The Syrian Uprising: Dynamics of an Insurgency Carsten Wieland, Adam Almqvist, and Helena Nassif University of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies 2013 1 2 The Syrian Uprising CONTENTS • Foreword—Tina Zintl. • Assad's Decade of Lost Chances—C. Wieland. • The Syrian Uprising and the Transnational Public Sphere: Transforming the Conflict in Syria—A. Almqvist. • Celebrity Politics in Troubled Times: The Case of Muna Wassef—H. Nassif. Appendix: Memorandum of the Advisory Committee about the Internal Situation on the Verge of the Second Decade of the Leadership of your Excellency. Foreword 3 Foreword Tina Zintl In this issue of the St Andrews Papers, three excellent articles – each based on empirical information collected in interviews with Syrian respondents – as well as an internal whitepaper by a presidential advisory committee share remarkable insights on the first months of the Syrian uprising that begun in March 2011. Though the articles take very different perspectives, i.e. on the transnational public space, on an individual artist’s divided loyalties as well as a retrospective state- centred point of view, they all show the inconsistencies and contradictions the Syrian political system was afflicted with and which, ultimately, were brought to the fore and aggravated by the uprising. Carsten Wieland demonstrates at which points of his rule and how Bashar al-Asad could have taken a different route down history. Wieland’s counterfactual analysis thus emphasizes that there were several lost opportunities which became particularly obvious in retrospect. For instance, what seemed, at first, like a comeback to the international stage, carefully orchestrated by the Syrian regime from the 2008 onwards, was ‘wasted’ and not translated into corresponding domestic political reform. With the advent of the uprising even these earlier gains were one-by-one readily given up to a confrontative foreign policy. Viewed in this way, the Syrian regime’s inept manoeuvring during the first months of the uprising was a continuation of its earlier politics of ‘lost chances’. Adam Almqvist’s and Helena Nassif’s contributions both demonstrate how the Syrian public space developed during the early uprising and, by doing so, illuminate the dilemmas and limited room for action two particular groups of people faced, cyberactivists and internationally-known celebrities. This is particularly interesting since both the diaspora and artists are at times perceived as actors who are 4 The Syrian Uprising ‘independent’ enough – geographically and intellectually – to formulate political demands and, thus, to possibly constitute a democratizing force. As Almqvist shows, expatriate cyberactivists have been playing a significant role since the beginning of the uprising and they have had a clear influence on both the nature of the transnational public sphere and on the situation on the ground. Partly mobilizing the protests against al- Asad’s rule, partly documenting them and spreading them to foreign media outlets, they forced the Syrian regime to fight back on the transnational public front as well. On the one hand, cyberactivists are just one group of several groups of transnational Syrians spurred into action by the uprising and confronted with questions of representativeness and internal factionalism. On the other hand, even though they were unable to turn the tables in favour of the oppositional struggle, the uprising has developed a distinct transnational twist through them. Helena Nassif focuses on the Syrian actress Muna Wassef and her publicly made statements and actions during the early days of the uprising. Being the mother of exiled activist Ammar Abdulhamid, the famous actress sought to use her popularity to rally humanitarian aid for the suffering civilian population in Daraa; additionally, her famous role as an anti-imperialist heroine in a TV series made protesters project their hopes onto her. Yet, as the contribution vividly shows, the al-Asad regime continued to have a powerful hand in the entertainment industry, and knew how to discredit such calls. The contribution thereby allows the drawing of conclusions on Syrian society beyond Mouna Wassef’s particular biography. Central bones of contention in the current crisis, e.g. the cleavage between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as well as the fear of sectarian strife, can be viewed through her. The first is reflected by Wassef’s rootedness in Syria vs. her affection for her oppositionist son living abroad; the second was demonstrated by protesters’ creative use of her fictional role as a strong Christian woman, thus trying to resist the increasingly sectarian nature of the protests. Lastly, the memorandum in the annex, prepared in 2010, had been commissioned by the Syrian president’s office but later been ignored by it. While the short-timed and ineffectual nature of advisory committees and their reports was rather common under Bashar al-Asad – their recommendations were regularly sought but seldom implemented – the frankness and urgency demonstrated by this particular report are striking. It shows that ‘insiders’ of the system were well aware of the headwinds al-Asad’s politics and, particularly, his polarizing political economy faced. Despite due adulation of its recipient, the memorandum to the president spells out that “difficulties […] have escalated, by Foreword 5 neglect and mismanagement, into a socio-economic crisis” and thus led to “a great deal of dissatisfaction among the citizens as well as the elite.” For instance, the memorandum points towards the lack of direction and clear decision-making, rising poverty and social imbalance, corruption and mismanagement and, even, towards the limits of using police, security