SPRINGER BRIEFS IN SOCIOLOGY Miguel A. Cabrera A Genealogical History of Society 123 SpringerBriefs in Sociology More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10410 Miguel A. Cabrera A Genealogical History of Society 123 Miguel A.Cabrera Department ofHistory University of LaLaguna LaLaguna Spain ISSN 2212-6368 ISSN 2212-6376 (electronic) SpringerBriefs inSociology ISBN978-3-319-70436-4 ISBN978-3-319-70437-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70437-1 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017957179 ©TheAuthor(s)2018 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Printedonacid-freepaper ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbySpringerNature TheregisteredcompanyisSpringerInternationalPublishingAG Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 The Making of Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1 The Critique of Individualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2 Society as Civilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.3 A New Theory of Human Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3 Society as Economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.1 The Critique of Economic Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.2 Society as Economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4 A Genealogical Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Epilogue: The Disenchantment of the Social.. .... .... .... ..... .... 97 Bibliography .. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 105 v Chapter 1 Introduction This book presents the outcomes of my research on the genesis and process of formation of the modern concept of society. The object of that research was to unravelthecausesandreconstructthecircumstancesthatgaverisetotheemergence ofthisconcept,pavingthewayfromaspecificmomentforcertainpeopletobegin thinking that such a thing as society existed. Given that the concept of society has playedaprominentroleinthedevelopmentofhumanhistorysincethen,thesubject is of pivotal interest and importance. During that time, the assumption that society exists has heavily influenced the way many people have conceived of themselves, behaved, and related to each other, as well as the kinds of institutions they have created, the values and beliefs they have entertained and promoted, and the life expectations they have tried tofulfil. Along with theconceptof theindividual, the concept of society has, for more than a century, been one of the main organizing factors of human existence, both personally and collectively. The influence of the concept of society underlies, for instance, facts and events such as the creation of the Socialist parties, the implementation of the Welfare State, and the outbreak of theRussianandChineserevolutions.Andthesamecanbesaidoftheappearanceof class identities and the notions of social rights and citizenship. It was also the conceptofsocietywhichmadetheemergenceandformationoftheso-calledsocial sciences conceivable and possible, providing them with their subject matter, and definingthetermsoftheirtheoreticaldebates.Allofthesefacts,events,andnotions are evidence of the deep impact the concept of society has had on the recent development of human history. But the interest and importance of investigating the gestation of the concept of societyalsostemfromthefactthatithelpsusbetterunderstandandexplainsucha historical development. By providing us with greater knowledge of the genesis of the concept, this investigation helps us gauge the nature and scope of its influence in the making of subjectivities, behaviours, and human institutions over the past twocenturies.Researchhasmadeitclearthattheconceptdidnotmerelyappearto name a phenomenon or entity (‘society’) which, though previously unnoticed, really existed. Rather, it emerged as the result of an operation of resignification of ©TheAuthor(s)2018 1 M.A.Cabrera,AGenealogicalHistoryofSociety,SpringerBriefsinSociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70437-1_1 2 1 Introduction the human world triggered by the practical necessity to endow this world with a new intelligibility. Therefore, this being the case (as it apparently was), it implies that people who have acted under theinfluence ofthe concept of society havenot, as is usually believed, been determined by their social conditions of existence. Rather, what those people have done is to translate into action a certain form of conceivingofhumanbeingsandtheirworldasembodiedbytheconceptofsociety itself. And the same can be said of the analytical usage of the concept by the so-calledsocialscientists.Inthiscasetoo,theentitytowhichtheconceptrefershas noobjectiveexistenceandisonlyawayofobjectifyingcertainhumanphenomena. Some of the theoretical and epistemological implications