Beyond cultural intimacy: The tensions that make truth for India’s Ahmadi Muslims Nicholas H. A. Evans Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities University of Cambridge Alison Richard Building 7 West Road Cambridge, CB3 9DT, UK [email protected] How should anthropologists write about the public self-presentation of minority groups? In the Indian town of Qadian, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community – a marginal group with a long history of persecution in South Asia – uses visual media to counter hostility and produce images of its members as exemplary Muslims. That such images are artificially produced is an intimate secret shared by the town’s residents. Understanding this secret without undermining the political struggle that Ahmadi Muslims are engaged in means moving beyond the idea that truth need be located in either the everyday or the public. For Ahmadis in Qadian, the disjuncture between these realms is a space of possibility that reveals truth. [Keywords: cultural intimacy, visual media, exemplarity, self-representation, Ahmadiyya, Islam, India] The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, or Jama‘at as it is commonly referred to by its members, is a transnational sect that emerged in nineteenth century India. Adherents, who are known as Ahmadis, face persecution and social ostracism from other Muslim groups around the world. 1 The Jama‘at is centralized and hierarchical, and uses a variety of media – the most important of which is a satellite television network – to present the world with images of its members as exemplary Muslim subjects who exhibit discipline and serenity in the face of persecution. As is the case for many precarious minority groups, however, the official self- presentation of the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at poses an ethical and analytical challenge to anthropology. This difficulty lies in understanding what Andrew Shryock describes as the “off stage”: the hidden spaces of the group where “the explicitly public is made, even staged, before it is shown” (Shryock 2004b, 3). Writing about Arab Americans – another group who face intense pressure to represent themselves in a particular public fashion – Shryock demonstrates how ethnography can capture intimacies behind the making of official discourses in a way that is embarrassing for his interlocutors (2004b). Indeed, to even acknowledge the possibility of artifice in the self-representations of minority groups can dangerously destabilize their ability to make political claims (Shryock 2004a, 286). To quote Laura Jeffrey and Matei Candea’s work on the similar problem of writing anthropologically about groups who make particular political claims to victimhood, there is “no comfortable mode in which to do” this; it necessarily comes from a place of “discomfort” (Jeffery and Candea 2006, 290). The idea of “cultural intimacy,” which opposes messy, changeable and vulnerable interiors to neat, timeless and controlled exteriors, has been crucial to anthropological attempts to understand the construction of official representations (Herzfeld 1997). Inspired by this notion, anthropologists have often assumed that public representations tend toward identity rendered safe and generic, in contrast to the complexity of intimate private worlds (Maddox 2004; for an earlier formulation of these ideas, see Wilk 1995). When we study up and describe the official discourses of entities such as nation states, exposing a “desire for control” over external self-representations is often seen as politically liberating.1 This same theoretical 2 move can nonetheless become fraught with a sense of betrayal when we study groups who use their public image to either counter oppression or claim victimhood. In such instances, ethnography can expose uncomfortable truths, undermine the politics of our interlocutors, and turn the ethnographer into an informant. One approach to this ethical and analytical dilemma would be to draw upon an idea that is increasingly popular in the anthropology of ethics, and see exterior self-representations as disciplinary practices through which a virtuous interior selfhood might be achieved (e.g. Mahmood 2005). In the case of the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at, this would mean seeing the Ahmadis’ outward presentations of disciplined obedience to a global leader as attempts to cultivate discipline as a virtue. In fact, my ethnography from Qadian shows that this is an incomplete picture. It is paradoxically through the failures of public representations to produce virtuous persons that my interlocutors feel themselves confronted with what they understand to be undeniable religious truth. For Qadian’s Ahmadis, exemplary self-representations beckon toward a religious truth not just in spite of the fact that as disciplinary processes they are shot- through with ambiguity and the possibility of failure, but because of it. For Ahmadis, truth