34 D AYS 34 D AYS ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, AND THE WAR IN LEBANON AMOS HAREL AND AVI ISSACHAROFF 34 DAYS Copyright © Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 2008. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproducedin any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case ofbrief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–60400–1 ISBN-10: 0–230–60400–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Harel, Amos. 34 Days : Israel, Hezbollah, and the war in Lebanon / Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–60400–5 1. Lebanon War, 2006. I. Issacharoff, Avi. II. Title. III. Title: Thirty four days. DS87.65.H37 2008 956.9204(cid:1)4—dc22 2007048534 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems, Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: May 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America. CONTENTS Introduction and Acknowledgments vii One The Abduction 1 Two Barak Promises 17 Three Denial 39 Four A New Triumvirate 59 Five Going to War 75 Six The Ship Leaves Port 91 Seven The Soldiers Can Wait 111 Eight Bint J’Bayel, First Round 119 Nine To Us, a Tie Is the Same as Defeat 145 Ten Floundering 165 Eleven The Cabinet 191 Twelve Casualty Count in Saluki 215 Thirteen Not Defeat, Failure 241 Epilogue Until the Next War 253 Notes 263 Index 279 INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS H ERE AND THERE you can still see them along Israel’s roads and highways, car bumper stickers, left over from mid-July 2006. Some of the country’s larger newspapers handed them out during those days of optimistic patriotism. On one the legend reads, “Israel is Strong!!,” as if we’re not quite sure and need a reminder. Another reads simply, “We’ll Win.” When the war ended, many drivers, frustrated and angry, scratched off the stickers. Their hopes were dashed. The media, full of praise for the country’s leaders, now attacks them for their haste and stupidity in deciding to go to war. Over a year has passed since the end of the second Lebanon war, but its signs are still clearly noticeable. As far as losses are concerned, this was not a particularly big war. An average week of Shiite and Sunni violence in Iraq causes more deaths than were recorded on the Israeli side during 34 days of war with Hezbollah (161, of whom 119 were soldiers and 42 civilians). But the war had a far-reaching effect on Israel. More than 4,000 rockets were fired at the northern towns and villages; this was the first time the Israeli home front was under constant attack for so long. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed in its attempts to stop the bombing, and the end of the war did not leave Israel in a controlling position. Israel’s achievements—which included the removal of Hezbollah from the border and the arrival of a multinational force (whose efficiency remains controversial)—were nowhere near the level of expectations defined by the prime minister Ehud Olmert and minister of defense Amir Peretz at the beginning of the war. Israel was badly scalded by the war, which had an adverse effect on the way in which Israelis view their leaders, their army, and even the future of the state within the hostile region that surrounds it. In some ways, this could have been a case of overreaction. Recuperation was quick, too. A year later, Israel is enjoying an economic boom; in the North, restoration of war-damaged property is moving ahead at a reasonable viii (cid:1) Introduction and Acknowledgments (cid:2) pace; tourists are again arriving in the thousands. But the swift recovery did not dispel, or even dull, the national feeling. Many Israelis continue to feel mistrust, disgust even, toward the leadership and have expressed their doubts as to the IDF’s ability to face up to future challenges. No less serious is the fact that our neighbors have also noted the results of the war. Hezbollah’s rocket war has exposed the vulnerability of Israel’s home front and its leadership’s indecision in carrying out IDF counterattacks. At least some of the Arab states now believe that Hezbollah has come up with a winning strategy worthy of emulation. In this regard, the second Lebanon war could be remembered as the decade’s key turning point. As we see it, the war did not begin on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli reserve soldiers. The story has a broader scope that goes back to Israel’s decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon, a departure that was completed in May 2000. In this book we have chosen to provide an exten- sive description of the six years prior to this war, years during which the IDF’s strength was sorely tried in an effort to curb Palestinian terrorist attacks from within the occupied territories while Hezbollah was preparing itself for another potential confrontation with Israel. All this, of course, could be pure hindsight. Most of the intelligence we now have was not available to Israel’s decision makers at the time of the with- drawal from Lebanon; when Israel showed restraint over Hezbollah’s first abduction of soldiers on Mount Dov (Sha’aba Farms) in October 2000; or when the government decided to deviate from its former policy when two more soldiers were abducted. Leaders, especially those in Israel, are under enormous pressure. In the Israeli case, it is due in part to the hostile environ- ment in which the country exists; it is also due in part to Israeli society’s well-known tendency toward mass hysteria. More than a year and a half has passed since the war. Today, too, some details remain classified, hidden from the public eye, to become known only when the archives are opened. Throughout our research and writing of this book, information continued to flow in our direction, and viewpoints and aspects sometimes changed. The book, therefore, is based on everything we knew during the summer and fall of 2007. Future developments may well shed a different light on some things. There will no doubt be those who will say that by publishing the book at this time we are jumping to conclusions. We are convinced, however, that there is enough in what we have seen to provide a reasonably clear picture of the events of the summer of 2006 in