B A The perception of what he calls ‘aspects’ preoccupied Z Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objective; it presents perceivable unity and sense that are (arguably) not The Philosophy of (yet) conceptual; it is ‘subject to the will’, but at the same time Ludwig Wittgenstein is normally taken to be genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian aspects. It then challenges two widespread ideas: that aspects are to be identified with concepts, and that aspect perception has W Wittgenstein a continuous version that is characteristic of (normal) human it t g perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect perception e n brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived st e on Aspect and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in in o n the constitution of the former. A s p ec Perception t P e r c e About the Series Series Editor p t This series provides concise and David G. Stern ion structured introductions to all the central University of Iowa topics in the philosophy of Ludwig Avner Baz Wittgenstein. The Elements are written by distinguished senior scholars and bright junior scholars with relevant expertise, producing balanced and comprehensive coverage of the full range of Wittgenstein’s thought. Cover image: Adapted from a portrait of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951) by Moritz Nähr, 1930 (IanDagnall Computing / Alamy Stock Photo). ISSN 2632-7112 (online) ISSN 2632-7104 (print) ElementsinthePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein editedby DavidG.Stern UniversityofIowa WITTGENSTEIN ON ASPECT PERCEPTION Avner Baz Tufts University, Massachusetts UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906 CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108813150 DOI:10.1017/9781108878012 ©AvnerBaz2020 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2020 AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-108-81315-0Paperback ISSN2632-7112(online) ISSN2632-7104(print) CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception ElementsinthePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein DOI:10.1017/9781108878012 Firstpublishedonline:November2020 AvnerBaz TuftsUniversity,Massachusetts Authorforcorrespondence:AvnerBaz,[email protected] Abstract:Theperceptionofwhathecalls‘aspects’preoccupied Wittgensteinandgavehimconsiderabletroubleinhisfinalyears.The Wittgensteinianaspectdefiesanynumberoftraditionalphilosophical dichotomies:theaspectisneithersubjective(inner,metaphysically private)norobjective;itpresentsperceivableunityandsensethatare (arguably)not(yet)conceptual;itis‘subjecttothewill’,butatthesame timeisnormallytakentobegenuinelyrevelatoryoftheobject perceivedunderit.ThisElementbeginswithagrammaticaland phenomenologicalcharacterizationofWittgensteinianaspects.Itthen challengestwowidespreadideas:thataspectsaretobeidentifiedwith concepts,andthataspectperceptionhasacontinuousversionthatis characteristicof(normal)humanperception.Itconcludesbyproposing thataspectperceptionbringstolightthedistinctionbetweentheworld asperceivedandtheworldasobjectivelyconstrued,andtheroleweplay intheconstitutionoftheformer. Keywords:Wittgenstein;Perception;AspectPerception;Phenomenology; PhilosophicalMethod ©AvnerBaz2020 ISBNs:9781108813150(PB),9781108878012(OC) ISSNs:2632-7112(online),2632-7104(print) Contents Introduction 1 1 TheGrammarandPhenomenologyofWittgensteinian Aspects 2 2 AspectsandConcepts 10 3 AspectsasPerceivedInternalRelations 19 4 ContinuousAspectPerception? 25 5 AspectsandPerceptualIndeterminacy 33 6 TheSignificanceofAspectPerception 42 Appendix:TheNaturalAttitudeandtheLimitations oftheWittgensteinianGrammaticalInvestigation 46 References 52 WittgensteinonAspectPerception 1 Introduction The following monograph draws on, and from, work onaspect perception that I’vedoneoverthepasttwentyyearsorsoandpublishedineightpapersthatare verydifferentfromeachother–notonlyintermsoftheirfocusandemphases,but alsointermsoftheirperspectiveandapproach.Forawhile,Ihadtoyedwiththe ideaofturningmyworkonaspectsintoamonographbutwasreluctanttodoso, fearing that the dialectical nature of the work – the ways in which it is tied to particular conversations with particular interlocutors and rooted in particular momentsofmyphilosophicaldevelopmentandtheparticularinterestsofthose moments–wouldtherebybedistorted.Nowthattheeightpapers–allmoreor lesssubstantivelyrevisedandexpandedfromtheiroriginallypublishedversion– havecomeoutinacollection(Baz2020),Ihavefeltreadytodotheexerciseof distillingmyworkonaspectsintothisshortmonographonWittgensteinonaspect perception, which I hopethe readers willfinduseful. I dofeelthatthirtyyears afterthepublicationofStephenMulhall’sinsightfulandrightfullyinfluentialOn Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heideggeron