services and the military for controlling social unrest. It prefigures the outbreak of the popular uprising less than a year later and, notably, it is a far cry from the self-assured public speeches of Bashar al-Asad. As late as end-January 2011 he claimed in a, by now infamous, interview with the Wall Street Journal that “[i]f you want to talk about Tunisia and Egypt, we are outside of this” since he believed himself to be “very closely linked to the beliefs of the [Syrian] people”.1 Thus, the memorandum presents a highly interesting primary source that not only confirms Carsten Wieland’s point that Bashar al-Asad could have taken different decisions and possibly even have warded off the uprising, but that also demonstrates that the Syrian president was informed by his advisors about the most pressing problems and the alternatives available to him. The different perspectives presented in “The Syrian Uprising: Dynamics of an Insurgency” illustrate which structural problems and misguided tactics led up to the current crisis and they help to explain the downward spiral of brutality that followed in the subsequent months, turning the spontaneous popular uprising into a protracted conflict.                                                                                                                           1 The Wall Street Journal, 31.01.2011: “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, available from http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.html, last accessed 07.05.2011. 1 Asad’s Decade of Lost Chances1 Carsten Wieland The autocrats who were toppled during the Arab Spring persevered for some 30 or 40 years before their power structure imploded. After only a decade of rule, the Syrian regime under President Bashar al-Asad seems to be nearing its end. The country, its morale and social fabric are in ruins. Born in 1965 he is the youngest among the Arab autocrats and already politically paralyzed - no matter with which scenario the bloody revolt in his country will end. How has this happened after Asad started his rule with so much anticipation and high hopes in June 2000? The story of his political career is a chain of missed chances and practical failures. We can assess how far Asad has fallen when we compare to where he came from after the death of his father, Hafez. For this purpose I would like to quote a passage from my book “Ballots or Bullets?” in which I reflected the mood in the streets of Damascus some eight years ago: Although his nimbus is fading, the young president possesses an image that, from the point of view of most Syrians, is neither stained with blood nor corrupted by radicalism or incompetence (though some would say more the latter than the former). He has successfully been able to distance himself from his father’s political Stone Age. Most Syrians tend to look for faults in Bashar’s surroundings rather than in Bashar himself.2 After 2011 the president will never be able to revive his former image. He has chosen bullets instead of ballots. Usually, any assessment of Bashar al-Asad starts with his personality, although this approach fails to explain developments in their complexity. “Bashar is not the regime”, traditional oppositional figures used to reiterate. This was different under Hafez al-Asad. The regime is 7 8 The Syrian Uprising a complex web of direct or subtle influences, priorities, jealousies and power struggles. There are indications that at times Bashar was incapable of enacting decisions of his own or even fulfilling given promises, because others were calling the shots. A leading and well- informed oppositional figure said at the end of 2010 that Asad had been left to act freely in foreign policy only, whereas domestically the secret services, the Baath Party, his clan and big business representatives were controlling the sinecure.3 Without further evidence it is hard to prove if the observations also held true a few months later. In light of this thesis it remains an open question as to what extent the cruelty of 2011 and 2012 and the numerous technical mistakes committed in suppressing the popular protests are due to the plurality of power centres in the Syrian polity under Asad or if they can be directly attributed to him and his personal strategy. Whether he is personally responsible for each and every shot that was fired, for each child that was tortured and mutilated, for every armed attack of the shabbiha Alawite gangs to incite sectarian hatred, for cattle and fields that were burnt to starve dissenting villagers, does not really matter in the end. Since 2000 the president has reshuffled almost all important positions in the mukhabarat, the military and government bureaucracy. He is the president and thus responsible for the so-called security solution. The protests triggered typical reflexes of a thoroughly authoritarian culture with a cruel history of civil wars and crackdowns. Survival is a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. This outcome was far from inevitable as the following pages show. Asad had a plethora of opportunities that he missed one by one, domestically and internationally. Many Syrians pinned their hopes for the young president as a reformer (as their fathers and grandfathers had already projected their hopes on Hafez al-Asad as a “liberalizer” and “pragmatist” in 1970-1971). From the beginning of his rule in 2000 Bashar faced a very moderate and intellectual opposition that did not pursue the priority of toppling the president but that tried to press for incremental change and gradual pluralism. Bashar did not reach out to them but launched three major waves of suppression against the oppositional Civil Society Movement between 2001 and 2008-2009. The noose was tightening around the neck