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1 Canadian Rocket Battery, RCA, 1944 - 1945 Edited by Doug Knight The Land Service Mattress The Origin and Life of the First Canadian Rocket Battery, RCA by D.C. Knight This article originally appeared in The Quadrant. The article was later expanded into The Land Mattress in Canadian Service, Service Publications, Ottawa, 2003. During one of the battles for North Africa during the Second World War, the unit commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Wardell was heavily attacked and the British defence was about to collapse. In desperation, he obtained the support of a nearby antiaircraft battery and convinced them to engage the Germans with their multiple anti-aircraft rocket projectors. While the actual damage inflicted by the rockets remains vague, they had a significant morale effect on the Germans and the attack was stopped. Wardell was wounded in the engagement and was invalided back to England. Wardell was impressed by the effects of the impromptu rocket attack and he became active in the development of a rocket projector for land use. The problems were substantial. Insufficient range, accuracy and the prejudice of those who controlled artillery development against anything unconventional resulted in considerable frustration and disappointment. Nevertheless he persevered, and in early 1944 he gave a demonstration of a prototype multiple rocket projector at Larkhill. Lieutenant- Colonel W. Eric Harris, who was in the Artillery Staff Duties Section of Canadian Military Headquarters, attended the firing. The Canadian interest in rockets started when Major James Hahn attended a demonstration in Aberporth in 1943. His recommendation resulted in Captain R.E. Kirkpatrick being sent to the British Rocket Research Establishment. At the same time, the liaison officer with the Controller of Projectile Development, Captain R.J. Rannie, was asked to forward regular updates on rocket progress to CMHQ. Harris was very impressed by the demonstration of Wardell's rockets. In the mess that evening, he had long discussions with Wardell, who considered that his project had failed to attract the necessary official attention. The British opinion was that the system looked good, but that it was too late because it would take at least two years to develop! Harris and Wardell decided to see if the Canadian Army would support the project. On his return to London, Harris convinced his superiors of the system's potential. He was authorized to support Wardell, as long as it did not strain relations with the War Office. By 18 May 1944, two prototype 40-tube projectors were being constructed on a priority basis. They were rudimentary; in the firing position, they were simply tipped up on a rear spade with no further adjustments for elevation. The rockets used a 29- pound warhead from the naval mattress rocket ships, a 3-inch aircraft rocket motor with cut-down fins, and a standard army base-detonating fuse. Major variations in range were achieved by fitting spoilers, or large discs, on the nose of the rocket. As eventually developed, there were three sizes of spoilers, coloured red, blue, and white. They provided a simple method of varying range and dispersion, but had the disadvantage that a moving target could pass from one spoiler zone to the next, which would involve changing the spoilers and delay the firing. The first prototype fired a full salvo at Aberporth, Wales, on 16 June 1944, at a maximum range of 8,250 yards. A further demonstration was scheduled for 1 July 1944 at Larkhill, but events postponed this until 13 July when it was fired in front of a large group of senior officers including Brigadier H.O.N. Brownfield, who was the Brigadier Royal Artillery at First Canadian Army Headquarters. A competitor to the 40-tube projector was a large 84-projector unit mounted on a semi-trailer. This used fourteen standard naval “mattress” sections which the Royal Naval Dockyard at Portsmouth had assembled in one week. However, it had a fixed, unalterable range of 3,500 yards, and no possible traverse except by moving the trailer. These limitations and the fact that no trailers could be made available, ended its trial. Wardell's prototype projector had 40 tubes in five rows of eight, mounted on a two- wheeled trailer. In the firing position, it was supported on a rear spade, and elevation could be adjusted from 30 to 45 degrees using a jack. A second prototype also permitted five degrees of traverse each side of the centre line. The rocket was a tri-service hybrid, with a naval warhead, an aircraft rocket motor, and the army No. 721 fuse. The fuse had been changed to give faster action, and reduce the penetration of the rocket into the ground before bursting. The 29-pound warhead was considered by the Ordnance Board to be the equivalent of a 5.5-inch shell. A single projector could deliver the equivalent of two full regiments of medium artillery. However, the guns could keep up a steady fire whereas the projector took 15 minutes to reload. Brigadier Brownfield was favourably impressed with the demonstration, and was in a critical position to support the