Seeing Aspects, the philo- sophicaldiscussionofaspectperception–inWittgensteinandmoregenerally– standsinneedofrefocusing.Onlytimewilltellwhether thisshort monograph succeedsinrefocusingit–ifonlybyprovokingotherstoarticulatetheirdisagree- mentswithit.ButIam,inanycase,gratefultoDavidSternandtoCambridge UniversityPressfortheinvitationtowriteit. TheaimofthisElementistointroducereaderstowhatthelaterWittgenstein calls“aspects”,andtosomeofthemostbasicquestionsthathaveariseninthe literatureaboutWittgensteinianaspectsandtheirsignificance.1 Section1willofferbothagrammaticalcharacterizationandaphenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian aspects. It will be emphasized that though Wittgenstein himself was suspicious of phenomenology and sometimes even presentedhisgrammaticalinvestigationasanantidotetowhathesawasthepitfalls ofphenomenology,bothsortsofcharacterizationareimportantforanunderstanding ofwhathecalls“aspects”,andforaproperappreciationofthesignificanceofaspect perception. Section2will challengethewidespread tendency –exhibitedbyStrawson, Wollheim,andothers–toidentifyWittgensteinianaspectswith,orintermsof, concepts.Itwillbearguedthatonanyofthemostcommonwaysofunderstand- ing“concept”,orourconceptofconcept,thatidentificationismisguided,and distorts both the grammar and the phenomenology of aspect perception. The 1 IspeakofWittgensteinianaspects,becauseIbelievethattheperceptionofwhatWittgensteincalls “aspects”–eventhoughittakesavarietyofformsandmanifestsitselfinavarietyofcontexts–is morespecificthanwhatsomeofhisinterpretershavemadeitouttobe. 2 ThePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein basic point will be that Wittgensteinian aspects are not general as concepts essentiallyareandarenotseparablefromtheobjectsperceivedunderthemin thewaythatconceptsare. InSection3,Iwillproposethatwhilenothavingthegeneralityofconcepts, andwhilebeinginseparable–grammatically andphenomenologically –from thethings perceivedunder them, Wittgensteinian aspects nonetheless connect the things perceived under them with other things. The connection, I will propose, is perceptual and internal, in the sense that how one thing presents itselftousperceptually–itsperceived“physiognomy”–isnotseparablefrom itsperceivedrelationtootherthings. Sections4and5willaddresstheidea–tobefoundinStrawson,Wollheim, Mulhall,Searle,andothers–thatthereisacontinuousversiontotheperception of aspects, and that, indeed, all (normal) human perception may aptly be understoodastheperceptionofaspects.ItwillbearguedinSection4thatthe textualbasisforattributingthatideatoWittgensteinisweak,andthatthereis much textual evidence against that attribution. The idea of continuous aspect perception,itwillthenbearguedinSection5,failstorecognizetheindetermin- acy of the phenomenal world – by which I mean, the world as perceived and respondedtopriortobeingthought,orthoughtortalkedabout,andsopriorto being conceptualized. The dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects, whether soli- cited or unsolicited, willed orunwilled, it will be proposed, is the necessarily passing introduction of (relative) determinacy into the phenomenal world – amomentarytakingholdofthings,perceptually. Section6willaddressthequestionofthesignificanceofaspectperception: what,ifanything,doestheperceptionofWittgensteinianaspectsrevealabout (normal)humanperceptionassuch?Itwillbeproposedthatitrevealstherole weplayinbringingaboutandsustainingtheunityandsenseofthephenomenal world; and it also reveals our capacity for more or less playful, more or less creative,projectionofperceivablesenseontosomegivenobject,orsituation. IntheAppendix,IwillsaysomethingaboutwhatIseeasthelimitationsof theWittgensteiniangrammaticalinvestigation,asthoselimitationsmakethem- selvesmanifestinWittgenstein’sremarksonaspects. 1TheGrammarandPhenomenology ofWittgensteinianAspects I begin with what I take Wittgenstein to mean by “seeing (perceiving) some- thingassomething”or“seeing(perceiving)anaspect”.Thefirstfewremarksof Section xi of part II of the Investigations are a good place to seek initial orientation: WittgensteinonAspectPerception 3 Twousesoftheword“see”. Theone:“Whatdoyouseethere?”