arising from my research will be summarily explored in the Epilogue.1 The modern concept of society entails a well-defined set of assumptions on the nature ofhuman beings, theorigin of human subjectivity and the causes of human behaviour, the genesis of human relations and institutions, and historical change. Thefirstandmostbasicoftheseassumptionsisthathumangroupingsarenotmere additions or aggregates of individuals, but specific entities, qualitatively different from their constituent parts. And, therefore, relations and interactions between human beings constitute an autonomous domain, independent of the participants’ intentionality. It is a domain governed by its own rules, endowed with an intrinsic causalmechanism,andwhoseconstitution,operation,andtransformationovertime not only are not the outcome of the subject’s will and conscious action, but are beyond the intentional control of the subjects themselves. Indeed, the concept of society is explicitly defined in contrast to the concept of the individual and entails the denial of the existence of human nature. Human beings are neither natural and timeless subjects nor the bearers of intrinsic and unchanging attributes, whose actions are driven by their innate inclinations and propensities. On the contrary, human beings are social, historical, and changing subjects whose subjectivity and identitydependonandaretheexpressionoftheirsocialcontext.Humanbeingsare nopre-constituted agents,buttheembodiment oftheirsocialsetting, whereas their actions are not the effect of their motivations and decisions, but of their social dispositions. In sum, the concept of society implies the notion of social causality. Thatis,theassumptionthathuman beings’subjectivityandbehaviourarecausally determined by the real conditions of existence typical of each historical situation. Themodernconceptofsocietythusentailstheassumptionthatthoseconditions of existence constitute an objective realm, in the sense that they possess intrinsic meanings, and that, by virtue of it, they have the power to project into and 1This book is part of a wider ongoing research project whose objective is to investigate and analyzethehistoricalgenesis,epistemologicalnature,andpracticalimpactofthecharacteristically modern conception of the human world. Here it deals with one of the components of such a conception,theconceptofsocietyasanobjectivephenomenonorentity.Thisconcept,alongwith thatofhumannature,hastakenan outstandingplace intheconstellation ofconcepts whichhas providedthemodernworldwithontologicalandtheoreticalfoundations.Theanalysisofthisissue seems to be an important endeavour today, as it can help us better understand and assess the so-calledcrisisofModernitywitnessedinrecenttimes. 1 Introduction 3 determine human beings’ consciousness and meaningful actions. This objective social reality is the causal foundation of subjects’ cultural dispositions and of the relationsandinstitutionsestablishedbythem.Inthisview,thewaypeopleconceive oftherealphenomenathatconstitutethehumanworld,themeaningstheyattribute to such phenomena, and the way they react to them are all implicit in the phe- nomena themselves. For the societalist paradigm, real phenomena are natural and objectiveentities,asonlyonewayofinterpretingandreactingtothemcanbetaken astherightone.Thisiswhywhensuchinterpretationsandreactionsdonotconcur with the theoretically prescribed, they are deemed as a (ideologically) distorted perception of reality or false consciousness. Eitherasawholeorseparately,theseassumptionshavebeenaninescapablepart of modern culture and are deeply embedded in our common sense. As already pointed out, many people have identified themselves, acted, and experienced their livingrealityonthebasisofthoseassumptions.Manyscholarshaveembracedthem and used them as analytical tools to explain human behaviour and institutions and historical change in their terms. These scholars have taken for granted that the concept of society refers to an existing entity and that at a given moment, the existenceofsocietywasdiscoveredastheresultofaclose,methodicalobservation of the human world. This is, in fact, the story told by those who first came to formulate the concept of society inthe early nineteenth century and began using it intheirinquiriesandpoliticalproposals.Itisoftenaddedthatsuchadiscoverywas prompted bythe rapid transformation ofEuropean societyfrom thelate eighteenth century, in the wake of the crisis of the Old Regime, industrialization, and the establishmentofthemarketeconomyandliberalpoliticalregimes,inparticularthe regimethatemergedfromtheFrenchRevolution.Boththespeedanddepthofsuch a transformation, as well as the emergence of a new and more complex type of economic, social, and political relations, it is argued, would have led some con- temporaries