emerges from their Jama‘at’s ability to enforce a surface against and in spite of moments of breakdown. Anthropologists working on the politics of minority self-representation have long assumed that what is hidden can be embarrassing. Even if we argue that neither the official nor the intimate is truer than the other, we are tempted to assume that exposing difference between them can cause embarrassment (Steinmüller 2015). Yet this means overlooking how tensions between the public and the private might produce intimate cultural secrets that are powerful, valued and sustaining. For my Ahmadi interlocutors, neither the intimate and everyday nor the public and official have a monopoly on reality; rather, religious truth is found in the capacity of their Jama‘at to force a disjuncture between the two. 3 The Jama‘at-e-Ahmadiyya Ahmadi Muslims are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (c.1835 – 1908), who was born, lived, and was buried in the Indian Punjabi town of Qadian. Between 2010 and 2012, I conducted 15 months of fieldwork in Qadian, investigating the lives of the town’s minority Ahmadi population.2 Ahmad claimed to be a prophet of Islam after Muhammad, and also declared himself to be the embodiment of two figures from Islamic eschatology, whose appearance is usually thought to coincide with the end times, namely the Masih (the Messiah, usually understood as the second coming of Jesus) and the Mahdi (the rightly guided one). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad stripped these figures of their apocalyptic dimensions and recast them as reformers of Islam in its hour of greatest need. While Islamic history is replete with charismatic Mahdis, Ahmad’s movement has, unlike that of many others, been able to far outlast his death. For the last century, however, Ahmadis have been shunned by the vast majority of other Muslims in South Asia. In the fractured landscape of South Asian Islam, there are few points of unanimity, but Sunnis, Shias, Deobandis, and Barelvis all agree that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a false prophet (Zaman 2007, 11). His existence is seen to contravene the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood, and for this reason, Ahmadi Muslims are routinely dismissed as kuffar (nonbelievers). Many opponents claim that Ghulam Ahmad was an agent of imperialism, tasked by the British with dividing the Muslims of India, and to this day, Ahmadis are routinely accused of all manner of attempts to destroy Islam from within. In Pakistan, where the Ahmadis are most numerous, they have suffered decades of violent persecution, and their exclusion from what is officially recognized as Islam has been central to state attempts to define majority Muslim identity and instrumentalize Islam (Iqtidar 2012; Qasmi 2015). Since 1974, the Pakistani state has 4 officially considered Ahmadis to be non-Muslim, and many of the more extreme elements of society see this as providing a carte blanche for violence against them. Nowadays, the Jama‘at is a hierarchical organization, structured around the infallible leadership of a Caliph. It has branches in over 200 countries and maintains its boundaries rigorously. All Ahmadis are expected to demonstrate allegiance to their leader, the Caliph, as well as pay a contribution (chanda) of 1/16th of their income to support the missionary activity and growth of the movement. The Ahmadis I knew were exclusively endogamous, and marrying outside of the Jama‘at – especially for a woman – carries the risk of excommunication by the Caliph. In both the UK and India, the two places where I have conducted fieldwork, there is a persistent concern among Ahmadis to correct the misconceptions that the majority populations might have about Islam. This involves a promotion of the Jama‘at as a counter-example to the image of the feared Muslim terrorist, who in different ways haunts these countries’ public discourses. In the UK the most prominent example of this in recent years has been a series of advertising campaigns on the sides of buses with the slogan “Muslims for loyalty, peace and freedom.”3 At times, such efforts can amount to something approaching a branding of the Jama‘at, with its motto “love for all, hatred for none,” its slick press packages, and its soundbite-ready spokesmen.4 What is easily obscured about these impressive surface discourses is that they are not just directed at the outside: they are also essential to how Ahmadis come to appreciate the truth of their own movement. The most obvious feature of the Jama‘at’s public self-presentation, however, is its promotion of an image of itself as the unified, dynamic, fast-growing and peaceful face of Islam. Ahmadis contrast this with what they see as the sectarian and backward character of their opponents. They curate every aspect of their public self-representation to give an impression that their Jama‘at is organized and united, while claiming that their opponents 