–“Iseethis”(andthenadescription, adrawing,acopy).Theother:“Iseealikenessbetweenthesetwofaces”– wherethemanIsaythistomaybeseeingthefacesasclearlyasIdomyself. The importance of this is the difference in category between the two ‘objects’ofsight. Theonemanmightmakeanaccuratedrawingofthetwofaces,andtheother noticeinthedrawingthelikenesswhichtheformerdidnotsee. Icontemplateaface,andthensuddenlynoticeitslikenesstoanother.Isee that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticinganaspect”(Wittgenstein2009b(hereafter‘PPF’),111–3,transla- tionamended). Thefirstthingtonote,evenbeforewedrawonthebasisoftheseremarksan understanding of what Wittgenstein means by “seeing-as” or by “aspect”, is that he characterizes his subject matter both grammatically – in the Wittgensteinian sense of that term – and phenomenologically. On the one hand,hetalksabouttwousesoftheword“see”,andgivesaninitialandpartial characterizationofthosetwouses.Thisisinlinewithhislaterphilosophical practice. At the root of any number of traditional philosophical difficulties, Wittgenstein identified the tendency to suppose that our words – including philosophically troublesome words such as “see”, “understand”, “know”, “think”,“mean”,“intend”,“pain”,andsoon–‘nameobjects’,or,ascontem- poraryanalyticphilosophersliketosay,‘referto(denote)itemsintheworld’; and accordingly to suppose that the best way to become clear about the meaning of those words, or the concepts they embody, is to identify and study those ‘objects’ directly– that is, not by way of an investigation of the useofthosewords.2WhatWittgensteintriestogetustoseeisthatthemodel, or picture, of ‘object and designation’ (Wittgenstein 2009a (hereafter ‘PI’), 293)ismisguidedandmisleadingwhenitcomestosuchwords,andthatwhat weendupproducing,whenweattempttoelucidatethenatureofthe“objects” towhichtheyaresupposedtorefer,arephilosophicallyconstructedchimeras– ‘structures of air’, as he puts it (PI, 118) – that we erect by the light of questionable or confused theoretical commitments, and on the basis of ‘pic- tures’thatwehaveformedforourselvesofthose“objects”. Wittgenstein’sappealtotheuseofphilosophicallytroublesomewords,orto what he calls their ‘grammar’, is an antidote to the tendencies and the 2 In Baz (2017a), I argue, following Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, against this prevailing conceptionoflanguage,which(Iargue)hasunderwrittenthephilosophical“methodofcases” andhenceasignificantportionoftheworkproducedwithinmainstreamanalyticphilosophyin thepastfiftyyearsorso. 4 ThePhilosophyofLudwigWittgenstein philosophicalidlenessoremptinesstheyleadto.Intheremarksonaspects,he repeatedlyurgeshisreader(orhimself)nottotrytounderstandaspectpercep- tionbywayofintrospectionofwhathappensinortouswhenweseeanaspect (seePPF,241;andWittgenstein1980a(hereafter‘RPPI’),1011).‘Forget’,he urgeshisreader(orhimself),‘forgetthatyouhavetheseexperiencesyourself’ (Wittgenstein1980b(hereafter‘RPPII’,531).‘Don’ttrytoanalyzetheexperi- encewithinyourself’(PPF,188;seealsoPPF,204).‘Thequestion’,hewrites, ‘isnotwhathappenshere[thatis,whensomeonetellsme:“NowIamseeing this point as the apex of the triangle”, AB], but rather: how one may use that statement’(RPPI,315).Wittgensteinreorientshisreader’sattentionawayfrom hisorherownexperienceandtowardtheuseofrelevantwords–here,firstand foremost,thewordswithwhichtheexperienceofnoticinganaspectmayaptly andnaturallybevoiced.Toattainclarityabouttheseeingofaspects–orforthat matteraboutanyother‘conceptofexperience(Erfahrungsbegriff)’(PPF,115)– weneedtodomorethanjustremindourselvesofparticularisolated formsof wordsthatmaybeusedtodescribeorotherwisegivevoicetoourexperience. Weneedalsotoremindourselvesof‘theoccasionandpurpose’ofthesephrases (PPF, 311). ‘It is necessary to get down to the application’ (PPF, 165), to ask oneself ‘What does anyone tell me by saying “Now I see it as ... ”? What consequenceshasthispieceofcommunication?WhatcanIdowithit?’(PPF, 176,translationamended).Inmyexperience,commentatorsonWittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception have tended to lose contact with his subject matter, and to get themselves confused, as a result of failing to heed this Wittgensteiniancallaltogether.Theuseoftherelevantterms,andthelanguage- game(s)withinwhichtheyhavetheirsense,haveoftenbeenneglectedinfavor of theoretical commitments and ambitions, which are often sustained by mis- leadingpictures.3 BeforeofferingagrammaticalcharacterizationofWittgensteinianaspects, ImustnotethatWittgensteinintroducesthenotionof“aspect”bywayofthe experienceofnoticinganaspect,ofsuddenlybeingstruckbyanaspect.Andit might be tempting to suppose, as any number of readers of Wittgenstein’s remarksonaspectshavesupposed,thatWittgensteinianaspectsmayalsobe, and regularly are, perceived continuously, and that Wittgenstein finds the experience of aspect dawning or lighting up interesting, and focuses on it, onlybecauseitbringstolightinadramaticfashiontherealityofcontinuous 3 Thus, for example, Severin Schroeder writes: ‘[W]henever something is seen (and not only lookedatinanelyorabsent-mindedly)someaspectofitmustbenoticed,beitonlycertainshapes orcolours’(2010,366).Buthowexactly,orinwhatsense,isthecolorofanobjectoritsshapean aspect?SurelynotinWittgenstein’ssense.Andwhyareaspects,thusunderstood,philosophically interesting?