project. In his capacity as senior gunner in First Canadian Army, he was able to present the requirement for the equipment at a senior level. The British 21st Army Group, in which First Canadian Army operated, was not enthusiastic about new projects that might interfere with the production of conventional ammunition, and there was ongoing concern about the availability of manpower. It was probably useful that the Canadian Corps and Army commanders both had artillery backgrounds. Nevertheless, it required considerable personal attention on the part of Harris and Wardell to get the system produced. The personnel availability was overcome by using the manpower of light anti-aircraft gun batteries, and superimposing rocket-trained personnel as a command and control cadre. At this point in the war, the Allies had such a command of the air that the anti-aircraft units were not fully employed. The Larkhill trial indicated that untrained personnel could be taught to use the projector in one day. This was optimistic and in the event, about two weeks were required. In fairness, the LAA batteries were not trained in field artillery techniques, and required considerable basic field gunnery training as well. The project probably violated every known principle of project management. It was controlled by two men with significant contacts on the "old boy net", and who were enthusiastic about the equipment. Since the official requirement had been raised by First Canadian Army as a Canadian project, some of the British conservative opposition was overcome, but it did require high level intervention by senior officers at CMHQ to break some log jams. Once that was accomplished, Harris and Wardell received at least reasonable cooperation, but some of the details as to how the system was produced are illuminating. Sir Alwyn Crow of the Projectile Development Establishment at Fort Halstead had the authority to construct up to twelve samples of any project which he considered to have promise beyond the prototype stage. With Crow’s authorization, Wardell, through the Ministry of Supply, was able to fund a small company (Meyer-Dunford, who were peacetime manufacturers of bottling equipment) to manufacture twelve projectors for operational trials. It appears that they were built "as per sample" with minimal drawings or specifications. S/Sgt A.W. Holmes and several other craftsmen of the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers assisted in the actual manufacture of both the prototypes and production models. The first prototype was sent for quick towing trials, and the second was rushed to the Canadian School of Artillery (Overseas), (C.S.A.(O)) to permit development of gun drill and maintenance techniques. This had been arranged by Harris who had been the first commander of the C.S.A. (O). The two prototypes were not identical, in that the the first had a gate to retain the rockets in the launcher while travelling. After the development of the gun drill, the second prototype was returned to the manufacturer to serve as a quality control standard for the remaining ten production models! A Meyer-Dunford 32-tube Land Mattress, loaded in firing position. The rocket “pigtails” (electrical connection) can be seen dangling from the bottom of the tubes. DND At the same time, a more conventional contract was let with the Tillings-Stephens company to produce the service launchers. If it had been necessary to wait for the conventional production process, the project would indeed have been too late. The production Tillings-Stephens equipments did not arrive in France until the end of March 1945. However, two Tillings-Stephens prototypes were delivered to the C.S.A.(O) in time to accompany the “Land Mattress Party” to Europe. In the meantime, Wardell had arranged for the Navy to fill (on an “experimental” basis) approximately 11,000 warheads that had been suitably modified to accept the number 721 fuse. No. 1 Canadian Base Workshop, RCEME, was tasked to produce the adaptors between the warhead and the rocket motor. The Royal Air Force provided the rocket motors, but Harris had to provide transport for all the pieces to manufacturing and assembly locations. Much of the movement was carried out by Royal Canadian Army Service Corps units, frequently accompanied by a project officer to ensure that lack of proper documentation was not a problem. It must be remembered that the Land Service Mattress was always a non-standard equipment, and was not handled by routine ordnance channels. Lt-Colonel H.E. Chater demonstrates a Land Mattress rocket. DND The fuse was an ongoing problem. The British Ordnance Board did not believe the safety mechanism in the fuse was adequate, but CMHQ formally accepted the risk and the Board acquiesced. The fuse, as most of the other parts, was chosen for its availability rather than its suitability, and, although a better fuse was developed by the end of the war, it never saw service. Supplies were obtained by sorting through more than 600,000 fuses, which had been assigned to scrap, in order to find the correct variant. Furthermore, there was an incompatibility at the extreme ends of the manufacturing tolerances between the fuse and the spoilers, so the fuses had to be sorted again when the rockets were assembled in order to to eliminate those which would not fit. On 10 September 1944, ten officers from the Officers Training Wing at C.S.A.