of the opposition despite increasing relaxation of international relations from 2008 onwards. Syria was by no means on a path of reform when the Arab Spring hit the country. Nevertheless, the international community was ready to listen to Bashar’s promises and to appreciate the certain stability that he embodied until he was rolled over by mass protests from March 2011 onwards. Bashar led his country into international isolation and Asad’s Decade of Lost Chances 9 traumatic destruction. Stability and secularism, the Asads’ main assets, are no more. Asad destroyed his political legacy, his family, his religious community, Syria as it used to be and probably himself. The decade of his rule is a tragic story because it could have ended so differently. The Loss of Projected Innocence The trained ophthalmologist - often described as western in outlook because of his studies in the United Kingdom - differs from the stereotype of a brutal dictator. In his youth he is described to have been relatively humble, honest, and even “non-ideological”.4 He did not display anything similar to the arrogant, dissolute, and excessive life- styles of the sons of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or Libya’s Revolutionary Leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Asad is no natural leader and did not intend to get involved in politics. He had to follow his father’s will after the premature death of his elder brother Basil in a car accident in 1994. Asad was more interested in the internet and computers than in conspiracies and arms. In one of the most sealed off countries ruled by the “Sphinx of Damascus”5, his father Hafez al-Asad, he became head of the Syrian Computer Society from which he later recruited some of his personnel. Contrasted with the unscrupulous “security solution” against the mostly peaceful street protests of his own people in 2011, the following statements of Asad in his inauguration speech a decade earlier appear almost surreal: I am not after any post nor do I avoid any responsibility. The post is not an end but a means to achieve an end. And now, and since my people have honored me with their choice of me as president of the Republic […] I would like to say that I have assumed the post but I have not occupied the position […]. I feel that the man you have known […] will not change at all once he assumes his post. He came out of the people and lived with them and shall remain one of them. You may expect to see him everywhere whether in the work place or in the streets or at your picnics in order to learn from you […]. The man who has become a president is the same man who was a doctor and an officer and first and foremost is a citizen.6 Indeed, Asad was seen at times in the lanes of old Damascus or Aleppo without visible bodyguards and dined in restaurants. If assertions of Sheikh Ahmed Badr al-Din Hassoun, the Syrian Grand Mufti, reflect the truth, Asad confided in him more than once that 10 The Syrian Uprising in his dreams he would like to return to his profession one day and run an eye clinic. This was the first time that a confidant of the president had spoken of the possibility of a voluntary and premature end to his rule (although the remarkable utterances may have had tactical reasons in the tense political situation of November 2011).7 Indeed, Asad had not been known for his brutality and extravagance but for precisely the opposite: his restraint in private matters, awkwardness in public appearances, and even political ineptness up to the point that during the gravest crisis of his political life the media described him as “the dictator who cannot dictate.”8 A member of the opposition reported already years ago that some had complained about his “weak character.” “He holds the opinion of the person he last spoke to,” said an oppositional journalist who preferred to remain anonymous. His sister Bushra reportedly called him “stupid and nervous” when he allegedly was among a circle of relatives after the turbulent events in Lebanon in early 2005.9 Certainly, Asad has made a plethora of technical and strategic mistakes. After a decade of his rule everything pointed to the fact that despite his differences, he ended up sharing the other Arab autocrats’ cynicism, loss of reality and – contrary to his and Hassoun’s statements – an autocrat with an apocalyptic outlook will to cling to power at any cost. The cynicism is reflected in his readiness to accept an unexpectedly high blood toll and to give carte blanche to the security forces and Alawi militias. A researcher close to the Syrian opposition said that during the uprising Asad calmly explained that his strategy was to get not more than 25 to 30 people killed per day, on Fridays maybe more, in order to avoid upsetting international public opinion.10 With several thousands of people killed since March 2011 as well as tens of thousands arrested and held under torture and abysmal conditions in cramped dungeons or sport stadiums (estimates from fall 2011 range from 20,000 to 50,000), it is possible that the number will equal the toll of the notorious massacre in Hama in 1982. The cruelty of tortures, rapes, collective punishment, the barring of wounded from treatment, and the cold-bloodedness of civilian killings in the streets of Syrian towns that are documented in countless amateur videos, despite the technical obstacles and personal risks, exceeds what the world had witnessed in the Libyan civil war that led to the fall of Qaddafi. Even worse, the displayed degree of atrocities against a widely unarmed population is not at all necessary to suppress a rebellion. Technically speaking, it is counterproductive. But we will come back to bad management and political mistakes during the upheaval later in the article.