanding paper and then on a book to fill in the assumptions and arguments that the paper necessarily left unexplored. Writing the book has been a labor of love. Addressing the proto- type paper’s unanswered questions was like blowing up an easily in- flated balloon, one of the long narrow ones that are easily twisted into segmented dachshunds. At each stage, the writing drew urgency from conviction. Once, before presenting one of the book’s chapters in a talk, I heard myself saying, “I always believe what I write, but this time I mean it.” I still don’t know quite what I meant when I said that, but I do know that whatever it was, I meant it. viii Preface and Acknowledgments The paper from which the book developed, also entitled “A Wild West of the Mind,” first appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 3 (2019): 483– 96. I thank the publisher for per- mission to reprint some material from it here. I also want to thank the many friends and audience members who have provided valu- able feedback on the project. I presented material from the book at the University of Warwick, the University of Arizona, the University of St. Thomas in Houston, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress in Boulder, Colorado, and the Second Workshop on Humanistic Ethics at Rice University, and I was privileged to attend a one-d ay workshop on the full manuscript at the Free University of Amsterdam. On each occa- sion, I received illuminating comments from more people than I can now remember, so I’ll simply offer a collective “thank you” to all who contributed to those interesting discussions. Thanks, too, to those who generously commented on the project in its various stages of development: Richard Arneson, Gwen Bradford, Anthony Carreras, Justin Coates, Thomas Hurka, Michael McKenna, Daniel Pallies, Philip Robichaud, Steven Wall, Jan- Willem Weiland, and two anonymous referees for the Australasian Journal. I owe a spe- cial debt to my colleague Vida Yao, who read the whole manuscript and had perceptive and illuminating things to say about each part of it. I couldn’t wish for a better philosophical interlocutor. My greatest debt is to my wife, Emily Fox Gordon, a marvelous writer who has supported and encouraged this project from the be- ginning and who, as it happened, was herself mining a related seam of ideas while I was writing the book. (Two of the essays she wrote during that period are cited in Chapter 6.) Our conversations about these subjects were the best kind of collaboration, with lots of amplifying, correcting, filling in, and egging on in both directions. It was a won- derful experience, and the book is much the better for it. 1 Nasty as I Wanna Be A ramble through someone else’s mind would not be a pleasant ex- perience. Even if you didn’t stumble across any fond memories of snuff movies, and even if you encountered no pockets of lust for eight- year- olds or lurid fantasies of torture, domination, or rape, you could hardly avoid the many rank pools of resentment, jeal- ousy, and schadenfreude. You’d also be likely to find many hos- tile attitudes toward nominal friends, negative and stereotyped judgments of groups, and florid growths of contempt. There would, of course, also be much that was pleasing: genuine affec- tion for some, perhaps a judicious appreciation of merit in others, and— one might hope— a generalized sense of goodwill and com- mitment to sound principles. Still, much of what you found would be ugly and would invite justified moral condemnation if it were externalized. Are we similarly entitled to condemn what is inside when it is not externalized? According to many, the answer is a resounding “yes.” We are all familiar with moral condemnation that is directed at purely pri- vate events— at forbidden thoughts and fantasies, inappropriate emotions, beliefs that are unsupported (or, sometimes, supported!) by evidence, and wayward attitudes, like the lust that once resided in Jimmy Carter’s heart. It seems to me, though, that all this finger- wagging is badly mistaken and that the realm of the purely mental is best regarded as a morality- free zone. Within that realm, no thoughts or attitudes are either forbidden or required. In the chapters that follow, I will argue that unlike actions in the world, which morality is properly said to constrain, each person’s subjec- tivity is a limitless, lawless wild west in which absolutely everything is permitted. A Wild West of the Mind. George Sher, Oxford University Press (2021). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780197564677.003.0001 2 A Wild West of the Mind I By “everything” I mean everything, and it will be helpful to begin with a few examples. Although I cannot prove it, I am convinced that every living human being is often bloody- minded and even more often dirty- minded and that there is no day in anyone’s life in which he does not have thoughts that he would not dream of expressing. Although there are of course limits of both decorum and self- protection to how far one can go by way of illustration—e verything I mention must of course have occurred to me—a n incomplete sampling is better than none at all. Here, then, are some of the things that I think it is not impermissible to feel or think. It is, I maintain, not morally wrong to 1. Beam hatred at the elderly woman who is fumbling with her coupons and holding up the checkout line while your ice cream melts; 2. Be embarrassed by your spouse’s grammatical lapses (bad pos- ture, social gaffes, etc.); 3. Think, while consoling a friend who has received a bad diag- nosis, “Better you than me”; 4. Be pleased that a professional acquaintance who isn’t as good as you has had a manuscript rejected; 5. Be pleased that a professional acquaintance who is better than you has had a manuscript rejected; 6. Find the painful pratfalls on America’s Funniest Home Videos endlessly amusing; 7. Hope the plane whose landing you are watching catches a wing tip on the ground and cartwheels in a ball of fire; or 8. Wish someone you dislike would die. And here are some beliefs— all false, many noxious—t hat I take sim- ilarly to escape moral condemnation. It is, I maintain, not morally wrong to believe that 9. The poor are just lazy; Nasty as I Wanna Be 3 10. The richest 1% (environmental criminals, Republicans, etc.) should be imprisoned and the worst of them shot; 11. Women (Blacks, Jews, etc.) are intellectually or morally inferior to others; 12. Men, with their rampant testosterone, are responsible for 90% of the world’s troubles; 13. Women who dress provocatively are asking for it; 14. Six- year- olds can give meaningful consent and aren’t harmed by sex anyhow; 15. Homosexuality is abnormal; 16. The act with the best consequences is always the right one to perform. And here, finally, is a tiny sampling of the fantasies that I take to fall out- side morality’s purview. It is, I maintain, not wrong to fantasize about 17. Dropping a heavy object from the top of the Empire State Building; 18. Punching an obnoxious child; 19. Keying every Hummer (every Prius) in the parking lot; 20. Having sex with your married neighbor (your sister, the secre- tary of the treasury, a ruminant, etc.); 21. Having nonconsensual sex with any of the above; 22. Licking your own genitals, like a dog; or even 23. Dressing up as a clown to attract children to sodomize, dis- member, and bury under your house. Exercise for the reader: extend each list. II My claim that thoughts like these are not subject to moral condem- nation appears to be a minority view. Because moral theorists are un- derstandably preoccupied with what goes on in the public world, they do not often say much about purely private fantasies, emotions, and 4 A Wild West of the Mind beliefs. However, when they do address such issues, they generally say things like this: Consider . . . a person who considers herself very progressive and liberal, but who discovers she is harboring serious prejudices against homosexuals. She might be unwilling to publicly express her attitudes precisely because she believes that they cannot be mor- ally justified. In cases of this sort, I would argue, there might well be grounds for feeling guilty. . . . Morality may demand that we not harbor malicious, disrespectful, or prejudiced attitudes toward others, but [sic] this demand seems morally justifiable.1 It is morally wrong to admire Hitler . . . it is morally wrong to delight at another person’s suffering, it is morally right to be pleased by jus- tice and disgusted with oppression, etc.2 Imagine . . . an aging man who finds himself beset by persistent desires to rape a younger woman. It seems to me that this persis- tent longing is an occasion for a morally directed self- criticism and self- reform, and that this would remain true even if the man were entirely confident that he would never permit himself to rape anyone.3 Say that we are envious and unfairly resentful of our colleague’s success in competition with us and driven by this to an intense dis- like of him. Resentment, envy, detestation all determine what we are prepared to believe about him. We believe our colleague to be a fool because we wish he were a fool; we believe him merely lucky and probably corrupt because we wish him to be worthy of our contempt. Such believing is morally wrong because it is generated 1 Angela Smith, “Guilty Thoughts,” in Carla Bagnoli, ed., Morality and the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 243. 2 Alan Hazlett, “How to Defend Response Moralism,” British Journal of Aesthetics 49, no. 3 (July 2009), p. 245. 3 Talbot Brewer, The Bounds of Choice: Unchosen Virtues, Unchosen Commitments (New York: Garland, 2000), p. 38.