5 remained hopelessly divided. For Ahmadis, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings are the only path toward a revitalized and unified Islam, and the only way to know these teachings is to live beneath the Ahmadiyya Caliphate. For most Ahmadis in the global Jama‘at, a relationship with the Caliph is cultivated through the Jama‘at’s network of satellite TV channels, MTA (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya). The first MTA channel was launched in 1994, and there are now three, two of which broadcast mainly in Urdu and English, and one entirely in Arabic. Every household I visited in Qadian had a TV, and MTA constantly played in the background of most homes, the Caliph’s face and words illuminating the private spaces of the town. Programs are produced across the world, and it is through MTA that Ahmadis in Qadian witness the Jama‘at’s entanglement in global modernities and its growth in countries – particularly African nations – that many in Qadain see as places of expansive possibility. One senior cleric in Qadian declared that even if there were no longer any missionaries, books, or journals to proselytize with, the message would continue to spread so long as MTA were broadcasting. Presenters on MTA are celebrities within the Jama‘at. Programs – particularly those featuring the fourth Caliph – are watched no matter how many times they are repeated, and it is through the network’s talkshows that Qadian’s residents come to viscerally feel their theological superiority over others in debate (Evans 2016).5 This network was not, however, just the background to the consumption of truth in Qadian: there was also an MTA studio in town, the output of which was small compared to studios in London and Pakistan, but which was responsible for producing some programs broadcast around the world, as well as documentaries of major Jama‘at events across India. Although this studio only employed a few young men, the town’s entire population shared the burden of producing programs, for as the next example shows, it was my interlocutors’ behavior that became metonymic of Ahmadiyyat when this studio produced its programs. 6 Exhibiting Discipline In late September 2011, the Jama‘at curated an exhibition about the Qur’an in New Delhi. It was a meticulously planned event held in an exclusive and expensive club. Most of those involved in organizing the exhibition were from Qadian, and I travelled to Delhi by train with a large group of Ahmadi missionaries and students, who helped set up the exhibition and later guide visitors around it. The exhibition was completely in English, and sought to position Islam within cosmopolitan and wealthy India. More fundamentally, it was an argument, sustained through the visual beauty of its material presentation, for Islam as the end point of modernity. For most Ahmadis, the idea that Islam is compatible with modernity is too simplistic. Rather, they see Ahmadiyyat as providing a way for modernity to culminate in Islam. Although most organizers of the exhibition had come from Qadian, little reference was made to the town. As it turned out, this was perhaps no accident. High quality glossy posters explaining various principles of the Qur’an covered the walls of the exhibition, and in brightly lit and specially made cases, every single one of the Jama‘at’s many Qur’an translations were displayed. In its physicality, its beauty, and its shining, glossy exteriority, the exhibition thrust itself upon viewers as a testament to truth. Integral to this was an MTA camera crew, who documented both the event and its reception (see Figure 1). [Please insert Figure 1 here] In preparation for the exhibition, one hundred thousand text messages were sent out to residents of Delhi inviting them to attend, and particular groups were also targeted with publicity. Among these were journalism students, people who I was told would be “shaping the opinions of tomorrow.” Such individuals, one Ahmadi in attendance argued, would almost 7 certainly have “misconceptions” about the Qur’an; the idea was to persuade them of its beauty and relevance. As such, the exhibition was not initially an explicit reflection upon the difference between Ahmadiyyat and other groups; rather, it aimed to put forward a particular reading of the Qur’an, in which science and modernity are wholly encompassed by and contained within Islam. On only its second day, however, the Qur’an Exhibition became the subject of a dispute between the Ahmadis and Delhi’s substantial non-Ahmadi Muslim population. For the Ahmadis present, this marked the moment when the exhibition transformed into a battle between atavistic localism and Islam as a modern success story of global growth and encompassment. The exhibition came to the attention of a broad Muslim public on Friday 23rd September, when the Shahi Imam – often regarded as the de facto leader of Muslim opinion in Old Delhi – denounced the Ahmadis’ actions in his sermon. That