(O) started development of the gun drill. The prototype projectors required modification in the school workshops before the drill could be developed. Captain Rannie provided much of the technical rocket background. The gun drill was completed by Lieutenant W.S. Jackson and Battery Sergeant Major E. Noakes, both of whom were to stay with the Land Mattress until the end of the war. Command of the Land Mattress Party was assumed by Major E.A. Royce on 18 September 1944. The name of the unit was continually changing. During development, it was known as the Land Mattress Party or Cadre. After the successful operational trials, it became 1 Canadian Rocket Unit on 23 December 1944. To give it a greater artillery flavour, it was renamed 1 Canadian Rocket Battery on 17 February 1945. The rockets could be significantly affected by low level winds at the launch site, and a method was required to measure them. Captain Rannie created a machine which took ten men and four hours to erect, but Harris finally solved the problem by producing a combination of two anemometers. Battery Sergeant Major McAfee took charge of all the meteorology for the battery, and also amended the range tables after a firing at Beachy Head on 23 September. The culmination of the development was a demonstration firing using two projectors on 26 September. After a flurry of activity, including a rather scenic tour of London as a result of inexperienced drivers and a lack of maps, the projectors, stores, and vehicles were loaded on the Sammont for shipment to France at 0900 hours on 30 September. Consider the achievement: in nine weeks, a single prototype launcher was expanded into a complete rocket battery of equipment and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. Admittedly, most of the parts were “off the shelf”, but they needed modification, and they had not been integrated into a single system until 14 July. Few, if any, weapon systems can claim this progress, and the credit is due entirely to the drive and persistence of Harris and Wardell. The Land Service Mattress Cadre spent eight days at sea off Arromanches, France, because of the weather, but finally landed on 10 October. They arrived in Bruges on 15 October, and the training of 112 LAA Battery in the use of the equipment started on 17 October. The battery was very enthusiastic but it was necessary to conduct some very basic training; antiaircraft units were not familiar with the dial sight and director (a survey instrument for aligning the projectors to the arc of fire). In addition there was continuous development of the gun drill and fire control procedures. In fact, a formal gun drill pamphlet was never written; the drill was always on loose foolscap paper. On 18 October the projectors arrived. One of the two Tillings-Stephens prototypes had been badly damaged when being unloaded, and was returned to England. The remaining prototype and the ten Meyer-Dunfords all needed welding repairs. On 29 October, the battery gave a successful demonstration at Bourg Leopold range to Brigadier Brownfield and other officers from First Canadian Army Headquarters. The first operational use of the Land Mattress was in support of the attack on Flushing. The aim was to neutralize open-topped anti-aircraft gun positions. The projectors were in position on 31 October and, starting at 0620 hours the following morning, the battery fired three troop salvoes (of four projectors each), followed by several individual projector salvoes. Immediately in front of the battery position was a medium gun regimental position. Despite the fact that they had been warned of the signature of the rockets, when the projectors fired, it was noted that the medium gunners immediately took cover in their slit trenches and were not seen for some time! It was during this operation that the first and only attempt was made to use observed fire on targets of opportunity. Harris and Royce climbed into a windmill and tried to engage a target whose location was not precisely known. Using normal ranging procedures, single rockets were directed at the target. Unfortunately, as the range was altered, it moved into the next spoiler zone. This involved a delay to change all the spoilers and the attack had overrun the target before the battery was ready to fire. Harris was not pleased, but it was a good demonstration of the limitations of the system. From 6 to 8 November, the battery was deployed in support of the First Polish Armoured Division in their attack on Breda-Moerdijk. The action opened with 764 rounds fired at first light on 6 November, followed by a number of troop salvoes and a full battery salvo into Moerdijk on the morning of 8 November. One salvo caught a group of 90 Germans in the open, resulting in 30 casualties and the rest surrendering. Three projectors were damaged by muzzle prematures or developed electrical faults. Ammunition preparation was a major problem, but