to scrutinize the human world more closely and to develop new and more precise conceptual tools, in an attempt to grasp the nature and operation of that world. One such new tool would have been the concept of society. Things seem to have happened very differently, however. Research shows that the concept of society was not the fruit of a scientific discovery, but of a re-conceptualization of the human world triggered—and, at the same time, theo- retically delimited—by the frustration of expectations with regard to the actual outcomes of implementing the tenets of individualist classical liberalism. The conceptofsocietydidnotarisefromacloseandmethodicalobservationofhuman reality, but from a mutation in the way of conceiving of this reality caused by a critical reaction against the individualist theoretical paradigm. That frustration of expectationsnotonlyforcedthere-conceptualizationofsomehumanphenomena,it alsosetouttheterms,limits,andscopeofsuchare-conceptualization.Theconcept ofsocietydidnotariseoutofamereepistemologicalencounterwithreality,butof a meaningful re-articulation of reality carried out by the previous category of individual. The new concept of society is potentially implicit in the concept of the individual and is prefigured by it, as it was possible to conceive of the former because of the latter’s prior existence, which constituted its starting point. For the 4 1 Introduction concept of society to be conceived of and to emerge, the prior existence of the conceptoftheindividualisaprerequisiteandindispensablecondition.Thisiswhy, despite being opposites, both concepts are theoretically interdependent and closely linkedandimplyoneanother.Therefore,theconceptofsocietyhasnoscientificor representationalorigin,butratheragenealogicalone.Itwasconceivedofasaresult of the meaningful interaction between observed empirical reality and the inherited concept of the individual. Thattheconceptofsocietywaspotentiallyimplicitandprefiguredinthatofthe individualdoesnotmeanthatateleologicalrelationshipexistsbetweenthetwoand thatthelatterwasboundtogiverisetotheformer.Onthecontrary,theconnection between thetwoconceptsishistoricallycontingent:themutationoftheconceptof the individual into that of society was caused by a set of clearly identifiable phe- nomena. Without the presence of these phenomena, such a conceptual transmuta- tionwouldnothavehappened.Thus,thefactthattheconceptofsocietyarosefrom the observation of socioeconomic, political, and cultural reality is an empirically obviousfact.Whattriggeredthereflection,analysis,andtheoreticalrethinkingthat ledtotheformulationoftheconceptofsocietywastheinterestandconcernforaset of empirically observable phenomena. These were the object of observation of thosewhofirstmadethatformulation,anditwaswiththepurposeofunderstanding and explaining such phenomena that they formulated the concept of society, as it appears explicitly and clearly in their writings and statements. Among the phe- nomenathatprominentlycontributedtotheemergenceoftheconceptofsocietyare, forinstance,theexistenceofpoliticalconflicts,thepersistenceofsocialinequalities and poverty, and the economic situation of industrial workers. But the existence of such real phenomena does not in any way explain the theoretical conclusions at which the theorists of the social arrived. If these phe- nomena were interpreted as they were and the theoretical conclusions reached, it was because the observers started from certain assumptions concerning the human worldandhistory.Iftheaforesaidrealphenomenaprovokedacriticalreactionand gave rise to such a conceptual mutation, it was because they were faced, experi- enced, and analyzed through categories such as human nature and historical pro- gress. That is why such phenomena could appear as evidence or symptoms of the practical failure of the individualist paradigm. If they appeared as evidence of failure (which should be repaired), it is because they were compared with and assessed according to a certain normative pattern of success (the ideal social order implicitinandpromisedbytheindividualistparadigmitself).Thisisalsowhythat failure was meant to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the theoretical premises of the paradigm, leading to the conviction that they should be severely critiqued and replaced by more accurate ones. Theconvictionthatagapbetweentheoryandpracticaloutcomesexistedwasin turn grounded by critical observers on two implicit assumptions. Firstly, that the human world was susceptible of being known in the same manner as the natural world. Secondly, that human history tended intrinsically towards a perfect and superior type of social organization, devoid of conflicts and in which equality, well-being,andideologicalconsensuswillprevail.Inlight ofthisassumption,that