afternoon, a group of Muslims gathered outside the Qur’an exhibition, waving placards and shouting slogans. The scene was tense but thus far non-violent. The protestors claimed that in displaying the Qur’an, the Ahmadis were dishonestly representing themselves as the voice of Islam, and thus misleading people into thinking that they were Muslims. This argument was similar to a Pakistani Ordinance that criminalizes Ahmadis for posing as Muslims (Gualtieri 1989). The Ahmadis’ propriety in representing Islam was questioned, and some protestors even doubted the appropriateness of displaying the Qur’an in any fashion, claiming, “The Holy Qur’an is not a thing to be exhibited.” When I showed a video of this to several Ahmadis that evening, they laughed openly. “They are worried only because they will lose their income,” one contended, referring to the recurrent idea that once Ahmadiyyat gains ascendency and removes all misconceptions, the mullas will no longer be able to peddle fraudulent theology for money. Soon, television camera crews arrived at the exhibition, and the various protestors, 8 although still few, spoke over one another and clamored to speak in the microphones proffered in their direction. In response, the Ahmadis performed quite differently. They stood back from the protest, either remaining within the building or, when it was necessary, venturing out in such a way as to form a perimeter line. They did not speak to journalists, and despite the protestors’ attempts to engage them, they held back from either name-calling or entering into debate. Moreover, they drew comparisons between their ordered behavior inside the exhibition and the protesting rabble outside. An important change had thus occurred, for the systematized behavior of the Ahmadis in attendance, rather than the exhibition, had become the primary object on display. While the protests at the Qur’an exhibition intensified, I moved to the opponents’ side to take pictures and record what they were saying. But, as I was talking to one of the protestors, an older Ahmadi gentleman grabbed me by the arm and steered me inside. “Come this way,” he said. “But I was talking to that man there!” “I know. Come this way.” It was an order, not a request, for I had broken rank and upset the running of the system. The personnel at the exhibition consisted of a number of Ahmadi clerics, including nearly 30 final-year students from the theological college in Qadian, but as events unfolded, none of them moved forward to speak to the waiting journalists or engage with the protestors. The reason for this was simple: “we do not have permission.” Only one group of Ahmadis did cross this line: the MTA cameramen, who silently documented the incoherence of the opposition while also training their cameras on the TV news crews who were in turn filming the crowd. It was a representation of a representation, a witnessing of the fact that this event was about to receive nation-wide coverage (see Figure 2). [Please insert Figure 2 here] 9 It was only when an official spokesman from the Jama‘at came forward to give a statement that the Ahmadis finally engaged in dialogue with the waiting news reporters. The spokesman delivered a speech to the press in which he recited the kalima (“there is no god but God, and Muhammad is his messenger”), confirmed that the Ahmadis consider themselves to be Muslim, stressed their doctrine of peace, underlined that they are law abiding citizens, and made the point that the exhibition was going ahead with permission from the authorities. His message was straightforward: we are doing this in a correct, orderly fashion, and our doing so has direction and coherence. As this statement was read out, a group of Ahmadis stood around their official spokesman. They spoke only to join in with his recitation of the kalima, and to unite in intoning “sall Allahu ʿalay-hi wa-sallam” (peace be upon him) after the name of the Prophet Muhammad. As the spokesman turned to go, however, there was a brief moment when the Ahmadi group and their opponents found themselves face to face. To my side, several protestors began talking among themselves about whether the Ahmadis believe in the Nabi (the Prophet Muhammad). They evidently had little familiarity with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s notion of prophethood, a theology that rests upon fine distinctions that might easily be lost in the middle of a heated protest. A young Ahmadi missionary in training, unable to resist, turned to them and said, “we do believe in the Prophet”. “And after him?” “There is no prophet.”6 Another Ahmadi then interjected, “Muhammad is the last law-bearing prophet.” At this point, a senior Ahmadi cleric looked over with concern, and, understanding that a discussion was about to flare up, began to usher the young students physically back in. “Don’t debate! In accordance with our system!” he told them. Then, turning to the protestor, he said, “It’s over, sir.” 10