was solved by Major Benson of 112 LAA Battery gathering a diverse group of cooks and clerks to assemble the rounds. No complaints were noticed since the battery commander himself was busily preparing ammunition. At the end of the operation, the Polish division had high praise for the effect of the rockets. By 8 November 1944, there were ample results from the operational trials. Brigadier Brownfield noted in his summary that the Land Mattress was definitely an area weapon. In order to get the best effect he believed there was a requirement to equip two more batteries, although it was agreed that ammunition supply might be a problem. He wanted an immediate supply of 15,000 rockets per month. Ammunition supply was to be an ongoing problem and was never adequately solved. Unlike standard types of ammunition for the 25-pounder or 5.5-inch guns, the Land Mattress rockets were unique to a single unit and had to be handled as a special item. This frequently meant that battery trucks had to drive to a port and pick up the ammunition. Special arrangements had to be made in England for the production of the pieces, and while this made considerable use of existing parts, much sorting was required. The spoilers were a particular supply problem, in that there were three types and any one type might be used in any engagement, leaving two sets of spares available for future use. Considerable correspondence was required to ensure that an adequate supply was available without having large quantities of the wrong size. On 10 November, 112 LAA Battery turned the equipment over to 338 LAA Battery R.A., and for the next two months, the Land Mattress was used in support of the British Army. Major E.S. Stronach took over command from Major Royce. Remember that the rocket battery was only a cadre, which was superimposed on an existing LAA battery. Its efficiency was always dependent on that of the base unit. All training was carried out by the rocket battery officers and NCOs, and repairs were carried out by a supporting RCEME Light Aid Detachment, (later to become 127 LAD, RCEME, and still later 131 LAD, RCEME). On 4 December, the battery set up a base training camp near Tilbury, Holland, which was used until the end of the war. The Rocket Battery firing a salvo. Several rockets can be seen in the air. The rockets were fired at ¼-second intervals. DND On 3 December two full battery salvoes were fired at Venio in support of Operation Guildford, during which the 15th Scottish Division captured the west bank of the Maas River. A letter of thanks was sent to General Crerar by the British Corps Commander. Later, from 9 to 15 December, the battery prepared 2,500 rounds of ammunition to support an attack by 30 British Corps. When the attack was cancelled, the ammunition had to be returned to the depot. Rather than repack the whole lot, it was transported in racks in the back of 3-ton trucks. 128 rockets could be carried in each truck in this way, and it was so successful that it became the standard method of transport. On 16 December, 337 LAA Battery, R.A. replaced 338 LAA Battery as the under-lying unit. Training was started, but was interrupted by the battery returning to anti- aircraft duties during the German Ardennes offensive. Training was completed on 10 January. In the meantime, 338 Battery took eight of the projectors in support of the 3rd Polish Infantry Brigade at Kapelsche Veer. By this time, wear was causing the elevation and traversing gears to jam regularly. The LAD managed to repair the gears, but a problem with the control boxes was more difficult. After the rockets were loaded the firing switches had to be reset (like a circuit breaker in house wiring). However, the control box was not very sturdy and wires frequently shorted out. The result was that when the resetting switch was pressed, there was a tendency for some rockets to fire immediately. No one was injured, but it was unsettling for the detachment commanders. The Poles were very pleased with the support since a previous attack without rocket support had failed. At Sittard on 18 January, 337 Battery used the projectors operationally for the first time in support of 12 British Corps. The battery was inexperienced, and it was noted that they lacked a sense of urgency. During this operation, it became apparent that the maximum time the projectors could stay in continuous action was about ten days, after which a 48-hour rest was required to recharge the launcher batteries. On 24 January, 337 Battery was replaced by 30 LAA Battery, part of 6 LAA Regiment, 2 Canadian Corps. Since the battery now had official status, it began to receive its authorized vehicles and equipment. Battery transport went to Oostende, Belgium, on 31 January to pick up the next shipment of ammunition. Operational forecasts required that it be assembled at a rate of 2,000 rounds per day. BSM Noakes gathered a labour crew of 250 men and the work was completed on time, but at the expense of ignoring the assembly drills. By 6 February, the ammunition was loaded on seventy vehicles and moved to a new location. On the way, one truck overturned, but there was no explosion, so the rockets were loaded on another truck and the trip completed. On arrival, an inspection revealed that twelve rockets had lost their safety caps and collars in the accident, and had been transported 50 miles in this condition! From 8 February until 8 March, the battery was in support of Operation Veritable, the crossing of the Rhine River. During this time they engaged 33 prearranged targets, expending 13,300 rockets, which was all the ammunition in the theatre! On one occasion, a record reload time of seven minutes was achieved, which was attributed to greater personnel experience with the equipment and a new type of connecting plug for the rockets. Only one rocket motor in the 13,300 burst on firing. There was a theoretical probability that one in 10,000 would malfunction in this way, and the battery experience supported this estimate. There had been considerable worry that the signature of the rockets would make the battery a high risk target for counter-bombardment. The risk was thought acceptable, in that the launchers were relatively inexpensive and the men relatively protected during firing. In the event, there was never any serious counter-bombardment of the unit. Casualties did occur, but the shelling was more of a routine nature. The confused nature of the front lines at this time of the war was highlighted by some scouting done by 127 LAD. Lieutenant Tripp was leading his LAD and took the wrong road. Rather than turn around, he continued on and took another route. It was only when he got to the new position that he realized that they had crossed the front lines - twice! Training continued with 364 Battery R.A. and 30 Battery of 6 LAA Regiment. Twelve Tillings-Stephens projectors were received on 18 March. These were the first of the normal production projectors, demonstrating that had it not been for the unconventional method of producing the Meyer-Dunfords, there would have been little use of the land mattress in the war. The top traverse of the new equipments was 20 degrees, as opposed to 9 degrees in the earlier model, which simplified the deployment. However, all required modification by RCEME before they could be considered operational. The battery fired 20 salvoes from 23 to 29 March in support of Operation Plunder, in which 51st Highland Division crossed the Rhine. In their wake, on 29 March 1945, the First Canadian Rocket Battery crossed the Rhine and entered Germany. The new projectors had considerable problems with buckling of the baffle plates at the base of the launch tube, which was attributed to loading at too high an angle. Considerable work was also required to overcome careless assembly of the tail pin adapters at the factory. In the attack in the Arnhem area from 12 to 16 April, two rocket batteries were operated as a regiment. Manpower was provided by 337 Battery using the new projectors, and by 338 Battery using the Meyer-Dunfords. By this time the old projectors were giving very poor service, and they were replaced on 16 April. Still, they had served well and it is probably fitting that they took part in the only regimental (combined battery) salvo at 0600 hours on 16 April. On the night of 25 April, the battery was warned that three self-propelled guns were moving down the road to their position. In addition to manning the Projector, Infantry Anti-tank and the Bren light machine guns, Lt. N.C. Reid called forward a projector and laid it on the road at three degrees elevation. Nobody was sure what effect the rockets would have on the armour, but it was agreed that the occupants would receive a nasty surprise. To everyone's disappointment, their enemy did not appear. From 25 April to 2 May, nine salvoes were fired in support of 4 Canadian Division. The last salvo was fired at 1430 hours on 2 May 1945. One projector was totally destroyed by a bomb dropped by a Spitfire on 3 May; the only projector ever to be destroyed by "unfriendly" action. The war ended on 8 May 1945. For the next six weeks, the battery was occupied in occupational duties. In mid-June the equipment was packed up and 1 Canadian Rocket Battery officially ceased to exist on 22 June 1945. From the time that Major Royce took command of the Land Service Mattress Cadre until it was disbanded, 1 Rocket Battery, RCA, existed for 277 days. After the initial attack on Flushing, the battery supported every major attack by First Canadian Army until the end of the war. Indeed had the war lasted much longer, there would have been a Rocket Regiment. By itself, the Land Mattress (or Projector, Rocket, Three Inch, Number 8, Mark 1 as the Tillings-Stephens projectors were formally designated) was not a war-winning weapon. However, as an example of the effective use of resources which would otherwise have been scrapped, it probably had few equals. It was best used in prearranged fire plans, and the troops believed that it reduced their casualties in the attacks. But, without the persistence of lieutenant-colonels Harris and Wardell, and the high level support of First Canadian Army, it would never have seen wartime service.

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Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.